EVALUATING IMF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: HAS STREAMLINING WORKED TO REDUCE CORRUPTION?

by

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DEDICATION

In dedication to my partner, Sean. His support throughout this endeavor has been as monumental as the task at hand. Facilitating this opportunity to pursue higher education with an unbelievable degree of selflessness, compassion, and unwavering willingness to keep my head up, body fed, and our house clean. Daily acts of love I won’t ever forget.
ABSTRACT

At the turn of the century, while facing significant criticism for the inherent invasiveness of structural conditionality, the frequently high number of conditional requirements attached to loans, and relatively low implementation rates of conditional reforms, the IMF made a series of changes to their conditionality practices to streamline back to their core organizational mission of macroeconomic stability. The IMF defends its continued use of structural conditions with the institutional transparency and accountability that these conditions seek to impose, thereby reducing corruption. IMF structural conditions can however create new opportunities for corrupt linkages to develop and limit the state’s institutional capacity to limit corruption. This study seeks to assess the impact of IMF structural conditionality on corruption within 131 countries between 2000 and 2014. Replicating Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis and King’s 2018 methodology, this study implements these scholars’ maximum likelihood estimation with an instrumented variable approach to isolate those structural conditions imposed through IMF lending arrangements to assess their effects on a specific indicator of governance, corruption. The findings indicate structural conditionality does not significantly reduce corruption; this effect is statistically insignificant and not distinguishable from zero. While no broad conclusions can be reached in the setting of statistical insignificance, the IMF’s contention that structural conditionality uniformly abates corruption across borrowers is called into question.
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<td>BSU</td>
<td>Boise State University</td>
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<td>GC</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has integrated and relied upon conditionality in its lending arrangements and economic support programs to meet institutional and programmatic objectives of correcting macroeconomic imbalances. Conditionality is the imposition of requirements onto the provision of benefits of a contract. The IMF incorporates conditionality onto a borrowing country’s eligibility for lending arrangements and continued financing eligibility. IMF membership and access to lending arrangements are generally conditioned upon a country’s implementation of certain obligatory policy commitments and reforms, addressing both the way a country governs its economic and political institutions and the substance of such governing ordinances (Kentikelenis et al. 2016).

At the turn of the century, the IMF’s use of conditionality was at an all-time high, and structural conditionality, where conditional lending requirements include both specific end goals as well as specific requirements on how to meet those ends, was incredibly prevalent within lending arrangements (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). At the turn of the century, the IMF was facing criticism from academics and world leaders for the inherent invasiveness of structural conditionality and the extensive number of conditional requirements attached to lending agreements, along with relatively low levels of conditional reform implementation. As a result, the IMF made a series of changes to their conditionality practices to streamline their efforts back to their core organizational
mission of macroeconomic stability (Bird and Willett 2004). Beginning in 2000, the IMF altered their conditionality practices in a number of ways.

One shift that accompanied their so-called ‘streamlining’ of conditionality practices was a heightened focus on broadly promoting good governance with their lending requirements. Governance relates broadly to how government functions and is structured, including aspects like the types of regulations or policies a government imposes to oversee and enforce both public and private activities. “Good governance” has become a popular phrase to indicate that governmental institutions are effective, transparent, and law-abiding. As backlash mounted in the late 1990’s, the IMF declared aspects of governance such as the rule of law, public sector efficiency and accountability, and reducing corruption to be essential components for ensuring a framework within which an economy can prosper (IMF 1997; IMF 2020).

To foster good governance within its recipient countries, the IMF utilizes conditionality to mandate governance-related practices, reform existing institutional rules and regulations, and ensure compliance. The IMF defends conditional reforms relating to the governance of its borrowers as inherently relevant to its core organizational scope and mission. The IMF argues that poor governance, generally through avenues of corruption, threatens a borrowing nation's economic stability by interrupting the agreed-upon channels of loan distribution and impeding a borrower’s prospects for loan repayment (IMF 1997). Corruption is widely defined as the misuse of public office for private gain (World Bank 2020). To date, research has not empirically confirmed structural conditionality’s positive effects on governance. Additionally, there is empirical evidence that corruption increased after IMF mandated privatization, a common form of structural
conditionality (Manzetti & Blake 1996; Wedel 2001; Stone 2002; Mwenda & Tangri 2005; Painter 2005; Hamm, King & Stuckler 2012; Reinsberg et al. 2020). However, corruption is found to have serious negative implications economically, as well as socially and politically. Corruption hinders economic growth and development, interrupts the provision of public services, reduces the degree to which citizens can and will hold government officials accountable, and is even found to increase environmental pollution (Mauro 1995; Welsch 2004; Persson & Rothstein 2015).

This study assesses whether the IMF’s emphasis on good governance through streamlining conditionality practices since the turn of the century has improved governance within a borrowing country. Since the IMF streamlined their conditionality practices beginning in 2000, governance issues such as corruption as well as the rule of law, accountability, transparency, and institutional efficacy determine the content and scope of conditionality requirements for IMF lending arrangements. Because good governance encompasses a wide variety of governmental practices and functions, I utilize corruption as the outcome variable to better specify the impacts IMF conditionality has on governance across multiple arenas.

This study assesses the impact IMF structural conditions have on member states’ levels of corruption. Two competing hypotheses are at question: Has the IMF’s emphasis on good governance in their conditionality instruments at the turn of the century specifically reduced corruption? Or, has the IMF’s streamlining failed to interrupt the previously observed relationship between the presence of structural conditionality and the marked increase in corruption?
Drawing upon Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis and King’s 2018 novel research design, including their collected data on IMF conditionality lending, this study assesses 131 countries across the globe between 2000 and 2014. This analysis is a partial replication of their published work “How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality: an extension of quantitative approaches and an empirical application to public education spending” (Stubbs et al 2018). Unlike Stubbs et al.’s published application of their quantitative method which evaluates IMF conditionality’s impact on a borrowing country’s level of public education spending, my analysis introduces a new dependent variable: corruption. The dependent variable data is derived from V-dem’s political corruption index. Additionally, instead of assessing all binding conditions as the Stubbs et al. do in their published analysis, my contribution to the body of literature reduces the scope of inquiry to only the category of structural conditions from the point at which the IMF revised and streamlined their conditional practices at the turn of the century.

The quantitative analysis of Stubbs et al., a maximum likelihood estimation, offers a groundbreaking methodology to analyze IMF conditionality while accounting for the endogeneity of such questions. The ability to account for endogeneity is essential where the variable of interest is IMF conditionality. Participation in an IMF lending program, and the circumstances that often precede membership, such as economic crisis, create a unique host of conditions that will determine outcomes at some level. When evaluating the impact that the IMF has on an outcome—here, the conditions attached to a loan—it is important to be able to separate the endogenous effects yielded by a country’s need for participation in an IMF program from the effects caused by the substantive reforms and regulations imparted through IMF membership.
The results of maximum likelihood estimator regression models analyzing the impact of binding structural condition on corruption reveal no significant relationship between the independent and dependent variable. The impact IMF structural conditions have on corruption is directionally negative, indicating a reduction to corruption, but the results are neither statistically significant nor distinguishable from zero. Therefore, this analysis does not indicate any broad conclusion can be made on the effect IMF structural conditionality has upon corruption and the IMF’s efforts at the turn of the century to streamline the practice of affected governance in borrowing countries.

This thesis is structured as follows: The first section reflects on the history and purpose of IMF conditionality, along with the critique and controversy that motivated the IMF’s eventual overhaul and streamlining of the practice in 2000. Section two sets forth the theoretical arguments for the positive and negative impacts of structural conditionality on corruption. Section three describes the methodological strategy and the data utilized for this analysis. Section four illustrates the results of the empirical analysis. The final section offers a concluding reflection on the impact IMF-imposed structural conditionality has upon good governance.
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF IMF LENDING

The core and stated purpose of the IMF’s use of conditionality in lending arrangements is to reduce inefficient policies domestically so that the borrowing country can resolve balance of payment issues in the short run and improve economic production in the long run (IMF 1997; IMF 2021; Nelson and Wallace 2016). IMF loans infuse financial assistance into a country experiencing an economic crisis to support that country to meet financial obligations. By keeping a country solvent, the IMF loan alleges to help maintain the borrowing country’s currency exchange rate and allow them to bail out their suffering or nearly insolvent financial institutions, preventing a full-fledged economic crash (Nelson and Wallace 2016). However, to be eligible for such assistance, the IMF requires many policy commitments and reforms to a borrowing country’s government and economy.

The IMF imposes two types of conditionality instruments upon their borrowers; quantitative and structural (Stubbs et al. 2020; IMF 2015). Quantitative conditions are the most common conditionality instruments imposed by the IMF. The IMF requires specific macroeconomic targets before loan disbursement to be met over the life of the lending arrangement. Quantitative conditions generally regulate a borrower’s fiscal policy; these conditions often integrate reforms or regulations relating to international reserves, fiscal balances, or external borrowing limits (Stubbs et al. 2020). Quantitative conditions include actions such as instituting a ceiling on how much a government can borrow or establishing a minimum level for a federal government’s primary balance (IMF 2015).
Quantitative conditions direct a country to meet a certain macroeconomic target but do not specify how a country should achieve the goal set through the IMF program.

Structural conditions, by contrast, put forth specific policy requirements to achieve the macroeconomic and governance related targets required through the lending arrangement. Structural conditions, also known as political conditionality, seek to change a country’s political, economic, and social architecture (Babb and Carruthers 2008). These conditions require specific reforms relating to economic and political rules and regulations and the foundational structures of governmental institutions themselves. IMF structural conditions commonly privatize state-owned enterprises, impose regulations ensuring the independence of financial institutions, deregulate labor markets, and restructure tax policies or exchange rate systems to ensure modern market economy features (Goldstein 2000; Kentikelenis et al. 2016; Stubbs et al. 2020).

Structural conditionality has been a fixture of IMF lending for decades. In the early years of the IMF, conditionality followed in the footsteps of private creditor lending agreements, with primarily quantitative conditions being imposed around the structure of loan repayment (Babb and Carruthers 2008). While implementing these quantitative conditions is still essential to IMF lending, the growing use of structural conditionality has been criticized by leading scholars, world leaders and civil societies across the globe. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that international lending institutions, including the IMF, began imposing more structural conditions onto lending assistance eligibility (Robinson 1993; Babb and Carruthers 2008; Brown 2009; Hackenesch 2019). This shift from primarily quantitative conditions to structural ones has been attributed to the end of the Cold War and the “third wave of democratization” when democracy promotion
became a key focus of foreign policy focus for many Western powers (Babb and Carruthers 2008; Brown 2009; Hackenesch 2019). This shift is also ascribed to the introduction of and movement towards “Washington Consensus” economic policies, which prescribed broad and rapid economic growth across all economic sectors in impoverished countries to improve development therein (Pender 2001).

The IMF has supported the economic tenants of the Washington Consensus, and its structural adjustment programs have often imported this ideology with conditionality aimed at decentralizing state-run industries, reducing central government spending through social service reductions, and liberalizing and opening trade and other economic markets (Brown 2009; Pender 2001). Structural conditionality also extends outside of financial and economic arenas with policy requirements to increase governmental transparency, accountability, and even efficiency. While structural conditionality is not overtly political in the sense that it specifically requires regime transition to democracy or democratic practices to be eligible for lending arrangements, the IMF has increasingly promoted the concept of ‘good governance’ and has utilized conditionality to incorporate or facilitate governmental transparency and accountability. Furthermore, theory suggests structural conditions aimed at macroeconomic stability and economic development encourage democratic development, a key goal of Western powers during the third wave (Brown 2009). Structural conditions present uniquely capable mechanisms to infuse the strategic interests of the Western World without prescribing democracy outright. Scholars who evaluate IMF conditionality find that the behavior and decision making of the IMF, and subsequently the conditions they impose through their loans, are primarily reflective
of its institutional interests, along with those of their major shareholders and staff (Drazen 2002; Dreher et al. 2015; Lang 2020; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000).

**Critique & Controversy of IMF Conditionality**

During the broad expansion of structural conditionality of 1980s and 1990s, the IMF’s overall program implementation was low, with very few of the conditions attached to loans being successfully implemented (Bird & Willett 2004). By the turn of the century, demand for IMF funding was significantly decreasing and the institution was facing widespread backlash from civil society groups and academia across the globe surrounding its practices and institutional ethics (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). Discontent was specifically increasing around the IMF’s practice of conditionality and the value it was bringing to borrowing countries. Critics argue that the conditions themselves are dictated with very little, if any, input from the portions of society ultimately bearing the greatest burden of restructuring (Nelson and Wallace 2016). IMF lending arrangements are typically discussed in private sessions between IMF staff and a borrowing country’s economic policymakers, leaving legislators, civil society, and citizens out of the decision-making process entirely.

Additionally, the ‘Washington Consensus’ theory and policies informing IMF conditional structural adjustment were heavily criticized during this era (Kentikelenis et al. 2016; Nelson and Wallace 2016). According to these critiques, the IMF severely limits a recipient country’s discretion to determine its macroeconomic policies by requiring certain pathways to economic development. Frequently these pathways include spending cuts to social services and trade liberalization, which critics argue places the burden of economic reform and adjustment back onto a citizenry already plagued by the economic
instability that brought them to the IMF in the first place, and further reduces the capacity of a government to mitigate those burdens (Nelson and Wallace 2016). Under these circumstances, social discontent can swell, increasing a country’s risk for destabilization (Hartzell et al. 2010). Marginalized, economically constrained, and unrepresented societal groups and citizens may resort to violence against the state, or alternative measures for survival, such as engaging in corrupt or illegal behaviors (Hartzell et al. 2010; Nelson and Wallace 2016).

The extent of conditions imposed during the era of structural conditionality’s expansion and an overall lack of participation by a borrowing country’s government and civil society fueled widespread criticisms that the IMF imposed upon national sovereignty and impeded governmental development (Drazen 2002; Babb and Carruthers 2008; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000). To further discredit poor implementation and success rates of IMF programs, dissenters raised the complaint of lack of ownership, citing that the recipient country seldom had equal say and stake in the requisite economic policies (Bird & Willett 2004).

The expansion of structural conditionality into multiple policy arenas, including labor markets, social welfare, and good governance, is critiqued widely by scholars as mission creep (Robinson 1993; Babb and Buira 2005; Babb and Carrurthers 2008; Brown 2009; Breen 2013). The IMF founding Articles of Agreement set forth six main purposes: (1) promoting international monetary cooperation, (2) facilitating expansion and balanced growth of international trade, (3) promoting exchange stability, (4) assisting in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments and eliminating foreign exchange restrictions, (5) assisting members through Fund resources, and (6) shortening the
duration and lessening the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members (IMF 2020). Conditionality, both quantitative and structural, have extended far beyond the scope of macroeconomic stability and development originally put forth as the stated mission of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. (Babb and Buira 2005; Breen 2013; Kentikelenis et al 2016).

While criticism of the IMF and its use of conditionality had percolated for years prior, the organization's involvement in the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s cultivated such widespread backlash the Fund was forced to reevaluate its organizational practices and mission (Breen 2013; Feldstein 1998; Katz 1999). Leading up to the collapse in the 1990s, many East Asian countries, notably the East Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand), were experiencing miraculous industrialization, economic development, and growth (Breen 2013; Katz 1999). Notably, the Asian Crisis and collapse did not mirror prior financial crises like those in Africa and Central and Latin America, where excessive government spending led to price inflation, account imbalances, and overvalued currencies (Katz 1999). By stark contrast, East Asian countries were operating on government budget surpluses, modest inflation, and positive account balances (Katz 1999). However, in the mid-1990s, the IMF, along with its key shareholders like the United States and Japan began urging East Asian countries to liberalize capital accounts to promote short and medium-term capital transfers (Katz 1999). This freeing up of the amount of capital that could move in and out of a country opened up the flood gates for irresponsible and excessive borrowing. Foreign banks began borrowing excessively within Asian markets and domestic borrowers, from city banks to run of the mill investors, were able to borrow foreign capital cheaply and readily
(Katz 1999). With very little transparency or regulatory monitoring, both the amount of capital flow and how much overseas borrowing was occurring became difficult to trace, and it became impossible for Asian governments to prevent or curb the overwhelming capital inflows. The collapse was swift as unprepared and inexperienced Asian financial institutions could not maintain order. By 1996, with banks unable to control monetary aggregates, keep real interest rates low, or stabilize inflation, borrower’s confidence quickly fell, and a widespread and unstoppable withdrawal of the enormous amount of capital occurred, throwing the entire region into economic crisis. The IMF’s role in pressuring Asian countries to liberalize their capital accounts—wherein a massive influx of capital was funneled into institutionally ill-equipped countries, resulting in a devastating regional crisis—served as confirmation of the widespread suspicion that the IMF was acting far beyond their intended mission and scope (Breen 2013; Katz 1999).

**An Overhaul to Conditionality**

The IMF’s involvement in the Asian collapse forced the institution to reevaluate the scope and efficacy of its involvement in domestic borrowers’ affairs and ultimately motivated the institution to refocus its mission back upon its core purpose of economic stability (Bird & Willett 2004; Kentikelenis et al. 2016). In the early 2000s, the IMF’s use of conditionality in lending arrangements had become excessive and indicated its desire to streamline conditionality and reform programs to emphasize national ownership (IMF 2001; IMF 2004; Kentikelenis et al. 2016).

The IMF committed to allowing borrowing governments greater discretion in policy reforms and agreeing to facilitate greater ownership, as long as a borrowing government met certain qualifying standards (IMF 2001; IMF 2004). Operationally, the
IMF defined ownership as a “willing assumption of responsibility to formulate and carry out [these] policies based on the understanding that the programme is achievable and in the country’s best interests” (Bird & Willett 2004, 434). The IMF additionally put forth new design principles for conditionality to better tailor policy reforms to a country’s specific circumstances and implement greater coordination between international organizations to ensure program design has adequate ownership (IMF 2001; IMF 2004). The IMF set out to streamline conditionality practices to improve rates of program implementation. The redesigning of their conditional lending was meant to combat the widespread criticism of the IMF’s imposition on national sovereignty as much as it was to achieve programmatic success (Bird & Willett 2004).

Another piece of the IMF’s efforts to streamline conditionality and introduce greater ownership was reevaluating the policy prescriptions imposed through conditional lending programs (IMF 2001). This effort specifically addressed the expansion of structural conditionality into policy arenas outside macroeconomic development and stability, including policy requirements around fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, and reductions to public sector funding. The IMF also redesigned conditionality practices at the turn of the century with changes to its policy prescriptions through conditional lending programs. Conditional lending through the 1980s and 1990s had become overtly structural, with fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, and massive cuts to public sector institutions requirements in many of the IMF’s binding conditions (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). The IMF announced its commitment to limit its use of structural conditions only to those lending arrangements where a country had a high degree of national ownership
for structural changes, and only where the end goal of the structural condition was to improve the governance of the borrowing country’s regime and institutions (IMF 2001).
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The IMF has two key objectives with the use of conditionality: (1) to improve a borrowing country’s capability to pay back the IMF loan it receives and (2) to foster a borrowing country’s economic stability to prevent any further economic downturns (Bird & Willett 2004). In order to achieve these objectives, they have prioritized the concept of good governance, implemented through conditionality instruments, as a necessary feature of lending programs to support economic rehabilitation and stability (Bird & Willett 2004; IMF 2020).

The term ‘governance’ encompasses how a country governs its regulatory institutions and economy as well as its commitment to rule of law, institutional transparency, and accountability (IMF 2020). The IMF’s position is the governance of a borrowing nation has a direct impact on both its prospects for loan repayment and prospects for achieving economic stability. Poor governance threatens regime stability, functionality and efficacy; it also increases the incentives and opportunities for corruption. Corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain, poses an enormous institutional risk to the IMF, as the monetary infusion of their funds into corrupt governments are highly likely to be mismanaged or misappropriated through corruption linkages.

There are a host of economic concerns and consequences associated with corruption. It reduces the rate of economic growth and the investment rates (Mauro 1995; De Beke 2002). Additionally, governmental sectors that are more easily corruptible, such
as public investment programs or military sectors, see increased spending where sectors like education and health are reduced as these institutions don’t lend themselves as easily to the development of corrupt linkages (De Beke 2002; Linares 2005). Corruption can also limit the tax revenue a country receives, impeding a government’s capacity to effectively govern as well as increasing the income inequality of society (De Beke 2002).

Ultimately, poor governance facilitates opportunities for corruption which in turn threatens economic development, distorts competition, reduces market integrity and further harms the society’s trust in its government (IMF 2020). Here, the IMF suggests that by implementing structural conditions around institutional transparency and accountability as well as those which restructure and regulate a state’s economic structures, the IMF can stabilize economies, improve prospects for loan repayment, and combat this key challenge limiting their core mission and purpose: corruption.

Therefore, the IMF incorporates an agenda of good governance into their lending programs through structural conditionality instruments. The IMF maintains the use of structural conditions, which impose a series of policy and institutional framework changes, promote good governance, and combat corruption (IMF 2020). Through structural conditionality, technical assistance and surveillance, the IMF encourages good governance with policies aimed at improving governmental transparency and accountability and the restructuring and reform of both public and private sector institutions. These structural conditions include requirements such as “strengthening public expenditure controls; publishing audited accounts of government agencies, central banks and state enterprises; making revenue administration less discretionary; enhancing bank supervision; reforming regulatory frameworks to reduce the scope for bribes;
strengthening anti-money laundering measures; and fortifying anti-corruption legal frameworks such as asset declaration requirements for senior government officials” (IMF 2020).

Structural conditions are primarily concerned with improving transparency within governmental institutions, regulatory bodies, and a country’s political elite. Transparency is considered an important instrument to reduce political corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Lindstedt & Naurin 2010; Kolstad & Wiig 2009). Empirically, high levels of transparency in the press and media are found to have a robust relationship to low levels of corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Suphachalasai 2005). Theoretically, improving access to and sharing information can improve corruption detection (Kolstad & Wiig 2009). For government officials who might profit from corrupt behavior such as bribery, transparent structures around positions, roles, and compensation can make it more difficult to engage discreetly in corrupt behavior and increases the probability of being caught (Kolstad & Wiig 2009). Transparency can also facilitate the selection and retention of highly competent and honest government officials. Improved pathways to information incentivize integrity of elected officials and motivate these types of individuals to compete for and hold public positions (Kolstad & Wiig 2009).

However necessary transparency may be to reduce political corruption, the true degree of its efficacy has been increasingly questioned. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) find that this well-established link between transparency and corruption often fails to account for two essential conditions: publicity and accountability. For transparency to reduce political corruption, what they call the publicity conditions mandate that “information made available through transparency reforms must stand a reasonable chance of actually
reaching and being received by the public” (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, 302). Their accountability condition further suggests that the general public must have access to an effective sanctioning mechanism to interrupt corrupt political behavior (Ibid). In resource-rich countries, the efficacy of transparency on corruption reduction can hinge on levels of education (Svensson 2005; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005), economic diversity (Auty 2001; Woolcock, Pritchett, & Isham 2001), and levels of democracy (Ross 2001; Aslaksen 2007).

The IMF specifically defends the importance of structural conditionality as a necessary practice to improve good governance. Yet, the literature on the subject illustrates two pathways through which IMF conditionality might foster corruption. Foreign aid literature analyzing government-to-government foreign economic assistance indicates that IMF lending might perpetuate corruption when certain pre-existing factors are present in a borrowing country. Factors that can foster corruption include a high concentration of bureaucratic power (Leite and Weidmann 1999), a large role of the state in the economy (Tanzi 1994), and economies with influential interest groups in the setting of weak regulatory institutions (Tornell 1996). Here, IMF conditions which seek to increase government oversight might ostensibly rely on pre-existing corrupt linkages to accomplish such conditional reforms.

Additionally, how financial lending institutions disperse foreign aid can perpetuate corruption. IMF lending disbursement is generally highly centralized to government recipients. In institutional settings where corruption already flourishes, the ‘voracity effect’ might occur, where a windfall of aid can worsen corruption by creating further conflict amongst corrupt political elite, special interest groups or bureaucratic
factions to expand their corrupt redistribution channels with the incoming funds (Alesina and Weder 1999). Instead of genuine reform, the influx of capital in tandem with the conditional restructuring that relies upon existing institutions or elite groups could further entrench and strengthen corrupt linkages.

Existing empirical analysis on structural conditionality and corruption specifically also does not confirm the IMF’s argument that these instruments have important corruption-impeding effects. This is particularly salient within the body of existing research on market liberalizing restructuring. The IMF herald’s privatization of state-owned industries as an important achievement for abating corruption. However, analysis on Latin American, sub-Saharan African, East Asian, and post-Soviet transition countries indicate corruption is amplified following privatization mandates by the IMF (Manzetti & Blake 1996; Wedel 2001; Stone 2002; Mwenda & Tangri 2005; Painter 2005; Hamm et al. 2012). IMF structural conditionality privatizing state-owned enterprises is found to reduce a borrowing country’s control on corruption and increase its prevalence (Reinsberg et al. 2020). Furthermore, the context of economic crisis presents an important factor when examining the impact of structural conditions on corruption. Integrating market reforms like privatization and deregulation doesn’t necessarily eliminate the opportunity for corrupt transactions to occur. Instead, old norms of corruption like the sale of public contracts are often replaced with new ones, such as the sale of inside information as to the nature of impending reforms (Manzetti & Blake 1996). Existing avenues of corruption might be interrupted with the imposition of structural conditions, but additional opportunities are quickly realized and the motivation for utilizing public resources for private gain is not sufficiently addressed.
Much of the literature assessing structural conditionality’s impact on good governance outcomes takes a qualitative approach, with a regional (Manzetti & Blake 1996; Wedel 2001; Stone 2002) or single case study analysis (Mwenda & Tangri 2005; Linares 2005). Linares argues the IMF has historically taken too soft a stance on corruption abatement in its lending arrangements with his case study of the IMF’s involvement in Argentina from 1990 leading up to their financial crisis in 2000. He showcases that not only did the conditional reforms the IMF subjected Argentina to do little to correct the economic imbalances, there was an overt failure to combat the widespread national corruption allowing the influx of monetary assistance from the IMF to be largely misappropriated to the personal coffers of Argentinian politicians and officials (Linares 2005).

The body of literature assessing the impact IMF conditions have on corruption also commonly limits the scope of their analysis to one type of structural condition, such as the privatization of state-owned industries. The Reinsberg et al. 2020 piece, “Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world,” which quantitatively assesses the impact of one type of structural condition (privatization of state-owned industries), challenges the IMF’s assertion that structural conditions uniformly abate corruption, but does not assess the full scope of structural conditions. In Manzetti and Blake’s qualitative analysis of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, privatization and market deregulation were assessed to reveal that such structural conditions will not reduce corruption unless they are put forth in a context of transparency.
Additionally, this study benefits from methodological improvements when testing the impacts of structural conditionality on an outcome quantitatively. A common quantitative method for analyzing the effects of IMF involvement is a matching methods approach where observations are paired by diverging IMF participation status. While widely used for evaluating the impact of participation in IMF programs and commonly employing a nearest neighbor design (Atoyan and Conway 2006; Hardoy 2003; Nelson and Wallace 2016), this approach is unable to separate the effects from participation from the effects of involvement with specific aspects of the program, such as structural conditionality. Nelson and Wallace for instance, implement a genetic matching algorithm to test the impact of IMF participation on democracy levels, finding a small yet positive effect. While participation in IMF programs involves conditionality, and broad inferences could be drawn that these programs and the conditions imposed improve democracy levels, this approach suffers methodologically from its inability to separate the endogenous impact of IMF participation from the endogenous impacts derived from the specific imposition of structural conditionality upon participating national economies.

Importantly, the circumstances motivating participation are entirely different than the circumstances motivating the number and type of conditions imposed through an IMF lending arrangement. There is consensus in the literature that countries select into IMF participation broadly as a result of impending or occurring economic crisis (Caraway et al. 2012; Rickard and Caraway 2014; Vreeland 2006). However, whether countries select into conditionality (Caraway et al 2012; Rickard and Caraway 2014; Vreeland) or if conditions are imposed upon unwilling borrowing countries (Simmons et al 2008; Stiglitz 2002) is still a feature of debate. Scholars agree that the number of conditions is
determined by both domestic political factors as well as international strategic factors (Caraway et al. 2012; Dreher et al. 2009; Stone 2008). Ultimately, the circumstances constituting IMF participation and IMF conditionality are entirely different and in order to evaluate questions pertaining to IMF conditionality, simply analyzing IMF participation will not suffice.

The present study seeks to assess the impact of IMF structural conditions on corruption in recipient nations of their lending arrangements. The IMF purports structural conditions reduce corruption while the literature on the impact of structural conditionality broadly suggests it increases corruption through the mechanisms described above. The body of literature lacks an effective quantitative macro-level assessment of the impact that all structural conditions have on good governance. Additionally, much of the literature critiques the IMF’s failure to implement transparency and accountability mechanisms to combat corruption utilizing pre-2000’s era data. This study accounts for those alleged changes by evaluating data after the IMF’s streamlining changes to the scope and content of structural conditions. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature and evaluate which theoretical argument has merit. Has the IMF’s emphasis on good governance in their conditionality instruments at the turn of the century specifically reduced corruption? Or has the IMF’s streamlining failed to interrupt the previously observed relationship between the presence of structural conditionality and the marked increase in corruption?
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

This study investigates the effects of IMF structural conditionality on corruption for 131 countries between 2000 and 2014 and benefits greatly from the recent scholarly work by Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis, and King (2018). The scholars created a groundbreaking statistical approach and novel dataset that meticulously coded IMF lending arrangement data. I draw upon this dataset to isolate structural and binding conditions from non-binding, quantitative conditions. Upon this data set I perform a maximum likelihood estimation analysis, which accounts for the IMF’s recent overhaul to their structural conditionality practices beginning in the year 2000 by assessing only 21st century data.

Utilizing Stubbs et al.’s conditionality dataset and methodology, I measure the effect of IMF structural conditionality on political corruption. The authors published an application of their method weighing the impact of IMF quantitative and structural conditions on the government public education spending in a borrowing nation between 1990 and 2014. They found that exposure to an additional IMF condition results in a 0.05 percentage point decline in public education spending. This study uses the same models and data published by Stubbs et al. to test a different question of IMF conditionality: what is the impact of IMF structural conditionality on corruption for IMF member states since the revision of conditionality practices, from 2000 through 2014?

I use V-Dem’s measure of corruption for the dependent variable. V-Dem’s variable combines data across six different forms of corruption, including executive,
legislative, judiciary, and public bureaucracy giving a comprehensive indicator of how pervasive corruption is during a given year. The corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt across an interval of 0 to 1. This index aggregates average corruption scores across V-Dem’s public sector corruption, executive corruption indexes as well as the scores of legislative and judicial corruption, weighting each equally to produce the end corruption score. The IMF’s objective with structural conditionality is to institute transparency and accountability across the variety of institutions where public officials operate, hence the aggregated corruption variable. Disaggregating this variable across the corruption indices and scores could offer future research a more refined understanding of the impacts of structural conditionality.

Utilizing V-dem’s data, collected through expert surveys, will have implications upon the results of this paper given the measurement of corruption stems from how much or little it is perceived. Relying upon a body of experts’ understanding of the extent to which corruption prevails within a borrowing country’s institutions presents two potential pitfalls which are important to set forth at the outset of this analysis. First, corruption is inherently dynamic and difficult to trace; the occurrence or entrenchment of corrupt linkages might be outside of the vantage point of those enlisted to answer V-Dem’s questionnaire. Second, as with any survey methodology, the data collection is limited to those self-selecting into the respondent pool, resulting in an inherent respondent bias. Therefore, the level of corruption, or changes across this analysis may be under-reported in this analysis. Additionally, utilizing this measure additionally presents the risk that the data itself is inherently skewed towards the biases of the respondent pool.
The IMF conditionality variables are derived from the original dataset published by Kentikelenis et al. in 2016, which coded agreements between the IMF and borrowers. Notably, Stubbs et al., following established practice in the field (Copelovitch 2010a; Rickard and Caraway 2014; Stubbs et al. 2017; Woo 2013) only utilize binding conditions, otherwise known as prior actions or performance criteria, in the count. Considering only binding conditions allows the analysis to focus only on those conditions that have some tangible impact and are required for disbursement eligibility either before or during the lending arrangement. Their dataset includes a binary IMF participation variable measuring whether a country was a recipient of an IMF lending arrangement for at least five months of the calendar year (Stubbs et al. 2018).

There is a substantial body of research assessing the long-term determinants of political corruption such as colonial history, latitude, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, predominate religion, as well as the political system features like federalism and proportional representation (La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000; Reinsberg et al. 2018). Such determinants are time-invariant, and following Reinsberg et al.’s justification, this analysis includes a series of controls that offer time-varying correlates for the control of corruption. The natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included to control the level of development, indicating the overall efficiency of institutions (Stubbs and Kentikelenis 2018; Reinsberg et al. 2018). The level of trade openness, as a percentage of GDP, is included to account for the expected reduction to corruption because it can lead to increased competitiveness (Krueger 1974). These variables are lagged one year to mirror the budget cycle (Stubbs et al. 2018).
Political factors are also known to impact corruption levels. I use Freedom House data on regime type to account for this political implication on corruption. Specifically, democratic regimes are more capable of combatting corruption than transitional and authoritarian regimes given the presence of institutional transparency, which increases opportunities to expose corrupt linkages and reduces or eliminates incentive structures around corrupt activity (Montinola & Jackman 2002; Larrain & Tavares 2004).

Three variables meant to capture the existing opportunity for rent-seeking are included. I include the degree of urbanization to control for urban areas increasing the opportunity for corruption simply due to closer proximity between bribe-takers and bribe givers (Billger & Goel 2009). I additionally address the theoretical “resource curse” which supposes the reliance on oil or other natural resources increases a country’s vulnerability to corruption by including the natural logarithm of oil production per capita and mineral rents measured as a percentage of GDP (Ross 2001).

Table 1 summarizes the statistics associated with the independent, dependent and control variables of this study.
Table 1  Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>4,260</td>
<td>.5096853</td>
<td>.3003564</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.181212</td>
<td>3.902319</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per capita</td>
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<td>8.093943</td>
<td>1.634626</td>
<td>4.242465</td>
<td>11.97416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.315376</td>
<td>3.258932</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (lagged)</td>
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<td>86.70073</td>
<td>52.18038</td>
<td>.0209992</td>
<td>531.7374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
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<td>55.27063</td>
<td>24.70295</td>
<td>5.342</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Rents (% of GDP)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>.7023107</td>
<td>2.349428</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31.59379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Rents (% of GDP)</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>4.042652</td>
<td>9.9344818</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66.71276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drawing upon Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis, and King’s (2018) groundbreaking methodological work specifically isolating and assessing the impact of IMF conditionality, this study utilizes their double instrumental maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) integrating three simultaneous equations. Broadly, the objective of Stubbs et al.’s methodology is to separate endogenous effects that come with the choice and/or need to participate in an IMF program from the endogenous effects of the conditioned IMF policies to assess their effects on an outcome variable independently. They achieve their MLE through three simultaneous equations, which combine an instrumental variable approach. Their methodology allows for IMF conditionality to be assessed either by accounting for the total number of conditions, which acts as a proxy for the overall burden of the conditionality. Conveniently, their published data includes a separate count of the imposed structural conditions, which is the focus of this study given
the IMF’s streamlining efforts at the turn of century to revise practices around structural conditionality only.

A comprehensive explanation of this methodology is detailed at length in their published work, and their appendices made available online. However, I will briefly highlight two important aspects of their methodological choices that allow this quantitative analysis to assess the impact of structural conditionality on corruption accurately. The first is that they identify a suitable instrument for their instrumental variable approach and test its performance using Monte Carlo simulations. They propose IMFBUDG, a novel instrument for IMF conditionality, an interaction variable between the average number of conditions a country receives within an IMF program and the year-on-year IMF budget constraint. They find that variances in the IMF’s budget constraints will not affect any outcome of interest. They measure budget constraints using the natural log of the IMF’s liquidity ratio as a proxy and find their instrument fulfills the exclusion criterion.

Figure one demonstrates the excludability of IMF budget constraint on outcomes of corruption when testing the impact of structural conditionality. This figure compares trending behavior across countries with high versus low exposure to the average number of structural conditions imposed by the IMF across this timeframe. Stubbs et al. produce this same figure with their independent variable of binding IMF conditions in the left panel and their outcome variable of government education spending as a share of GDP for the right panel. Figure 1 here replicates this analysis utilizing only the mean number of structural conditions for the left panel and the outcome variable of this study, corruption. In accordance with the findings from the original published work, Figure one
illustrates a qualitatively similar trend pattern across the groupings, with those countries with higher exposure to structural conditionality experiencing a higher number of conditions and a higher level of corruption.

Figure 1  Parallel trends in IMF conditionality compound instrument

Figure 2 illustrates the temporal evolution of the IMF’s liquidity ratio from 2000-2014. Importantly, and in keeping with the author’s findings for their quantitative application, the trend pattern for the instrument across this timeframe is not similar to that observed between the IMF liquidity ratio and the mean number of structural conditions or between the IMF liquidity ratio and corruption. As such, these figures illustrate there is no apparent violation of the design assumptions of this approach and demonstrate the validity of IMF budget constraint as an instrument in this analysis.
The second important aspect of their double-instrumental variable maximum
likelihood estimator is the accounting for endogeneity pertaining to IMF participation and
conditionality while allowing researchers to estimate both equations’ covariants jointly.
Simply put, the MLE model uses three equations: the first equation obtains the predicted
values for IMF participation for a given country and year, the second equation obtains the
predicted values for IMF conditionality for a given country and year. Equation three takes
the fitted values derived from equations one and two along with the excludable
instrument, a set of country dummies and a set of year dummies to identify an outcome of
interest. Models one and two derive a list of covariant that, using an MLE in equation
three, are jointly estimated to produce an outcome of interest. While the equations for
IMF participation and IMF conditionality are linear, this method offers more flexibility as
it can accommodate non-linearity if needed, unlike a probit model.
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS

Table 2 presents the results of the quantitative analyses testing IMF structural conditionality’s impact on corruption. Model 1 runs a simple OLS estimation, including only the control variables to ensure model specification. These results maintain the expected effect established by prior studies on political corruption except oil and mineral rents: positive for urbanization and negative for GDP per capita, democracy, and trade. Only democracy and urbanization are statistically significant. Model 2 runs the same OLS estimation adding in the IMF condition and participation variables without correcting for endogeneity. The results for the control variables remain substantially unchanged and the IMF variables are statistically insignificant.
Table 2  Effect of IMF Structural Conditionality on Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Specification</th>
<th>1. Controls Only</th>
<th>2. All conditions &amp; controls</th>
<th>3. All conditions &amp; exogenous controls</th>
<th>4. All conditions &amp; controls</th>
<th>5. All conditions &amp; exogenous controls</th>
<th>6. All conditions and controls</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Identification Strategy</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Conditionality IV, Participation IV</td>
<td>Conditionality IV, Participation IV</td>
<td>Conditionality IV, Participation CFA</td>
<td>Conditionality IV, Participation CFA</td>
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<td>-0.0618</td>
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<td>-0.0155</td>
<td>-0.0581</td>
<td>-0.0627</td>
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<td>[0.0466]</td>
<td>[0.0472]</td>
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<td>[0.0325]</td>
<td>[0.0455]</td>
<td>[0.0451]</td>
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<td>Urbanization</td>
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<td>0.0035*</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>0.0033*</td>
<td>0.0036*</td>
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<td>-0.0171**</td>
<td>-0.0206**</td>
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<td>-0.0173**</td>
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<td>[0.0082]</td>
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<td>[0.0082]</td>
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<td>[0.0078]</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mineral Rents (% of GDP)</td>
<td>Oil Rents (% of GDP)</td>
<td>IMF Participation (lagged)</td>
<td>IMF Binding Structural Conditions (lagged)</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>1.2463***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.0008]</td>
<td>[0.0008]</td>
<td>[0.0012]</td>
<td>[0.0011]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.0005</td>
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<td>[0.0005]</td>
<td>[0.0006]</td>
<td>[0.2470]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IMF Participation</td>
<td>0.0602</td>
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<td>-0.0038</td>
<td>0.9654***</td>
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<td>[0.0457]</td>
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<td>IMF Binding Structural</td>
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<td>0.9688***</td>
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<td>Conditions (lagged)</td>
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<td>[0.0012]</td>
<td>[0.2617]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>[0.007]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.9654***</td>
<td>0.9688***</td>
<td>1.2033***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>[0.2617]</td>
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<td>[0.2340]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
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<td>1726</td>
<td>1726</td>
<td>1726</td>
<td>1726</td>
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<td>Number of Countries</td>
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<td>131</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>131</td>
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<td>F-Statistic for Conditionality Instrument</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>74.50</td>
<td>78.98</td>
<td>39.34</td>
<td>43.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-Statistic for Participation Instrument</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>11.28</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint F-statistic</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>74.64</td>
<td>79.07</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Models 3 and 4 follow Stubbs et al.’s (2018) preferred method for correcting for the endogeneity of program participation and the number of conditions imposed using their instrumented variable MLE equation. Model 3 excludes democracy and trade, which IMF intervention can endogenously impact. This reveals that exposure to an additional IMF structural condition is associated with a 0.001 decrease in percentage points in corruption, which is not statistically significant, nor distinguishable from zero. Model 4 includes those potentially endogenous controls and, again, the result is substantially unchanged but is statistically significant. Notwithstanding the results of Models 3 and 4 having no distinguishable value more than zero, the statistical significance found in Model 4, in contrast to those findings in Model 2 which underestimates the effect of conditionality indicates the presence of endogeneity. Specifically, this finding suggests that when corruption is high, an increased number of structural conditions are imposed by the IMF.

Interestingly, statistical significance is not repeated in Models 5 and 6 where a more efficient control function for the endogenous impacts of IMF program participation is utilized, suggesting a spurious correlation between IMF structural conditionality and corruption.

In order to understand specific parameterization, Models 5 and 6 utilize the same instrumented variable approach to account for the endogeneity of IMF participation and conditionality. Unlike Models 3 and 4, IMF participation equation is not linearized in Models 5 and 6. The facilitates of more efficient control function approach to account for the endogeneity of IMF program participation. The replicated scholar’s analysis of these equations reveals both equations are virtually unbiased, but the linearized approach performs better than the control function model given the higher revealed on the F-
statistics for the conditionality instrument. Similarly, model 5 excludes the potential
dendogenous controls, democracy, and trade, while Model 6 includes them. The main
results across both models reveal a miniscule increase to the percentage point political
corruption decreases by in the setting of an additional structural condition. However,
these results do not rise to the level of statistical significance. This indicates a stronger
performance by the linearized approach utilized in Model 4. Stubbs et al find that their
linearized model will perform better than the control function approach when
instrumentation in both equations is strong, and cross-equation correlation is mild, and
when misspecification has occurred with a third variable causing both IMF structural
conditions and corruption. A mild omitted variable bias is therefore present across this
analysis indicating and one or more additional control variables are needed. Potentially
such variable(s) should account for another endogenous effect stemming from IMF
program participation.

Ultimately, I find a consistent yet miniscule effect of the total number of IMF
structural conditions reducing a borrowing country’s level of corruption. Only the results
of the linearized double instrumented MLE equation (Model 4) rise to statistical
significance across each of the six models rises. These findings reveal the empirical
impact IMF structural conditions have on reducing corruption is not distinguishable from
zero.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This paper utilizes a newly published advanced statistical method, and associated IMF conditionality data, to assess the impact of IMF structural conditionality on levels of political corruption. The study draws upon a sample of 131 countries between 2000-2014. The IMF herald’s structural conditionality as a necessary instrument to improve good governance within borrowing countries, maintaining that good governance is an essential framework for achieving economic prosperity. Beginning at the point at which the IMF streamlined their conditionality practices in 2000, this study asks how effective structural conditionality is at reducing a borrowing country's level of corruption, which is a key feature of good governance identified by the IMF. Utilizing an instrument variable maximum likelihood estimation approach, this study reveals that the addition of structural conditions within an IMF lending arrangement does have a negative relationship to corruption, though very minimally and is statistically insignificant.

Ultimately, these findings do not yield any indication for a broad conclusion to be made on the impact structural conditionality has on corruption, or more generally, good governance. While these findings do not reveal the strong impact the IMF purports structural conditionality to have on political corruption, there may be nuances in countries, regions, or on other variables that are not adequately accounted for in the models. Structural conditionality may have a strong and significant positive impact on corruption in one country or region, where the opposite direct effect is seen in another country due to extenuating circumstances resulting in these inconclusive results on the
broad trend. Additionally, while mild, the misspecification within the models indicates additional control variable(s) relating to IMF program participation could improve the significance and/or results of these analyses. While this study’s focus developed theory around the relationship between IMF structural conditions and corruption, further theoretical development relating to IMF participation and corruption is needed to identify potential control variables necessary to overcome the omitted variable bias. Notwithstanding these considerations, these results do indicate that the IMF cannot reasonably defend its ongoing use of structural conditionality as uniformly abating corruption within borrowing nations.

The implications of IMF 2000’s era streamlining are additionally called into question in the context of this study’s findings. The IMF’s commitment to reducing the number of structural conditions as well as tailoring structural requirements only to those countries where ownership exists has not yielded the broad improvement to corruption as the institution hopes for. Future work on how the streamlining efforts have impacted conditionality outcomes would benefit from a comparative analysis in theses pre and post timeframes. Additionally, corruption is only one outcome of poor governance. It would be beneficial for further research to analyze other governance features, such as the strength of the rule of law, institutional accountability, or electoral transparency, to further assess the impacts of structural conditionality specifically on the governance of borrowers. In the context of the IMF's streamlining efforts, these new approaches to structural conditionality may be impacting a different measure of governance. Therefore, future work would benefit from further extension of this study to additional dependent variables relating to governance.
The null findings of these quantitative analyses, and misspecification identified through Model 6, do beg the question of how IMF structural conditionality impacts corruption, and what role the endogenous impacts of IMF program participation play in that relationship. There are an extensive number of factors that could theoretically cultivate unique and irreplicable outcomes in the context of IMF structural conditions. For example, endogenous features of IMF participation, such as the circumstances leading to economic collapse, including those pre-existing levels of corruption, or the IMF’s strategic relationship to a borrowing country will impact both the number and substance of IMF structural conditions. These relationships will vary greatly across the sample of countries included in this analysis. Therefore, structural conditionality will have inherently dissimilar impacts on governance outcomes, including corruption. A qualitative comparison of borrowers with similar corruption experiences will yield useful insights into what additional variables should be included in an analysis of the impact of structural conditionality.

While we cannot draw any broad conclusions on structural conditionality’s impact on corruption from this analysis, it is worth considering the other implications this type of IMF conditionality has on borrowing nations. Structural conditionality has been widely critiqued as overly onerous on developing nations, overtly intrusive onto the sovereignty of nations, and widely outside of the mission and scope of the IMF’s core institutional goals and responsibilities outlined in their founding Articles of Agreement. Implementation of structural conditionality can often take enormous effort from the borrowing government and come with a heightened risk of political destabilization, as reversing economic crisis and restoring the balance of payments is often achieved
through government spending cuts (Brown 2009). Implementation of these structural changes potentially requires high levels of political capital or even military strength and associated safeguards to respond to or prevent civil unrest. Furthermore, increasing the number of structural conditions within a lending arrangement has also been found to significantly and negatively affect the level of democracy within a borrowing country (Brown 2009). In her panel dataset of 23 Latin American countries between 1998 and 2003, Brown found that IMF structural conditions involving fiscal and legal and institutions reforms had strongly negative effects on a country’s Freedom House political freedom and civil liberties scores.

Further research on the impacts of IMF conditionality should also consider these associated costs and risks that implementing structural conditionality holds for borrowing nations. Again, a qualitative perspective could provide important insights into the amount of political capital and military strength is needed for a country to implement structural changes imposed through IMF lending arrangements. A higher capital on both fronts may reveal repercussions on corruption, as well as governance broadly, that would benefit this study’s analysis.
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