

THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HAITIAN DIASPORA IN THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI

by

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## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my lovely Mom, Marie Imène Vital, who is living the rest of her days in a nursing room. You deeply inspired me when you tried to learn how to write and spell your name in your fifties. You made me believe that I can overthrow any barriers if I work hard enough.

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## ABSTRACT

It has been over a century since Haiti proclaimed its independence from France, but the nation still struggles to find a way to sustain its development. From an authoritarian governmental system to democracy, Haiti is widely known to be the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. As globalization opens doors for new opportunities, skilled Haitian professionals as well as professionals from other developing countries take advantage of those opportunities. However, the politics of repression of the Duvaliers (Papa Doc and Baby Doc) (1957-1986) and the failure of Haitian governments during the last three decades have encouraged not only the departure of those skilled professionals, but also have created a massive internal and external migration within the country. As a result, human resources in Haiti, which are a significant asset to the development of the country, become scarce. This research aims at analyzing the causes of the Haitian mass exodus, which is a major “Brain Drain”, and proposing methods to leverage and empower the Haitian Diaspora to participate in the improvement of their own homeland.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UEH	State University of Haiti
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
PNEF	Plan National of Education and Training
ESSA	Every Student Success Act
NCLB	Non-Child Left Behind
GERM	Global Education Reform Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
DEED	Economic Development for a Sustainable Environment
IHRC	Interim Haitian Recovery Commission
DNE	National Department of Education
MENFP	Ministry of National Education Professional and Training
IPN	National Pedagogical Institute
PROMEDLAC	Principal Education Project for Latin America and Caribbean
BID	Inter-American Development Bank
MENJS	Ministry of National Education Youth and Sport

EFANAS	Education for All National Action Strategies
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
NOAH	National organization for the Advancement of Haitians
AMHE	Association des Médecins Haïtiens à l’Etranger
HTA	Home Town Associations
MHAVE	Ministry of the Haitians Living Abroad
TPS	Temporary Protected Status

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Solemnly, on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1804, Haiti proclaimed its independence as the first free black nation and the second free nation in the Western Hemisphere after the United States. Since the founding of the nation, little has been done to accelerate sustainable development of Haiti. It is important to note that Haiti obtained its independence in a particular manner; by fighting the most powerful and most well-equipped country at that time, France, while still under slavery, which meant not having access to education or military training. Like other poor countries, socio-economic, educational situations, and political conflicts in Haiti are the key issues that potentially motivate stakeholders, teachers, students and skilled professionals to emigrate abroad (Higazi, 2005).

“Haiti’s fragility cannot be blamed on its geography or its demography, but rather on its history” (Crane et al., 2010, p. 9). Forced to pay an indemnity to its former colonizer for properties lost during the slave’s rebellion, Haiti became entrapped in a cycle of poverty and misgovernment from which it never emerged (Crane et al., 2010). In 1915, a U.S intervention that lasted for 19 years left behind a heavy legacy of an abusive military (Crane et al., 2010). The period between December 1956 and September 1957 with the installation of Francois Duvalier as president, was marked by political instability (Metz, 2001). Reigning for fourteen years, Duvalier and his henchmen instituted a system of political repression and used many techniques such as prison, torture, intimidation, and exile to eliminate opponents (Metz, 2001; Loescher & Scanlan, 1984). The flow of Haitians fleeing the country to ensure their personal security increased drastically and

constituted the first wave of Haitian emigration (Metz, 2001; Loescher & Scanlan, 1984). Further, Loescher & Scanlan (1984) argue that little effort has been made by the government to eradicate this outflow. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reported more than 55,000 Haitian "boat people" arrived in Florida between 1972 and 1980, and 50 percent of them fled from being detected by *Tonton macoutes*, a nationwide paramilitary force created by Duvalier that was directly responsible to report people identified as opponents to the government (Metz, 2001). Built by Francois Duvalier in 1957 as a tool to repress dissent, *Tonton macoutes* became a government tool to despotically rule the country (Fatton Jr, 2005). Even after the overthrow of Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, *Tonton macoutes* remained operational, attacking a church in Port au Prince, killing nine people and wounding some 77 others (Stevens, 2005). The military regime (1991-1994) was marked by an intense rate of displacement within Haiti as a result of chaos and political instability perpetrated by army repression; thousands of Haitians were held at Guantanamo in Cuba, an American military base, asking for refugee status (Metz, 2001). Averill (1994) notes, "The common distinction between political and economic refugees is of little help understanding the Haitian situation" (p. 255).

To a considerable extent, development and reconstruction – social and economic – could not have been reached because the money that should have been spent on reconstruction and development was swallowed by debt repayments to foreign banks (Macintyre, 2010). Further complicating matters, according to the U.S. State Department (1980) cited by Loescher & Scanlan (1984) "corruption is traditional at all levels of the society, and a significant amount of domestic revenues usable for development continue



to be diverted to personal enrichment” (p. 317). Consequently, the impoverishment of the population increased, and the economy was destroyed (Macintyre, 2010). In addition to political turmoil and violence, the domestic economic situation in Haiti affects both internal displacement, and emigration flows (Shellman & Stewart, 2007).

The most recent major earthquake on January 12, 2010 devastated the country of Haiti, mainly the capital, Port au Prince. It killed approximately 230,000 people and injured over 300,000 more (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). This quake was among the most catastrophic disasters in the last decades. It drove a sizeable number of the Haitian population to leave in pursuit of better lives. Approximately three million people were affected and more than 1.2 million displaced (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). South Florida served as a host for critically injured survivors and for 263,000 school-aged children (Sapat & Esnard, 2013). The earthquake, hurricanes, droughts, and deforestation caused deterioration and damage to agricultural production, the backbone of the economy (Fischer & Levy, 2011). The agricultural sector alone represents more than twenty-five percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country and more than fifty percent of jobs in rural areas (Fischer & Levy, 2011). Due to natural disasters and other fundamental basic problems, many professionals lost their jobs and many peasants lost their sources of revenue mostly gained from the agricultural sector (Fischer & Levy, 2011). Therefore, unable to sustain themselves, unemployed Haitians looked elsewhere for other opportunities. Brazil and Chile were selected as new emigration targets (Da Silva, 2013).

The Haitian education system has been unaccountable and remains unable to sustain itself in terms of school equity and quality (Salmi, 2000). This lack of school

equity and quality results from a shortage of human resources and substandard school facilities caused by the political, economic and natural disasters factors described above (Salmi, 2000). With a capacity of 3,000 seats, the State University of Haiti (UEH) is unable to receive the 15,000 high school graduates every year. Furthermore, because of their inadequate quality and their high tuition fees, private universities are not an option envisaged by sizable numbers of students (Joseph, 2013). Therefore, most of those high school graduates prefer to attend universities in the Dominican Republic with a higher probability of getting hired after receiving their degree. Joseph (2013) notes that 73.5 percent of students abroad in the Dominican Republic are Haitian. Haiti is suffering from losing large numbers of competent professionals in all domains, who migrate mostly to the United States, Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic (Toussaint-Comeau, 2002; Wah, 2013).

### **Purpose of the study**

The purpose of this research is to analyze the causes of the Haitian mass exodus and diagnose different impacts this phenomenon has on Haitians. Few studies have been conducted on the matter and many did not analyze it through the perspective of stimulating skilled Haitians to return and help their country to reach sustainable development as one the millennium objectives for developing countries (Sachs, 2012). This study, in fact, proposes an eventual plan through which recommendations are provided to the Haitian government to decrease the mass exodus while stimulating skilled Haitian professionals to give back to Haiti. Thus, two approaches are considered as theoretical frameworks for this research. The first approach is by McDonnell and Elmore (1987) as a mechanism that translates alternative policy goals into concrete action. The

second approach is that of MacLaughlin (1987) that emphasizes the local concept of policy-directed change as a matter of capacity and will.

### **Educational Policy Trajectory**

Haiti, like many other developing “countries that are built upon the continuum of policy transfer inherited from colonization, mirrored some of its policy choices of the former colonial power in different sectors including education” (Johnson, 2006, p. 679). Based on the legacy that former colonies inherited from their colonial powers, Johnson (2006) brings five metaphors to describe the policy transfer that shapes educational trajectories of developing countries: “telling, rebelling, compelling, selling and gelling”. It is not necessarily true that all five elements are present in all individual former colonies; but it is to be expected that some of these elements should be present even though each country has their own cultural-historical aspects (Johnson, 2006).

### **Definitions of these Five Metaphors and the Application to the Haitian Education**

The first metaphor is the ‘politics of telling’, referring to the idea of imposed educational transfer. “Such a politics is a continuation of colonial educational policies that affect the occupied territories” (Johnson, 2006, p. 680; Tan, 2010, p. 1). Tan (2010) notes that “the ‘politics of rebelling’ often takes place in postcolonial relationships, ranging from policy review and renewal to complete rejection” (p. 1). Applicable for mostly poor and indebted countries, the third metaphor, ‘politics of compelling’, seen in a neo-colonial context, refers to constraining negotiation of developing countries to force the international donor community to accept their relationships (Johnson, 2006; Tan, 2010). The ‘politics of selling’ as a metaphor describes the control of international educational markets to force the adaptation of educational policies as part of the larger

globalization efforts (Johnson, 2006; Tan, 2010). The last metaphor, ‘politics of gelling’, is a melting of indigenous and foreign resources of knowledge from which a new concept of economy of knowledge emerges and evolves (Johnson, 2006; Tan, 2010).

The system of Haitian education was patterned by the politics of telling from the colonization period through an imposed model designed and monitored by a small centralized, authoritarian, and bureaucratic elite (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010) to serve a minority group, especially children of the political elite, predominantly in urban areas (Salmi, 2000). According to Luzincourt & Gulbrandson (2010) “France, in fact, gave more social, economic, and legal liberties to those with lighter skin color and with knowledge of French language” (p. 6).

A remarkable period in the history of the American occupation (1915-1934) was the Haitian education and educational policy. Angulo (2011) argues that the occupation had power over almost all aspects of the Haitian government except education. However, Farnham, who was the Vice President of National City Bank of New York and of Banque Nationale in Haiti, knew quite a bit about Haiti, and proposed the invasion and occupation of Haiti to profit Wall Street speculators. Farnham’s vision for Haiti was to train Haitians to provide a labor force that supported American financial and economic interests (Angulo, 2011). For some scholars, the policy of implementation of technical schools of agriculture by the United States was a giant step toward democratizing the Haitian education system (Al-Bataineh & Nur-Awaleh, 2005). For many Haitians, it was interpreted as “being intellectually inferior and being kept in a subordinate position academically and economically” (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010, p.7). Thus, such a policy created the period of “rebellious” with a radical shift in the ideology of education

and political classes promoted by the emergence of a movement in the 1930s called ‘*noirisme*’<sup>1</sup> (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010). Initiated by many Haitians, the movement called for the rejection of European civilization to instead embrace African culture with Creole as a language of instruction and a strong black leadership (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010). The results of the *noirisme* ideology led to Dumarsais Estimé as the first black president during the post-occupation period (St Hubert, 2014) and later produced the Duvalier administration as *leitmotif* to undertake education reform, but the new policy unfortunately did not create opportunities in the education system for all Haitians (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010).

Salmi (2000) notes that during 1940, some efforts were deployed by the government to change the educational policies in terms of expanding educational coverage to better adapt to the Haitian reality. Such efforts were nevertheless neglected and became worse during the Duvalier era due to his political persecution that caused many qualified teachers to leave Haiti (Salmi, 2000). Haitian public schools adopted the curriculum of France that prioritizes a teacher-centered approach instead of a student-centered approach (McNulty, 2011; Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010; Piasentin, 2016) where teachers tend to lecture to passive students who are likely to memorize instead of understand the contents (Hebblethwaite, 2012). “The systems are marked by the influence of the more centralized French system, where the administrative civil service takes a more prominent role in the running education system” (Johnson, 2006, p. 685). Additionally, rural areas are neglected by the education system. Although 70 percent of

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<sup>1</sup> Noiriste, a form of political and cultural ideology that grew out of indigenism, which in turn was a reaction to the American occupation of 1915-34

the population presently live in rural areas, only 20 percent of the total education-related expenditures reaches these rural areas (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010).

The Haitian educational trajectory shows alternating periods of policy debate about shifting to the Haitian mother language, Creole, which is spoken by 100 percent of Haitians, instead of keeping French as the dominant instructional language. On one hand, authors in favor of French dominance, Youssef (2002) and Francis (2005), claim that for Haiti to have access to international communities, funds, products, and institutions, French-dominant instruction language should be prioritized (Hebblethwaite, 2012). Youssef (2002) argues that “modern communications have evolved to a level such that we need a language of maximum communicability, and there is a need for Caribbean people to embrace both varieties of language, the Standard and the Creole, as their own” (p. 185). They advocated that French could help avoid a condition of isolation that Creole education might have created (Hebblethwaite, 2012).

On the other hand, scholars such as Dejean (2006) argue that, “with French-dominant education, 95 percent of Haitians who speak only Creole remain isolated inside of their own country” (as cited by Hebblethwaite 2012, p. 272). Further, Efron (1954) argues that “Haitians are more isolated by their illiteracy than they would be if they adopted a Creole school system and achieved universal Creole literacy and with it the expansion of societal knowledge” (as cited by Hebblethwaite 2012, p. 272).

Despite the majority of the population, which includes professional and social classes, displaying their preference for Creole speaking (Efron, 1954; Lofficial, 1979; Dejean, 1993), and despite the Haitian minister of education, Joseph Bernard, advocating for educational reform in favor of Creole-dominant language instruction, Dejean (1993)

asserted that when it comes to international trade, formal education, government speaking in official occasion, and literature, French is still considered the preferred language (Hebblethwaite 2012). In the current constitution, however, both Creole and French are recognized as official languages, but the constitution did not prescribe which should be the language of instruction (Hebblethwaite, 2012). Given the constitution of 1978 calls Creole “the sole language that unites all Haitians” because it is spoken by all Haitians, many scholars and stakeholders have highly encouraged that policymakers clearly enact policy in the direction of Creole to be the medium of instruction (Hebblethwaite, 2012, Dejean, 2010). Still, due to group interests and lack of political will of Haitian governments and parliaments, the efforts that were made to implement this reform have come to naught (Hebblethwaite, 2012).

### **Analysis of the Migration Impact and Educational Policies on Haitian “Brain-Drain”**

The migration and educational policies leading to the Haitian migration will be analyzed at two levels. First, the four instruments of McDonell and Elmore’s (1987) approach will be used to analyze the Haitian education system. Second, McLaughlin’s (1987) approach of will and capacity will target the executive and legislative branches’ ability to enact rules and policies.

#### **Research questions**

The focus of this research is to address the following questions:

- 1) What are applicable methods and/or practices that could be implemented to reduce the current rate of the Haitian mass exodus and decrease the “brain drain” phenomenon?

- 2) How could the Haitian government leverage and empower skilled Haitians abroad and stimulate them to return and participate in rebuilding their homeland along with other Haitians living in Haiti?



## CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF HAITI AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this literature review is to provide context and historical background on how slavery took place in Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic) and how this practice shaped the future of the entire island. When hearing the word “Haiti”, poverty and “boat people” are the two concepts that come to people’s minds. This chapter aims to present another facet of Haiti and its journey from slavery to its current status. First, I contextualize Haitian slavery and show the benefits of such traffic for the European empires. Second, I proceed to demonstrate the hardships that the slaves went through and circumstances through which they freed themselves. Third, I explore the meaning of the revolution and demonstrate how superpower countries took advantage of the newborn nation. Fourth, I emphasize the context of the Haitian migration and the conditions that facilitate this growing movement. Fifth, I present the current state of Haiti that stems from the demise of Jean Claude Duvalier, which is considered as a second independence by most Haitians. Finally, I attempt to situate the education system during all these contexts and explore the relationships between society and education, and how policies have affected schools in Haiti.

### **The Context of Slavery in the Colony**

Slavery was instilled across the Atlantic region for almost three centuries before the Haitian revolution in 1804. According to Farmer (2006), “Cultivation of the difficult sugar cane required slaves, and for this, the enterprising colonists turned toward Africa. Transatlantic traffic in humans began in earnest in 1517 in Africa” (p. 54) after “half a

million Arawak Indians had been exterminated in the Spanish gold mines” (Jenkins, 2001, p. 904). By 1517, Charles V authorized the export of 15,000 slaves to the Saint-Domingue, and thus priest and King launched on the world the American slave trade and slavery” (Jenkins, 2001, p. 904). Twenty-three years after, the number of African slaves imported into Hispaniola doubled, reaching 30,000 (Farmer, 2006). “In terms of wealth procured to Paris and in terms of influence of agriculture and commerce... Saint-Domingue became the chief port-of-call for the slave trade” (Farmer, 2006, p. 56). Farmer (2006) writes that “between 1784 and 1791, the average annual import was 29,000 slaves. The small territory was by then home to almost half of all slaves held in the Caribbean colonies” (p. 56).

Jenkins (2001) notes “after nearly one hundred years of Spanish, British, and French fighting over the island, Spain ceded Saint-Domingue, now Haiti, to France in 1695 by the treaty of Ryswick” (p. 940). Unlike the Spaniards who were mostly focused on gold, according to Farmer (2006), “the newcomers were more interested in agriculture” (p. 55). Among diverse worldwide agricultural productions in the colony, such as coffee, rum, cotton, and indigo, “sugar cane was the focal point” for Paris (Rigueur, 2011, p. 30). “Between 1730 and 1760, Saint-Domingue became “*L’Isle àj Sucre*” par excellence” (Trouillot, 1982, p. 336). Debien (1943) rightly assessed the situation of the times:

Since the destruction of the cacao fields - around 1736 - and the retrogression of indigo, in the middle of the eighteenth century, there was not any country in the world more completely attached to one crop than Saint-Domingue to sugar-cane (cited by Trouillot, 1982, p. 336).

In other words, three-fourth of the world's sugar came from Saint-Domingue, which was the richest and busiest trade center in all the Caribbean colonies (Farmer, 2006). Trouillot (1982) noted:

French natives from aristocratic or bourgeois families who had accumulated capital or acquired credit came in growing numbers. By the late 1740's, many colonists who did not inherit the particle, the first sign of nobility, had enough money to buy a Vicomte de, a Marquise de for themselves, or for their sons or daughters (p. 371).

Additionally, Farmer (2006) asserts “the slaves made the French traders and planters quite wealthy, and in the process generated enormous revenue for France” (p. 55). “By 1789, Saint-Domingue supplied two-thirds of the overseas trade of France and was the greatest individual market for the European slave trade” (Jenkins, 2001, p. 940). With such an agricultural empire, France did everything in its power to consolidate the subjugation of slaves and maintained the status quo in the colony. Eric Williams (1970) describes the structures of classes in the colony in those terms:

The first was the planters, the big whites...they were restless under the Exclusive<sup>2</sup>. The second was the royal officials, the representative of the Exclusive, the symbols of the denial of the self-governing institutions. Then came the poor whites, the overseers, artisans, professional men, hating the planters above, determined to maintain the bridge that separated them from the men of color below. Below them came the fourth class, the mulattos and free Negroes, ... possessing one-third of the real estate and one-fourth of the private property in the

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<sup>2</sup> Exclusive is the system, through specific laws, controlled the commerce of the French colonies.

colony, but denied social and political equality with the whites. Finally, there were...the slaves, many of them only recently arrived from Africa, the foundation on which the prosperity and superiority of Saint-Domingue rested (cited by Farmer, 2006, p. 58).

So, as Quijano (2000) argues, two historical processes of the fundamental axes of power are the social classification of the world's population around the idea of race as an expression of establishment of the colonial domination and the modern concept of Eurocentric capitalism. First, "The idea of race does not have a known history before the colonization of America. Perhaps it originated in reference to the phenotypic differences between conquerors and conquered" (Quijano, 2000, p. 534). According to Quijano, (2000) "the conquered and the dominated people were situated in a natural position of inferiority and, as a result, their phenotypic traits as well as their cultural features were considered inferior" (p. 535).

The second aspect that justified slavery based on the fact that "from the very beginning of the colonization of America, Europeans associated unpaid or non-waged labor with the dominated races because they were inferior races" (Quijano, 2000, p. 538). In other words, "the unpaid labor developed among the Europeans the perception that paid labor was the white's privilege...and the controlled groups [originally American Indians, blacks, and in more complex way, the mestizos] were obligated to work for the profit of the privilege groups, their owners" (Quijano, 2000, p. 539). As Quijano (2000) mentions, the slavery system was articulated on all historic forms of labor control around the capitalist wage-labor relation, but justified by the racist model of universal classification of the world population. In short, "the colonizers exercised diverse

operations... to expropriate the cultural discoveries of the colonized peoples most apt for the development of the capitalism to the profit of the European center” (Quijano, 2000, p. 540-541).

### **The Context of the Revolution**

“The path between determinism and voluntarism is often a thin one, but it is in the ambiguity of their relationships, in the minute dysfunctions of the structure, that men and women seize their opportunities and create history” (Trouillot, 1982, p. 383). The Haitian revolution could not have been possible without putting in context the production of coffee that Trouillot (1982) called “the coffee revolution” (p. 337). Coffee played a leading role by “introducing a new dimension into the opposition between the nobles and non-nobles” (Trouillot, 1982, p. 371). In the middle of eighteenth century, the production of coffee increased tremendously and “changed the locus from the Indian Ocean [where Dutch coffee production led for almost two centuries] to the Caribbean, that is, to peripheries geopolitically more integrated within the world-economy” (p. 340).

The local climate and topography for growing coffee were optimal in the mountainous parts of the colony, where most freedmen and men of color [*les hommes de couleur*] acquired small mountain and mid-altitude lands unwanted by planters (Trouillot, 2006). This “natural environment presented some relative advantages to these potential coffee growers” Trouillot, 2006, p. 343). As a result, according to Trouillot (2006), “between 1776 and 1789, slightly for more than two decades, the volume of coffee exported from the colony quadrupled while sugar export volumes rose at a lower rate” (p. 331). In addition, Trouillot (2006) asserted that, “values from coffee exports sextupled,

thereby matching the values of white sugar and equaling more than two-thirds of the hitherto unmatched values from coarse sugar” (p. 331)

According to Trouillot (2006), the coffee boom was based on three main groups or categories: “the Whites of moderate resources who did not own sugar plantations but, up to the 1760’s, lived off the socioeconomic complex of sugar, freedmen of color, and the newcomers who came after the Peace of Paris” (p. 349). According to Trouillot (2006), “the extension of coffee production and the demographic “takeover” by freedmen occurred in the same rhythm and in the same time frame... In late eighteenth-century Saint-Domingue, where there were freedmen, there was coffee” (p. 354). So, one of the biggest challenges that the colony faced was the “growth of the population and the spread of settlers in zones of the colony hitherto uninhabited” (Trouillot 2006, p. 364).

Unhappy with both the local administration and Paris, according to Trouillot (2006), “coffee growers, by allying across color lines, had shaken the colonial bureaucracy, disturbed the power structure and, ... created new turbulence in the system” (p. 368). In 1769, Mulattoes and free Blacks constituted the mass of the rebel bands, joined by White rebels “*Petit-Blancs*,” were marching about the country (Trouillot, 2006, p. 365). As a result, this protest, known as “Whites revolt”, “was triggered by the local administration’s decision to reinstate the militia” (Trouillot, 2006, p. 368). This rebellion “created a fissure between coffee growers and the influential sector of sugar plantocracy, but also created conditions that would influence the turn of events leading to the Haitian Revolution” (Trouillot, 2006, p. 368).

The Haitian Revolution was also facilitated by the French Revolution of 1789, which triggered some tensions among the factions of the colonial ruling class. These

tensions led to an open conflict, which fueled the rebellion of slaves in August 1791 (Hallward, 2007). To contain the white rebellion seeking more independence from Paris, the commissioner Sonthonax “offered permanent freedom to the slave armies in exchange to their support” (Hallward, 2007, p. 10). As Farmer (2006) mentions, “revolts, alleged poisoning of Whites, arson, and the standard battery of slave abuse led slowly to the explosion” (p. 60). Knight (2000) reports the determination and will of the slaves as follows:

The hundreds of thousands of African slaves and tens of thousands of legally defined free coloreds found the hallowed wisdom ... to be a despicably inconvenient barrier to their quest for individual and collective liberty. Their sentiments were motivated not only by the difference of geography and culture but also by a difference of race and condition...within fifteen turbulent years, a colony of coerced and exploited slaves successfully liberated themselves and radically and permanently transformed things (p. 104).

Emerging as a dominant black leader from the earliest slavery revolt in all colonies in America, Toussaint Louverture, legally free at the age of 45, introduced guerrilla tactics into the slave army (Jenkins, 2001; Farmer, 2006). Little by little, Toussaint Louverture controlled the colony by defeating the planters, Spanish, and his own rivals among black and mulattos’ militias (Hallward, 2007). Naming himself “Lieutenant General of a colonial state within the French Empire”, Toussaint’s goal was nothing less than the restoration of the colony’s economic prosperity – Without slavery” (Farmer 2006, p. 61). Ideally attached to his loyalty of freeing the colony from the bloody treatment of the planters, Toussaint broke the “old Exclusive trade agreement” with

France, and signed trade agreements with the United States and Britain (Farmer, 2006). Such a decision did not please France; as a result, Napoleon sent his brother-in-law, Captain-General Leclerc, with an army of over 20,000 men to reestablish France's rule in the colony (Farmer, 2006).

By capturing the architect of the independence, Toussaint Louverture, who was dispatched to a prison in France where he died some months later from cold and misery, Leclerc thought that he was successful (Farmer, 2006; Hallward, 2007). Nevertheless, when Toussaint's troops were informed of their leader's deportation, they executed an attack led by Jean-Jacques Dessalines on November 8, 1803 called the "Battle of Vertieres" (*Bataille de Vertieres*), forced Leclerc's troops to retreat and called for immediate independence and expulsion of all whites (Farmer, 2006; Hallward, 2007).

After three centuries of Spanish and French colonial rules, the country regained its Indian name "Haiti". The Republic of Haiti was the second nation after the United States in the Western Hemisphere to become independent, and the first free black nation within the Western Hemisphere (Jenkins, 2001; Farmer, 2006; Hallward, 2007; Chomsky, 2015). However, the new republic faced an economy that had been devastated for at least a decade of bloody fights (Rigueur, 2011).

### **Haitian Revolution in the Eyes of the International Community**

As Mintz suggests, "The birth of Haiti was a nightmare for every country in which slavery endured" (cited by Farmer, 2006 p. 64). According to Hallward (2007), "the slave-owning world immediately closed ranks and locked the island in a state of economy isolation from which it has never recovered" (p.12). "The United States and allied European powers helped France to orchestrate a diplomatic quarantine of the Black



country” (Farmer, 2006, p. 66). Further, France’s foreign minister Charles Talleyrand wrote to the US Secretary of State James Madison in 1805, “The existence of a Negro people in arms, occupying a country it has soiled by the most criminal of acts, it is a horrible spectacle for all white nations” (Hallward, 2007, p.12). The United States did not recognize the Republic of Haiti until it started addressing the status of its own slaves in 1862 (Farmer, 2006; Hallward, 2007).

### How the Isolation Took Place After the Independence

According to Dubois (2012), “Haiti’s present is the product of its history: of the nation’s founding by enslaved people who overthrew their masters and freed themselves, of the hostility that this revolution generated among the colonial powers surrounding the country” (p. 4). The nations that surrounded Haiti saw its existence as a bad precedent for their own slaves and as a serious threat to disregard and thus should be isolated. France refused to recognize Haiti as a nation for decades, with the intention to return to exercising its sovereignty over its old colony (Dubois, 2012). Dubois (2012) asserts that “being Haiti, it turned out, was costly” (p. 5). “To defend against possible attack, Haiti poured money into building fortifications and maintaining a large army” (Dubois, 2012, p. 5).

Over the course of the nineteenth century, Haiti became the pariah of the international community and some countries like England and the United States followed France’s lead (Farmer, 2006). As Dubois (2012) mentioned, “foreign governments gained more and more control over Haiti’s economy and politics” (p. 7). The French monarch Charles X pressed the Haitian president Jean Pierre Boyer for an indemnity of 150 million francs (roughly \$3 billion in today’s currency) as a sort of revenge to remunerate

the plantation owners for their losses (Farmer, 2006; Dubois, 2012). As a well-known Haitian writer, Joseph Janvier cited by Dubois (2012) summarizes:

Haitians had been forced to pay their land... of which we are the masters..., not once or twice but three times. They first paid for it through their ancestors, with two centuries of tears and sweat. Then, the Haitians paid for it during their revolution, through the massive quantity of blood spilled to win liberty and independence. And, after all that, they still had to pay for it in cash that passed from Haiti to France's treasury for generations (p. 8)

Many wonder how much Haiti could have done with this money. The worst of it was that "cost was borne by Haitian farmers, the descendants of the same slaves who have been lost by the French slaveholders" (Dubois, 2012, p. 8).

"During the first two years of Haiti's unrecognized sovereignty, however, the United States, consolidated its position as her chief trading partner" (Farmer, 2006, p. 68). As Farmer (2006) explains it, "with the vast Louisiana purchase, the United States was inclined to be placatory towards France" (p. 66). To show such an attachment of the United States to France, Farmer (2006) reports the following,

The United States blocked Haiti's invitation for the famous Western Hemisphere Panama Conference of 1825 and refused to recognize the independence of Haiti until 1862. This isolation was imposed on Haiti by a frightened white world, and Haiti became a test case (p. 66).

Mintz (1995) asserts that "after twenty-one years of the Haitian independence, Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina whispered that Haiti's freedom could not even be discussed in the United States, so as not to disturb the peace and safety of a large

portion of our union" (p. 78). But "shortly the United States recognized Haiti's sovereignty, it began showing great interest in Mole St-Nicolas, a safe harbor across the Windward Passage from Cuba" (Farmer, 2006, p.72).

**Haiti in the Context of Neo-Colonization of Oppression and Trans-Global Interest  
(from American Occupation to Present)**

Beckles (2010) notes, "Haiti did not fail, it was destroyed by two of the most powerful nations on Earth, both of which continue to have a primary interest in its current condition" (para. 1). For more than a decade, "the Haitians fought for their freedom and won, as did the Americans fifty years earlier" (Beckles, 2010, para. 6). As Hallward (2007) notes,

Of the three great revolutions that began in the final decades of the eighteenth century – American, French and Haitian – only the third forced the unconditional application of the principal that inspired each one: affirmation of the natural, inalienable rights of all human beings. Only in Haiti was the declaration of human freedom universally consistent...Only in Haiti were the consequences of this declaration – the end of slavery, of colonialism, of inequality – upheld in terms that directly embraced the world as a whole" (p. 11).

In addition, as Beckles (2010) mentions, such a declaration should be boosted by the "Americans that crafted, for their independence, an extraordinary constitution that set out a clear message about the value of humanity and the right to freedom, justice, and liberty" (para. 6). Instead, as Beckles (2010) asserted that, they became France's allies, as well as the British and every other Nation-state in the Western World. In other words, Haiti was isolated at birth.

### Justification of American Occupation

As Gaillard notes, “the United States had for several years helped to “ripen” political conflict in Haiti “according to its taste and its project” as cited by Dubois (2012, p. 211). This project started, as earlier mentioned, with the great interest of the United States for the Haitian port of Mole Saint-Nicolas as a strategically important harbor for the U.S. Navy in case of a “military emergency” (Farmer, 2006; Dubois, 2012). In addition, through a broader sweep of intervention in the Caribbean, the United States fought Spain to help Cuban independence by the end of 1898. Because of its economic interest, “the United States had occupied Cuba and Puerto Rico, and soon thereafter it took over the construction of the Panama Canal, which was completed in 1914” (Dubois, 2012). So, the American military intervention in 1915 in Haiti, according to Dubois (2012), was part of this series of intervention in the Caribbean.

Despite some Haitian politicians, such as Antenor Firmin, and Demevar Delhomme, “attempting to transform the political system in Haiti” (Dubois, 2012, p. 201), there can be no denying that some Haitian politicians, because of a lack of capacity and will to rule the country, left the possibility for such an intervention of the U.S. Navy. The political situation was anarchic (Farmer, 2006). During his last days, Firmin wrote “one of two things will happen: either Haiti will fall under foreign control, or it will resolutely adopt the principles in the name of which I have always struggled ... No people can live indefinitely under tyranny, injustice, ignorance, and misery” as cited by Dubois (2012, p. 203). Dying in St. Thomas in 1911, Firmin did not experience the U.S. Navy invasion in 1915 (Dubois, 2012). According to Farmer (2006),

the pretext of the U.S. intervention was the “instability” in Haiti...and the apogee was reached with political detainees, and the execution of one hundred sixty-three of one hundred seventy-three prisoners in the Penitencier National by the President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (p. 79).

Nevertheless, as Dubois (2012) points out, “a U.S. congressman...observed that the United States was also hardly a model when it came to political violence: like Haiti, it had seen three presidents assassinated since, not to mention having had its own cataclysmic civil war” (p. 213). As a matter of fact, the invasion was advantageously strategic and economic for the United States.

According to Schmidt (1971), “the immediate objectives of the American expansion were to achieve hegemony in the Caribbean and in the Pacific” (p. 4). “Its interests were strategically bound to developments in the Pacific and Asia...and the taking of the Philippines made the United States an Asiatic power” (Schmidt, 1971, p. 4). “During the period from 1867 to 1900, the United States annexed approximately fifty smaller islands in the Pacific ... and took Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898, took Panama in 1903, occupied Cuba in 1898, Nicaragua in 1909, Haiti in 1915, Dominican Republic in 1916 and purchased the Virgin Islands in 1916” (Schmidt, 1971, p. 4-5).

As Dubois (2012) mentions, “the U.S. strategists were particularly concerned about the presence of Germans in the region with the outbreak of World War I” (p. 211). “They knew, in addition, that Haiti’s powerful and well-established community of German merchants had occasionally bankrolled revolts in the country and had repeatedly called on their home government to back up their claims with gunboats” (Dubois, 2012, p. 211). “The U.S officials feared that it would not be too difficult for Germany to take

another step and annex part of Haiti for use as a military base” (Dubois, 2012, p. 211). So, such fears were among reasons that influenced the United States to invade Haiti.

From a revisionist point of view, as Schmidt (1971) analyzes, “the United States pursued an open-door policy in the twentieth century that was rooted in the ideology of ‘liberal internationalism’, which envisaged the capitalist economic expansion in an open world” (p. 5). Indeed, “this policy was characterized as ‘imperial anti-colonialism’ inasmuch as it involved American economic imperialism sustained in part by the destruction of other nations’ colonial spheres of influence” (Schmidt, 1971, p. 5). Schmidt (1971) noted that “the United States practiced liberal internationalism (open-door policy) in areas where it could not set up its own spheres of influence” (p.6).

In China for instance where the United States did not enjoy the politico-economic power, it used an open-door policy as a ploy to further American interests, while an exclusive closed-door in the Caribbean and the Pacific where it utilized its military power to impose its hegemony (Schmidt, 1971, p. 6).

It was clear that the intervention of the U.S. Navy on the shores of Haiti in 1915 was an application of the Monroe Doctrine. As Farmer (2006) observes, “the U.S. occupation (1915-1934) was not ...the sudden manifestation of a new U.S. interest in protecting the Haitians from corrupt rulers, but a continuation ... of imperialism that had already taken root throughout Latin America” (p. 78). In other words, “it was the indication of dominant liberal internationalist tendencies of the United States foreign policy, which was the closed-door or sphere-of-influence policy towards the Caribbean and Pacific countries” (Schmidt, 1971, p. 6). In the case of Haiti, many North American

companies benefited from such a policy by acquiring lands for new plantations of bananas, sugar, rubber and other tropical produce (Farmer, 2006).

There is no doubt that the U.S. intervention in Haiti was strategic and economic for the fact that “high ranking officers in the United States military were anti-German and certain that German territorial expansionism would eventually threaten the United States’ security and hegemony on the American continents” (Mancini, 1997, p. 138). However, it seemed that the U.S. Navy invasion in Haiti was attached to some degree with racism. Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips wrote “they are an ‘inferior people’, unable to maintain the degree of civilization left them by the French or to develop any capacity of self-government entitling them to international respect and confidence” as reported by Chomsky (2015, p. 276). In addition, “Marine Colonel L.W.T. Waller was the effective ruler of Haiti, freshly arrived from appalling atrocities in the conquest of the Philippines, described Haitians as follows: “they are real niggers and no mistake...” (Chomsky, 2015, p. 277).

#### The Non-Physical Continuation of the Occupation

After nineteen years (1915-1934) of U.S. occupation, Dubois (2012) wrote that “at a simple ceremony in Le Cap, the stars and stripes were taken down and the Haitian flag put back up” (p.266). As Dubois (2012) asserts:

The U.S. occupation had profoundly changed the country ...and deepened the poverty of the countryside. Many Haitians dreamed in 1934 that their country would finally be able to move forward toward a radically different future. Instead, they found that the years of subjugation were haunting them still (p. 267).

As Smith (2009) notes, “after two decades of U.S occupation that witnessed popular and intellectual resistance, ...the occupation was finally nearing its end” (p. 1).

To an ample picture of the postoccupation period, Smith (2009) highlights the follows:

The postoccupation turning point came with the revolution of 1946, which sought to reverse the abuses in Haitian politics laid by the dominant political classes since independence, and continued by the country’s rulers in the decades after 1934. However, the revolution quickly splintered and its fragmentation created the roots of the contemporary political tensions in Haiti (Smith, 2009, p. 1).

Smith (2009) asserts, “the years of postoccupation .... witnessed the establishment of a popular labor movement; the rise of political parties; a bitter and vibrant ideological struggle; and a shift toward an assertive brand of black nationalism, the *noirisme* (p. 1).

Additionally, Smith (2009) argues, “if 1934 marked an end to the struggle for the désoccupation, it was the beginning of a long and intense ideological and political conflict that would intimately lead, in 1957, to one of the most brutal dictatorships the Caribbean has ever experienced: the regime of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier (p. 1).

According to Dubois (2012), “the extent of foreign support during the second half of the twentieth century has often been one of the most important factors determining the political destiny of Haitian rulers” (p. 9). Further, Dubois (2012) noted that “François Duvalier and his son Jean Claude ..., used U.S. support to stay in power for decades while driving hundreds of thousands of their countrymen into exile” (p. 9).



### The Contemporary Domination of Haiti by the Combined USA, France and Canada

In 1987, Haiti entered into a new political era after the demise of the authoritarianism of the Duvalier family dictatorship. Haiti was unable to demonstrate its capability to maintain democracy through a series of coups until the general elections in December 1990 that attempted to put an end to anarchy and build a modern and democratic nation especially with new hope for the lower classes (Dupuy, 1997). Unfortunately, this hope did not last long since President Aristide, the winner of those elections, was overthrown after seven months in office. The key point to highlight is “the dual policy that the Bush and Clinton administrations pursued vis-a-vis Aristide: condemning the coup while pressuring him to make concessions with his enemies as conditions to his return to office” (Dupuy, 1997, p. 139). The Bush administration policy toward Haiti was supportive of the Haitian military junta and the interests of the bourgeoisie class, and advocated for a non-return of Aristide in office. To justify its position, “the administration called Aristide’s allegedly poor human rights record, and it participated in a campaign of misinformation and character assassination designed to portray Aristide as unstable and unfit to hold office” (Dupuy, 1997, p. 141).

Haitian people who sought asylum by fleeing the military repression under the Bush administration were considered as economic, not political, refugees. As such, those who were intercepted at sea (boat people) were forcefully repatriated without asylum hearings in accordance with the executive order signed by President Bush in May 1992 (Dupuy, 1997). With this order, Dupuy (1997) notes that “the Bush administration implicitly endorsed the coup [especially after the speech delivered at the United Nations in September 25, 1991, where he laid out ten democratic commandments according to his

views of democracy...], disregarded the military human rights violations, and encouraged its further repression of Aristide's supporters" (p. 140).

The Clinton administration took over for the Bush administration on January 20, 1993. "As a presidential candidate, Clinton had vowed to end Bush's inhumane policy of repatriating Haitian refugees. But he reversed himself after assuming office when confronted with the possibility of having tens of thousands of Haitians reaching the U.S. shores" (Dupuy, 1997, p.140). However, unlike President Bush who supported the Haitian military Junta while repatriating Haitian refugees and kept Aristide in exile until his term ended, President Clinton made a deal with President Aristide to stem the flow of refugees (Dupuy, 1997). As Aristide himself asserts:

A deal ... could be struck between [President Clinton] and me. I would discourage the boat people, and he would work for a return to democracy. The Haitian refugees would stay in the country, in cooperation with the U.N. the American president would put all his weight in the balance to oust the de facto government (cited by Dupuy, 1997, p.141).

As Dupuy (1997) observes "if the intervention made possible a reopening of the democratic process ..., it also brought with it the direct occupation of Haiti by the U.S.-U.N. forces" (p. 163). Regardless of the circumstances within which intervention took place in Haiti, the U.S. plan remains unchanged since the occupation of 1915. The occupation of the United States in Haiti is well established, justified by inoffensive expressions of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping force (Dubois, 2013; Chery, 2015).

According to Hallward (2007), the *coup d'état* in February 2004, as so-called by Aristide himself and his supporters "the kidnapping", was interpreted by the presidents of

powerful countries such as George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Paul Martin Jr [respectively the United States, France, and Canada] as a new day for democracy in Haiti (Hallward, 2007). This interpretation by powerful countries, according to Hallward (2007) was the achievement of a mission started since the first *coup d'état* in 1991 by the international community.

As Farmer (2006) notes, “it was not until March 2004 that one could read in a U.S. daily the news that the aid freeze might have contributed to the overthrow of the penniless Haitian government” (p. 385). To better understand the role of those countries in the coup, we must look at their influence on international financial institutions.

Stockman & Milligan (2004):

For three years, the U.S. government, the European Union, and the international banks have blocked \$500 million in aid to Haiti’s government... The cutoff, intended to pressure the government to adopt political reforms, left Haiti struggling to meet the basic needs and weakened the authority of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. (para. 1 & 2)

“On January 1, 2004, during Haiti’s bicentennial celebrations, Aristide announced he would replace 21-gun salutes with a litany of 21 points about what had been achieved in spite of the embargo” (Farmer, 2006, p. 386). Aristide was persuaded that after two centuries of expelling a bloody system that cost millions of slaves’ lives, the time came for France to restitute the money that Haiti paid in recognition of the independence.

Farmer (2006) asserts that Aristide arrived at the amount that France owed Haiti, which was U.S. \$21,685,135,571.48 counting at five percent annual interest. “The figure of \$21 billion was repeated and again, the number of 21 appeared all over the place in Haiti

along with the word restitution” (Farmer, 2006, p. 386). With such a slogan, it was obvious that the superpowers already planned the future of President Aristide.

President Michel Martelly, in the role of puppet, (as was the reality of the former Haitian President Phillipe Sudre Dartiguenave during the U.S. occupation), was obligated to accept former US President Bill Clinton as U.S. High Commissioner of Haiti after the earthquake in 2010 (Chery, 2015). “In his role as co-chair of the international commission, Bill Clinton seems to hold more power over the country than does Haiti’s elected president” (Dubois, 2013, p. 9). Chery (2015) warns that “the 1978 Constitution has not been changed, but the letter of a series of amendments designed to benefit Bill Clinton and his cohorts is being systematically followed” (p. 127).

### **Migration (1957 –Present)**

According to Taveras (2011), “many immigrants chose to maintain and nurture social, political and economic links with their homelands... In doing so, these immigrants become the transnational communities” (p. 60). These communities are people who “are at least bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political, and cultural interests that require a simultaneous presence in both” (Taveras, 2011, p. 60). In addition, Basch, Schiller, and Blanc (1994), define the transnationalism as:

The processes by which the immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.... An essential element is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies (quoted by Portes 1998, p. 4).

Itzigsohm, et al., (1999), note that “The transnational connections that immigrant communities keep are part of their everyday activities and affect all aspects of their lives, economic, political, social as well as individual and group identities” (as cited by Taveras 2011, p. 61).

According to Horboken (2004), “diasporas are communities of people who left their ancestral homes and settled in foreign countries, but who preserve the memory of and links with the land of their fathers and forefathers” (as quoted by Taveras 2011, p. 61). Sheffer (2003) additionally defines the similar “diaspora” as a “social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and now permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries” (Taveras, 2011, p. 61).

The concepts of transnational and diaspora are related, but not synonymous, assert Braziel and Mannur (2003). According to Braziel and Mannur (2003), “diaspora refers to the movement of people, while transnationalism refers to impersonal forces, such as the movement of capital, information, and business” (as cited in Taveras, 2011, p. 62). The diaspora as movement of people aligns with the concept of culture in its broader sense – cuisine, folklore, dance, language, literature, cinema, music, community life and family bonds – that constitute the very fabric of diaspora (Bruneau, 2010, p. 3-4). In other words, “transnationalism can describe NGOs and political organizations as well as individuals, while diaspora is a human phenomenon” (Taveras, 2011, p. 62). This research will adopt Braziel and Mannur’s (2003) definition of diaspora to refer to Haitian migrants who have settled in foreign countries.

### **Classification of Haitian Diaspora**

Laguerre (2016) classified the Haitian migrants into three waves, which include (1957-1964) as the period when educated Haitian professionals and elite left; (1964-1971) the period when middle class Haitians left as tourists and settled in the host countries after the expiration of their visas; and (1971 - present) the period when the lower-class Haitians left via boats. This thesis considers another classification because of the evolution of Haitian migration during the last two decades. The first wave of the migration of Haitian people occurred during the period of rule by the Duvalier family (1957-1986). The second wave (1986-1994) includes the fall of Duvalier until the return of Aristide in power after being ousted in 1991. During the last period (1994 – present), after the country returned to the constitutional order, people fled the country from disappointment that neither political nor economic situations had significantly improved.

#### **Period of Duvalier family (1957-1986)**

The first wave of the Haitian diaspora is considered from the moment of political turmoil of Papa Doc in 1957 until the departure of Baby Doc in 1986. During this wave, Haitians were forced to leave the country because as Weiss Fagen et al. (2009) note “the rulers [Papa Doc and Baby Doc] outlawed political parties, jailed or murdered political rivals and tolerated no dissent from any branch of society – political, intellectual, economic or professional – during these twenty-nine years of their dictatorship (1957-1986)” (p. 12). Among the first wave of the Haitian diaspora, those of the 60s and 70s, there existed a combined group of political activists that settled in New York, France and Canada (Québec) who were motivated to return soon after the fall of the Duvalier regime (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009).

As mentioned before, this group of exiled people, though well-settled in the host countries, still maintained relationships with their homeland. Rigueur (2011) defines these exiles as “active Diaspora”. According to Weiss Fagen et al. (2009), “The first wave of migrants closely followed events in Haiti and intended eventually to return to play leading roles in their country’s post Duvalier development” (p. 18). It is estimated that during the 1970s about 400,000 Haitians for the most part, professionals, that settled in the New York City area; the estimate for Florida was 350,000 and for Boston was 100,000 (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009). One third of black doctors in New York area are Haitians (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009). As well, in Canada, the Haitian demographic is quite similar to that of New York (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 31). Unlike New York, “The Canadian government has taken measures to make Haitian diaspora projects more effective” (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 31).

By the time the Duvaliers fell in 1986, the second wave of Haitian migrants arrived in New York, on the shores of Florida, and elsewhere (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 19). This second group of Haitian migrants was more socially and educationally diverse than their predecessors with different immigration status (Rigueur, 2011; Weiss Fagen et al., 2009). As Weiss Fagen et al. (2009) note “The Haitians (“boat people”) that came during the second wave brought many skills, but the majority arrived with little education and few or no resources” (p. 23).

The third wave (1994 – present) of Haitian migrant flow is characterized by a poorer group than those who came before (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 24). When Aristide returned in 1994, the flow of Haitians migrating into the United States slowed because they hold hope in a potentially brighter future (Rigueur, 2011, Weiss Fagen et

al., 2009). During Préval's administration (1995-2000), the same pattern continued as he potentially changed the political landscape and maintained a quiet political atmosphere. However, the flow of migrations reopened under the second term of Aristide (2000-2004). The country was facing a terrifying economic and political crisis that began early in 2003 after Aristide attacked the international community in a speech on January 2003 (Girard, 2010). Armed bands, so-called *chimères*, installed by Aristide himself, perpetuated dozens of political assassinations of his opponents (Girard, 2010), which plunged the population in a situation where the only alternative was to leave the country.

In addition, the earthquake in 2010 created a horribly difficult social and economic situation in Haiti. As Thomaz (2013) asserts, "The thousands who fled the country in search of safety and survival at that time did not generally find similar solidarity and humanitarian response in potential countries of refuge, such as the United State, France, and Canada" (p. 35). Hiding behind the strictly legal definition of refugee as defined in the Cartagena Declaration of Refugee in 1984, "the US imposed a naval blockade around its shores and France closed the borders of French Guiana, one of its overseas departments" (Thomaz, 2013, p. 35). According to Thomaz (2013), "In January 2012, owing to an increase in the number of Haitians arriving, the Brazilian authorities took the initiative to regularize the situation of approximately four thousand Haitians who had already entered the country" (p. 36). Nieto (2014) notes between 2010 and 2013 there are roughly 15,000 Haitians who moved to Brazilian territory.

### **Current State of Haiti (1986 - Present)**

In this section of this paper, I review relevant literature of the history of Haiti and address three main points: the current Haitian government, the Haitian education system



and reforms, and the Haitian diaspora (Brain Drain), as well as its effects on the development of Haiti.

### **Recent Government Systems**

More than 200 years after its independence, Haiti is still unable to design a political system different from its legacy of centralized governments based on authoritarian rule and of politics guided by a minority elitism, cronyism, and exclusion (Metz, 2001). Metz (2001) notes that, historically, strengthening institutions to enact programs for the welfare and the well-being of the population has never been a priority for the Haitian State. In other words, the politics in Haiti have traditionally been perceived as a space to socially promote individuals, which means, as Maingot noted (1986) “political individualism became the norm, and that individuals could achieve their aspirations only through access to maximum national power, i.e. to the presidency itself” (p.89). Fatton Jr (2011), describes Haiti’s political system as a “predatory democracy.” “While Haiti has all the features of an unconsolidated democracy, it suffers from more acute symptoms of democratic dysfunctionality” (Smith, 2005, p. 188). The next sections examine the government systems, public institutions, and recent political systems in Haiti.

#### Government Systems

According to Metz (2001), the complex system of government created by the 1987 Haitian constitution was still not completely in place, although progress had been made since the 1994 ouster of de facto military rule by way of parliamentary and municipal elections in 1995, the presidential election of 1995, and programs for judicial reform (p.

429).

He notes that the governments from 1986 to 1994 either suspended the constitution or selectively used articles that benefited them. In a democracy, the design of the constitution is to create democratic institutions and find ways to protect them for the long term (Samuels, 2005).

The constitution is a modern document written after twenty-nine years of the authoritarian dictatorship of Duvalier (Baby Doc) (Metz, 2001). “It guarantees a series of basic rights to the citizenry. It declares the intent to establish and maintain democracy in Haiti and includes ideological pluralism, electoral competition, and the separation of powers” (Metz, 2001, p.427). By separating powers into three branches, the constitution reduces the presidential powers, establishes the decentralization of governmental authority, creates an independent judiciary power, and eliminates votes by referendum (Metz, 2001). Paradoxically, in the eyes of some politicians (President Préval) and scholars, the constitution is a source of conflict and filled with ambiguities, and thus it needs to be amended and reformed (Heine & Thompson, 2011). Préval was the only president who appointed a constitutional reform that put into account the dual citizenship for Haitians living abroad (Charles, 2017). Mirlande Manigat, a former senator, an eminent political leader, and a respected constitutional scholar, described the constitution as follows,

Haiti’s 1987 constitution complicates the ways in which the country’s government must operate. Haiti has ended up with an odd hybrid between presidentialism and parliamentarianism, an unmanageable elections calendar that puts an enormous strain on the nation’s budget and a large number of local government assemblies

which do much the same. Most observers agree that constitutional reform to streamline this system is needed (as cited by Heine & Thompson 2011, p. 16).

### **Recent Political Systems in Haiti**

Historically, the Haitian state served as an apparatus by which elites enriched themselves from the impoverished population, but not as a means of serving Haiti's citizens as Crane et al. (2010) have argued. Haitian recent political history, in the context of this research, can be divided into three periods: 1) the post-Duvalier struggle for change (February 1986 through September 1991); 2) the period of military rule (October 1991 through September 1994); and 3) the period of external military intervention, restoration of democracy, and reconstruction (October 1994 until present).

Haitian politics experienced a long period of transition after the demise of the military regime in 1986 (Smith, 2005). Danner (1990) argues that Haiti was on its fifth government within four years of the fleeing of Duvalier. He emphasizes that Leslie F. Manigat, a well-known professor, elected in the election organized by the military, was deposed four months later by General Henri Namphy. Then, Namphy lasted three months in office and was deposed by another general, Prosper Avril, who, with increasing brutality, ruled the country for eighteen months. Due to the pressure from the population, Prosper was forced to leave the country and fled to exile in March 1990 (Danner, 1990). Danner notes that Ertha Pascal Trouillot, the president of the Haitian Supreme Court, was chosen by a group of civilian leaders in opposition to conducting the elections that elected Jean Bertrand Aristide. Further, Smith (2005) highlights that, as a Roman Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became popular for helping poor people in slum

areas where he was established as a preacher. He was the first democratic president elected by Haitian people from the polls.

The second period (1991-1994) was marked by the military coup and turmoil, massive displacement and migration, with an estimated 300,000 of Haiti's seven million people displaced internally, while another 60,000 to 70,000 became refugees (Metz, 2001). Ruled by a "de facto government"<sup>3</sup> during this period, Haiti was left with few experienced policymakers, leaders, teachers, managers, and technicians (Wah, 2013).

The third period (1994 – present), supported by former United States president Bill Clinton, saw Aristide return officially into the office in 1994 (Metz, 2001; Smith, 2005). Chosen to be the successor of Aristide in 1995, René Garcia Préval was the only democratically elected president who completed his term after the adoption of the constitution of 1987. Although, as Fatton Jr (2005) argues, Préval's presidency symbolized the politics of *doublure*<sup>4</sup> where Aristide, with his full power and invisible hands behind Préval's back, maintained his hegemony and kept ruling the country. Indeed, re-elected in 2000, Aristide served a second term that was fragile due to corruption, crime, and narcotics trafficking. The opposition accused his administration of supporting *Chimeres*<sup>5</sup> in terrorizing of the population (Smith, 2005). Fatton (2007) argues that, "supported by the United States and France, the opposition regrouped in the "Groupe des 184" refused to recognize the legality of these ballots and contributed to the departure for a second time of Aristide in 2004" (p. 9). For both Aristide terms, Maguire

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<sup>3</sup> De facto government; after overthrowing Jean Bertrand Aristide as the first democratic government, Raoul Cedras ruled temporarily the country as a 'de facto' president in place of the lawful government.

<sup>4</sup> Politics of *doublure*; is a Haitian political practice where the country is ruled by someone else than those in office.

<sup>5</sup> *Chimeres*; is a derogatory term whose original meaning is translated as "monster" or "ghost" putdown against poor people who live in some of Haiti's slums. Those people were used to inflict harm upon Jean Bertrand Aristide opponents during his second term.

(2011) notes that “Haiti ended up having a U.N.-sanctioned and U.S.-led armed intervention” (p. 230).

The main goal of the Préval administration, for the sake of democracy, was to stabilize Haiti after twenty years of instability (Heine & Thompson, 2011). Heine & Thompson (2011) notes that Préval was the only president democratically elected who finished the two terms of his presidency. Unlike his first term, the second term of the Préval administration made tremendous progress in terms of economic growth. “In 2007, economic growth reached 3.8 per cent; and in 2009, with 2.4 per cent growth, Haiti was one of two countries in all the Americas to experience economic growth” (p. 6).

According to Charles (2017), Préval was criticized for his reclusive personality, his low-key leadership style and his lack of communication with the Haitian citizens. As a result, he concludes President Préval lost a lot of supporters that did not collaborate with his chosen “dauphin” Jude Celestin for presidential candidate in the election of 2010. However, argue Heine & Thompson (2011), “Préval’s personal integrity (no one has ever accused him of anything untoward) has provided the role model Haitians have longed for in their president” (p. 6).

Taft-Morales (2011) notes, after the final results of the election with 68 percent of the votes for Martelly against 32 percent for Mirlande Manigat, Martelly was sworn into office in May 2011 as President. As a former musician and singer, for many observers, his lack of political skills and experience did not enable him to carry his promise of implementing free education for all children, addressing agricultural issues, creating more jobs, and strengthening rule of law (Taft-Morales, 2011). Furthermore, Taft-Morales (2011) claims that Martelly struggled to form his cabinet because two of his chosen prime

ministers were rejected by the parliament.

Concerned by the limited capacity of the Haitian institutions, the United States and the international community wondered if the newly elected government was able to manage the billions of dollars of international aid released towards Haiti's reconstruction (Taft-Morales, 2011). According to Taft-Morales (2011), the management of the aid was assured by the Interim Haitian Recovery Commission (IHRC) created in late 2010 under the Préval administration, but there was not a guarantee that the new administration would get along with the commission. Since his presidential campaign, Martelly was advocating for a better implementation and monitoring of the international assistance, but he did not have any plans on how to do so (Taft-Morales, 2011).

Throughout the recent political history of Haiti, as noted by Crane et al. (2010), corruption has been a serious problem for the development of the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti ranked 159 out of 176 in the corruption perceptions index, in the same league as Chad, Burundi, Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic (Transparency International, 2016). Stiftung (2016) presents the corruption as follows:

There are no functioning mechanisms for curbing corruption in Haiti, and state institutions do not have effective control over corruption either. The population is used to paying for services that all public institutions in charge of corruption – the financial intelligence unit, the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Public Administration Audit Court – suffer from bad reputation and/or a chronic lack of material and human resources. There have been no major corruption trials so far. An anti-corruption law has been proposed to the Parliament but has not been adopted. In a very recent and rather spectacular case, a judge who sued the Martelly family for

bribery and corruption died of a heart attack following massive pressure and intimidation from the Martelly camp (p. 23).

### **Educational Systems**

All education systems are subject to constant change, dictated by society, which itself, in turn, is undergoing constant change (Hadjadj, 2000). To best understand Haitian education, it is important to briefly review its historical context. After its independence in 1804, Haiti was more concerned about maintaining the newly founded nation than the establishment of a formal education system (Hallquist, 2011; Clément, 1979). The first reference to formal education after independence came in 1805, based on the educational vision of the nation's founders (Joint, 2006). Article 19 of the general dispositions of the Constitution of 1805 states: "In each military district, there shall be a public school for the youth." At that time, there were six military districts in Haiti (Clément, 1979, p.163), which means there were six public schools that were attended only by the children of the military who served the country (Joint, 2006).

In December 1848, Haiti passed an important law creating rural schools (Clément, 1979). Among other things, this law ordained special secondary schools, three new lycées, rural schools, schools for girls, and normal schools (Logan, 1930). This law significantly changed the context of Haitian education for the second half of the 19th century. According to Clément (1979) "it opened up instruction to the masses of Haitians who never had the opportunity before" (p. 166). The law provided for the granting of three degrees in the Haitian education (Baccalaureate, License, and Doctorate) (Clément, 1979), as well as the creation of schools in Anse à Veau, Port de Paix, and Les Cayes

(Logan, 1930). Articles 117, 118, and 119 of the law, known as the Law of December 29, 1848, decreed:

Article 117: There shall be established on the rural habitations national schools where shall be taught the precepts of religion, reading, writing and the fundamentals of arithmetic. The pupils shall learn to apply the best possible methods for the most productive cultivation of the land. The girls shall learn to sew.

Article 118: There shall be boarding schools where the greatest possible number of children of agricultural families shall be educated at government expense. They may also admit boarding and day students supported by parents or municipalities.

Article 119: There shall be annexed to each rural school sufficient land which, when cultivated by the children themselves, shall provide for the total or at least a part of their subsistence (Clément, 1979, p. 166).

From 1862 to 1915, the year that American troops landed in Haiti, significant developments in the education system took place such as additional schools, establishment of secondary schools for young women, introduction of a grading system, and creation of several private law schools, (Clément, 1979). In the course of the American occupation (1915-1934), the Haitian education budget increased approximately by nine percent (Logan, 1930). In 1920, the United States invested roughly \$340,000 in Haitian education for a population of approximately 2.5 million people, while during the same period, the United States financed the Puerto Rican education with \$400,000 for a population of 1.25 million people (Joint, 2006, Vallas & Pankovits, 2010). This comparison portrays how the Haitian education was valued by the United States. Haiti



had a larger population than Puerto Rico, but more funds were allocated to Puerto Rico. According to Hallquist (2011), the United States aimed to improve both vocational and academic fields in the Haitian education system. However, because of long lasting political conflicts between the two nations, no major progress was made. While Hallquist (2011) states that the investment of the United States in Haitian education was not effective, Al-Bataineh & Nur-Awaleh (2005) argue that the United States made significant contributions to the Haitian education system through implementing technical schools of agriculture and through democratizing Haitian education. On one hand, such educational contributions were significant for the Haitian education system after the law of December 29, 1848 that created the schools in the rural areas for Haitian peasants. On the other hand, the United States via their international policies spread out their economic hegemony that sought cheap labor to produce crops that supplied their industrial market. In other words, it was in the interest of the United States when they took the initiative to contribute to the Haitian education system.

During the 1940s, educational policies were passed that allowed the government to build more public schools in a context more adapted to Haitian reality (Salmi, 2000). Maurice Dartique, who became Minister of Education in 1941, was the first educator chosen for this position and was the pillar of those reforms. Unfortunately, while he was Minister of Education, those reforms were not applied to the educational system for reasons not well-known (Salmi, 2000). After the revolution of 1946 with President Dumarsais' administration, the National Department of Education (DNE) controlled the education system (Al-Bataineh & Nur-Awaleh, 2005). Thus, one of the missions of the

DNE was to reduce agricultural and handicraft training, which had been prominent ideals for the context of the Revolution of 1946 (Hallquist, 2011, thesis).

During the Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), because of the terror of both father and son Presidents, many qualified teachers left Haiti to escape the repression. In fact, conditions in public schools declined enormously (Salmi, 2000). To compensate for the gap created in public education while the population growth increased, many religious communities established their own educational institutions (Salmi, 2000). The reforms initiated by minister of education Dartique were implemented into effect under the leadership of Joseph Bernard, who became Minister of Education in 1980 (Al-Bataineh & Nur-Awaleh, 2005). The reforms took so long to be implemented because almost all Ministers of Education under the dictatorship of François Duvalier did not last for long in their jobs.

The Decree of 1998 laid out the structure and composition of the Haitian Ministry of National Education and Professional Training (MENFP), which included departments (Haiti's ten geographic regions), school district offices, and inspection zones (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010). The Ministry's mission was twofold: (1) to provide educational services to its citizens and (2) to play a normative and regulatory role (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010). In other words, MENFP was responsible for the development and application of education policy in the country (Hadjadj, 2000). However, most observers agreed that MENFP has not been able to fulfill its mandate (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010). However, Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, (2010) note,

To decentralize the education sector, a limited amount of responsibility and authority has been given to departments and district offices.... such as the

implementation and follow-up of educational policies and plans, the recruitment and management of teaching staff, and the supervision of schools (p. 2).

Despite the creation of these educational policies to reinforce the structure of the system, due to lack of resources available in the rural areas, these plans did not last very long.

“With the state’s lack of institutional strength and capacity to provide basic services to the Haitian children, the education sector has become increasingly privatized” (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010, p. 2). The private sector has occupied an important part in the Haitian primary education enrollment with 57% in 1979, 67 % in 1987, and 76.8% in 1997 (Salmi, 2000; Al-Bataineh & Nur-Awaleh, 2005). As seen in Figure 2 (see Appendix C), the enrollment in the private sector has increased by at least 20%, which is overwhelming for the majority of Haitian parents who daily live on less than two US dollars. “According to the 2002-2003 education census cited by World Bank, only 8 percent of Haitian schools were public, while approximately 92 percent were privately owned and financed, meaning they were tuition-based in most cases” (Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010, p. 2). McNulty (2011) asserts that about “80 percent of all primary schools are private, and the majority of those schools do not adhere to any standards, and are not accredited to any central governing body” (McNulty, 2011, p.111). He further notes that “to be a private school in Haiti is not too demanding, it is only necessary to create a name and have a bucket of paint to draw Disney characters on the street-facing wall of the building” (p. 111).

### **Educational policies during the last five decades**

According to Prou (2009), “It was at the time of the U.S occupation that Haiti experienced its first major educational reforms. Although the primary objective of the

occupation was to restore political stability and economic security” (p. 32). This reform created two different primary school systems: one addressing the agricultural aspect and administered by the Department of Agriculture, the other continuing to provide traditional education in both urban and rural areas (Al-Bataineh & Nur-Awaleh, 2005, Prou, 2009). A second attempt of educational reform was made under the presidency of Elie Lescot with Minister Maurice Dartigue. In 1941, Maurice Dartigue attempted to implement a new reform that mostly embedded the practically-oriented agricultural and vocational curriculum in rural areas (Prou, 2009). By the middle of the 1970s, there was a necessity for a change in the education system and there was a genuine concern as well as a clear consensus that education needed a new reform (Prou, 2009).

In May 1979, Minister of Education Joseph Bernard took some drastic measures that aimed to reform Haiti’s education system (Prou, 2009). Prior to the announcement of the Bernard reform, the “National Pedagogical Institute” (IPN) was created to renovate the entire educational system and offered the solution to eliminate the discrepancy between urban and rural schools by reunifying them under the new Department of National Education (DEN) (Prou, 2009). Bernard’s reform fit within the international framework manifested by a series of regional meetings around the Principal Education Project for Latin America and the Caribbean (PROMEDLAC) (Hadjadj, 2000). His five major goals included: 1) Establishment of basic education for all school-age children by the year 2000; 2) Introduction of Créole as an official language of instruction; 3) Restructuring primary and secondary grades; 4) Restoring pedagogy; and 5) Adjusting the curricula with a focus on students as a catalyst for social and economic development. According to Hadjadj (2000), “Bernard’s reform was the first consistent attempt to

modernize the Haitian education system” (p. 20). “The initiatives of Bernard’s reform reflected the proposed universal general standard used by school reform projects in other developing countries” (Prou, 2009, p. 44). In March 1989, a decree was released to officially offer a legal basis for the activities of the reform, with curricula capable of modernizing programs in all schools of the Republic (Hadjadj, 2000). The new curricula replaced the traditional system of stratified education (primary and secondary) into a compulsory formal basic system divided into three cycles of 4 years, 2 years and 3 years, that was more adaptive to the needs and aspirations of Haitian students (Hadjadj, 2000). Unfortunately, this reform failed because of inadequate resources and infrastructure for its implementation (Piasentin, 2016).

Launched in 1993, the National Plan of Education and Training (NPET) was adopted by the Ministry of Education Professional and Training (MENFP) in the context of meeting the Jomtien conference goals (Hadjadj, 2000). One of the main goals of the NPET was to introduce citizenship education based on student-centered instead of teacher-centered methods inherited from the French educational model, with the aim to improve civic knowledge and promote social cohesion and inclusiveness (Piasentin, 2016). The development of the plan used participatory approaches involving all stakeholders in the educational field and designed through ten objectives (Hadjadj, 2000).

Even though the NPET per se was commendable and positively affected most stakeholders in the education system by implementing citizenship education, promoting social cohesion and inclusiveness, and especially by improving civic knowledge, the most critical issues were not resolved. Among those issues, “the right of free and compulsory primary education was not translated into practice” (Piasentin, 2016, p. 72).

The Education for All National Action Strategy (EFANAS) is a set of measures adopted in 2007 by the MENFP (Piasentin, 2016). However, the MENFP was prevented from implementing EFANAS by the devastating earthquake in 2010, which forced them to refocus priorities on other strategies (Vallas & Pankovits, 2010). In May 2010, the Ministry of Education Professional and Training (MENFP) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in a partnership, started working through the post-earthquake reform of education. Among other measures, this reform aimed at re-establishing national standardized curriculum and corresponding instructional models, enhancing and accelerating professional development/teacher training, university and vocational training, adult literacy, and public-private partnerships (Vallas, & Pankovits, 2010). In addition, other mechanisms were suggested for the successful implementation of the plan, such as consultations with external partners, the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and the establishment of a complementary but autonomous institution for the evaluation of the progress made (Piasentin, 2016). All reforms made within the Haitian education system, from the American occupation with first Haitian Minister of Education Dartique until Bernard's reform, have aimed to reach universal primary education and establish a system that is adapted to the Haitian social, politico-economic reality.

### CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the methods and the procedures employed to conduct and explore this study. The theories of the followings authors will be taken into account as framework for this thesis:

- 1) McDonell and Elmore (1987) for their policy instruments: Inducements, Capacity Building, System Changing Mandates
- 2) MacLaughlin (1987) for her identification of Capacity and Will as integral to policy implementation.

These instruments address the policy's work by bringing the resources of government into the service of political objectives, and by using those resources to influence the actions of individuals and institutions (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 133).

#### **McDonell & Elmore's Approach**

##### Policy Formulation and Policy Implementation

According to Howlett (1991), "political scientists have studied policy instruments in order to better understand the linkages between policy formulation and policy implementation, and to gain insights into the decision-making process" (p. 1). Few studies have explored educational policy and reforms in Haiti and have addressed the question of rebuilding the nation through the perspectives of restoring social capital, social services, and the education system (Marcelin et al., 2015; Edgington, 2011; Sills et al., 2010; Stotzky & Concannon, 2012; Bernal, 2011; Luzincourt & Gulbrandson, 2010). These studies did not focus on stimulating the return of well-educated Haitian

professionals as one of possible factors in the process of nation rebuilding for a long-term sustainable development. Unlike previous research, using the four policy instruments of McDonnell and Elmore (1987) as part of two approaches considered, this paper analyzes the causes of the Haitian mass exodus, studies the Haitian diaspora community settled in their host countries, and offers policy alternatives to leverage their return to Haiti.

### Definitions of Concepts

Public-policy instruments are defined as “a set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect (or prevent) social change” (Vedung, 1998, p. 21). McDonnell & Elmore (1987) define policy instruments as “the mechanisms that translate substantive policy goals into concrete action” (p. 134) and classify these policy instruments into four categories:

- *Inducements*: transfer of money to individuals and agencies in return for certain actions;
- *Capacity-building*: transfer of money for the purpose of investment in material, intellectual, or human resources;
- *System-changing*: transfers official authority among individuals and agencies in order to alter the system by which public goods and services are delivered;
- *Mandates*: rules governing the action of individuals and agencies, intended to produce compliance (p. 134)

### Inducements

Inducements are a form of procurement in terms of an authority, agency or individuals who receive money in exchange for producing something valuable such as



goods or services (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; Emanuel, Currie & Herman, 2005). After all, “the purpose of any inducement is to change behavior” (Emanuel, Currie & Herman, 2005, p.336). Inducements are, in fact, accompanied by rules designed to make sure that inducements are used with policymakers’ intent (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).

According to Liu, Johnson & Peske (2004), “incentives (or “inducements”) have both advantages and disadvantages and their use reflects certain assumptions about problems and solutions” (p. 219). As a policy instrument, Liu, Johnson & Peske (2004) note that, “inducements attempt to elicit the production of value in terms of goods, service, or a set of specified behaviors contrary to mandates that seek to elicit compliance and uniformity of behavior” (p. 230). In other words, incentives rely on money as a condition of performance while mandates rely on coercion to affect behavior (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).

Liu, Johnson & Peske (2004) highlight three advantages that inducements have as a policy instrument compared to mandates. First, the costs of getting involved to enforce mandates can be higher than the costs of overseeing an incentive program. Second, inducements do not burden the targets of the policy with high compliance or avoidance costs. Third, even though inducements, such as regulations or guidelines, may resemble mandates to some degree, they do not typically constrain individuals and agencies in their ability to produce a desired program. (p. 220). Moreover, Liu, Johnson & Peske (2004) note that “inducements focus on short-term and more tangible outcomes, and as a result, they are easier to enact politically than policies that aim at producing outcomes that take a long time to be realized” (p. 220). In short, inducements may foster more innovation and creativity when the capacities exist to produce goods and services that are allowed

and supported by policymakers (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; Liu, Johnson & Peske, 2004).

The disadvantages of inducements as noted by Liu, Johnson & Peske (2004) is that “policies that rely on inducements face the challenge of getting the incentives right” (p. 220). Therefore, the difficult aspects of that challenge are the ability to set proper incentives, which require a certain knowledge of preferences, priorities, and capacities of a target audience (Liu, Johnson & Peske, 2004). Additionally, inducements assume that lack of money sometimes prevents individuals and organizations from producing something of value (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). In other words, the implementation of inducements is a central issue, since policymakers must know “how much variation they are willing to tolerate in the production of things of value, and how narrowly they are willing to prescribe how money is to be used and what is produced” (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 142). As Liu, Johnson & Peske (2004) note, “the lack of information about the feasibility of inducements, their effects, and the existence of capacity may lead to ineffective incentives” (p. 220).

### Capacity Building

Capacity building is a concept beset by conflict and confusion from being used in a wide variety of contexts and thus susceptible to different interpretations (Hailey & James, 2004). According to Cornforth & Mordaunt (2011), “capacity-building is used at different levels of analysis, ranging from individuals to nations, and referring to multiple types of interventions” (p. 431). Universally speaking, there is no single accepted definition of capacity-building, as the diversity of literature in this area demonstrates (Eade, 1997; James, 1998; Hailey and James, 2004). For some scholars, it is associated

with building the organizational capacities of individuals, agencies, or systems to better fulfill their goals or mission (Eade, 1997; Cornforth & Mordaunt, 2011); for others, capacity-building broadly embraces the civil society as a whole (including communities, families, and individuals) to participate in the political and social arena for the purpose of investment in future benefits (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987). In the same perspective, a Tennessee Municipal League report stated:

When we use this term [capacity building] we are referring to any and all efforts directed toward helping municipal governments to plan and manage their affairs more effectively, and in accordance with national policy and recognized standards of professional competence (as cited in Honadle, 1981, p. 577).

According to McDonnell and Elmore (1987), the benefits of all efforts – material, intellectual, and human resources – accrue in short term to the individuals and institutions; however, the ultimate beneficiaries are future members of the society. The idea of building for the future generation is what Honadle (1981) called the rationale of capacity building, which corresponds to "the ability to make decisions and allocate resources more rationally by learning to use certain techniques and models developed for application to systems [and benefit the future generation]" (p. 576).

For the purposes of this research, the concept of capacity building is defined as developing the capacities of an organization to manage and improve its resources, especially in the education system, through reforms and policies for its effectiveness and sustainable development. As a means of clarifying capacity building in its application as a system, Honadle, (1981) conceptualizes this framework with the following elements:

definitional characteristics, administrative practices, institutions, and organizational requirements.

*Backbone of Capacity-Building*

Honadle (1981) highlights six main actions that are considered the backbone upon which capacity building is based:

1. Anticipate and influence change.
2. Make informed, intelligent decisions about policies.
3. Develop programs that support the implementation of policies.
4. Attract and absorb resources.
5. Manage resources.
6. Evaluate current activities to guide future actions (p. 577).

The Bush administration, for instance, was criticized for not anticipating or planning adequately for the post-war period in the reconstruction of Iraq after its government totally collapsed (Fukuyama, 2004). According to Harrow (2001), there are two orientations towards capacity building. First, “the empowerment model” that local actors are conscious of problems and look for strategies to address it themselves. Second, the “deficit model” that relies on external interventions to identify and diagnose weaknesses and gaps and then fill those gaps (cited by Cornforth & Mordaunt, 2011).

System-changing

System changing as described by McDonnell and Elmore (1987) measures the productivity of existing institutions, working under existing incentives that are not able to fulfill the policies made by policymakers. Those institutions may be more efficient in terms of the nature of those products created if there is a redistribution of authority

among individuals and agencies. In contrast, Kiser & Ostrom (2000) argue that not all changes in behavior lead to changes in outcomes: “A change in the institutional arrangement for deciding energy policy does not change patterns of energy use until individuals in their everyday lives lower the thermostat settings, join a carpool, buy a solar heater, and so on” (p. 57).

With that said, the concept of system-changing as McDonnell and Elmore (1987) argue “the expected effects of system-broadening and system-narrowing is a change in the institutional structure by which public goods and services are delivered” (p. 139) was seen as institutional arrangements by Kiser & Ostrom (2000). Kiser & Ostrom (2000) claim that these institutional arrangements are “the sets of rules governing the decision makers, allowable actions and strategies, authorized results, transformations internal to decision situations, linkages among decisions situations” (p. 65). Furthermore, Hurwicz (1973) referred to “decision mechanism to approach institutional arrangements by conveying the image of device constraining and guiding the choices that individuals make” (as cited by Kiser & Ostrom 2000, p. 65).

To illustrate this theory, in some countries with high tuition fees that low-income families cannot afford, the executive branch allowed private schools to receive public funding to level the playing field for disadvantaged students. Such a transfer of funds to the private sector, therefore, is an effect of system-changing as it alters the distribution of public funds to providers for public services (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987). When private schools agree to receive public funding, usually they must comply with a high degree of government regulations (Kober, 1998). Kober asserts that “the most heavily subsidized of these schools must follow virtually the same regulations as public schools”

(p. 8). These private government-dependent schools, found in sufficient numbers in almost all European countries and in small numbers throughout the United States, are subject to some restrictions in their curriculum, mode of examination, payment of teachers, and admission criteria for students (Dronkers & Robert, 2008).

### Mandates

Mandates as policy instruments are used as the conditions under which target regulations can be expected to comply with given levels of enforcement, sanctions, costs and benefits of compliance (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Over the past forty years, *mandates* are among the most important tools on which policymakers and governments rely to project national priorities and exercise intergovernmental regulations (Posner, 2007). In other words, the characteristic of mandates is by nature a regulation that implies the relationship between an authority and individuals or agencies (Stone, 1982).

For instance, the “Every Student Succeeds Act” (ESSA) that replaced the “No Child Left Behind Act” (NCLB) is an example of a mandate. The latter Act, indeed, required that states and schools boost the performance of certain groups of students such as English-language learners, poor and minority children, and students in special education (Klein, 2015). States and schools that fail to bring students to this “proficient level” are subject to serious sanctions (Klein, 2015). Given the importance of education across all cultures, a society must inevitably adopt policies and practices to foster the effective participation of members of society (Klein, 2015). In fact, Roden (1980) and Jaynes (2008) assert that parent-teacher partnership was one of the greatest values found in the American education system in the 1870s and the post-World War II era. Therefore, parents’ involvement in children’s education is significant in many ways (e.g., higher

grades, test scores, and graduation rates; better school attendance; increased motivation; improved self-esteem; lower rates of suspension; decreased use of drugs and alcohol; fewer instances of violent behavior; and greater enrollment rates in postsecondary education) (Ingram, Wolfe, & Lieberman, 2007). The “No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act” in Title I mandated the development of school-family-community partnerships (Ingram, Wolfe, & Lieberman, 2007; Bryan, 2005). Consequently, as Bryan (2005) asserts, “Under NCLB Title I, schools are required to work jointly with family and community members to develop a school-family-community involvement policy” (p. 220).

### **McLaughlin’s Approach**

According to McLaughlin (1987) the success of policies is based upon two essential factors; local capacity and will. The approach of “capacity” has been widely addressed earlier in the McDonnell and Elmore (1987) instruments. Admittedly, McLaughlin (1987) notes that “capacity is something that can be addressed and managed by the policy” (p. 172). Is will or motivation subject to the same reality of that of the capacity? Perhaps some other factors, other than policies, such as socio-political milieu, environmental stability, and competing centers of authority, might influence will or motivation.

### **Political Will**

McLaughlin (1987) defines will, or motivation, or beliefs, or commitment as an “implementor’s response to a policy’s goals or strategies” (p. 172). In political discourse, according to Kosack (2009), will is simply a commitment to a goal by individuals or policy-makers. As noted by Kosack (2009) and Persson & Sjöstedt (2012), people tend to

call leaders liars on their initial will when they do not keep their promises and fail to make major changes. McLaughlin (1987), however, asserts that will can be influenced by other factors such as environmental instability, contending priorities or pressures, while previously unknown other socio-political aspects can deeply influence implementations. “Political will –broadly understood as the will of leaders to sustain reform – is, in other words, rightly put forward by policy-making community and policy-oriented scholars as an important causal factor in the development process” (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012 p. 618).

Governments usually have limited budgets for education, and one of the key factors to determine if a government has the will to implement, for example, an educational program, is the type of citizens who are likely to demand it (Kosack, 2009). Kosack (2009) further argues that, there are two types of citizens that ask for universal primary education in developing countries; low income families and employers (political entrepreneurs) who are facing some particular conditions. Basically, it is structural reasons that force governments to rely on employers to design their policies or their educational programs, because economic performance depends on them (Kosack, 2009). Unlike employers, on the other hand, low income families do not represent a vital constituency<sup>6</sup> which is capable of supporting governments. In other words, living mostly in rural areas and being short of money and time prevents poor families from organizing themselves as a force to influence governments’ policy-making decisions (Kosack, 2009).

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<sup>6</sup> Vital constituency, the idea behind the 'vital constituency' sometimes goes by other names in political science: simply 'constituency', or, more recently, 'electorate' (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Kosack chooses this new label because the 'vital constituency' arises by a different mechanism from existing consents of a government's constituency.



In sum, this action could be a rational response to the circumstances under which these leaders govern.

### Rethinking the political will

According to Persson & Sjöstedt (2012), “political will is a silver bullet in the fight against weak development performance” (p. 617). Political will is considered as the cornerstone of development when it is perceived as a collective good by the entire population to carry change. Rethinking political will has to do with visionary and powerful leadership where leaders are responsive and responsible to leverage collective consciousness in order to provide developmental reforms capable of producing public goods and services (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012). Additionally, Persson & Sjöstedt (2012) argue the following:

Policy-makers should pay much greater attention to how the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, as well as the relationship between the citizens, play out in different countries. In places where a shared social contract seems to be lacking, they should concentrate their efforts into helping to construct such a contract (p. 626).

However, in the context of extreme poverty and the tasks of development too far away to reach, the mass of the people can be motivated to work for their advancement (Thapar, 1975).

### Local Capacity

To define local capacity in this paper, I ask what elements are needed to foster community development. Beaulieu (2002) identifies two different views about community development: “development ‘IN’ the community and development ‘OF’ the

community” (p. 5). Development “IN” the community, as Beaulieu (2002) asserts, is “the attraction of new services, new businesses, and new facilities added to the physical, and economic infrastructure of the community. Development “OF” the community... seeks to uncover and expand the knowledge and skills of people in the community... Asset mapping represents an essential step in promoting the development “OF community” (Beaulieu, 2002, p. 5).

It is true that asset mapping can be a significant procedure to identify local skills and talents within the community; unfortunately, it does not eliminate the distinct problems and existing challenges in the community (Beaulieu, 2002). The list might include the concerns with local school systems, limited numbers of jobs, lack of running water, degradation of the environment, transportation problems, lack of health services, inadequate child care services, lack of good recreation programs, corruption, and food insecurity, to cite a few. Therefore, when local capacity is not enough to address the challenges that a community is facing, it is necessary to look outside for collaboration to reinforce and empower its local capacity.

#### Empowering Local Capacity

Decentralization of capacity and self-government appears to be the best option to address the challenges above because citizens are given more opportunity to internalize democratic norms and practices for its lower obstacles of participation compared to the national level (Osei, 2002). To overcome these challenges, Warner (2010) suggests: 1) rethinking local government revenues sources, 2) negotiating labor relations, 3) rebuilding citizens’ view of the society. He further notes it will be a perplexing task, but it is necessary for a local government to sustain development and a high quality of life.

For instance, Jamaica is a great example in the western hemisphere of a country that inherited the local government system from transplanted British models since 1664 (Mills, 1985 as cited by Osei, 2002). Local communities in Jamaica were designed “to offer a wide range of services, including public cleansing, public markets, building and physical planning controls, fire rescue services, disaster preparedness, poor relief, cemeteries, street lighting, abattoirs, minor roads, public community parks and traffic control” (Osei, 2002, p.32). Either politically or functionally, such local capacity provided local governments administrative, legal and fiscal capacities to sustain local institutional development (Osei, 2002; Sellers & Lidström, 2007). For instance, Edward Seaga ruled Jamaica in 1984. He faced difficult moments because some important services and functions of local authorities were taken away and went back to the central government in Kingston (Osei, 2002).

The United States, for example, as a developed country, has local government revenue based on regressive tax instruments, meaning taxes are collected on property, sales, and user fees (Warner, 2010). Thus, according to Warner (2010), a need arises to restructure local revenues to capture the growing parts of the economy. The second aspect, as Warner notes, is the rigid labor systems that should be replaced by a flexible labor market with flexible policy that balances labor costs with service demands. He suggests a reduction of political interference, while reforming the public sector to attract more young employees. The third aspect advocates the reengagement of the citizens with their local communities to valorize public services and understand the need to balance service demands with revenue generation. To cope with all these requirements, Osei

(2002) argues that “transfers of resources and responsibilities should be carefully coordinated, and intergovernmental relationships should be clearly defined” (p. 38).

The local capacity, thus, is a sort of “evolving combination of attributes, capabilities and relationships with the central government that enables a system to exist, adapt and perform well” (Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010, p. 3). “It is also seen, to some extent, as a way of increasing the effectiveness of public administration and local accountability” (Osei, 2002, p. 38). According to Brinkerhoff & Morgan (2010), capacity is generated by five core capabilities, including:

- a) The capability to commit and engage.
- b) The capability to carry out technical, service delivery, and logistical tasks.
- c) The capacity to relate and attract support.
- d) The capability to adapt and self-renew.
- e) The capacity to balance diversity and coherence. (p. 3)

These five core capacities highlight several implications in the perspective of policy implementation and capacity development argued by Brinkerhoff & Morgan (2010) as follows,

First, it is “the complexity and the inter-connectedness of the elements associated with capacity, which means any reductionist efforts to focus on separate components of capacity are unlikely to produce good outcomes. Second, capacity is a latent phenomenon; the presence and quality of each of the capabilities only becomes apparent when actors exercise them to achieve some sort of result. Third, capacity and its associated capabilities emerge as a function of the agency of country actors (p. 3-4).

With that said, the long-term development of a community relies on the ability to reinforce its local capacity in creating a synergy among its people, institutions and informal organizations. For the development of community to be effective, the concept of asset mapping should be applied by looking at resources available outside of the community that can reinforce or be added to those already available in the community.

## CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIASPORA

This chapter analyzes the roles and the effectiveness of the Haitian diaspora through different stages since its beginning in the 1960s, using as frameworks the instruments of McDonnell and Elmore (1987) and McLaughlin (1987). First, I examine the first wave of Haitian diaspora in the 1960s, those who were considered as political exiles. Those people who fled the Duvalier family dictatorship from the 1960s to late 1980s and settled in their host countries for at least thirty years, showed their desires to return (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009; Chomsky, 2015). As a matter of fact, many of them returned after the demise of “Baby Doc” in 1986. Second, this chapter considers the role of a second flow of Haitian diaspora that fled the country in the early 1980s until the *coup d'état* on Jean Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. The second group of people, the so-called “boat people”, represents the backbone of the Haitian economy and plays a crucial role in sustaining their families and friends (Orozco, 2006). Third, it analyzes the impact of the most recent group of diaspora (1994-present) who, after the country returned to the constitutional order, fled because of disappointment that neither political nor economic situations had significantly improved. To do so, this paper uses as frameworks the instruments of McDonnell and Elmore (1987) – inducements, capacity-building, system-changing and mandates – and that of McLaughlin (1987) – capacity and will.

## **The Role and the Effectiveness of the Haitian Diaspora During Post Duvalier**

For the purpose of the thesis, I analyze the Haitian diaspora from the moment of political persecution which is extended until the departure of Duvalier (Baby Doc) in 1986 to the new wave of earthquake displaced Haitians. Michel Laguerre (1986) identifies three types of Haitians who emigrated into the United States:

All based on different economic standing in Haiti as well as in the United States, the first wave (1957-1964) of Haitians in the US were of the Haitian elite and staunchly opposed Duvalier and emigrated with the intent to return after Duvalier's fall. The second wave (1965 – 1971) were the middle class of Haiti. And, the third wave (1972 -) which continued [well into 2004] consisting mostly of boatloads of undocumented refugees headed toward Miami (as cited by Rigueur, 2011, p. 43-44).

However, Laguerre (1986) did not take into consideration the group of Haitian migrants that left Haiti during the post Duvalier period. Given the importance of different hardships that happened during this time, this research aims to reconsider the classification of the Haitian migration based on political conflicts, economic situation, and the unemployment rate among the youth of the population.

### **First Wave Period**

The first wave migrants were forced to leave the country because, as Loescher & Scanlan (1984) note, "Opponents of [Duvalier's regime] are denied the right to organize, union activity and political expression are closely monitored; prison, torture, and exile are used to suppress dissent" (p. 314). The United States encouraged this group of Haitians to migrate to the United States and allowed them to apply for asylum (Lennox, 1993).

According to Lennox (1993), between 1972 and 1980, out of 50,000 Haitians who asked for asylum, only 25,000 were granted. While the number of Haitians seeking for asylum rose, the United States reinforced its migration policy against Haitian migration by employing three strategies: deportation, detention and interdiction at sea (Lennox,1993).

### Deportation

“According to *Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith*, between 1970 and 1978 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) knowingly allowed the accumulation of as many as 7000 Haitian deportation claims” (Lennox 1993, p. 700). As Loescher & Scanlan (1984) note, “several lawsuits were filed on behalf of these Haitians during 1979, temporarily blocking INS deportation proceedings” (p. 339). In *National Council of Churches v. INS*, in order to investigate and prove the Haitian returnees were persecuted under the Duvalier administration, the plaintiffs asked for the names of all Haitians deported (Loescher & Scanlan,1984). In response to this request, “The U.S State Department sent to Haiti in May 1979 a study team to investigate charges that Haitian refugees were being persecuted upon their return” (Loescher & Scanlan,1984, p. 339). Surprisingly, “the study team reported that it had found no evidence of such persecution” (Loescher & Scanlan,1984, p. 339), which meant that the study team regarded the deported Haitians as economic asylum seekers rather than political refugee seekers.

To prove, however, that the U.S. government’s policies on Haitians’ deportation were biased, Judge James Lawrence King disgraced the State Department Team Study conclusion that Haitian returnees were not being persecuted upon their return. He argues that "much of Haiti's poverty is a result of Duvalier's efforts to maintain power. The Haitians' economic situation is a political condition" (Loescher & Scanlan,1984, p. 340).



According to Loescher & Scanlan (1984), “the most significant case was the *Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti* in 1980 that concluded as follows:

Those Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom and justice did not find it. Instead, they were confronted with an Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport them.... A Program was set up to accomplish this goal.... This Program, in its planning and executing, is offensive to every notion of constitutional due process and equal protection. The Haitians whose claims for asylum were rejected during the Program shall not be deported until they are given a fair chance to present their claims for political asylum (p. 340).

#### Detention

“In 1981, the U.S Attorney General decided that Haitians were no longer eligible. Instead, the INS created a program under which Haitians were detained during the asylum application process and denied legal representation” noted Lennox (1993, p. 701). As a result, Haitian refugees were incarcerated in prison in Florida, New York, Puerto Rico, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Texas (1993). In an open letter to the public from Fort Alien, Puerto Rico, refugees pleaded for freedom, reported by Lennox (1993):

Dear Readers, Gentlemen, Civilian, and Military Authorities,

For the last few months we have been imprisoned without knowing what outcome our fates would have...

When we left Miami, we were led to believe that we were only going to Puerto Rico for a few days. And until now we have been suffering for eight months without knowing why. Each day we hear only one thing: those who wish to return to Haiti can come give their names...

Our situation is pitiful. We have been locked up behind barbed wire from Miami to Puerto Rico. The days are always the same for us. We don't know what the date is. Sometimes we are hungry and cannot eat...

Now we cannot stand it anymore. It is too much. If we have not been freed by the end of November, a considerable number of us are going to commit suicide.

Because we have sworn to die in the United States (p. 702).

“In a subsequent decision, the court ordered release of the incarcerated Haitians until the promulgation of a new detention policy or a determination of their claims for admission” (Lennox, 1993, p. 703). “When protests from the Congressional Black Caucus and others brought these practices to a halt, the INS adopted a policy of routinely sending some Haitians to the coldest or the most remote parts of the United States” (Loescher & Scanlan, 1984, p. 345).

#### Interdiction at Sea

In 1981, President Reagan launched a program authorizing the Coast Guard to capture Haitian refugees at sea before reaching U.S. soil and return them to Port-au-Prince (Lennox, 1993, Loescher & Scanlan, 1984). An increasing aid of \$11.5 million was given to the Baby Doc administration as an agreement on Haitian refugees (Lennox, 1993), dedicated to implementing social programs, stopping illegal migrations and preserving human rights (Loescher & Scanlan, 1984). As identified by McDonnell and Elmore (1987), such an agreement exemplifies a typical example of inducements from the U.S government to encourage the Haitian government to take action on illegal Haitian migration.

### **Second Wave Period**

The departure of Duvalier, asserts Farmer (2006), “was marked by spontaneous street celebrations throughout the country” (p. 107). The first wave of Haitian diaspora victims of Duvalier family brutality started returning to the country with the hope that was “Haiti’s best chance for democracy” (Chomsky, 2015, p. 287). “The hope was quickly soured” notes Farmer (2006, p. 111). According to Chomsky (2015), elections were supposed to be scheduled in November 1987, but General Namphy and his associates (army, political elite) decided to reorganize *Tontons Macoutes* and the terror continued. From that moment on, as previously mentioned, people started fleeing the country until the general elections of December 16, 1990.

The Haitian interdiction pattern continued. “Between 1981 and 1990, approximately 22,900 Haitians were intercepted at sea, only eleven deemed qualified to apply for asylum” (Lennox, 1993, p. 704). To keep Haitians from reaching the soil of the United States, according to Koh (1994), “In February 1992, more than three thousand Haitian refugees were being held at Guantanamo” (p. 5). As noted by Lennox (1993), As a result of this political coup d’état which deposed President Aristide from power in September 1991, over 38,000 Haitians have attempted to enter the United States. Only 11,000 Haitians have been granted the right to apply for political asylum from within U.S. jurisdiction; the Coast Guard returned the other 27,000 to Haiti (p. 700).

### **Third wave**

Referring to the recent mass of Haitian migrants forced to displace because of the earthquake of 2010, Thomaz (2013) suggests,

The migration of these Haitians was mainly generated by the fragility of the Haitian state and its consequent inability to secure its citizens’ basic subsistence

needs, a reality which was only aggravated by the natural disaster that, in that sense, acted as a trigger – and not as the main driver – for the displacement (p. 35).

Usually, the Haitian migration first targets included the United States, Canada and France. Knowing that Haitians intended to leave Haiti after the earthquake, these countries took measures to avoid Haitians landing on their soil and asking for asylum (Thomaz, 2013). Therefore, “The United States imposed a naval blockade around its shores and France closed the borders of French Guiana, one of its overseas departments” (Thomaz, 2013, P. 36). On one hand, the United States took measures to disallow the entrance of Haitians after the earthquake; but on the other hand, via Secretary Napolitano of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 18 months, as a sort of discretionary relief from deportation to 58,000 Haitian nationals who were in the United States prior to January 12, 2010 (Wasem & Ester, 2008; Wasem, 2011, Schulz & Batalova, 2017).

Remittances from the Diaspora have played a significant role in the Haitian economy for decades; if these displaced migrants were integrated in the United States and France, they would be able to send some money back and support their families (Thomaz, 2013). In other words, denying the entrance for the post-disaster Haitian migrants means the denying of thousands of families the possibility to recover from this disaster in terms of human rights and humanitarian aspects.

### **Haitian Migrant Organizations**

The United States hosts the largest number of Haitian immigrants (676,000), followed by the Dominican Republic (329,000), Canada (93,000), France (74,000), and

the Bahamas (28,000) (Schulz & Batalova, 2017). The Haitian diaspora residing in the USA and in Canada sustains economically better lives and attains higher levels of education than those who live in the other countries (Wah, 2013). Legal status, the accessibility to workplace, and the availability of educational facilities for immigrants contribute to the high accomplishment of those living in the United States and Canada (Wah, 2013). This explains the main reason why the “United States settlement has been by far the most numerically and politically significant” (Schiller & Fouron, 1999, p. 346).

### **Capacity-building Through the Haitian Diaspora Perspective**

As previously mentioned, the first wave of Haitian diaspora that fled the country during the Duvalier dictatorships constitutes to some degree a solid group in their host countries. They have the relative potential to leverage people living in Haiti and influence the Haitian government’s decisions because most of them are skilled professionals, educated people, and are economically established. Whether they were part of some organizations or remained uninvolved, this group of diaspora tended to stay loyal to Haiti and planned to return to participate in Haiti’s development (Schiller & Fouron, 1999; Wah, 2013). Indeed, it is important to highlight that Haitian immigrants generally remain attached to their culture, whether they hold multiple citizenships or not (Schiller & Fouron, 1999). Further, beyond the culture, the Haitian diaspora wants to be more committed to their homeland and participate in its development (Schiller & Fouron, 1999). Despite the international migration policies, especially the United States migration policy, these commitments have been demonstrated by acting publicly, creating activities that generate resources for the development of Haiti, following political and social development, and influencing political decisions (Schiller & Fouron, 1999). The most

frequent association found among Haitian communities in New York, in Florida, and in Canada was Home Town Associations (HTAs) with the focus of sending remittances to their homelands (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009).

Two other groups of Haitian professional associations, respectively called National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians (NOAH) and Association of Medecins Haitiens à l'Etranger (AMHE), were comprised of well-skilled, educated and wealthy people (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009). NOAH pursued the aim of promoting tourism, organizing training platforms for Haitian medical workers, and planning some other activities (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009). AMHE was founded in 1970 and was comprised exclusively of Haitian doctors. Unlike NOAH, AMHE aimed at:

creating activities that include raising medical standards in the major hospitals, training Haitian physicians, and mounting campaigns to reduce HIV/AIDS and malaria. The government of Haiti has also given AMHE a customs franchise that allows it to ship medical supplies to the country duty free. (Customs duties are a continuing problem for other organizations, and it is not clear whether they are unable to negotiate similar arrangement or prefer not to do so (Rigueur, 2011, p. 55-56).

According to Weiss Fagen et al. (2009), Haitian members of these organizations planned to return after the demise of Duvalier in the 1980s, and many of them returned when Aristide took office in 1990. Later, asserts Weiss Fagen et al. (2009), “as political instability and violence in Haiti increased, direct ties and frequent visits were seriously impeded... Diaspora visitors were among the frequent targets for kidnappers, activities declined, and community attachments deteriorate” (p. 39).

During his first exile, President Aristide understood the potential of the diaspora coup and called it “The Tenth Department” because,

The coup against Aristide on Sept. 30, 1991, was followed by immediate protests in Washington, Miami, Boston, Montreal and New York, with a major protest in New York announced for Friday, Oct. 11, 1991. Over 60,000 people blocked downtown Manhattan for hours to protest against apparent tacit U.S. support of the military (Rigueur, 2011, p. 75).

As Weiss Fagen et al. (2009) points out, “In 1994, [when President Bertrand Aristide was brought back to the office], he created a new cabinet post, commonly called the Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad (MHAVE) “with the charge of facilitating diaspora investments, contributions and visits, and improving relations with diaspora organizations” (p. 42). Based on the framework of McDonnell and Elmore (1987) from which this research is analyzed, Aristide tended to incorporate the concept of capacity-building in the Haitian state via embracing the Haitian diaspora community that was excluded from the Haitian political landscape by prior governments to participate in the political and social arena for the purpose of investment in future benefits of the society.

If Aristide did not have the political will to build the capacity, as defined by McLaughlin (1987), during his first term of the presidency, the Haitian diaspora would not support him in his journey to return to Haiti. Such support shows that, according to Rigueur (2011), “the whole Haitian community was elated to see Aristide return to Haiti as its rightful leader” (p. 65). With the return of Aristide, the Haitian Diaspora made giant steps in building a strong role in USA/Haitian relationships (Rigueur, 2011).

The Haitian Diaspora has successively engaged the US government in the area of refugee policies...Members of the diaspora community have managed to become major actors changing the way in which the US approaches Haiti. There have been instances of Diasporas participating in island politics [who] contact US Congressmen and formal, voluntary and grassroots organizations for favors on behalf of Haiti...also members of the diaspora have been able to introduce their presidential candidates to US politicians and to members of Congress (Rigueur, 2011, p. 76).

The problem however with the Haitian organizations is that they are not organized to work as a whole in terms of impacting the development of Haiti. As Rigueur (2011) asserted, “This diaspora was supposed to be a key element in the development of Haiti..., but there is doubtfully a common denominator in Haitian history, which the diaspora has transplanted and perpetuated as its been involved in the Haitian democratic and developmental process” (p. 66). As the New York based social analyst Francois Pierre-Louis has written:

In a country like Haiti where the state is weak, the hometown associations, if they are organized and financed, can implement certain projects more effectively than the government bureaucracy. However, while they may come with good intentions to implement sound projects for the population, they can also undermine the authority of the state by competing with one another and creating duplicate projects as cited by (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 41).

According to Rigueur (2011), “That common denominator is the fragmented social structures in Haiti, which the Haitian Diaspora has transplanted into the diaspora



community” (p. 66). This fragmentation was seen through different Home Town Associations (HTA) in most Haitian-based places that were fragmented after being put in federations. For instance, as noted by Weiss Fagen et al. (2009), a few Federations such as ‘Fédération des Associations Haitiennes à L’Etranger (FAHRE)’ in New York, American-Haitian Foundation (AHFED) in Boston, and Regroupement des Organismes Canado-Haïtiens pour le Développement (ROCAHD) have struggled to fully operate in the receiving countries and even worse to cooperate with the Haitian State.

### **Inducement through Diaspora Perspective**

Among causes that have impoverished Haiti, according to Dupuy (1989), was its integration into the global capitalist market as a small economy based on agricultural crops and its limited production of manufactured goods for exportation. Former U.S President Bill Clinton claimed,

The Haitian trade liberalization policies that I pushed in the 1990s, which compelled Haiti to remove tariffs on imported rice from the United States, may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. . . . Haitians had to live every day with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti because of what I did, nobody else (Dupuy, 2010, p.14)

Farmer (2006) notes that, from a pariah nation since its independence, to a failed and collapsed Nation-State over the last four decades, Haiti has demonstrated its lack of capacity to provide services to Haitian citizens. Haitian leaders have shown neither the will nor the capacity to optimize national resources to address this failure due, to some extent, to corruption. Instead, according to Cantave (2006), Haiti relies on foreign aid

managed by non-profit organizations (NGOs) that have engaged in a variety of social, environmental, civic, and political activities, to provide goods and services. This phenomenon has been increasingly common in Haiti for the fact that among donors (World Bank for example), these agencies are more cost-effective than governments in providing basic social services, are better able to reach the poor, and are key players in democratization processes (Ebrahim, 2003, Reimann, 2006). After February 7, 1986, from an authoritarian system, Haiti entered a new paradigm of system-changing, which was the democracy. Unfortunately, Haiti repeatedly experienced one crisis after another (Cantave, 2006) that Fatton (2002) calls “Predatory democracy”<sup>7</sup> (p. xii). The proliferation of NGOs is a result of these crises (Cantave, 2006). Edmond Mulet, a former head of the UN mission in Haiti, conservatively estimates that there were more than 10,000 NGOs in Haiti before the January 12 earthquake and Haitians ironically refer to their country as a “republic of NGOs” (Edmonds, 2014).

According to Toussaint-Comeau (2012), a billion dollars in foreign aid has been spent for governance and democratization programs, but the outcomes remain insignificant because of the lack of will of the Haitian governments to direct foreign aid into real development. As Emanuel, Currie & Herman (2005) argue, “the purpose of any inducement [money received in exchange of producing goods and services] is to change behavior” (p. 336). In accordance with that perspective, is it worth questioning the importance of these agencies (NGOs) that are operating on the ground.

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<sup>7</sup> Predatory democracy is a regime in which very imperfect trappings of liberal democracy coexist with the Hobbesian struggle to monopolize the few sites of public power with access to wealth and privilege Fatton (2002, p. xii).

Experience has shown that foreign aid does not guarantee anything in terms of improving Haitian people's lives. According to Barton-Dock and Singh (2015), the international aid in Haiti reached a ceiling after the earthquake in 2010; since then, it started decreasing and it is projected to be highly insignificant by 2025 (Fig. 7). The Red Cross, one of the largest non-profit NGOs, collected \$255 million from private donations, but allocated only \$106 million to Haiti relief. This left \$149 million of donations unaccounted for (Edmonds, 2014). Furthermore, the Clinton Foundation, for their involvement with recovery efforts of rescued people in Haiti, raised \$30 million for aid relief projects. According to Marleine Bastien, executive director of Fanm Ayisyen Nan Miyami, the money that Clinton Foundation raised for the quake reconstruction has helped his global investor initiative more than it has benefited poverty-stricken Haitians (Sheerin, 2016).

In short, as mentioned by McDonnell & Elmore (1987), "the expected effect of inducements is the production of value" (p. 138). One must ask, for whom did they produce value? Literally, the types of foreign assistance that have been implemented in Haiti did not work for the benefit of Haitians. For Haitians, therefore, what type of aid and global collaboration with the donors would work? According to Fatton Jr (2011), it is time to change the paradigm.

### **Harnessing the Resources of Diaspora**

Developing Haiti will not be an easy task, especially with the majority of the population living in poverty. Aid from the international community will be important in this matter, but it is also imperative for the government and policymakers to enact attractive policies and programs to induce the Haitian diaspora to return and help rebuild

the country. Despite the fact that they presumably live a higher standard of life in their host countries, the Haitian diaspora has the will and the desire to return (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009; Chomsky, 2015; Wah, 2013). They show this will through their remittances sent to support families and their investments in small activities and projects, etc. To generate more capacity-building from the Haitian diaspora to participate in the development of the country, the government could craft inducements that comply with the Diaspora's development perspective by enacting policies that create the bond between Haiti and its diaspora community.

### Diaspora Remittances

“Remittances are defined as the transfer of money or goods sent by the migrants and received by individuals who, generally, are family members of these migrants” (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009). Therefore, remittances are among the tangible bridges between diasporas and development, and represent one of the largest sources of financial flows to developing countries (Barajas et al., 2009). Generally spent on consumption necessities (food, clothing, medicine, and shelter), remittances help lift vast numbers of people out of poverty by supporting a higher level of consumption than would otherwise be possible (Barajas et al., 2009).

Before 1970, there is no record showing the remittance inflows from the United States to Haiti (Fig. 8, see Appendix C). As the number of Haitian migrants started growing during the first wave, a positive trend of remittances developed from the sending countries (USA, Canada, France, etc..) to the receiving country (Haiti). It was documented, as the result of this growing number of Haitian diaspora, an estimated \$18

million USD in 1970 was flowing into Haiti from the United States and reached \$106 million USD in the 1980s (Rigueur, 2011)

Although remittance receipt patterns steadily increase during the second wave and the third wave from \$123 million in 1990 to more than \$ 2 billion in 2014 (Fig 8, see Appendix C), the amount is meager compared to many other countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC) (Fig. 9, see Appendix C). In 2015, the Haitian diaspora in the United States and the Dominican Republic sent annually remittances that are worth \$1.3 billion and \$490.5 million respectively (Fig 10, Appendix C).

At a micro-level perspective, remittances sent back to Haiti from the Haitian diaspora impact individual lives by being invested in children's schooling and assisting other family members' needs. At the macro-level, however, remittances sent to Haiti could have a large and sustained effect on the economy if they were invested in a long-run technology or used for capital investment (Mundaca, 2009). Unfortunately, the government shows its lack of will and capacity to enact policies that could guide the diaspora in that direction. Nonetheless, the Haitian diaspora community and some charity organizations channeled collective remittances to run some projects in building health infrastructure and assisting in different sectors where the Haitian government is unable to provide services such as running water, electricity, schooling etc... Unfortunately, follow up on such philanthropic practices is often lacking.

### Diaspora Bonds

First and foremost, to change the paradigm, the government should implement programs that induce diaspora such as "diaspora bonds." A diaspora bond is a "debt instrument issued by a country — or potentially, a sub-sovereign entity or even a private

corporation — to raise financing from its overseas diaspora” (Ketkar & Ratha, 2010, p. 252). According to Ketkar & Ratha (2010), Haiti is among twenty-five developing countries ranked by the presence of a highly-skilled diaspora settled in rich countries (Table. 5, see Appendix D). As such, Haitian diaspora bonds may be an attractive vehicle to help stabilize the financing situation of the country while the foreign aid is declining. Haitian migrants remain attached to their country of origin, and this patriotism may be a great motivation to drive them to purchase bonds.

However, patriotism is not enough for diaspora to purchase hard currency bonds released by the government. Usually, Haitian governments are involved in corruption; even the current president Jovenel Moise recognizes and repeatedly mentions the corruption as a gangrene for the development of Haiti (Widlore, 2017; Ricardo, 2017). The president claims that his administration adopted some measures to eradicate corruption, but until now there has been no real evidence from the government that shows the will to fight corruption. Clarens Renoit, a former Presidential candidate, declares “the credibility to fight corruption fundamentally relies on the exemplarity that must come from the President by providing justice to those in the president’s immediate circle who would be suspected of corruption” (as cited by Rosny, 2017). In addition, as Ketkar & Ratha (2010) note, “the absence of governability [which is translated as a lack of capacity of the Haitian government to govern wisely] can be a big negative for diaspora bonds” (p. 257).

To encourage the Haitian diaspora to purchase bonds, it is also necessary for the government to demonstrate its capacity and will to empower them and provide them with some inducements. According to Ionescu (2005), one way to demonstrate Haitian

diaspora capacity and will is to grant them dual citizenships and voting rights. A signal was sent at the beginning of 1991 by the first President Aristide administration in which Haitian diaspora were welcomed as the “Tenth Department”<sup>8</sup> (US Department of State, 2010), but this initiative did not last too because the constitution was not amended to award such privileges and benefits to overseas Haitian populations (Schiller & Fouron, 1999).

According to Schulz & Batalova (2017), more than a million Haitians are currently living overseas, about 676, 000 and 329,000 of them are respectively living in the United States and Dominican Republic (Fig. 7 & 8). For instance, admittedly Haitian diaspora would consent to annually purchase a thousand US dollars hard currency bonds, which is less than \$85 a month, that would add up more than a billion US dollars in the Haitian economy for investment. Ketkar & Ratha (2010) analyzed the Haitian diaspora regarding the investment as follows:

Nearly one-third of legal Haitian immigrants in the US earned more than US \$60,000 in 2009.... A quarter of Haitian immigrants, especially women, are reportedly in the relatively higher paying health care and education sectors and only a small number are in the construction sector. Not only Haitians, but also foreign individuals interested in helping Haiti, even charitable institutions, are likely to be interested in these bonds. That would further expand the pool of potential investors in Haiti’s diaspora bonds (p. 261).

Even though there is a lack of trust in Haitian public institutions, according to Ketkar & Ratha (2010), an inducement of a five percent tax-free dollar interest rate

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<sup>8</sup> Tenth Department: a subset of the population that lives outside of the country ‘s ten geographic departments

would drive a tremendous number of Haitian diaspora to invest in these bonds.

Nonetheless, the Haitian government could create specifically a bank, so-called the “Haitian Diaspora Bank,” which should be co-managed by Haitians living abroad and by some trustworthy members in the Haitian civil society. The collection of diaspora bond funds will be done on an annual basis after the annual report submitted to all investors.

#### Trade and Investment Flows

Plaza & Ratha (2011) demonstrate that countries seem to trade more with countries from which they receive immigrants. The more immigrants living in a country, the more the flow of merchandise trading that exists between these countries. Some countries use their diaspora to provide market information and change investors’ perspectives about the bad news that come from their homeland (Plaza & Ratha, 2011). When it comes to investments, diaspora generally is more willing to take risks investing in their own homeland than other investors because they are better placed to evaluate the market and make the complete paperwork process easier (Plaza & Ratha, 2011). According to Brinkerhoff (2006), “diaspora members can act as catalysts for the development of capital markets in their countries of origin by diversifying the investor base, by introducing new financial products, and by providing reliable sources of funding” (p. 49). The so-called “Tenth Department” is an under-utilized source of capacity that the country can count on (Kelley, 2001). Providing inducements to Haitian diaspora investors (free-tax exempt for example) to minimize the risks and be competitive with other countries, especially in the Caribbean area, may perhaps be beneficial in attracting their investment, as well as new foreign investments from their associates.



### Knowledge and Technology Transfer

Haitian diaspora may provide to Haiti access to technology and skills through professional associations (for example, the Haitian Doctors and Association in New York), temporary assignments of skilled expatriates in Haiti, distance teaching, and the return (either short period or long return) of emigrants with enhanced skills. To facilitate this process, the government must encourage *networks of knowledge*<sup>9</sup> exchanges or create attractive incentive activities or programs. For instance, initiate small pilot programs to attract Haitian diaspora to teach courses in distinct parts of the country, especially in provincial and rural areas with competitive salaries by providing teachers risk bonuses and technology-based school facilities.

It is practically impossible for higher education in Haiti to play its role of generating scientific knowledge and adapting programs that benefit Haiti and the scientific community in general, when “only 10 percent of university teachers have a master’s degree” (Paul & Michel 2013, p. 68). In addition, universities in Haiti are unaccountable; among 200 universities that were operating in 2009, only fifty were allowed by MENFP<sup>10</sup> to operate. The criteria that awards the opening of these universities are non-academic. In other words, no academic backgrounds are required when opening a university in Haiti (Paul & Michel 2013).

When analyzing the characteristics of Haitian diaspora academics, 7 percent have an advanced degree (master’s degree, PhD or post-graduate degree) compared to 11 percent of the U.S general population (Table 4, see Appendix D). They are an asset for

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<sup>9</sup> Networks knowledge is “skilled personnel who migrate every year from their home countries to join thousands and millions of their countrymen and women residing in countries other than their own” (Plaza & Ratha, 2011, p.

<sup>10</sup> MENFP stands for “Ministry of National Education Professional and Training. However, the name of this ministry has changed from time to time, such Ministry of National Education Youth and Sport (MENJS).

the academic development of Haiti and an opportunity that Haiti needs to take advantage of by reconsidering its policies vis-a-vis academic Haitian diaspora. As Kohler (2010) proposes “the brain drain can be transformed in brain gain” (as cited by Paul & Michel 2013, p. 69). It suffices for Haiti in general and the universities in particular to enact policies that are capable to change Haitian people’s mentality on the concept of diaspora.

It is common in the Haitian mentality that diaspora is someone who maintains a relationship with their motherland through remittances, and as tourists when they visit, but not to settle and create opportunity. Enacting policies to change the anti-diaspora attitude by adopting more attractive attitudes to induce Haitian diaspora to return, could generate an enormous impact on the development of Haiti.

Initiated in 2011 by the former President Michel Martelly, the Universal, Free, and Compulsory Education Program (PSUGO) is a subsidized fund collected from the Haitian diaspora on out/ongoing calls and remittances for education. The Haitian diaspora was not happy with the Fund National for Education (FNE), the public entity that manages the fund because it was illegally collected without official government approval until August 2017 when it was passed by legislation and signed by the President (Celiné, 2017). Such a program may be used as an inducement to attract skilled-teachers and professionals to voluntarily teach in the schools that are subsidized by these funds. The government and policymakers could enact policies ensuring that a portion of the funds finance Haitian diaspora teachers’ and professors’ travels fees, transportation, and their settlement during the teaching period and another portion finances e-learning programs or collaborate with some other programs, such as “Teach for Haiti” (Anseye pou Ayiti) that allow diaspora to directly come and teach for a period of time. All these

can be measures initiated by the Haitian government to build its capacity by attracting and leveraging Haitian skilled-professionals to play their role in the development of their homeland.

### Institutions Rearrangements

According to Ionescu (2006), government institutions abroad, especially embassies and consulates, can play a key role in reaching out to the diaspora by “gathering information on diaspora, offering services to expatriates and maintaining links with the expatriate communities” (p. 36). Like other institutions on the ground, Haitian embassies and consulates lack adequate human resources. The Haitian government lacks the will to improve these institutions’ capacity to promote programs such as bonds that attract Haitian diaspora to work with the Haitian community to seek investments and trades, and use these institutions as vehicles to promote development of the country. The Ministry of the Haitians Living Abroad (MHAVE) was mandated to support with concrete initiatives the collaboration with the Haitian diaspora communities, to facilitate the services of the Haitian state to the members of the diaspora, and to advocate for their interests, and mainly to regain expatriate resources to rebuild Haiti’s economic development (Ionescu, 2006; Plaza & Ratha, 2011). Since its creation on January 25, 1995, it seems that MHAVE failed to fulfill the objectives for which it was created because MHAVE has never engaged the Haitian diaspora (Wah, 2013). This failure may be due to a lack of financial and human resources in terms of capacity allocated to the ministry (Wah, 2003).

## Dual Citizenship

Dual citizenship occurs when individuals acquire citizenship from a host country other than their home country, which means they are eligible to be citizens of more than one country, according to Sejersen (2008). Plaza & Ratha (2011) show that migrants from countries where dual citizenship is granted maintain the will to interact and be involved with their homeland. According to Ionescu (2006), granting dual citizenship is a sort of inducement given to facilitate diaspora contributions. Plaza & Ratha (2011) added that dual citizenship encourages greater participation of diaspora, and motivates their involvement in activities and transactions in which foreigners have faced trouble, such as temporary work, land ownership, etc.

Schiller (2005) notes that an increasing number of sending countries that have many migrants abroad, including Jamaica and Dominican Republic, allow dual citizenship to their expatriates. As Sejersen (2008) notes, “the number of migrants is not a new phenomenon, what creates new patterns is the increasing likelihood of migrants maintaining ties to origin places” (p. 524). Even though the Haitian constitution of 1986 denied the dual citizenship, Haitian diaspora to some extent maintain strong relationships with families, friends, and local governments. As previously mentioned, the Préval administration advocated for a constitutional reform that granted dual citizenship to Haitian migrants, but the initiative failed. In 2011, lawmakers finally voted to grant Haitians living abroad dual citizenship with the right to own lands and run for public office. This new legislation came with some restrictions on president, prime minister, police chief, judge in Supreme Court, and either parliament elective post (Americas

Quarterly, 2011). In short, dual citizenship creates policy implications for legislation related to taxing, property rights, and voting rights.

### **System Changing Through Haitian Diaspora Perspective**

Being in a situation where international aid becomes scarce because of the lack of confidence in debt markets that Haiti has been through, Haiti should manage its finances in productive and innovative ways to manage better its politico-economic, and social system. One way to do so is to reconsider the Haitian diaspora involvement in Haitian affairs. According to McDonnell and Elmore (1987), when the institutions are unable to fulfill the policies for which they are assigned, it is necessary to rearrange the authority among and within these institutions to make them more efficient. This research analyzes the implication of the diaspora as a changing vehicle to the system at two levels: individual and organizational levels.

Given the contribution of the Haitian diaspora through their remittances, which are more than two billion dollars annually (Fig. 8, see Appendix C), it seems that the government and local authorities do not understand this potential to profoundly involve the Haitian diaspora in real change for the development of Haiti, or they may not want their involvement because of an anti-diaspora perception among some citizens, fearing they will come to take over people's positions. According to the Migration Policy Institute (2014), the Haitian community is growing and represents approximately 915,000 people (first and second generations combined) living in the United States. Haiti-born individuals account for 1.5 percent of the total U.S. foreign-born population (Tab. 4, see Appendix D). Haiti is among the countries in the LAC with high remittances sent from their diasporas (Fig. 9, see Appendix C). As a matter of fact, Haiti must initiate a

dynamic to integrate the overseas Haiti-born population in its different developmental aspects.

In addition, in terms of education, “Haitian diaspora members in the United States had slightly lower educational attainment than the U.S general population, meanwhile the second generation made significant educational advances compared to the first generation” (MPI, 2014, p. 2). For instance, among the same group, fifteen percent [1<sup>st</sup> generation 13 percent and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation 29 percent] from age 25 and older had a bachelor’s degree, while seven percent of them held a master’s degree, a PhD or an advanced professional degree (MPI, 2014, p. 4) (Table 4). These statistics are higher than the educational attainment of Haitians living in Haiti. In fact, an educational comparative analysis of Haitian diaspora and the Haitian nationals shows a great gap that will take Haiti almost “seventy-four years to produce an equal number of university graduates to that which already exists in the U.S. and Canadian Haitian diaspora communities combined” (Wah, 2013 p. 62). In Haiti, 40 percent of the population over 25 years of age have had schooling, while 93 percent of the same age in the U.S have had schooling. From that 40 percent, only about 3.5 percent attended college and 1.4 percent hold a university degree, while 32 percent of the U.S Haitian diaspora has at least attended college level and 18 percent hold a BA and higher degree Wah (2013).

The 2010 U.S. census showed the number of Haitian diaspora holding a university degree is close to 65,900, which is quadruple the number of all those living in Haiti (Wah, 2013). Definitely, like the Chinese State Commission for Science and Technology suggested in 1988 for overseas professional Chinese, overseas professional Haitians should be “regarded as an overseas reservoir” (Biao, 2006, p. 3). Therefore, the time has

come for Haiti to use these resources to rebuild the country. Wah (2013) claims that “Haiti has no choice in the short and medium term than to utilize its skilled expatriates in its development efforts, unless the country wants to largely import foreign skilled workers across all fields” (p. 62).

Some temporary return programs like TOKTEN have existed in Haiti since 1988 (Wah, 2013), but it seems like this program is not well known within the Haitian diaspora not because the government does not know the potential benefit of diaspora support to Haitian society, but it is because there is a lack of political will to bring diaspora groups into a more productive relationship with Haitian institutions and civil society overall (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 42).

For example, to address education issues facing the country, the Government of Haiti provided a roadmap sheet to the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP) that contains the operational plan for the quinquennial of the government. There is no call at all to the Haitian diaspora intellectual elite to participate in such a plan (Haiti Libre, 2017) (see Appendix A). Part of the reason is because, as Paul & Michel (2013) note, “the Haitian universities (Hus)’s inability to attract and retain highly qualified human resources” (p. 64). In addition, an anti-diaspora mentality exists among some who consider them as competitors instead of assets (Paul & Michel, 2013). At all levels in the society, as of today, some people think that the integration of the diaspora will be an issue in terms of taking away their jobs rather than a possibility that they should take advantage of. In short, the implication of Haitian professionals living abroad, not only in the public administration, but also in private sectors, is relevant for the development of Haiti.

### **Mandates Through Diaspora Perspective**

Haiti has a history of signing international conventions and treaties looking to increase funds without examining the long-term effects of such agreements (Sider & Jean-Marie, 2014). With decreasing international aid, the government, local authorities, and policymakers should use it as an opportunity to refocus on efficiency while keeping an eye on cumulative benefits to the Haitian government and the welfare of the Haitian people in general.

When it comes to education, the Haitian constitution of 1987 states, “Education is the responsibility of the State and its territorial divisions. They must make schooling available to all, free of charge, and ensure that public and private sector teachers are properly trained” (Constitution de la République d'Haïti, 1987). In addition, Haiti is a member of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; as a member, Haiti must adhere to article 28 that states:

Make primary education compulsory and available free for all; encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including vocational education..., make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means; make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children; take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.).

The ideal of the Constitution of 1987 embeds a universal vision of education for all Haitian citizens, but “the current realities of Haiti’s education are not aligned with the constitutional standards” (Coupet & Nicolas, 2016, p.160). “The mandates of universal



primary education passed by 2015 proposing that all students have access to primary school highlight the ineffectiveness of the Haitian Government's Ministry of Education National Professional and Training (MENFP) as there are no systems of accountability to ensure all students have access to quality schooling" (Coupet & Nicolas, 2016, p. 161). The majority of countries that applied the free primary education policies have, as a result, increased enrollment rates (Omwami & Keller, 2010). Haiti, in contrast, only has "60 percent of school-aged children attend school" according to Sider & Jean-Marie (2014) as cited by (Coupet & Nicolas, 2016, p. 161).

It is important to consider what makes other countries successful. With the Global Educational Reform Movement (GERM) of the 1990s, "the focus of educational development, such as curriculum development, student assessment, teacher development, technology-assisted teaching and learning have become common priorities in education reforms" (Sahlberg, 2011, p.176). GERM elements were adopted by many countries in the world as educational policies to increase student learning and teacher competencies (Sahlberg, 2011). Haiti, however, continues using the traditional materials and teaching approaches in classrooms. Referring to Freire's (2003) analogy of the banking form of education, in Haiti's schools, students are dehumanized by being filled with the knowledge or agenda of the teacher who is a steward of an oppressive system (Freire, 2003).

From a colonial legacy of an education system held by a minority while the mass of the population remained oppressed and divided, Dartigue attempted to transform the Haitian education bureaucracy. As Rea (2014) notes:

For more than 10 years, Dartigue attempted to establish methodology, uniformity and accountability by creating rural training centers for teachers, designing curriculum for farm schools and competency exams for teaching candidates. He promoted the use of Creole in children's early instruction as a stepping-stone to French (Rea, 2014, p. 47).

Then, Bernard attempted to apply Dartigue Reform through the Bernard Reform (*La réforme de Bernard*) in taking the following steps:

Modernize and democratize Haiti's primary and secondary education systems with focus on Creole as the language of instruction for the first four grades of primary school, separating the curriculum into both academic and technical tracks and also attempted to align the school structure with labor market demands (Rea, 2014, p. 49).

Nesmy Manigat, the former minister of MENFP in Matelly's administration, attempted to reconcile both Dartigue and Bernard reforms. He failed to do so even though he had the will to bring such an implementation; but he made some changes, including a new curriculum for preschool education and a policy banning preschool graduation ceremonies. He also improved instruction in Creole and reduced class sizes from two or three hundred students (depending on the school's location) to forty-five students for grade school and sixty for high school (Charles, 2015).

McDonnell & Elmore (1987) note two important points about the benefits of mandates, which accrue to specific individuals or groups and intend to benefit a broader society as a whole. Unfortunately, some Haitian parliament members, with limited academic backgrounds, demonstrate a lack of capacity to enact rules that benefit either

individuals or the entire society. Bernard Salome asserts “only an improvement in the stock of human capital by means of education and training adapted to the reality of Haiti can help to solve the dilemma of ‘ill-development’” (cited by Rea 2014, p. 3).

From a Freirian perspective, Haiti’s oppressors [the elite and the economic classes] have been dehumanizing most of the population through a continuation of the ‘politics of telling’ for more than two centuries (Johnson, 2006). It is time for teachers, parents, and all stakeholders to stand and speak for themselves and force the policymakers to pass legislation that benefits the entire country. “No matter how ignorant or submerged in the culture of silence” (Freire, 2003, p. 32), the Haitians must, as it was proven during the revolution period, be willing to work together and look for an alternative to change the legacy of educational policies of oppression. Further, Freire (2003) asserts the need for a people to achieve *conscientização*, or a critical consciousness, as imperative for their lives as politically and economically-free individuals:

The important thing, from the point of view of libertarian education, is for the people to come to feel like masters of their thinking by discussing the thinking and views of the world explicitly or implicitly manifest in their own suggestions and those of their comrades (p. 124).

Dartigue understood this critical consciousness and had the will to change the status quo through different actions taken as a former minister of MENFP, and said the following:

The masses must be educated so that they can watch over to see that the services are run properly. If the masses are educated they will no longer accept seeing the roads they use deteriorate through lack of upkeep. They will no longer accept that

hospitals and clinics cease to function, nor accept untrained doctors or nurses, nor illiterate teachers... They no longer will permit their representatives to vote laws contrary to their interests... (Rea, 2014, p. 18).

As mentioned earlier, will and capacity, to which McLaughlin (1987), referred are two important factors toward system-changing, but it should be a collective will where all individuals comply and converge their efforts toward the same focal point.

Finally, the idea of leveraging Haitian diaspora to play a role in the development of Haiti will not be possible if there are no regulations enacted by policymakers to create the harmony between the Haitian diaspora and the Haitian governments. To do so, the Haitian governments and policymakers should make generating the necessary will a priority and reinforce their capacity to enact policies and rules that integrate the Haitian diaspora.

## CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To understand the contemporary situation of Haiti, this thesis retraced the behavior of the international community towards Haiti as it isolated this country in one way or another for more than two centuries. From a developmental perspective, the Haitian government sought to look not only at internal resources but also at available transnational resources, especially at a time when international aid is decreasing. This paper demonstrates that the underdevelopment of Haiti has been a combination of Haitian ineffectiveness, unsuitable political practices and international policies against Haiti.

This thesis also analyzes, on one hand, the causes of the Haitian mass exodus and the impacts on the current Haitian situation. On the other hand, it aims at examining the potential of the Haitian diaspora community at different levels, such as education, economic, social, and political, as a resource for the development of Haiti. This participation can be pictured at distinct steps:

- a. directing their remittances towards development-based projects,
- b. structuring the Haitian diaspora associations,
- c. rearranging the government institutions by reinforcing the resources allowing them to better collaborate with the Haitian diaspora association to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, and more importantly
- d. creating conditions to leverage the Haitian diaspora to return to Haiti either temporarily or permanently.

When looking at the remittance trend from 1970 to 2015, the annual remittances reached more than 2 billion dollars. “Remittances, whether individual or collective, should help to build a more viable infrastructure that would eventually lead to development” (Rigueur, 2011, p. 81). Unfortunately, the remittance markets in Haiti remain underdeveloped in terms of financial infrastructure. As previously mentioned, with the growing Haitian second-generation, policy makers and the government should enact policies that culturally involve this generation in the development process by funding special programs such as short-term visits and work in Haiti. During their visit and work periods in Haiti, their relatives abroad could be motivated to send them remittances.

The Haitian diaspora associations play a key role similar to that of the international donors by helping their community to solve basic problems or/and providing basic services, such as paying medical bills, building schools, and paying for supplies to cite a few. However, “these actions are individualistic approaches that do not constitute effective development practice” (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 48). According to Weiss Fagen et al. (2009), “From the diaspora group’s perspective, the goals are to serve a given community, to deliver needed services and to make a personal mark, but not necessarily to replace the government in its plan to implement development” (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 48). In other words, not only the Haitian diaspora community have both the capacity and development-based visions to effectively participate in the development of Haiti, also this community has the will to better structure itself and work with the government to implement some major projects.

It is necessary that the government and policymakers enact policies to create more government institutions abroad that can collaborate with the Haitian diaspora community, especially in countries where Haitian migrants' rights are violated. In countries where the Haitian diaspora community is well established, these institutions could seek to work with the Haitian associations not only to generate programs that induce Haitian diaspora to invest in Haiti, but also to facilitate the transfer of knowledge.

The Haitian mass exodus causes a major obstacle to sustainable improvement and the development of Haiti, because it is missing the majority of well-educated and skilled professionals, who could be great leaders and contributors to the development of Haiti (Weiss Fagen et al., 2009, p. 48). Due to the current lack of capacity of the Haitian state to provide services, the return of Haitian diaspora either temporarily or permanently is a giant step toward changing the system. The Haitian diaspora share the same language and similar cultural background as the general population, which eases communication and facilitates understanding of transport documents, procedures, and regulations.

One last obstacle – beyond the focus of this thesis – is the current social context of Haiti, as previously described by the current President of Haiti. That context, as this author also acknowledges, creates the perception of a pervasive corruption of the Haitian government, agencies, and individuals that are operating on the ground. If the return of the Haitian diaspora reveals itself as imperative for the development of the country, this perception could affect their will and motivation to invest themselves and their money for the development of Haiti.

To address all these issues, this author proposes an alternative set of programs that could be implemented by the government to leverage the Haitian diaspora to play an

effective role in rebuilding Haiti. This chapter specifies these recommendations by addressing the following questions:

- What are applicable methods or/and practices that could be implemented to reduce the current rate of the Haitian mass exodus and decrease the “brain drain” phenomenon?
- How could the Haitian government leverage and empower skilled Haitians abroad and stimulate them to return and participate in rebuilding their homeland along with other Haitians living in Haiti?

To address these two questions, McDonnell and Elmore’s (1987) and McLaughlin’s (1987) methods are applied to formulate some propositions attempting to solve the Haitian mass exodus. These propositions are addressed at two levels. First, at the international level:

The Haitian diaspora is among the worldwide diasporas that maintain relationships with their family and friends at home. Because of the harsh situations that prevail on the ground, some Haitian migrants think that the solutions should come from people in Haiti. This paper aims at proposing solutions not only at the national level, but at the international level as well. Among these solutions, this author proposes:

1. It is necessary that, in terms of capacity-building, the Haitian diaspora mobilizes and structures the “socio-professional” networks to finance and implement direct projects in Haiti. To do so, the Haitian diaspora associations can negotiate with both sending and receiving countries’ authorities (policymakers) to work on policies that allow payroll deduction from the Haitian employees to fund a Haitian



diaspora bank for development to invest in material, intellectual, and human resources.

2. It is necessary that, in terms of system-changing, the Haitian diaspora collaborate with Haitian youth and encourage entrepreneurship among them. Today, “survey data from 2012 indicates that 40 percent of the urban labor force does not have a job” (Lozano-Gracia & Garcia Lozano, 2017, p. 35). As a result, this urban labor force is leaving the country for Brazil, Chile, and the Dominican Republic (Table 6, see Appendix D). Creating academic entrepreneurs can be a great tool against the exodus of Haitian youth attempting to migrate elsewhere.
3. It is necessary that, in terms of inducements, the Haitian Diaspora redirect the “Collective Remittances” sent by Home Town Associations (HTA) to better finance local projects (rural areas). With that said, HTA should condition these remittances by channeling them toward local projects as a means to sustain development to these areas often forgotten by the governments.
4. It is necessary that, in terms of capacity-building, the Haitian diaspora intervene directly in the education system through co-supervision of research projects, teaching, and students’ academic exchanges (Paul & Michel, 2013). Knowing that highly qualified people of Haiti have emigrated and some of them are involved at the best universities in the world, their academic investments in the Haitian education system may potentially improve the education system via e-learning and e-teaching.
5. It is necessary that, in terms of capacity-building, the Haitian diaspora work with the government institutions abroad (embassies and consulates, MHAVE) in a

partnership fashioned to create activities and programs whose objective is to change the images projected by certain media about the country to attract potential international investors.

6. It is necessary that, in terms of system-changing, the Haitian diaspora travel often to Haiti, either temporarily or permanently, to acquire a real and concrete vision of the situation and look for possibilities to link with people on the ground. These actions and strategies may influence change among young people who are considering migrating elsewhere.

At the national level, the Haitian government and local authorities must demonstrate their capacity and political will to create a bond between the Haitian diaspora and the Haitian population. Some measures proposed include:

1. It is necessary, in terms of inducements, that the Haitian government and local authorities, and policymakers enact policies and laws that allow the Haitian migrants with foreign citizenship (not those with dual citizenship) the rights to vote in general elections without returning to the country, even though they cannot be elected to political office. As well, create incentives for those who manifest the desire to return and settle temporarily and permanently in Haiti.
2. It is necessary, in terms of inducements, that the Haitian government and local authorities, and policymakers work together with receiving countries with a large number of Haitian migrants to enact policies that enable Haitian migrants to offer their expertise to Haiti for a brief period that does not go over six months while keeping their benefits in their host countries, such as the U.S.A, Canada, France, Dominican Republic, etc.

3. It is necessary, in terms of inducements, that the Haitian government, local authorities, and policymakers extend respectively the government institutions abroad and enlarge the budget of these institutions to lobby foreign investors, and also to encourage migrant business projects to invest in a social and productive sector. In doing so, the overall economy of Haiti can improve, thus increasing the opportunities for Haitian youth to remain in country – further strengthening Haiti.
4. It is necessary, in terms of inducements, that the Haitian governments and local authorities create conditions to eliminate the negative impacts on Diaspora returnees, such as kidnapping, by enacting rules and policies that punish severely those who are guilty of such actions. Assure the protection of their business and investments against vandalism, which may threaten the will of the diaspora to keep investing in the development of Haiti, by training the police and dispatching them in all parts of the country.
5. It is necessary, in terms of system-changing, that the Haitian government and local authorities create a diaspora bank (Bank of Haitian Diaspora for Development) to collect the bonds previously mentioned. The funds collected should be dedicated to finance significant infrastructures (rebuilding the collapsed edifices during the earthquake, roads) sustainable energy (water treatment, electricity from solar and wind), and build some credit systems by giving loans to large corporations that invest in thousands of jobs. To build trust and confidence of the diaspora, the Haitian government must enforce policies to fight corruption, build transparency in financial sectors and public administration, and introduce measures to reduce fraud and mismanagement.

6. It is imperative, in terms of mandates, that the Haitian government and local authorities show their political will to mandate compliance with rule of law and codes of ethics to eradicate the corruption and strengthen the Haitian judiciary system. As well, the Haitian governments should show their capacity to prosecute corrupt judges in the system.
7. It is necessary, in terms of system-changing and capacity-building, that the Haitian government and local authorities pass laws and policies that facilitate the creation of the technology-based e-learning programs, enabling the online learning/teaching resources to be operational. For instance, Haitian teachers living abroad can teach online courses without being physically in Haiti. Likewise, this policy will generate a better management in different provincial branches that constitute the University of State (UEH) because of the scarcity of teachers in the higher education settings.
8. It is necessary, in terms of system-changing, that the Haitian government, local authorities, and policymakers rearrange the public institutions by shifting the percentage of actual private schools (ninety-two percent) into public schools to reduce the burden of tuition fees mostly paid by relatives and friends living abroad. As well, implement Creole as the language of instruction, which is spoken by all Haitians. Finally, attract volunteering programs, such as Teach for Haiti (Anseye pou Ayiti), TOKTEN, etc.

Based on the instruments of McDonnell and Elmore's (1987) and McLaughlin's (1987) frameworks used to analyze this research, it is important to create a "diaspora return model" capable of designing a developmental-based concept for a better avenue

for Haiti. The main reason for this model, according to Wei & Balasubramanyam (2006) is “that skilled emigrants have much to contribute to the development of their home countries over and above the resource allocation effects identified by the so-called cosmopolitan model of the brain drain” (p. 1600). Because of the limitations of this research, further research is needed on collecting data about skilled and educated Haitian professionals in the diaspora community and determining how many are willing to return and play their role in the effective development of Haiti.

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APPENDIX A

**Roadmap of the Ministry of National Education**

### Roadmap of the Ministry of National Education

- "- To make an inventory of the main actions of the MENFP implemented from 2012 to 2016;
- Update and implement the Roadmap on the Reform of Education and Vocational Training;
- Assess the impact of the 12 measures taken by the Martelly administration to redress the Haitian school;
- To inventory the school population and the available infrastructures with a view to updating coherent statistical data reflecting the reality of the education system;
- Take steps to ensure better organization of state examinations and properly prepare the back to school for the academic year 2017-2018;
- From September 2017, give effect to the addition of two new disciplines in fundamental and secondary curriculum: financial education, sports education and ecology;
- To equip the lycées of the Republic with a minimum technical platform fed by small solar energy systems designed to promote the implementation of continuing education and technical and vocational training programs;
- Implementing the new secondary curriculum, through the creation of ten high schools in the ten school departments of the country over a period of ten years;
- Develop a real partnership with Akademi Kreyòl Ayisyen (AKA) and the Faculty of Applied Linguistics, with a view to tackling the problem of the language of education in the country. Undertake educational and linguistic development policies with a view to achieving balanced Creole / French bilingualism and

promoting multilingualism in the country;

- Implement a more sustained policy of learning English and Spanish at the primary and secondary levels;
- Define a responsible partnership with trade unions in order to enable all players to play their full role;
- Recruit teachers and any MENFP executives by competition;
- Reconsider the insurance, pensions and salaries of teachers in order to have a dynamic faculty;
- Make vote the draft law on the Validation of prior experience of work experience (VAEP), which is being studied by the Education Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.
- Develop and implement early childhood policy, taking into account the improvement of the programs for the protection and education of pre-school centers;
- Reduce significantly the disparities in school provision between departments, cities and rural areas;
- Provide each communal section of an establishment of basic education;
- Driving Strengthen pre-school centers for early childhood reception;
- Make the necessary arrangements to improve the quality of education and training offered to our students;
- Restructure the school canteen program and the textbook program;
- Strengthen the continuing education program for teachers;
- Strengthen the network of basic science laboratories to support the learning of



schoolchildren in the fields of mathematics, applied sciences, computer science, modern languages and entrepreneurship by taking advantage of remote training opportunities through information and communication technologies;

- Make arrangements to create a Trade Learning Center (CAM) in each department, while recognizing the special status of the apprenticeship master, create an information point on the trades in each secondary school of the Republic and improve the orientation of young people to their pathways;
- Encourage the development of the dual training offer, promote the validation of vocational experience (VAEP) and support lifelong learning;
- Organize, in cooperation with the Conference of Rectors and Presidents of Haiti University (CORPUHA), the "States General of Higher Education";
- Work with the education commissions of the Senate of the Republic and the Chamber of Deputies to vote the five (5) education bills that are under consideration in Parliament.

I ask you to start preparing the 2017-2018 Budget, which will have to be approved by the Council of Ministers, after arbitration by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and filed within the required legislative time in Parliament.

You will also have the task of increasing transparency, the fight against corruption and the good management of public property. It will be up to you to organize, direct and animate the services, teams and agents of the State placed under your responsibility.

Jack Guy Lafontant, Prime Minister." (Haiti Libre, 2017).

APPENDIX B


**Map of the Republic of Haiti**



**Figure B.1** Map of the Republic of Haiti

## APPENDIX C

**Figures**



Source: CRS presentation of U.S. Coast Guard data.

Figure C.1: U.S. Coast Guard Interdictions of Haitians, 1982-2009







Figure C.2: Enrollment of Students in Private schools




**Figure C.3: Remittance Flows from the United States, 2015**




**Figure C.4: Remittance Flows from the Dominican Republic, 2015**




**Figure C.5: Haitian immigrant population in the United States, 2015**



**Figure C.6: Haitian immigrant population in the Dominican Republic, 2015**




**Figure C.7: International Aid, 2008-2025 (In percentage of GDP)**



**Figure C.8: Annual Remittance Flows to Haiti, 1970-2014**





**Figure C.9: Annual Remittance Flows by Country, 1970-2014**

## APPENDIX D

**Tables**

**Table 1: Different degrees offered in Haiti (1877)**

<b>Levels of Schools</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Students</b>
Primary schools	165	1784
Rural schools	200	5939
Lycées (high schools)	4	543
Superior girls' schools	6	563
Secondary schools	5	350
School of music	1	46
School of medicine	1	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>19250</b>

Source: Logan, 30, p. 423

**Table 2: Objectives of the National Plan of Education and Training (NPET)**

<b>Objectives</b>	
<b>I</b>	improvement in the quality of education, notably in basic education
<b>II</b>	promotion of a sound policy for developing learning resources
<b>III</b>	growth and rationalization of the provision of schooling at the basic education level
<b>IV</b>	academic reform and rationalization of the provision of secondary education services
<b>V</b>	coordination of the mechanisms of support for overall early childhood development
<b>VI</b>	revival of the technical training
<b>VII</b>	restructuring of the State University of Haiti and establishment of a diversified and quality university system open to scientific research
<b>VIII</b>	rationalization and improvement of the provision of non-formal education services and programs of distance education
<b>IX</b>	reinforcement of the institutional capacities of the MENJS in the domains of administrative and educational management
<b>X</b>	reaffirmation of the teaching profession

Source: Hadjadj, 2000, p. 24

**Table 3: Objectives of the Education For All National Action Strategy (EFANAS)**

Objectives	
I	increase the number of pre-primary schools
II	make access to formal and non-formal elementary education more equitable
III	promote greater internal and external efficiency of the education sector
IV	improve the governance of education sector
V	make the education more efficient and more accountable

Source: Piasentin, 2016, p. 73.

**Table 4: Characteristics of the Haitian diaspora in the United States, 2009-20**

	Haitian Diaspora in the United States*	Total U.S. Population
<b>Educational Attainment **</b>		
Total population age 25 and older	554,000	201,925,000
... with less than high school education	22%	13%
... with high school or some college education	56%	57%
... with a bachelor's degree	15%	20%
... with an advanced degree	7%	11%
<b>Population Characteristics by Generation</b>		
First- and Second-Generation Immigrant Population	915,000	73,140,000
First-generation immigrant population***	576,000	38,468,000
... that was working age (18-64)	80%	81%
... that entered the United States before 2000	61%	64%
... naturalized as U.S. citizens	50%	44%
Second-generation population****	339,000	34,672,000
... that was under age 18	58%	46%
... that was working age (18-64)	42%	43%
... with only one parent from Haiti	24%	

\* defined as all first and second generation

\*\* highest level reported

\*\*\* all individuals who report Haiti as their place of birth, excluding U.S. births abroad

\*\*\*\* all individuals who report having at least one parent born in Haiti

+ calculated based on the share of all individuals reporting an occupation for their primary job at the time the Current Population Survey (CPS) was administered, or for their most recent primary job.

Source: MPI analysis of 2010-12, ACS pooled.

**Table 5: Countries with Large Diasporas Abroad (Sorted by High-Skilled Migrants)**

		High-Skilled Emigrant Stock (Thousand)	Total Emigrant Stock (Thousand)
1	Philippines	1,126	3,631
2	India	1,038	9,987
3	Mexico	923	11,503
4	China	817	7,258
5	Vietnam	506	2,225
6	Poland	449	2,316
7	Iran, Islamic Rep.	309	970
8	Jamaica	291	1,038
9	Russian Federation	289	11,480
10	Ukraine	246	6,082
11	Colombia	234	1,969
12	Pakistan	222	3,416
13	Romania	176	1,244
14	Turkey	174	4,403
15	Brazil	168	1,135
16	South Africa	168	713
17	Peru	164	899
18	Dominican Rep.	155	1,069
19	Haiti	153	834
20	Nigeria	149	837
21	Egypt, Arab Rep.	149	2,399
22	Serbia	148	2,298
23	Morocco	141	2,719
24	Lebanon	138	622
25	El Salvador	128	1,129

*Source:* High-skilled migrants abroad in high-income OECD countries as of 2000 from [Docquier and Marfouk \(2004\)](#); and total migrants abroad in 2005 from

**Table 6: Number of Permanent Residence Permits Granted to Haitians Nationals by Brazil under the RN-27 2011-2015**

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
N	708	4,825	2,069	1,890	41,632

**Source :** Conselho Nacional de Imigração – MTE, 2015.