Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2018

Abstract

Arguments from “easy knowledge” are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and Crispin Wright (2007). Finally I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge.

Copyright Statement

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at American Philosphical Quarterly, published by University of Illinois Press. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/apq.html

Available for download on Tuesday, October 01, 2019

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