The foundation of post–WWII US foreign policy is the deployment and maintenance of a vast network of overseas military deployments. While the external security implications of these deployments are better known, scholars have spent little time connecting deployments to the internal stability threat of a coup d’état. The deployment of service members overseas creates multiple pathways to decreasing the likelihood of coup attempts by both supporting the government and its security apparatus and decreasing the benefits of a successful attempt by coup d’état conspirators. Our analysis of coups from 1951 to 2019 demonstrates that the presence of US troops decreases the likelihood of a coup.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Foreign Policy Analysis following peer review. The version of record
Allen, M. A., Campbell, T., Hernandez, N., & Shepherd, V. (2023). US Military Deployments and the Risk of Coup d’État*. Foreign Policy Analysis, 19(1), orac027.
is available online at https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac027.
Allen, Michael A.; Campbell, Thomas; Hernandez, Nicolas; and Shepherd, Valeryn. (2023). "US Military Deployments and the Risk of Coup d’État*". Foreign Policy Analysis, 19(1), orac027. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac027
Available for download on Wednesday, January 01, 2025