Abstract Title
Experimental Philosophy Survey Research: Everyday External Intuitions of Epistemic Thought Experiments
Additional Funding Sources
This project is supported by a Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship from the University of Idaho.
Abstract
In “Becoming Relevant: A New Pragmatic Defense of the Everyday Theory of Knowledge,” I argue that the correct application of Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Relevance onto traditional epistemic thought experiments shows a lack of knowledge ascription in the implicatures of everyday speakers. Absent implicatures of knowledge, intuitive knowledge denials within traditional epistemic thought experiments are untenable support for Contextualism and against Strict Moderate Invariantism (MI).
However, intuitive knowledge ascriptions and denials from external consideration of traditional epistemic thought experiments maintain legitimacy through genuine implicatures of knowledge or an absence of implicature altogether. In these cases, support stems from intuitions about a thought experiment rather than intuitions within a thought experiment. Buckwalter and May et al. (2010) investigated these intuitions through survey research, finding that respondents tended to ascribe knowledge and maintain the ascription despite raising the stakes within the thought experiment.
This finding is significant because it works alongside my pragmatic account of MI to block the intuitional defense of Contextualism. Successful replication of this experiment and its results would reinforce this notable conclusion. Furthermore, determining the consistency of intuitions across broad demographics would contribute to the ongoing debate in experimental philosophy about the reliability of intuitions as philosophical evidence.
Experimental Philosophy Survey Research: Everyday External Intuitions of Epistemic Thought Experiments
In “Becoming Relevant: A New Pragmatic Defense of the Everyday Theory of Knowledge,” I argue that the correct application of Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Relevance onto traditional epistemic thought experiments shows a lack of knowledge ascription in the implicatures of everyday speakers. Absent implicatures of knowledge, intuitive knowledge denials within traditional epistemic thought experiments are untenable support for Contextualism and against Strict Moderate Invariantism (MI).
However, intuitive knowledge ascriptions and denials from external consideration of traditional epistemic thought experiments maintain legitimacy through genuine implicatures of knowledge or an absence of implicature altogether. In these cases, support stems from intuitions about a thought experiment rather than intuitions within a thought experiment. Buckwalter and May et al. (2010) investigated these intuitions through survey research, finding that respondents tended to ascribe knowledge and maintain the ascription despite raising the stakes within the thought experiment.
This finding is significant because it works alongside my pragmatic account of MI to block the intuitional defense of Contextualism. Successful replication of this experiment and its results would reinforce this notable conclusion. Furthermore, determining the consistency of intuitions across broad demographics would contribute to the ongoing debate in experimental philosophy about the reliability of intuitions as philosophical evidence.
Comments
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