While lacking coercive power to compel enforcement, interstate compacts create accountability through multiple sources and layers connecting enforcement behavior to oversight. Using logistic regression, we test a model of accountability and enforcement of unauthorized water usage on the Klamath River. Findings indicate unauthorized water usage is far more likely to be reported and enforced on the Klamath River than on neighboring rivers in the same counties. Conclusions indicate the increased institutional layers of interstate compacts lead to more accountability and stringent enforcement and reporting of unauthorized water use.
Fowler, L.N. & Castellano, I. "Creating Accountability with Interstate Cooperation: Unauthorized Water Use Enforcement on the Klamath River". State and Local Government Review, 49(4), pp. 234-250. Copyright © 2017, SAGE. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications. doi: 10.1177/0160323X17729740
Fowler, Luke and Castellano, Isaac. (2017). "Creating Accountability with Interstate Cooperation: Unauthorized Water Use Enforcement on the Klamath River". State and Local Government Review, 49(4), 234-250. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160323X17729740