DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION AND THE EFFECTS OF THIRD-PARTY STATE POWER ON INTRASTATE WAR OUTCOME

by

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DEDICATION

The author wishes to dedicate this work to C.M.S., L.D.S., and B.E.A.H..

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ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to examine the role third-party states may play as diplomatic intervenors in intrastate wars. Because diplomatic interventions seek settlement outcomes over military victory, understanding the efficacy of these interventions may provide support for their usage over non-diplomatic options. I hypothesize that third-party state power, in the form of military, economic, and political capabilities, will impact the likelihood of diplomatic intervention outcome; more powerful third-party states will have a greater likelihood of producing preferred outcomes. I use 12 multinomial regression models to examine this relationship. I find that economic capabilities are the only factor of state power that produce a significant relationship with partial settlement only. Assessing this relationship, I suggest states with higher levels of economic production and consumption may have positive, yet also limited, impacts as diplomatic intervenors in intrastate war.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IO	Intergovernmental Organization
CINC	Composite Indicator of National Capability
LRM	Logistic Regression Model
MLE	Maximum Likelihood Estimation
MLR	Multinomial Logistic Regression
OLR	Ordered Logistic Regression

INTRODUCTION

Although the post-WWII period has seen a marked decrease in the number of traditional interstate wars relative to earlier historical intervals, the occurrence of intrastate war has risen sharply in this same time period (Sarkees et al. 2003). Given the high human, political, and economic costs of civil war, research aimed at understanding and influencing these conflicts has increased in kind. The effect third-parties have in intrastate wars is especially salient. Although the scope and conclusions of research in this area varies, the general consensus is that outside parties may have a considerable impact on these conflicts in a number of areas. This paper contributes to this area of research by examining the role third-party intervenor characteristics may have on civil war diplomatic intervention outcome.

Research undertaken on third-party intervention in interstate wars is diverse. This ranges from the impact of economic and military interventions (Regan 1996; Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Lockyer 2011; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014) to the efficacy of diplomatic interventions (Regan and Stam 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Regan and Aydin 2006). A subset of this research explores characteristics of the intervenors themselves (Greig and Regan 2008; Kydd 2003; Svensson 2007; Aydin 2010). Although a significant relationship exists between third-party intervention, decisive military victory, and lasting peace (Fortna 2004; Toft 2010), this paper focuses pointedly on studying diplomatic interventions as a potentially more peaceful alternative.

The basis for this paper is predicated on the premise that incumbent and rebel combatants are unable to credibly commit to a negotiated settlement to terminate conflict due to security concerns (Walter 1997). The involvement of a third-party may mitigate this issue by guaranteeing to enforce the terms of an agreement (Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Lundgren 2016). Considering third-parties as mediators of negotiated settlements, I propose that the existing capabilities of third-party states will positively impact the outcome of resolution-oriented discussions; states with higher overall relative capacities will be more effectual mediators than those with less. The power a state wields, and thus its resultant ability to monitor or enforce a negotiated settlement, is implicitly present during the mediation process and allows negotiating combatants to anticipate the potentiality of security guarantees and come to agreement, even before explicit guarantees may be formalized.

This contribution occupies a gap in the current research by considering the dynamics of third-party power on intrastate war in a non-structural capacity. While there exists scholarship focused on how intervenors' capabilities, especially those that are military- and economic-based, may impact conflicts, this generally coincides with increasing lethality to bring about a decisive conclusion to conflict. By focusing on diplomatic intervention instead, my research seeks to indicate how powerful states may wield their influence in a way that may reach a lower-casualty conclusion. Showing that all intervenors are not equal, this alternative to continued conflict could potentially indicate how states that have both the abilities and desire to impact an intrastate conflict may do so in a diplomatic, and less lethal, way.

In this paper, I test my hypotheses using data that combines the capabilities of intervening states (Singer et al. 1972, Gleditsch 2002, Marshall et al. 2016) with the outcomes of diplomatic interventions (Regan et al. 2009). Although my original argument considered the role of state power specifically regarding mediation, for testing purposes I assume these implicit capabilities will also have the same positive effect on other forms of diplomatic intervention. After testing, I find that states, irrespective of power, are less likely to produce preferred civil war outcomes than non-states. In addition, state economic capabilities are the only facet of state power that may impact the likelihood of some civil war outcomes.

This paper proceeds as follows. Following the introduction, the literature review discusses the existing research relevant to the topic of this paper. Next, I describe my theory and introduce my hypotheses. The fourth section describes the methodology and data used for testing, while the fifth part analyzes and discusses my findings. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my observations, the limitations of this research, and future topics of research in this area.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Due to the rise of intrastate war occurrence in the post-WWII landscape relative to other types of wars (Sarkees et al. 2003), the study of these conflicts has also increased. This body of research ranges from coding-based considerations for empirical testing (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Sambanis 2004) and factors affecting civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Sambanis 2001; Buhaug and Gates 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003), to war duration and termination durability (Walter 1997; Fearon 2004; Toft 2010). Although the focus of this paper is limited to third-party intervention in intrastate wars, it is important to preface this more specific literature review that follows with a general and brief discussion of the themes in civil war research to date.

Broadly, the literature defines civil wars as conflicts that take place within the confines of a state in which the incumbent government is one of the main participants (Sambanis 2004). A large subset of intrastate research aims to disaggregate civil wars by type and specify factors that correlate with these types. One sphere of research differs over whether grievances over economic or political inequalities (Sambanis 2001; Besançon 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Cederman et al. 2011) or resource-based greed (Lichbach 1994; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Ross 2006) affects civil war onset. Other groups of researchers interpret this divide in terms of ethnic and non-ethnic wars (Sambanis 2001; Besançon 2005; Cederman et al. 2011) and argue that they should be considered separately. Still other researchers focus on correlates that may be explanatory, ranging from conditions that favor insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and

explanations for the difference in intrastate war duration (Fearon 2004), to war demand and geographic scope (Buhaug and Gates 2002). For the purposes of this paper, I do not segregate intrastate wars by type, cause, or other explanatory factors and instead consider all conflicts together. I base this decision on Regan's (1996) observation that intervention characteristics have a greater impact on diplomatic intervention outcome than conflict characteristics, as well as the practice of other research in this field of study (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Regan and Aydin 2006).

An increasingly large subset of civil war research concerns itself with the influence third-party actors may have on ongoing conflicts, specifically regarding the deployment of intervention strategies. This topic is diverse and ranges from the type (Regan 1996; Regan 2002; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014) and timing (Regan and Stam 2000; Aydin 2010) of interventions to characteristics of the intervenors themselves (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Kydd 2003; Abdelrahman and Lee 2016). The primary goal of this literature is to study how the involvement of third-parties can impact a conflict in terms of structure, duration, and outcome.

Regan and Aydin (2006) broadly classify third-party interventions into two types, defined by how the tactic affects the combatant relationship. The first type seeks to influence the structure of the conflict by providing incentives and deterrents; military and economic strategies are examples of this form of intervention. The second type, using diplomatic intervention strategies, aims to manipulate the information actors hold with regard to the abilities and resolve of the opposing side, as well as the nature of the conflict as a whole. This may be intelligence about the conflict—such as relative capabilities—not privy to both parties or the conveyance of information relating to the

resolve, compromise points, or fears of one of both parties that they may not be able to credibly communicate themselves. These tactics may be deployed singly, in combination with one another, or as a series of strategic actions. Although the focus of this paper is third-party diplomatic intervention, structural interventions may precede or follow diplomatic ones. As such, understanding the relationship between structural tactics and civil war outcome also informs our understanding of diplomatic-based outcomes. I will briefly summarize structural-based interventions for comparison.

Research regarding military and economic third-party interventions is predicated upon understanding the effects of the manipulation of relative capabilities among civil war parties. From the perspective of the intervenor state, the purpose of this assistance is to hasten a decisive military victory (Walter 1997; Fortna 2004). Specifically, these changes in relative power can impact the form of conflict (Lockyer 2011; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014), duration (Regan 1996, 2002; Regan and Aydin 2006; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008), or outcome (Gent 2008). For the purposes of this paper, I focus on diplomatic interventions exclusively, as they consist of strategies intended to discourage the continued violence necessitated by decisive military victory. Diplomatic interventions, especially those that take the form of mediation, encourage conflict resolution by engaging both parties to dialogue and coincide with temporary eases in conflict as negotiations occur. In addition, diplomatic interventions also serve as a more ethically acceptable alternative action of states to employ at the international level.

By far the most common, and commonly analyzed, form of diplomatic interventions are third-party mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts. Primary research in this field focuses on the varied effects this form of intervention may have on a conflict.

This ranges from timing of diplomatic intervention (Regan and Stam 2000; Aydin 2010) and its effect on duration (Regan and Aydin 2006), to state-specific factors pertinent to the offer and acceptance of mediation (Greig and Regan 2008; Abdelrahman and Lee 2016), to the impact of biased mediation on outcome (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2007). Diplomatic intervention research is also highly interested in facets of mediation that impact post-negotiation outcomes (Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Fortna 2004; Toft 2010; Driscoll 2012).

In the proceeding sections of this literature review I examine two themes of academic research associated with the goal of this paper: general research regarding the impacts of diplomatic interventions as a whole, as well as more specific research focused on how third-party characteristics may transform the relationship between diplomatic intervention and intrastate conflict. Broadly, diplomatic intervention is expected to alter both the duration and outcome of civil wars. This relationship stems fundamentally from the work of Walter (1997). She argues that civil wars that do not achieve a decisive, one-sided victory are more difficult to conclude in the long run because both the incumbent and rebel parties still possess military capacities. Since in the case of negotiated settlements one or both sides are generally asked to disarm, it is difficult for parties to demilitarize in an anarchic environment when the risk of doing so may lead to annihilation. To balance this, Walter argues that the introduction of a third-party into the negotiation process will increase the likelihood of success and long-lasting peace since they can enforce the terms of the treaty and allow combatants to credibly commit to disarmament. It is the credible commitment of the intervenor, as well as the facilitation of

credible commitment among warring parties, that serves as the mechanism that propels third-party diplomatic intervention and its impact on intrastate conflict.

Both Regan and Stam (2000) and Regan and Aydin (2006) find a statistical relationship between third-party mediation efforts and duration, although not a simple one. Regan and Stam (2000) find that the timing of the intervention plays a critical role; while mediation early and late in a conflict is linked to reducing expected duration, mediation in what is ex post the middle of the conflict actually increases the length of a civil war. Regan and Aydin's work (2006) suggests differing results. They find that third-party mediation is most effective in the middle of the conflict, with early and late interventions increasing the probability of increased war duration. Adding another dimension to this strain of research, Aydin (2010) tests how third-party strategy can impact the timing of intervention. She finds that while overall states are more likely to attempt to mediate conflicts early, as fighting continues (thus indicating said interventions have failed and imparting the difficulty of resolving the conflict) states become more hesitant to intervene. It is clear from these works that diplomatic intervention can be effective if deployed at the right time.

Another variety of third-party diplomatic intervention research focuses on the attributes of states offering mediation. Since mediation is, by definition, consensual (Bercovitch 1997), there are factors that affect both the offering and acceptance of negotiation. Greig and Regan (2008) find that third-party offers for negotiation are more likely when the intervenor has interests in the civil war state; this may be in the form of historical linkages, contiguity, or even prior conflict involvement. Abdelrahman and Lee

(2016) argue that the increased likelihood of mediation offers from states neighboring civil wars is due to the negative impact a contiguous conflict may have on its neighbor. Contrary to Aydin (2010), Greig and Regan (2008) also find that third-parties are more likely to extend an offer of mediation when multiple other parties are already involved. Offer acceptance, however, has different findings. Historical ties to the mediator actually decrease the likelihood of offer acceptance, while the reputation of the mediator increases it. The timing of acceptance differs as well. Parties involved in a civil conflict are more likely to reject mediation at what is ex post the beginning and end of conflicts, a conclusion that aligns with the efficacy of intervention timing as investigated by Regan and Aydin (2006).

Scholars expect bias among intervenors to have an influence on the efficacy of mediations. Although the general expectation may be that an unbiased mediator will be a more effective negotiator, both Kydd (2003) and Svensson (2007) find that biased mediators in civil war negotiations associate with an increased likelihood of the mediation ending in a negotiated settlement. A biased mediator conveys information, such as opponent resolve and resources, more credibly and thus facilitates more constructive negotiations (Kydd 2003). Svensson (2007) argues mediators biased specifically in favor of the incumbent are the most effective; because the incumbent is generally losing power (reputational, military, political, etc.) relative to the rebel group in negotiations, it is important that they receive more support to continue negotiations towards a productive end.

Finally, a large segment of third-party intervention research focuses on influencing the post-settlement outcome of mediation. Rather than measuring success of

diplomatic intervention in terms of decreasing war duration or reaching a final outcome, the goal of this area of examination centers around providing long-lasting peace via decreasing war recurrence. Building upon Walter's (1997) work, Fortna (2004) also finds that decisive military victory is better with regard to the likelihood of decreasing war reoccurrence. Given that this does not take place in a negotiated settlement, she finds that there are two factors that may also impact the durability of peace in a mediation scenario: the formalization of peace agreements and the presence of peacekeeping post-conflict. With regard to the former, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) observe that negotiated settlements with robust and multidimensional power sharing (e.g. political, economic, and military integration) significantly decrease the likelihood of war recurrence. Likewise, Driscoll (2012) argues for increased incumbent-rebel incorporation, but in a realpolitik fashion; post-civil war settlement is treated as a coalition formation game and success is predicated on the cooptation of rebels or rebel leaders into the existing government system. In Driscoll's model, rebels do not face a dilemma to disarm because they become part of the state itself.

Regarding the research goal of this paper, there exists a dearth of research interested in the capacities of states as third-party diplomatic intervenors and their impact on conflict outcome. The closest work to this involves the effects of intergovernmental organizations (IOs) on negotiation and post-negotiation outcomes. Doyle & Sambanis (2000) and Lundgren (2016) find that third-party involvement in the form of IOs or multilateral coalitions have the greatest influence on peace durability. Lundgren specifically incorporates the presence of IOs from the mediation to peace enforcement stages of combat. He argues that IOs with the ability to deploy peacekeeping or

monitoring missions outperform IOs without the capacity to intercede post-conflict in negotiations due to the implicit knowledge that they can credibly enforce a negotiated settlement with force. It is clear that the involvement of a militarily capable and willing third-party in diplomatic interventions has a significant impact on the post-conflict landscape of an intrastate war.

Finally, building upon Lundgren's (2016) observations about IO capacity and negotiation and post-negotiation outcomes, I conceptualize this relationship with regard to states. Similar to IOs, state capacity and the resultant ability to engage in monitoring or peacekeeping post-conflict may vary and impact negotiation outcome. The credible communication of these capacities is key and rests with the perceived power of a state. While this certainly may include a conception of power in the realist sense—overt coercion by self-interested states in the national interest (Walt 1998)—it is not exclusive. Barnett and Duval (2005) argue that power can also be expressed inconspicuously via social relations. This includes "joint action through mutual agreement and interactions in which one actor is able to convince another actor to alter voluntarily and freely its beliefs, interests, or action" (Barnett and Duval 2005, 42). Thus, power may be also expressed by a third-party state involved in consensual negotiation among states.

THEORY

Given the preceding literature review, this paper explores the relationship between the capabilities of third-party intervenors and the outcomes of the diplomatic interventions they undertake. Although *diplomatic interventions* is a broad term encompassing varying activities, in this paper I follow Regan and Aydin's (2006) example by generally conflating mediation and diplomatic efforts (of which mediation is an extensive subset) as serving the same function with regard to testing. I assume that the goal of diplomatic interventions, as opposed to military or economic ones, is to credibly provide information leading to settlements that terminate, rather than facilitate, additional violence.

To examine this, I frame the mediator-participant relationship in intrastate war as one of explicit and implicit communication. The aims of explicit communication are straightforward: a third-party intervenes diplomatically to convey information between combatants that they may not be able to credibly relay to each other. A third-party may also formally guarantee to monitor or enforce peace post-settlement (Walter 1997). There exists a large body of research that recognizes the positive relationship between these direct forms of communication and the outcome of diplomatic interventions (Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie; Regan and Aydin 2006; Lundgren 2016). While I emphatically agree that explicit communication is a fundamental mechanism of the association between diplomatic interventions and resultant outcome, it is not exclusively explanatory.

In addition to explicit modes of communication, I argue that a dialogue of implicit communication exists in civil war conflict between mediators and participants. This results in a series of implications and inferences that pervade diplomatic intervention attempts, while also running concurrently with the explicit forms of communication discussed previously. Drawing from Lundgren's (2006) observations on the efficacy of international organizations as mediators, I contend that the abilities of a state to credibly provide (and not necessarily explicitly offer) security guarantees impacts the likelihood of third-party diplomatic intervention reaching a constructive, successful outcome. Essentially: state power, even unexpressed, permeates dialogue between groups. A state than can feasibly commit to assuring a negotiated settlement by implicitly conveying their known capabilities will have greater intervention success than those without said capabilities.

Comparing and contrasting the diplomatic intervention attempts of the United States, Chad, and Thailand help to illustrate this theory. In her case study of the Bosnian War, Paczulla (2004) chronicles the intervention strategies of the United States, while Abdelrahman and Lee (2016) examine the maneuvers of Chad in the Sudanese conflict in Darfur and Thailand during the Cambodian Civil War. In all cases, multiple intervention strategies—economic, military, and diplomatic—were deployed and a variety of different types of actors became involved at different times. The greatest difference between these intervenors was their international power; the United States acted as an acknowledged military, economic, and political leader, while Thailand and Chad intervened as smaller, neighboring countries without any substantial influence.

In the cases of Thailand and Chad, both states entered their respective conflicts as intervenors due to concerns for regional stability. Both states also initially intervened unsuccessfully in their neighboring conflicts with more extreme, biased, and sometimes non-diplomatic strategies. Ultimately, this lack of coordination and posturing led to tensions among these states, other intervening parties, and the conflicting parties themselves. Both Thailand and Chad eventually revised their intervention strategies by using more powerful international and external actors to bolster their diplomatic actions with limited eventual impact on the conflicts and their resolutions (Abdelrahman and Lee 2016).

In contrast to the Thai and Chadian efforts, the intervention of the United States in the Bosnian War culminated in a more successful outcome. Acting after years of unsuccessful, yet valuable, international efforts by states and international organizations, the United States mediated the Dayton Accords to its eventual conclusion, resulting in the end of the intrastate conflict. According to Paczulla (2004), part of the success the United States experienced was due to the amount of pressure its diplomats were able to exert on the mediating parties. Although the conflicts in which Thailand, Chad, and the United States intervened were notably different, it is clear that the multi-dimensional power that the United States wielded in the international system aided its eventual success as a diplomatic intervenor.

As a precursor to testing state power and its impact on diplomatic intervention outcome, it is necessary to briefly examine how states and non-states perform against each other irrespective of power differences. While I posit that state power is integral to success, I also assume that selection bias is in effect; states with higher capabilities are

more likely to intervene in civil wars. Because of this, I expect the pool of state intervenors to be more capable, and thus more successful than other types of actors. This leads to hypothesis 1, which is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: *Third-party states will be more likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes than non-states.*

Dealing specifically with state actors, I hypothesize that state power, also conceptualized as state capabilities or capacity, will impact the likelihood of preferred civil war outcome. State capacity is a nuanced quality that encompasses a range of areas: from political and bureaucratic effectiveness to economic productivity (Hendrix 2010). Of these, military capabilities are the most conspicuous facet. States with relatively high military capacities can implicitly communicate their ability to guarantee security aspects of negotiated settlements. As such, hypothesis 2 is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: *Third-party states with greater military capabilities will be more likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes.*

Military considerations, however, are only one facet of state power. A state may be militarized and yet lack the economic faculty to credibly express their capabilities outside the borders of their own state. Thus, the economic capacity of a state is also key to the implicit communication of power. States with higher levels of consumption and production may have the resources necessary to potentially guarantee or convey the ability to enforce a mediation outcome. Hypothesis 3 addresses this relationship.

Hypothesis 3: *Third-party states with greater economic capabilities will be more likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes.*

Finally, I also conceptualize state power as a measure of state political capacity. I use this term to indicate the extent of state regime stability and internal political control. On a political continuum ranging from fully authoritarian to fully democratic, those states at the poles of the continuum are less likely to experience political violence than semi-democracies in the middle. In addition, strong autocracies and consolidated democracies have a longer median survival rate than anocracies (Hegre et al. 2005; Vreeland 2008). It follows that conflicting parties in a civil war environment may perceive those regimes not experiencing political violence or instability to be preferable to anocratic states as diplomatic intervenors. For instance, it is unlikely that states that are experiencing political violence and lack the ability to enforce policies within their own borders will be able to convey the willingness or ability to become involved in and effectively enforce any diplomatic intervention outcome. By contrast, politically stable states (either by democratic or authoritarian means) will be able to more effectively convey their willingness and ability to successfully mediate and enforce a variety of preferred outcomes among warring parties, depending on the preferences and linkages of the conflicting parties themselves (Grieg and Regan 2008). As such, hypothesis 4 is as follows:

Hypothesis 4: *Third-party states with greater political capacity will be more likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes.*

RESEARCH DESIGN

In the research design for this paper, I attempt to account for the relationship between state capability and diplomatic intervention outcome. First, to justify my focus on diplomatic intervention among states, I test the relationship between outcomes with states as intervenors and non-states as intervenors to determine whether a disparate relationship exists. Following this, I test my hypotheses for states only. I expect higher capacity third-party states to outperform lower capacity third-party states when engaging in diplomatic interventions.

Data

In this paper, I use the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009) for the purposes of testing the impact of state capability on diplomatic intervention outcome. I derive the dependent variable from this dataset, using a modified coding scheme of the authors. I also use this dataset for several control variables. The Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009) is an advancement upon Regan's (1996) previous intervention data, which only included economic and military interventions.

The Regan et al. (2009) dataset includes information on 438 diplomatic interventions in 68 unique conflicts spanning from 1945 to 1999. An obvious drawback to this dataset is timespan of the data. Despite the omission of relatively recent interventions, this is the most complete dataset that includes diplomatic intervention outcome data. It is also important to note that, following the previous work of Regan (1996), Regan et al. (2009) also lower the casualty threshold for civil war from 1,000

deaths to 200 deaths to account for a greater number of disputes. The lower casualty threshold creates a stronger test of my hypotheses by accounting for earlier interventions in conflicts that may not yet have reached the levels of violence resulting in 1,000 deaths. This inclusion may help to indicate patterns of successful intervention at earlier stages of intrastate conflict. The unit of observation is the conflict month.

This paper also uses variables from the Correlates of War Project's National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer et al. 1972). This dataset includes the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) variable, as well as its component parts. This variable is intended to represent the relative capabilities of states as an indicator of international influence or power. CINC consists of six state-level variables: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members. The timespan of the data ranges from 1816-2012. Although this interval is more extensive than Regan et al.'s (2009), its use is limited to those years available in the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset.

In addition to the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009) and National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer et al. 1972), this paper also utilizes the Polity V: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions (Marshall and Gurr 2018) dataset. This provides a variable to measure a composite indicator of political capability based on regime type. This dataset includes information on states with a population of over 500,000 for the years 1800-2018. As with Singer et al.'s (1972) data, the time range is limited to years available in the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009). Finally, I also use data from Gleditsch's (2002) Expanded

Trade and GDP dataset to provide economic data on intervening states. As with the previous variables, the usable data is limited to the timeframe of the dependent variable.

Dependent Variable

Diplomatic Intervention Outcome

I derive the diplomatic intervention outcome variable from the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009). In Regan et al.'s (2009) dataset, they code the variable as follows: 0= no agreement, 1= ceasefire, 2= partial settlement, 3= full settlement, and 4= ongoing. Besides the ongoing disputes category, the scale increases by the authors' preferred outcome. Thus, full settlements are preferable to partial settlements, which are preferable to ceasefires. Full settlements, partial settlements, and ceasefires are all preferable to no agreement reached.

For interpretation purposes, I have adjusted Regan et al.'s (2009) coding. For the purposes of this paper an ongoing dispute (4) is not preferable to either a ceasefire (1), partial (2), or full settlement (4). To reflect this, I have combined no agreement (0) and ongoing dispute (4) into the same category (0). The new formulation of the variable is coded as follows: 0= no agreement/ongoing dispute, 1= ceasefire, 2= partial settlement, and 3= full settlement. As discussed later in this section, I use multinomial logit models to test my relationships; as such, the dependent variable is treated as unordered. I discuss the grounds for this in further detail below.

Independent Variables

Considering the theory section and following hypotheses, I use four variables to operationalize my tests: actor type, composite state power, economic capabilities, and political capacity. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for these variables, which

include: number of observations, mean value, minimum value, maximum value, standard deviation, and expected relationship.

Table 1 Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest

Variable	Observations (n)	Mean	Min.	Max.	St. Dev.	Expected Relationship
State Actor	438	.5731	0	1	.4951	+
Military Power	243	.0516	.000011	.3639	.0776	+
Economic Capabilities	231	11924.37	375.36	37353.76	12009.19	+
Political Capacity	243	61.93	1	100	35.51	+

Actor Type

In my first hypothesis, I contend that states and non-states have differing diplomatic intervention outcomes. To test this, I create a dummy variable (State Actor) to indicate whether an actor is a state (1) or non-state (0). This variable comprises 251 states or state combinations and 187 non-states or non-state combinations.[1] As per hypothesis 1, I expect states to have a greater likelihood of achieving preferred diplomatic outcomes than non-states due to the self-selection of higher capacity states becoming involved in diplomatic intervention in the first place.

Military Power

My second hypothesis asserts that intervenor states with greater composite military capabilities will be more likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes. To test this, I use National Material Capabilities Dataset's (Singer et al. 1972) CINC variable (Military Power). As noted previously, the CINC variable is a composite variable consisting of total population, urban population, iron and steel production,

[1] A table of all state and non-state actors and groups may be viewed in Appendix A, Table A.1.

energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of states. Scholars commonly use this variable to represent the international influence or relative power of a state (Geller 1993; Allen et al. 2018), although it is not without its criticisms (Kadera and Sorokin 2004). I also use this variable for its measure of relative power, assuming states wield their international influence during diplomatic interventions to influence the outcome. As such, it is expected that states with higher CINC scores will have an increased likelihood of achieving the desired diplomatic intervention outcomes, either full or partial settlements.

Economic Capabilities

I consider the relationship between economic capabilities and diplomatic interventions in my third hypothesis. I operationalize this variable (Economic Capabilities) using Gleditsch's (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP dataset. Since GDP data is often incomplete for developing and conflict-torn states, Gleditsch uses additional data sources and data interpolation to provide consistent estimation of the economic resources and strength of these countries. I expect states with higher economic capacities to have an increased likelihood of achieving conflict settlement.

Political Capacity

To test my fourth hypothesis, I use regime authority measures from the Polity V: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions (Marshall and Gurr 2018) dataset. My primary variable of interest is the combined polity score (Political Capacity), which the authors compute by subtracting their score for institutionalized autocracy from their institutionalized democracy score; the autocracy and democracy scores are themselves

composite indicators which are composed of properties of democratic regimes. The combined polity score ranges from -10 (autocratic) to +10 (democratic).

For the purposes of testing, I square the polity score (Political Capacity Squared) to create a range from 0-100. Higher values on this scale will indicate stronger regimes, either autocratic or democratic. As noted in my theory section, states at either end of the autocracy-democracy continuum are less politically violent and experience longer lasting regimes that those states in the middle of the continuum (Hegre et al. 2005). The expectation is that regime strength will associate with an increased likelihood of diplomatic intervention success.

It is important to note that usage of the Polity variable is not without its concerns. Both Vreeland (2008) and Treier and Jackman (2008) find fault with the components and aggregate makeup of the Polity variable itself, suggesting that its use as an independent variable may not be precise (Trier and Jackman 2008) and may over-inflate the regime-political violence relationship (Vreeland 2008). Högström (2013) however, finds that the Polity data, when compared to the alternative Freedom House, produces results that are less dependent on economic results for explanatory power. For the purposes of this paper, this is preferable due to the inclusion of alternate independent variables that measure economic capabilities separately.

Control Variables

I include several control variables that are linked to diplomatic intervention outcome in previous research.

Intervention Timing

The control variable for intervention timing (Timing and Timing Squared) is a count of months since the start of a conflict and is a part of the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009). The expected effect varies; while Regan and Stam (2000) find that interventions at the beginning and what is ex post the end of a conflict will have a greater likelihood of success, Regan and Aydin (2006) observe interventions in the middle of a conflict to be most effective.

Number of Diplomatic Interventions

The variable for number of diplomatic interventions (Diplomatic Intervention) is from Regan et al.'s (2009) Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset. This variable measures the total number of diplomatic interventions in a conflict. Regan and Stam (2000) find the number of mediation attempts and duration to be positively correlated. Considering this, I expect higher numbers of diplomatic intervention attempts in a conflict to be associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict settlement.

Unilateral Intervention

The variable for unilateral intervention (Unilateral Intervention) is a dichotomous variable from the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009) that indicates whether the diplomatic intervention was unilateral (1) or not (0). Regan (2002) finds that unilateral interventions are less effective than multilateral ones, but his research tests military and economic interventions only. Considering the dearth of research related specifically to the efficacy of unilateral diplomatic interventions, I will assume the same causal mechanisms are at play and that unilateral diplomatic interventions will also decrease the likelihood of preferred civil war outcomes.

Models

To test the relationship between state capability and diplomatic intervention outcome I use a logistic regression model (LRM). A LRM takes into account the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, diplomatic intervention outcome. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous in a LRM, a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) model is a better fit than an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, which works under the assumption that the variable is continuous in nature and evenly distributed. The correct model specification allows for the outcomes of testing to be interpreted accurately by bounding the possible range from zero to one, estimating the logged-odds of an event occurring, and allowing for non-linearity in the change in the dependent variable. OLS lacks the bounding feature and thus may produce out of bounds predictions. In this paper, I use a variant of the LRM, which is the multinomial logistic regression (MLR) model. MLR allows for testing of relationships with more than two distinct outcomes. I utilized MLR, rather than an ordered logistic regression (OLR) model, because it does not assume consistent parameters across all outcome thresholds, also known as the "parallel regression assumption." Instead, the MLR model allows comparison of discrete outcomes against a base outcome, which in this case is "No Settlement/Ongoing Conflict."

I use 12 models to explore the relationship between third-party states and diplomatic intervention outcome. All models utilize the same dependent variable, diplomatic intervention outcome, which is treated as unordered. Models 1-6 correspond to my hypotheses. Model 1 tests the effects of third-party actors on outcome by differentiating between state and non-state actors. Models 2-6 test state-specific

attributes—military power, economic capability, and political capacity—for state actors only. Models 7-12 use the disaggregated CINC variables (Singer et al. 1972) to serve as a further robustness test for the expected relationships of models 2-6.

RESULTS

I include the results for the following discussion in Tables 2-13. As stated previously, all models use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the proposed relationships. Tables 2-7 correspond with testing for hypotheses 1-4, while tables 8-13 present additional examination based on the results of models 1-6.

In hypothesis 1, I project that states and non-states will have differing effects on intrastate third-party intervention outcome. Contrary to the expected relationship, that states will have a positive effect on intervention outcome, the results of model 1 (Table 2) indicate that state actors have a significant, negative effect on all outcome categories. State actors are less successful than non-state actors at achieving preferred intervention outcomes. The results are significant at the 5% level for partial settlement and full settlement, and significant at the 1% level for ceasefire. Additionally, control variables for timing squared and diplomatic intervention count achieve significance in multiple outcomes, while unilateral intervention is highly significant across all outcomes.[2]

[2] Upon suggestion, I have included contiguity as an additional control variable following the work of Fearon and Laitin (2003). The variable did not achieve significance in any estimation. The variable did not fundamentally alter my findings with only minor variation in various p-values and coefficients. In Appendix B, Tables B.2-B.6 provide examples demonstrating this.

Table 2 Results for State Actor Model

Model 1: State Actor

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
State Actor	-0.889	0.302***	-0.840	0.411**	-0.708	0.350**
Timing	-0.002	0.004	0.008	0.008	-0.001	0.005
Timing Squared	3.24×10^{-6}	0.000***	-0.000	0.000**	-4.70×10^{-7}	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.210	0.726**	-2.078	0.811***	-2.140	0.750***
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.042	0.018	0.044	0.024*	0.073	0.021***
Observations	425		425		425	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

This unexpected relationship may have multiple causes. It is possible that the pre-existing linkages between a third-party intervenor and a civil war state that increase the likelihood of outside state involvement (Greig and Regan 2008) also detrimentally complicate the diplomatic peace processes. Conversely, since the independent variable for state actor measures state actors of all capabilities, there is potential for both high- and low-performing states to impact outcome differently. While overall, state intervenors may have a negative impact on outcome, a small number of higher capacity states may impact diplomatic outcome differently. Finally, the conflict outcomes of state and non-state actors may experience different causal processes. While I hypothesize that relative power matters for states, I also assume that non-state actors do not possess these same variables of power for comparison (in addition, scholars do not measure these variables for non-state actors). Given this, comparing state and non-state actors may provide information on relative success, but it does not impart any understanding regarding how they impact outcomes differently. I explore state-only factors further in models 2-12.

Hypothesis 2 expects the CINC variable (Singer et al. 1972), a proxy for relative state influence and military power, to correlate positively with the likelihood of achieving a preferred diplomatic intervention outcome. I test this relationship in model 2 (Table 3). Although a majority of the coefficients positively correlate with preferred civil war outcome, they do not achieve significance. As with model 1, the variable for unilateral intervention is the only control variable that is significant in the expected direction across all outcomes, with diplomatic intervention count achieving significance at the 5% threshold for two outcomes. This finding suggests that military power and its concomitant international influence may not give a state actor a particular advantage regarding the likelihood of achieving a preferred diplomatic intervention outcome. Given my hypothesis, it follows that the implicit communication of military power and credible settlement commitment between intervenor and warring parties may either be nonexistent or, more likely, simply not as formally defined, and thus less actionable, as explicit communication.

Table 3 Results for Military Power Model

Model 2: Military Power

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Military Power	0.827	2.307	3.439	3.071	-3.280	3.007
Timing	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.010	0.002	0.006
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-1.990	0.737***	-2.050	0.847**	-2.008	0.777**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.042	0.024*	0.079	0.033**	0.067	0.027**
Observations	240		240		240	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (military power), two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

Similar to hypothesis 2, in hypothesis 3 I anticipate that state-specific attributes will positively influence the likelihood of preferred intervention outcome. Unlike hypothesis 2, however, hypothesis 3 presents economic capabilities as the source of influential power. I test this using Gleditsch's (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP dataset in model 3 (Table 4). The coefficients for economic capabilities are positive across all outcomes but do not achieve significance. Since the results given in model 3 do not support my hypothesis, it appears that no considerable relationship exists between state economic power and diplomatic intervention outcome. Once again, the control variable unilateral intervention achieves significance in the expected direction across all outcomes, while diplomatic intervention count is significant in two outcomes. While state economic characteristics of power may not play an appreciable role in settlement outcome, this does not indicate that economic influence does not impact the diplomatic intervention process as a whole.

Table 4 Results for Economic Capabilities Model

Model 3: Economic Capabilities

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Economic Capabilities	2.47×10^{-6}	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.43×10^{-6}	0.000
Timing	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.010	0.001	0.006
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-1.861	0.749**	-1.990	0.837**	-1.856	0.773**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.030	0.023	0.062	0.031**	0.062	0.027**
Observations	228		228		228	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (economic capabilities), two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

In model 4 I test my fourth hypothesis, which projects that states with higher political capacity will be more likely to generate preferred intervention outcomes. In this model, I include my variable for political capacity, a square of the state intervenor polity score (Marshall and Gurr 2018), as well as its respective non-square term.[3] The results of model 4 (Table 5) are generally consistent with expectations, with the exception of a negative coefficient for full-settlement outcomes. All outcomes, however, fail to achieve significance. As with hypotheses 2 and 3, this finding suggests that some forms of state power, in this case political capacity, do not impact the likelihood of preferred state diplomatic intervention outcomes. The control variables unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count are significant in nearly the same manner as previous models. The findings of this model indicate that the implicit communication of state power in diplomatic intervention may either be nonexistent or not sufficient to induce favorable outcomes.

[3] I also tested an alternative specification to the Polity Squared variable that included a binary measure of autocracy and democracy (7 or higher on their respective measures) following Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005). These variables were generally not significant and produced non-results for the other control variables.

Table 5 Results for Political Capabilities Model

Model 4: Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Political Capacity	0.044	0.032	0.053	0.046	-0.190	0.037
Political Capacity Squared	-0.010	0.007	-0.012	0.009	0.004	.008
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.010	0.003	0.006
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.667	1.010***	-2.848	1.078***	-2.674	1.037**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.031	0.024	0.060	0.031*	0.071	0.027***
Observations	240		240		240	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (political capacity) two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

Models 5 and 6 include the variables for political capacity in order to provide greater explanatory power in the models for hypothesis 2 and 3. In model 5 (Table 6), the polity variable is included as an additional control variable for the military power hypothesis. While the inclusion of the political capacity variables in model 5 alter the direction of the relationship between the CINC variable and full settlement, all relationships still fail to achieve significance. Following the pattern of previous models, the variables for unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count are the only control variables to achieve significance; unilateral intervention is significant in the expected direction across all outcomes, while diplomatic intervention count is significant in two of the three outcomes. This finding provides no additional support for hypothesis 2.

Table 6 Results for Military Power including Political Capacity

Model 5: Military Power including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Military Power	6.057	3.130	6.067	4.031	-4.268	4.003
Political Capacity	0.033	0.036	0.033	0.052	-0.005	0.040
Political Capacity Squared	-0.010	0.007	-0.017	0.010	0.005	0.008
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.006	0.010	0.004	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.660	1.012***	-2.794	1.081**	-2.742	1.043***
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.034	0.024	0.073	0.033**	0.065	0.027**
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (military power) two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

In model 6 (Table 7), I add the political capacity variable as an additional control variable for the hypothesis tested in model 3, which used Gleditsch's (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP data as a proxy for state economic capacity. This change is clearly noticeable. While the coefficient for outcome 2 (partial settlement) remains positive as in model 6, it now achieves statistical significance. It is notable that only the partial settlement outcome achieves significance, as it rests in the middle of the range of preferred outcomes. Although the coefficient is small, the range for the GDP variable is large, which produces a larger effect than expected from the size of the coefficient.

The behavior of the control variables changes as well. Political capacity, which is an addition that differentiates this model from model 3, is significant at the 5% level in outcome 2 (partial settlement) only. The expected relationship is negative, which is contrary to my expectations for this variable. The control variable unilateral intervention still achieves significance across all outcomes, however the expected relationship changes to positive in outcome 3, the full settlement outcome. Diplomatic intervention

outcome now only achieves significance in outcome 3, and is no longer significant for outcome 2. It is clear from the behavior of the independent and control variables that the addition of the political capacity variable significantly impacts behaviors in the model. The findings of this model indicate that economic capabilities, in some capacity, may have a positive impact on the likelihood of achieving partial settlement, but not on ceasefires (outcome 1) or on full settlements (outcome 3). I further explore this relationship in models 7-12.

Table 7 Results for Economic Capabilities including Political Capacity

Model 6: Economic Capabilities including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Economic Capabilities	-9.52×10^{-6}	.0000	.0000	0.000**	4.15×10^{-6}	0.000
Political Capacity	0.058	0.035	0.030	0.050	-0.006	0.034
Political Capacity Squared	-0.008	0.008	-0.025	0.012**	0.002	0.010
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.010	0.002	0.006
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.567	1.005**	-2.717	1.067**	1.027	1.027**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.018	0.024	0.053	0.032	0.027	0.027**
Observations	226		226		226	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (economic capabilities), two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

In models 7-12 I use the six individual components of the CINC variable (Singer et al. 1972) to further explore the relationship apparent in model 6 between economic capabilities and the increased likelihood of a partial settlement outcome. Although models 2 and 5 testing military power were not significant, the CINC variables are still valuable for testing individually as they are a mix of military, consumption, and population-based measures. Given the outcome of model 6, there exists an underlying process that appears to correlate some facets of economic influence with outcome.

Disaggregating the component pieces of the CINC variable allows for testing of this relationship to see if the correlation from my initial model is consistent with the outcomes in the proceeding models. These component pieces include: military expenditure of states, the amount of state military personnel, iron and steel production, energy consumption, total population, and total urban population. I expect that the economic-based variables may produce similar results as model 5 regarding the likelihood of achieving partial settlement.

Model 7 (Table 8) tests the impact of the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) individual variable for military expenditure on outcome. The military expenditure variable is the total military budget of a third-party state by year. Given the outcome of models 2 and 5, I expect there to be no significant relationship. Contrary to this, the results indicate that military expenditure and settlement outcome are correlated, achieving a significant relationship for partial settlement only. While the coefficient is seemingly small, the range of the variable is large, thus enabling the coefficient to substantively impact the relationship. The control variables behave similarly to those in models 2 and 5; unilateral intervention is negative and significant across all outcomes, while diplomatic intervention count achieves positive significance in outcomes 2 and 3. Although the military expenditures variable appears to be primarily concerned with military power, the existing relationship may be explained by considering the economic-based aspects of the variable. This finding supports the relationship observed in model 6, indicating the existence of a causal relationship that achieves significance in outcome 2, partial settlement, only.

Table 8 Results for Military Expenditure including Political Capacity

Model 7: Military Expenditures including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Military Expenditures	$3.34x10^{-9}$	$2.96x10^{-9}$	$9.43x10^{-10}$	$3.96x10^{-9}$**	$3.76.15x10^{-9}$	$3.47x10^{-9}$
Political Capacity	0.303	0.034	0.015	0.049	-0.031	0.038
Political Capacity Squared	-0.011	0.007	-0.019	0.010	0.002	0.008
Timing	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.010	0.001	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.567	0.995**	-2.750	1.077**	-2.677	1.025***
Diplomatic Int. Count	0.018	0.024	0.060	0.031*	0.077	0.027***
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

In model 8 (Table 9) I test the relationship between the number of third-party state military personnel by year and diplomatic intervention outcome (Singer et al. 1972). As with model 7, I categorize military personnel as a military power variable and expect no significant relationship given models 2 and 5. The results are consistent with the previous empirical results; the coefficients have no consistent direction and do not achieve significance for any diplomatic intervention outcome. The control variables results also remain consistent; unilateral intervention is negative and significant across all outcomes, while diplomatic intervention count is positive and significant for outcomes 2 and 3 only. This finding provides further evidence that hypothesis 2, which posits that military power may positively impact diplomatic intervention outcome, is unsupported.

Table 9 Results for Military Personnel including Political Capacity

Model 8: Military Personnel including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Military Personnel	0.000	.0000	.0000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Political Capacity	0.038	0.038	0.030	0.053	0.003	0.042
Political Capacity Squared	-0.010	0.007	-0.015	0.010	0.005	0.008
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.011	0.005	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.677	1.012***	-2.807	1.080***	-2.741	1.040***
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.031	0.024	0.072	0.034**	0.062	0.027**
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

Models 9 and 10, which include variables measuring third-party state iron and steel production and third-party state energy consumption, respectively, test the most economic-related measures available of the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) component variables. Given the outcome of model 6, models 9 and 10 should show similar results to further support the economic capabilities theory of hypothesis 3.

Model 9 (Table 10) behaves consistently with the expected relationships from previous models. A positive, significant relationship exists between the independent variable, iron and steel production, and outcome 2 (partial settlement) only. The control variables for model 9 also behave consistently with those in model 6. Since the range of the variable is significantly smaller than other, expenditure-based measures, the coefficient will not have as great of an effect on this relationship. The control variable political capacity squared is also unexpectedly negative and significant, while the control variables unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count follow the established pattern of previous models. The coefficient sign of unilateral intervention, however, does

not change to positive in model 9 as it does in model 6. Model 9 provides further support for the economic capabilities hypothesis.

Table 10 Results for Iron and Steel Production including Political Capacity

Model 9: Iron and Steel Production including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Iron and Steel Production	$7.63x10^{-6}$	$6.95x10^{-6}$	.0000	0.000**	$1.76x10^{-6}$	$8.83x10^{-6}$
Political Capacity	0.024	0.036	-0.009	0.056	-0.023	0.040
Political Capacity Squared	-0.011	0.007	-0.020	0.010**	0.003	0.009
Timing	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.010	0.003	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.599	1.011**	-2.535	1.078**	-2.666	1.048**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.036	0.024	0.077	0.033**	0.072	0.027***
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

In model 10 (Table 11), I continue testing of the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) component variables. As with model 9, model 10 tests a production or consumption-based economic indicator, in this case primary energy consumption. Also as with model 9, I expect model 10 to behave similarly in outcome to model 6. The results are consistent with expectations. Primary energy consumption correlates positively with the partial settlement outcome (outcome 2) only. Since the range of this variable is larger than that of iron and steel production, but smaller than other expenditure-based variables, the effect of the coefficient is small, but appreciable. Regarding control variables, there are two differences; unlike models 6 and 9, the political capacity squared variable does not achieve significance. In addition, while unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention fit the pattern of being significant in the expected directions, the sign for unilateral intervention does not change to positive for outcome 3 as it does in model 6.

Both models 9 and 10 have outcomes consistent with the expected relationships. Positive, significant independent relationships exist between both iron and steel production and state energy consumption and the likelihood of achieving outcome 2, partial settlement. The similarity of outcomes between models 6, 7, 9, and 10 provides further support for hypothesis 3.

Table 11 Results for Primary Energy Consumption including Political Capacity

Model 10: Primary Energy Consumption including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Primary Energy Consumption	2.95×10^{-7}	2.44×10^{-7}	8.72×10^{-7}	3.86×10^{-7}**	2.16×10^{-7}	3.05×10^{-7}
Political Capacity	0.026	0.035	0.003	0.054	-0.030	0.040
Political Capacity Squared	-0.011	0.007	-0.020	0.010	0.002	0.008
Timing	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.010	0.001	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.638	1.002***	-2.632	1.083**	-2.650	1.035**
Diplomatic Int. Count	0.036	0.024	0.069	0.032**	0.076	0.027***
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

Models 11 and 12 use the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) variables for total state population and total state urban population. Unlike models 9 and 10, these variables are not direct measures of economic capabilities. They do, however, represent the potential for high state economic capacity, as a large populace provides a larger base for production and consumption. With this in mind, I expect population and urban population to be positively correlated with diplomatic intervention outcome. The results are consistent with my expectations.

Table 12 Results for Total Population including Political Capacity

Model 11: Total Population including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Total Population	$4.85x10^{-6}$	$2.04x10^{-6}$**	$5.00x10^{-6}$	$2.20x10^{-6}$**	$4.17x10^{-6}$	$2.31x10^{-6}$*
Political Capacity	0.000	0.037	0.013	0.050	-0.051	0.042
Political Capacity Squared	-0.009	0.007	-0.012	0.009	0.003	0.008
Timing	-0.000	0.005	0.001	0.011	-0.001	0.007
Timing Squared	$-3.38x10^{-6}$	0.000	-0.000	0.000	$-5.43x10^{-6}$	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.618	1.026**	-2.780	-2.780**	-2.607	1.051**
Diplomatic Int. Count	0.039	0.023*	0.069	.031**	0.078	0.026***
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

Model 11 (Table 12), which uses the variable measuring total third-party state intervenor population, positively correlates with an increased likelihood of all intervention outcomes. All outcomes also achieve significance. The positive significance of the variable across all outcomes is a marked difference from the significant relationship between the independent variable and partial settlement only that is found in models 6, 7, 9, and 10. As with previous models, the large range of the variable allows for the small coefficient to still have sizeable effect on the relationship. The behavior of the control variables in this model is more consistent with model 10; political capacity squared does not achieve significance while unilateral intervention signifies positively across all outcomes and diplomatic intervention count achieves significance at the 5% threshold across only outcomes 2 and 3.

To demonstrate this relationship visually, Figure 1 shows the average marginal effect of the total population variable on the outcome. Because the range of the variable is

large, the coefficient has an appreciable impact. The average marginal effect of an increase in total population produces a smaller likelihood of obtaining an outcome of 0 (no settlement or ongoing conflict) and an increased likelihood of an outcome of 2 (partial settlement).



Figure 1 Average Marginal Effects of Total Population

Model 12 (Table 13), using total state urban population, is similar to model 11; unlike model 11, however, only outcomes 1 and 2 are correlated. The control variables for unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count also behave similarly to model 11. Also, as with model 11, the range of the urban population variable is great, allowing a small coefficient to have a marked impact on the relationship at hand.

Table 13 Results for Total Urban Population including Political Capacity

Model 12: Total Urban Population including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Total Urban Population	0.000	$9.44x10^{-6}$**	.0000	0.000***	0.000	0.000
Political Capacity	-0.005	0.039	-0.051	0.056	-0.060	0.040
Political Capacity Squared	-0.010	0.007	-0.011	0.010	0.003	0.009
Timing	-0.001	0.005	-0.005	0.011	-0.002	0.007
Timing Squared	$-3.00x10^{-6}$	0.000	$-7.45x10^{-6}$	0.000	$-3.51x10^{-6}$	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.573	1.021**	-2.716	1.101**	-2.578	1.051**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.043	0.023*	0.088	0.035**	0.072	0.027***
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; significant at 5%**; ***significant at 1%; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are reported.

As with model 11, I visibly illustrate the relationship of model 12 in Figure 2. The range of total urban population, although smaller than the range total population, is large enough that the coefficient appreciably impacts the relationship. The average marginal effect of an increase in total urban population produces a smaller likelihood of obtaining an outcome of 0 (no settlement or ongoing conflict) and an increased likelihood of an outcome of 2 (partial settlement).



Figure 2 Average Marginal Effects of Urban Population

A notable difference between models 6, 7, 9 and 10 and models 11 and 12 is the significance achieved across most diplomatic intervention outcomes, instead of just for outcome 2, partial settlement. While the outcomes of models 11 and 12 lend support to the economic capability hypothesis, this change in significance across all models may also indicate that other facets of state economic capabilities, such as consumption-based economic potential rather than production-based, may play a greater explanatory role in supporting hypothesis 3.

DISCUSSION

In the previous section I presented the results of models 1-12, which tested my four hypotheses with additional tests of robustness for the findings. In this section I briefly summarize my hypotheses and the resultant findings while also providing a discussion of the outcomes in the context of intrastate diplomatic intervention research. I conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this research and future areas of investigation.

To test my theory, that capabilities of third-party states engaged in diplomatic interventions positively impact the outcome of said interventions, I generated four hypotheses. The first hypothesis tested the relationship between state and non-state actors and diplomatic intervention outcomes (H1). The remaining hypotheses tested state-specific attributes I theorized may play a role in the intervenor-outcome relationship. These are as follows: military power (H2), economic capabilities (H3), and political capacity (H4).

Regarding my first hypothesis, the outcome of model 1 was not consistent with my expectation. Rather than increase the likelihood of preferred diplomatic intervention outcomes, state actors involved in diplomatic intervention decrease the likelihood of all intervention outcomes. There is no support for my hypothesis which suggested that states, just because they are states, are more likely to generate preferred intervention outcomes. This result in in line with Lundgren's (2016) research, which finds that IO's with greater

information gathering and field deployment capacities may outperform other groups as mediators.

Although the results of model 1 suggest that non-state actors may be more effective diplomatic intervenors in intrastate wars, it does not necessarily undermine hypotheses 2-4. All states are not the same and, while they may underperform compared to non-state actors, there still exists a continuum of success and failure regarding intervention outcome that requires further exploration. A study interested in further studying the comparative effectiveness of states versus non-states should consider exploration of the underlying causal mechanisms that drive the results of model 1. By attempting to isolate why non-states may be more effective intervenors, researchers and policy makers alike may be able to increase the effectiveness of state intervenors, or simply have a better understanding of which intervenor may be the most effective in a particular situation.

To test my theory of intervention influence among states only, I used three different aspects of state strength: military power (H2), economic capabilities (H3), and political capacity (H4). The results of the analyses do not provide any support for hypotheses 2 or 4, indicating that the military power or the political capacity of a state may not play a noteworthy role in the intervention and mediation processes. This may be interpreted in several ways. First, it is possible that while these attributes do not play a direct role in the immediate outcomes of diplomatic interventions, they may be at play in other components of the intervention process, such as the ability of a state to offer mediation or execute a diplomatic intervention (Greig and Regan 2008). If this is the case, state influence may be pivotal in bringing all parties together, but not necessarily

indicative of any greater success in outcome. Second, and as noted previously in the analysis section, it is possible that the implicit assurances of influential states that take place during interventions are ineffective when compared to explicit, documented commitments that culminate in ceasefires or settlements. A more formalized mediation taking place with the help of any state actor, regardless of international influence, may be more effective than informal mediations undertaken by powerful states.

Of my three, state-specific hypotheses, the only hypothesis that received consistent significant results was hypothesis three, which speculated an existing relationship between state economic capabilities and diplomatic intervention outcome. Specifically, four direct indicators of economic capability (models 6, 7, 9, and 10) exhibited positive, significant relationships between the measure of economic capability and the likelihood of partial settlement only (there existed no significant relationship between ceasefire or full settlement). The prevalence of this particular relationship is compelling. This association indicates that some aspects of the economic capacity of intervenor states may be sufficient to lead conflicting parties to a more defined resolution than a ceasefire, in the form of partial settlement, but are not influential enough to contribute to the preferred outcome, full settlement. It may be that the impact of economically influential states only goes so far in negotiations and that variables related to other aspects of the conflict or warring parties themselves may play a greater role in achieving the most preferred diplomatic intervention outcome. If this is the case, additional research on the subject should examine what additional intervenor or conflict-level variables, in addition to the economic capacities of the intervenor state, may bring about a higher likelihood of the most desirable intervention outcome.

Combining the findings of models 6, 7, 9, and 10 with the findings of models 11 and 12, it is clear that there is some support for the hypothesis that aspects of third-party state economic capability may positively influence diplomatic intervention outcome. From the variables tested, both production- and consumption-based indicators lend evidence to this relationship. Combining this with the insignificant relationships of my other hypotheses, the findings indicate that if some aspect of a state intervenor may be taken into account with the likely efficacy of the intervention in mind, economically productive states may be the best choice. Conversely, states that are military powerful or have high political capacity may not be any more effective intervenors than low- to mid-capacity states.

Finally, while I discussed the specific model-by-model outcomes previously, I am now addressing the general patterns and relevance of the control variables throughout models 1-12. With some exceptions, the control variables for diplomatic intervention count and the dichotomous variable for unilateral intervention achieved significance in the expected direction throughout. While unilateral intervention appears to hamper the likelihood of preferred diplomatic intervention outcome, the number of diplomatic interventions in a conflict increases the likelihood of preferred outcomes. The persistent significance of these variables indicates that these are relevant factors that may impact intervention outcome, and thus should be included as factors in the analysis.

The control variable with the greatest impact is the addition of political capacity indicators in models not directly testing political capacity as an independent variable. As noted in the results section, the inclusion of political capacity modifies the previously non-significant relationship testing economic capabilities and diplomatic intervention

outcome and the resultant outcome is a relationship between the tested economic capability measures and the likelihood of a partial settlement outcome. The observance of this suppressed relationship, as well as the collinearity between the political capacity indicator and economic capabilities variable, calls for caution in the above analysis, but the continued observed relationship remains valuable for examination.

There are many limitations to this research. Foremost, intrastate wars are complicated, multifaceted occurrences that have been explored academically in a multitude of ways. I do not account for many extant theories which propose variables that may also influence conflict outcome. These include: the role conflict-type may play in outcome generation (Sambanis 2000; Fearon 2004; Cederman et al. 2010), non-state third-party actors (Fortna 2004; Lundgren 2016), and intervention timing (Regan and Stam 2000; Regan 2002), among many other factors. By not accounting for some of these variables, the explanatory power of my models may be lacking and other relationships may not be apparent. In a similar vein, my treatment of all diplomatic interventions as interchangeable may also impact the viability and outcomes of the data. Consensual mediations, informal or formal negotiations, diplomatic recall, and international forums are each undertaken with different terms and expectations; disregarding the differences among these tactics may not allow for the theories of my hypotheses to be evident.

Future research may proceed in many different directions. With this work, I explore aspects of third-party state intervenors that may positively impact diplomatic intervention outcome. Continuing with this, further analysis of the economic capabilities hypothesis, for which some support is given in this paper, may reinforce the findings of this paper while also expanding on which specific aspects of state economic ability (and

thus which states themselves) may best impact diplomatic intervention outcome. Widening the scope of this paper, it may also be useful to be able to make similar comparisons as drawn in this paper concerning the capabilities and effectiveness of third-party non-state actors. If, as I find in hypothesis 1, non-state actors may be more effective actors in diplomatic interventions, the efficacy of non-state actors may be a topic of increased interest.

CONCLUSION

This paper aims to explore a distinctive facet of the relationship between third-party diplomatic intervention and diplomatic intervention outcome. Specifically, I focus on how the capabilities of third-party state actors may play a role in the final outcomes of diplomatic interventions. The diplomatic focus of this research is intentional; while structural interventions by third-parties may result in an increase in hostilities to bring about conflict termination, diplomatic interventions emphasize tactics that seek to decrease violence from the outset. By studying which actors have the highest likelihood of achieving preferred intervention outcomes, researchers and policymakers alike may be able to hone in on the most effective and peaceful processes for civil war termination.

Bearing the above in mind, I hypothesized at the beginning of this paper that third-party state power, in a variety of forms, may influence diplomatic intervention outcome. My findings offer mixed results. The analysis for two of the most conspicuous forms of international state influence—military power and political capacity—indicates no relevant relationship exists, while the relationship for the third hypothesized influence, economic capabilities, gives promising, yet limited, support. The results suggest that economic variables related to levels of third-party state consumption and production may increase the likelihood of preferred diplomatic intervention outcome, but this relationship stands for partial settlement only.

The results of this analysis are both puzzling and motivational. Additional research concentrating on the effect of economically influential states may provide

further insight into how state actors may effectively wield their international influence for diplomatic purposes. Furthermore, it is possible that various facets of state power, and thus powerful states themselves, may play effective roles in diplomatic intervention that manifest in areas other than directly on outcome. More research is necessary to understand how third-party states may effectively play a role in civil war diplomatic interventions.

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APPENDIX A

Table A.1 Tabulation of State and Non-State Actors

Tabulation of State and Non-State Actors

Third party Intervening State or Group	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Algeria	1	0.23	0.23
Arab League	2	0.47	0.70
Belgium	1	0.23	0.93
Benin	1	0.23	1.17
Brazil	2	0.47	1.63
British Commonwealth	3	0.70	2.33
CIS- Summit	1	0.23	2.56
CSCE	1	0.23	2.80
Cambodia	2	0.47	3.26
Canada	2	0.47	3.73
Canada, Netherlands, Norway	1	0.23	3.96
Carter Center	2	0.47	4.43
Carter Center & Tanzania	3	0.70	5.13
Catholic Church	23	5.36	10.49
Catholic Church, Kenya, and Zimbabwe	2	0.47	10.96
Catholic Church, Zimbabwe, and Kenya	3	0.70	11.66
Colombia	1	0.23	11.89
Congo	1	0.23	12.12
Cuba	3	0.70	12.82
DRC	3	0.70	13.52
Djibouti	4	0.93	14.45
Dominica	1	0.23	14.69
EC	7	1.63	16.32
ECOWAS	11	2.56	18.88
Egypt	8	1.86	20.75
Egypt, Libya	1	0.23	20.98
Ethiopia	6	1.40	22.38
France	5	1.17	23.54
France, Ger, Russia, UK, US	1	0.23	23.78
Gabon	4	0.93	24.71
Ghana	5	1.17	25.87
Ghana and Nigeria	1	0.23	26.11
IGADD	11	2.56	28.67
IGADD, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea	1	0.23	28.90
IGADD/Kenya	1	0.23	29.14
India	11	2.56	31.70
Indonesia	1	0.23	31.93
Indonesia & OIC	1	0.23	32.17
Indonesia, OIC	1	0.23	32.40
Intl. Org. of Americas	1	0.23	32.63

Iran	4	0.93	33.57
Islamic Conference	1	0.23	33.80
Italy	10	2.33	36.13
Japan and Thailand	1	0.23	36.36
Jordan	1	0.23	36.60
Kenya	6	1.40	38.00
Kenya and Zimbabwe	1	0.23	38.23
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Catholic Church	1	0.23	38.46
Kuwait	2	0.47	38.93
Liberian Council of Churches	2	0.47	39.39
Libya	7	1.63	41.03
Mali	1	0.23	41.26
Mexico	1	0.23	41.49
Nicaragua	1	0.23	41.72
Nigeria	4	0.93	42.66
Norway	2	0.47	43.12
OAS	3	0.70	43.82
OAU	15	3.50	47.32
OIC	5	1.17	48.48
OIC, Iran, Pakistan	1	0.23	48.72
OSCE	1	0.23	48.95
Pakistan and UN	1	0.23	49.18
Paraguay	1	0.23	49.42
Peace in Algeria	1	0.23	49.65
Poland	1	0.23	49.88
Russia	8	1.86	51.75
Russia, CSCE	1	0.23	51.98
Russia, Iran, UN	1	0.23	52.21
Russia, OSCE	1	0.23	52.45
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan	1	0.23	52.68
Solomon Islands	1	0.23	52.91
Somalia	1	0.23	53.15
South Africa	8	1.86	55.01
Soviet Union	1	0.23	55.24
Spain	4	0.93	56.18
Sudan	3	0.70	56.88
Sudan, Iraq, Morocco	1	0.23	57.11
Swaziland	1	0.23	57.34
Switzerland	1	0.23	57.58
Syria	2	0.47	58.04
Tajikistan	1	0.23	58.28
Tanzania	10	2.33	60.61
Tanzania, UN	2	0.47	61.07
Thailand	2	0.47	61.54
Turkey	1	0.23	61.77
UK	12	2.80	64.57
UK and UN	1	0.23	64.80
UK, France	1	0.23	65.03
UK, US	3	0.70	65.73
UK, USSR	1	0.23	65.97
UN	64	14.92	80.89
UN & EC	8	1.86	82.75
UN & friends to peace process	2	0.47	83.22
UN (Burma)	1	0.23	83.45
UN (Finland)	1	0.23	83.68
UN (Finland), US	1	0.23	83.92
UN, ECOWAS	1	0.23	84.15

UN, OAU	1	0.23	84.38
US	42	9.79	94.17
US and UN	1	0.23	94.41
US, Fr, OAU	1	0.23	94.64
US, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic	1	0.23	94.87
US, Mex, Argentina, Panama	1	0.23	95.10
US, UK	1	0.23	95.34
US, UK, Fr, Italy, Ger, Russia	1	0.23	95.57
US, UN	3	0.70	96.27
UTO/UN	1	0.23	96.50
Uganda	3	0.70	97.20
Ukraine	1	0.23	97.44
Vatican (Roman Catholic)	1	0.23	97.67
WCC (World Council of Churches)	1	0.23	97.90
West Germany	1	0.23	98.14
Yugoslavia	1	0.23	98.37
Zambia	1	0.23	98.60
Zambia, S. Africa	3	0.70	99.30
Zimbabwe	1	0.23	99.53
Zimbabwe, Botswana	2	0.47	100.00
Total	429	100.00	

APPENDIX B

Models 2-6 with Contiguity Variable

Table B.1 Results for Military Power Model

Model 2: Military Power

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Military Power	1.546	2.430	4.380	3.318	-3.184	3.096
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.010	0.003	0.006
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-1.999	0.759***	-2.062	0.856**	-2.025	0.783**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.042	0.410*	0.079	0.034**	0.067	0.026**
Contiguity	0.453	0.410	0.056	0.608	0.173	0.471
Observations	240		240		240	

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (military power), two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

Table B.2 Results for Economic Capabilities Model

Model 3: Economic Capabilities

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Economic Capabilities	3.79×10^{-6}	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Timing	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.010	0.001	0.006
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-1.880	0.756	-2.011	0.842**	-1.878	0.779**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.029	0.023	0.061	0.032	0.060	0.027**
Contiguity	0.348	0.467	0.804	0.716	0.375	0.535
Observations	228		228		228	

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (economic capabilities), two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

Table B.3 Results for Political Capabilities Model

Model 4: Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Political Capacity	0.046	0.033	0.055	0.046	-0.167	0.037
Political Capacity Squared	-0.009	0.007	-0.011	0.010	0.005	0.009
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.010	0.003	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.676	1.024***	-2.857	1.091***	-2.687	1.051**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.030	0.023	0.059	0.031	0.070	0.027**
Contiguity	0.215	0.436	0.222	0.601	0.301	0.520
Observations	240		240		240	

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (political capacity) two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

Table B.4 Results for Military Power including Political Capacity

Model 5: Military Power including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Military Power	1.935	3.139	6.191	4.125	-4.215	3.986
Political Capacity	0.034	0.037	0.034	0.052	-0.003	0.040
Political Capacity Squared	-0.009	0.007	-0.015	0.011	0.006	0.009
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.006	0.010	0.004	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.673	1.029***	-2.808	1.096**	-2.755	1.058***
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.033	0.024	0.071	0.034**	0.064	0.027**
Contiguity	0.296	0.441	0.321	0.629	0.273	0.521
Observations	238		238		238	

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (military power) two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.

Table B.5 Results for Economic Capabilities including Political Capacity

Model 6: Economic Capabilities including Political Capacity

	Ceasefire		Partial Settlement		Full Settlement	
	Base Outcome: No Settlement and Ongoing Conflict					
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Economic Capabilities	-7.06×10^{-6}	0.000	0.000	0.000**	8.58×10^{-6}	0.000
Political Capacity	0.058	0.036	0.031	0.049	-0.005	0.040
Political Capacity Squared	-0.008	0.009	0.031	0.049*	0.003	0.010
Timing	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.010	0.003	0.007
Timing Squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000
Unilateral Intervention	-2.582	1.022**	-2.733	1.085**	-2.575	1.045**
Diplomatic Intervention Count	0.017	0.024	0.052	0.033	0.054	0.027**
Contiguity	0.204	0.475	0.621	0.692	0.328	0.543
Observations	226		226		226	

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; one-tailed test for independent variable (economic capabilities), two-tailed test for control variables. Robust standard errors are reported.