Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-13-2017

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.32

Abstract

This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.

Comments

Date provided is the online early release publication date.

Copyright Statement

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Episteme, published by Cambridge University Press. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1017/epi.2017.32

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