Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The first half of this paper argues that if we take non-factualism seriously for any matters, such as morality, then we should take rampant non-factualism seriously. The second half of the paper argues that rampant non-factualism makes possible an attractive theory of vagueness. We can give non-factualist accounts of non-fundamental matters that nicely characterize the vagueness they manifest (if any). I suggest that such non-factualist theories dissolve philosophical puzzlement about vagueness. In particular, the approach implies that philosophers should not try to say which of the sorites-paradox-forming claims are true; we should not try to solve the sorites paradox in that sense.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:
Jackson, A. (2019). Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and Its Treatment of Vagueness. Analytic Philosophy, 60(2), 79-108.
which has been published in final form at doi: 10.1111/phib.12146 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Jackson, Alexander. (2019). "Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and Its Treatment of Vagueness". Analytic Philosophy, 60(2), 79-108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12146
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