EXPLAINING DESTINATION COUNTRIES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING WITH FACTORS RELEVANT TO TRAFFICKERS

by

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A thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science

Boise State University

May 2018

BOISE COUNTRY UNIVERSITY GRADUATE COLLEGE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND FINAL READING APPROVALS

of the thesis submitted by

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Thesis Title: Explaining Destination Countries of Human Trafficking with Factors Relevant to Traffickers

Date of Final Oral Examination: 28 February 2018

The following individuals read and discussed the thesis submitted by student Gabrielle Denae Boliou, and they evaluated her presentation and response to questions during the final oral examination. They found that the student passed the final oral examination.

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The final reading approval of the thesis was granted by Brian Wampler, Ph.D., Chair of the Supervisory Committee. The thesis was approved by the Graduate College.

DEDICATION

"Is not this the kind of fasting I have chosen:

to loose the chains of injustice

and untie the cords of the yoke,

to set the oppressed free

and break every yoke?" – Isaiah 58:6

To everyone I know who chooses to make a difference.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Wampler, Dr. Allen, and Dr. Burkhart for guiding me through this research and for pushing me to find real answers.

I would like to thank my family for letting me learn from each of them and never doubting me.

I would like to thank Monty Moreland for investing in so many lives and opening eyes to human trafficking.

ABSTRACT

Awareness of human trafficking is increasing. This thesis aims to deepen our understanding of why traffickers prefer some countries over others as destination countries for their victims. Existing studies tend to neglect two elements when researching international human trafficking: factors that appeal to traffickers themselves and the significance of the country's role in the international network as a destination country (rather than a source or transit country). In this thesis, I demonstrate that drug trafficking flows, legalized prostitution, and higher levels of corruption will appeal to traffickers and make countries more likely to be destination countries. I test this using data on human trafficking flows for 83 countries from 2006 to 2010 and find evidence of drug trafficking's impact, mixed support for my hypothesis concerning prostitution, and limited support for my hypothesis concerning corruption. These findings have important implications for those attempting to combat international human trafficking.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HTI	Human Trafficking Index
CPI	Corruption Perception Index

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen an increase in international concern about human trafficking—for good reason. Human trafficking refers to the exploitation of victims, usually in the form of forced labor or sexual services, that strips vulnerable individuals of the ability to make decisions about their own lives. Human trafficking's pernicious effects touch entire countries as well as individual lives. When it exists within a country in any form, trafficking damages the country's ability to care for its own citizens and, to the extent that citizens are aware of these problems, weakens a government's legitimacy by causing citizens to question their government's ability to stem crime and protect human rights. After all, human trafficking represents a deeply personal violation of human rights. Its inherently abusive and exploitative nature strips victims of agency and extracts something from them against their will. By limiting victims' choices and freedoms, trafficking also robs them of opportunity for healthy relationships, higher education, and other facets of a normal life. Of the different types of human trafficking, sex trafficking in particular can result in physical and psychological trauma as well as disease, pregnancy, and social rejection. In international cases, trafficking forcibly removes victims from the familiar and thrusts them into a dangerous unknown.

Yet, current research on international trafficking mainly focuses on what causes individual victims to leave their homes, source countries, which represent only part of the international network of countries (Aronowitz, 2001; Bernat and Zhilina, 2010; Studnicka, 2010). Less is known about what causes traffickers to move victims to

destination countries, yet traffickers are the primary decision-makers and research should what factors matter to traffickers. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by controlling for wealth and development to identify what other institutional-level variables explain whether a country serves as a destination country in the international trafficking network.

Human trafficking exists in many different forms. The best known are sexual and labor exploitation. The U.N. Global Report on Trafficking in Humans found that, as of 2014, sexual exploitation made up 54% of trafficking cases while forced labor made up 38%. However, human trafficking can also involve organ removal or forced military service. At its simplest, human trafficking is exploitation. Contrary to a common misconception, a victim of human trafficking need not be transported from one location to another; exploitation is sufficient to qualify as trafficking without physical travel. Cases where victims never leave their country of origin are considered internal trafficking. However, because I focus on destination countries where a victim is brought to one country from another, this thesis only considers international trafficking—victims transported into another country for any of six types of exploitation: prostitution, labor, debt bondage, domestic servitude, child prostitution, or child labor.

Estimates in 2016 held that 40.3 million people were victims of modern slavery at any given time (International Labor Organization, 2016; hereafter ILO). Women and girls make up 99% of victims of sexual exploitation and 58% of victims in other sectors of forced labor. Though most victims are between 18 and 24 years of age, one in four victims are children, and almost half of those are between only 5 and 11 years of age. Of forced labor victims, boys make up 58%; of hazardous labor victims, boys make up 62%.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that international human trafficking somehow involves every country in the world as a source, transit, or destination country with children comprising 28% of victims worldwide trafficked each year amongst these countries (2016). As of 2016, forced labor (primarily commercial sexual exploitation but also forced economic exploitation) generated 150 billion U.S. dollars annually—primarily in the Asia-Pacific region (generating 51.8 billion) and developed economies (46.9 billion) (ILO, 2016). Per region, the most wealth generated per victim occurred in developed economies (34.8 thousand in U.S. dollars) followed by the Middle East (15 thousand in U.S. dollars) (ILO, 2016). Of profits per victim per type of exploitation, sexual exploitation dwarfed the others: a single victim of sex trafficking generated 21.8 thousand U.S. dollars annually; the next closest was a victim forced into construction, manufacturing, mining, and utilities (generating 4.8 thousand U.S. dollars) (ILO, 2016).

Several types of actors facilitate the exploitation of victims throughout the various processes of human trafficking. For instance, in cases of sexual exploitation, pimps and johns both exploit victims, albeit in different ways. The pimp exploits the victim for profit; the john exploits the victim for sexual gratification. Other perpetrators might engage in "seasoning" victims (to use a term of sex trafficking) by breaking down the victim on behalf of the pimp or owner; still others are those who first sell targeted individuals to pimps. If traffickers are part of a criminal organization, their greater resources allow them to traffic victims more effectively across greater distances. Others, such as corrupt law enforcement officers, judges, and politicians, enable trafficking to persist though they may not be involved directly. Criminal organizations might identify

corrupt officials within an otherwise legitimate government, actively corrupt officials by use of their own resources, or, in fractured governments, build their own corrupt system. Some organizations involved with human trafficking were also initially engaged in drug trafficking, which motivated them to intentionally corrupt officials in the first place (Shelley, 2012).

Despite stereotypical portrayals in film, traffickers do not always, or even usually, use violent kidnapping to secure victims. Instead, victims or victims' guardians fall prey to false promises of a better life (Aronowitz, 2001; Hughes and Denisova, 2001; Bernat and Zhilina, 2010). This requires that there be something less than ideal about the victim's life, that the victim sees the false promise as plausible, and that the trafficker has the motivation to deceive the victim in the first place. In cases of international human trafficking, the trafficker must also have a reason to want to move the victim to another country. Despite abundant research on the scope of human poverty and methods of coercion and deception used by traffickers, human trafficking research tends to neglect the variable reasons why traffickers would invest the resources necessary to move victims from one country to another.

Current research on human trafficking focuses on push and pull factors that determine trafficking flows, but that picture is incomplete. Push factors (such as poverty and lack of jobs) "push" victims from their homes and pull factors (strong economies, glamor) "pull" victims to destination countries. Pull factors, however, tend to consist primarily of characteristics of destination countries that appeal to individual victims—an already vulnerable victim might find the allure of the relative wealth and allure of the United States more difficult to ignore than an offer to move to a poorer country. Yet,

despite the validity of such pull factors, the limited scope excludes other relevant factors. After all, victims are not the only actors.

What institutional differences draw traffickers to one country rather than another? What enables pimps or labor exploiters to set up shop in a given community? In cases of sexual exploitation, what encourages johns to spend the money and bear the risks involved with using prostitutes in one territory rather than another? This thesis seeks to investigate the factors that matter to traffickers as they bring victims to destination countries.

Researchers need to better understand what factors make a destination country attractive to traffickers for two reasons. First, researchers can use this knowledge to identify trends and, thereby, predict increases of human trafficking instances in destination countries. Second, researchers can educate other actors intending to combat human trafficking on better ways to discourage traffickers. After all, no politician would agree to trying to reduce a country's appeal *in general*, but they might agree to methods to reduce a country's appeal to the criminals involved in trafficking.

Of course, reducing the number of destination countries would not eradicate trafficking entirely. However, internationally trafficked victims face unique dangers and challenges and the destination countries themselves suffer from the trafficking that crosses their borders. Specifically attacking destination countries, while not an endeavor to be undertaken at the exclusion of other efforts, would ultimately shield victims from some though not all results of trafficking while simultaneously creating safer countries with greater legitimacy.

To investigate what factors encourage traffickers to use a given country as a destination country, I consider 83 countries from different regions of the world from 2006 to 2010, using seven probit models to account for the different types of human trafficking. My primary independent variables are drug trafficking flows, legality of prostitution, and corruption. I consider drug trafficking flows and legality of prostitution because they tend to be neglected in quantitative research on human trafficking. I also consider corruption. Other studies have investigated corruption's impact on human trafficking in general, but I want to know if corruption has a unique impact on destination countries in particular. I find that drug trafficking flows seem to mirror human trafficking flows (destination and transit countries for drugs are more likely to be destination countries for human trafficking), but legality of prostitution has a mixed effect and corruption has the opposite effect (less corrupt countries are more likely to be destination countries for domestic servitude).

This thesis is organized as follows: I first explore what previous research has to say about human trafficking, highlighting the key elements and different types of human trafficking and pull factors identified by other researchers. I then perform 7 probit models to identify which of those factors predict whether countries serve as destination countries for different types of human trafficking. After discussing the implications of my results and limitations of the analysis, I perform qualitative analysis of several countries to examine the application of my hypotheses in real cases. I conclude with a summary of my thesis and a discussion of future research directions.

CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Literature

Research on international trafficking often identifies push and pull factors, which is a step in the right direction, but the push and pull factors tested in quantitative analyses are typically only most significant matter to victims, thus neglecting much of the broader context in which victims are trafficked. Commonly recognized pull factors include "high levels of labor demand, higher wages, many job opportunities, and the perceived glamour of the lifestyle in Western countries" (Demir and Finckenauer, 2010: 60). Note that all of these represent pull factors that would appeal to victims. Other research offers "the male population over the age of 60, governmental corruption, food production, energy consumption and infant mortality" as other pull factors (Aronowitz, 2001: 171). Note that the first two represent factors that would appeal to traffickers whereas the last two represent measures of development, a common pull factor from victims' perspectives. Cho et al. (2013) found that countries with "higher GDP per capita, larger populations, larger stocks of pre-existing migrants, and a democratic political regime" are more likely to be destination countries (83).

The trouble with focusing on victims-oriented factors at the expense of others is threefold. First, they represent only part of the picture, and perhaps a less relevant part at that. Traffickers, not victims, are the primary decision-makers, yet focusing on victims' push and pull factors ignores factors that matter to traffickers. Second, victims-oriented factors may not accurately reflect reality—what victims *perceive* to be true of a

destination country may not actually be true (Bales, 2007). Finally, few countries would willingly reduce pull factors such as wealth, opportunity, and general quality-of-life appeal. After all, though traffickers know that "the higher the economic development of the destination country, the higher the price that will be paid for her" (Hughes and Denisova, 2001: 48), reducing economic development is not a feasible nor reasonable strategy to counteract trafficking.

In light of this, I investigate factors that make countries more likely to be destination countries by attracting traffickers. I model my thesis largely off the work of Bales (2007), who sought to explain all forms of international trafficking involving an organized criminal group. Bales' article sought to answer two questions: What are the strongest predictors of trafficking *from* a country on the global scale and what are the strongest predictors of trafficking *to* a country on the global scale? In my attempt to explain destination countries, I focus more on Bales' approach to this second question. In addition to considering the relatively standard "perceived pull factors," which tend to be victims-oriented, Bales also considered the "permeability" of borders (2007: 276). Lacking an estimate of permeability, Bales used several indicators, such as government corruption, that could increase border permeability. This begins to get at factors that attract traffickers.

Bales used data from the United Nations statistical handbook on all the countries in the world to measure social, political, and economic factors. Concerning explanations of trafficking *from* a country, Bales found support for the commonly understood push factors (societal pressures, lack of opportunity, government corruption) and pull factors (economic development, demographic profiles, and government corruption); beyond that,

the analysis suggested that reducing corruption should be the first and most effective way to reduce trafficking" (2007: 276). Concerning explanations of trafficking *to* a country, the results found only four variables are significantly related to the estimate of trafficking to a country, and together they account for only 15.5% of the variation between countries" (2007: 276). The primary predictive variable is the percent of the male population over the age of 60, followed by government corruption, followed by various indicators of government capacity and size of the economy (infant mortality, food production, energy consumption per capita) (2007).

More recently, Cho (2012) analyzed 180 countries from 1995 to 2010 to test different push and pull factors. Cho identified 67 potential pull factors from the literature to test; a series of regression analyses revealed a mix of significant factors:

> Percentage of workforce employed in agriculture (positive); refugee inflows (positive); (log)population size (positive); inflow of international tourists (positive); crime rates (positive); (log)amount of Heroin seized (positive); being an OECD member (positive); being an East Asian country (positive); being a land-locked country (negative); and percentage of Catholics in the total population (negative). (2012: 15)

Some of these factors are victims-oriented and many are neutral, but some (international tourists, crime rates, heroin seized) would be relevant to traffickers. Interestingly, Cho found that despite the significance of crime indicators (crime rates, amount of heroin seized), law enforcement and institutional quality did not determine whether a country would be a destination country (2012). Cho suggests that this might be explained by countries with advanced law enforcement capabilities and institutions that nevertheless

fail to apply those capabilities and institutions directly to the problem of human trafficking.

Surtees (2008) focused on understanding traffickers, though she limited her study to Southern and Eastern Europe and she took a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. She found that European traffickers are generally more organized than traffickers in South-East Asia, though the organizations remain loose rather than strictly hierarchical; traffickers in her study often managed multiple markets and routs, cooperating with other criminal groups (2016). She found that corruption was a crucial facilitator of human trafficking at several steps throughout the process—from border crossings to ignoring prostitution venues to dismissing criminal cases (2016).

According to Gallagher and Holmes (2008), wealthier destination countries (countries from North America, Western Europe, Australia, and certain Middle Eastern and Asian countries) "bear the greatest legal and moral responsibility for responding to trafficking because it is in these countries that the real profits are made and the real exploitation takes place" (2008: 321). Given that developed economies as a group are second only to the Asia-Pacific region in dollars generated annually through human trafficking, the argument has merit. If the argument that the majority of exploitation takes place in destination countries also holds true, such destination countries are positioned to exert greater influence. Thus, failure on the part of destination countries to identify, protect, and support victims and victim witnesses through an effective criminal justice system will result in a greater negative impact; success, on the other hand, would play a more significant role. Explaining how traffickers select destination countries, as this

thesis seeks to do, is a first step towards making the world less hospitable to human traffickers.

My first explanatory variable is drug trafficking. Drug trafficking plays a multifaceted role in human trafficking. Victims of trafficking may be used to smuggle drugs as part of forced labor (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005) or to pay for transportation to destination countries (Shelley, 2012). Addictive drugs given to victims compel individuals to perform sexual acts while stimulants enable laborers to work longer, harder hours (Shelley, 2012). Between the growing competition between drug trafficking groups, the extra focus of governments on drug trafficking rather than on human trafficking, and the relatively low entry costs of engaging in human trafficking (drug trafficking organizations can hide human trafficking within their other business ventures), criminal organizations typically begin trafficking drugs and expand to traffic individuals, rather than the other way around (Shelley, 2012). Drug traffickers often intentionally seek to corrupt government officials and such corruption further enables trafficking (Shelley, 2012).

Another potential variable influencing traffickers is the legality of prostitution. Though commercial sexual exploitation is only one form of human trafficking, it makes up the majority of cases. Prostitution remains controversial, with views split between the "sex work" approach to prostitution and the "neo-abolitionist" approach. The former generally separates prostitution from sex trafficking to focus on empowerment of vulnerable populations along with women's rights, the rights of prostitutes, and legal rights between consenting adults (Carson and Edwards, 2011). The latter considers prostitution inherently exploitative, questions the legitimacy of consent given by

prostitutes, and views prostitution as a root cause of commercial sexual exploitation (Carson and Edwards, 2011). Traffickers can use societal shame and drug addiction to maintain victims in a state of bondage as prostitutes (Baker et al., 2010). Notably, even some of the "sex work" camp acknowledge that legitimacy of consent is frail due to power asymmetries between parties (Carson and Edwards, 2011).

Theoretical arguments consistently fail to agree conclusively on the relationship between legal prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation. Hughes and Denisova (2001) investigated victims of commercial sexual exploitation from Ukraine. They found that "countries with legal or tolerated sex industries create the demand" and, thus, are more likely to be destination countries (43). Akee et al. (2014) tested the effect of legislation banning prostitution in both destination and source countries and found "both host and source country prostitution laws exert a positive and mutually reinforcing effect on international trafficking" (27).

Cho et al. (2013) takes a quantitative approach to test two potential and very different theoretical effects of legalization of prostitution. The first, the scale effect, means that legalization of prostitution actually expands the prostitution market. The substitution effect, however, suggests that demand for prostitutes will favor legal prostitutes over illegal ones, thus reducing illicit activities related to prostitution. Their dependent variable was trafficking flows and their two primary explanatory variables were dummy variables capturing whether prostitution in a given country is legal and whether third party involvement is legal. They found that, controlling for regional and demographic factors and wealth, countries where prostitution is legal experience more inflows of human trafficking, indicating that the scale effect dominates the substitution

effect and suggesting that legalizing prostitution invites human trafficking (2013). Their second dummy variable, however, was insignificant, suggesting that general legislation matters more than specific legislation.

Corruption is my third explanatory variable. It relates to both drug trafficking and legality of prostitution but should have an independent effect on trafficking as well due to its connection to organized crime in general. Though law enforcement can have a mixed effect by either deterring traffickers or raising the value of victims and thus enticing traffickers, the impact of criminal organizations and corruption is less ambiguous. Hughes and Denisova (2001) found that criminal organizations facilitate trafficking in part by encouraging corruption: the same criminal networks that keep databases about potential victims usually engage in other illicit activities, particularly drug trafficking. Corrupt officials, at minimum, ignore human trafficking, but they might also actively aid traffickers. Hughes and Denisova (2001) suggest that corruption plays larger roles in destination countries than in other countries as corrupt officials distributing authentic documents to traffickers (Hughes and Denisova, 2001).

Though the literature consistently cites corruption as a cause of trafficking but typically fails to discuss whether corruption at different levels of government produces variation in outcomes as well as the variation associated with countries positions in the trafficking chain (destination countries as opposed to source and transit countries). A minority opinion holds that less corruption may be counterintuitively harmful for destination countries. Akee et al. (2014) focus on middleman traffickers' response to buyers' willingness to pay in both source and host countries—which is dependent upon likelihood of discovery and work stoppage in the respective countries. The authors of this

study assume that both domestic and foreign demand exists for human trafficking and that bargaining position of transnational traffickers hinges on their ability to switch between domestic trafficking and foreign trafficking. They consider the effects of focusing anti-trafficking efforts (victim protection programs and law enforcement against prostitution) in a single country, domestically, and find that if buyer demand is inelastic, an increase in the likelihood of discovery in *destination* countries increases inflow of victims by increasing the relative value of a victim in that location, thus raising buyers' willingness to pay there. Though Akee et al. (2014) identify several policy combinations between destination and source countries that can hinder transnational flow of victims, they also discover that greater law enforcement in destination countries might result in an *increase* in the transnational flow of trafficked victims. With inelastic demands for buyers, greater law enforcement in destination countries "can raise the willingness to pay for trafficked victims in the host country, thus encouraging transnational trafficking" (29).

Other factors worth noting are migrants, smuggling, and their connection to corruption and law enforcement. Unlike human trafficking, migration and smuggling do not necessarily involve exploitation and are less often involved with organized crime groups (Aronowitz, 2001). Nevertheless, if migrants struggle to find legal entry opportunities into other countries, they may turn to expanding, illegal migrant networks, where traffickers can easily find vulnerable individuals (Demir and Finckenauer, 2010). Power imbalances between travelers and those helping them can cause both migration and smuggling to result in exploitation. When migrants and smuggled individuals are

illegally brought into a new country, they are unable to turn to law enforcement if their circumstances become exploitative (Chacon, 2006).

Hypotheses

The research outlined above suggests that a number of factors influence whether a country is a destination country of human trafficking. In this paper, I focus on three hypotheses. First, the presence of organized crime with experience transporting illicit goods such as drugs into and through the country should enable traffickers to bring victims to that country. Organized crime groups build extensive criminal networks and intentionally corrupt government officials. Even though some of these groups don't engage in human trafficking directly, they pave the way for human traffickers.

Hypothesis 1: Drug Trafficking

> Transit and destination countries for illegal drugs are more likely to be destination countries for human trafficking.

Second, countries where prostitution is completely legal might be more attractive as destination countries because it expands the market for prostituted individuals, including victims of forced prostitution. Legal prostitution also makes it easier for traffickers to create an image that victims are prostitutes by choice.

Hypothesis 2: Legal Prostitution

> Countries with greater legal protections for prostitution are more likely to be destination countries.

Finally, government corruption allows these traffickers to operate without obstruction. This is true of all countries that experience human trafficking, but I expect it to be especially true of destination countries. Corrupt governments are also less likely to

be either willing or able to advocate for victims. Therefore, countries with high levels of corruption would be more attractive to pimps, traffickers, and johns. This is particularly important for law enforcement, though all corrupt government officials can ignore human trafficking or even obstruct efforts to combat it.

Hypothesis 3: Government Corruption

Countries with high levels of government corruption are more likely to be destination countries.

Understanding the effect of these three variables on destination countries of human trafficking will both allow researchers to better understand the problem of international trafficking itself and direct policymakers in how to craft more effective responses. I now test the results in two stages: first, I use statistical analysis to test for precise relationships between my independent and dependent variables; second, I consider how those results operate in the real world through a seven case studies.

CHAPTER TWO: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Research Design

Measures of human trafficking remain a challenge. First, despite the antiquity of the problem, it only recently gained scholarly attention; data in many areas prior to the 1950s is elusive. This is exacerbated by different definitions between different countries; even if one country maintains data over a longer time, another country might use a different measure, making comparisons difficult. Even when countries use the same measures, the illicit nature of human trafficking naturally incentivizes actors to obscure its true extent. Data are often self-reported as well, so countries may have an incentive to misrepresent their criminal activity to the rest of the world. Finally, those who should measure trafficking, particularly law enforcement officers, might be tempted to ignore cases, especially when public officials are involved with sexual exploitation (Studnicka, 2010: 31). Consequently, data on this subject are variant in definition, design, systematization, and quality.

A thorough understanding of human trafficking requires comparisons across countries and through time. This allows researchers to reach more specific conclusions and understand competing claims to causation. For instance, a given factor might have great predictive power concerning internal trafficking but have little to do with whether the country will act as a host country to victims trafficked from abroad. Similarly, a few elements might largely explain trafficking within a certain timeframe but not so much in

another. Any factor that retains its explanatory power regardless of variance in country or time, however, deserves greater consideration.

My research includes data from 83 countries from 2006 to 2010. I run seven probit regression models with dichotomous dependent variables taken from the Human Trafficking Indicators (HTI) dataset (Frank, 2013). My first dependent variable is a binary indicator as to whether a country is a "destination" country (*General Destination*), meaning that victims are transported across borders into that country where they remain during their exploitation. I then proceed to narrow the parameters for the subsequent dependent variables. My other dependent variables, also taken from the HTI dataset, are binary indicators as to whether a country is a destination country for the following: prostitution (*Prostitution Destination*), labor (*Labor Destination*), debt bondage (*Debt Bondage Destination*), domestic servitude (*Domestic Servitude Destination*), child prostitution (*Child Prostitution Destination*), and child labor (*Child Labor Destination*).

Drawing from past qualitative and quantitative research, I consider several explanatory factors. My primary independent variables are illicit drug trafficking, the presence of government corruption, and the legality of prostitution. I measure drug trafficking with three dichotomous variables: a country's status as a drug source (*Drug Source*), transit (*Drug Transit*), or destination (*Drug Destination*) country with data from the U.S. State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report published from 2006 to 2010. I use binary variables to indicate whether the report recognizes that drugs flow from, through, or to that country. Note that for simplicity and clarity, I do not code countries based on whether they traffic in precursors. I expect countries that

experience any type of drug flow are more likely to be destination countries of human trafficking.

I measure legality of prostitution according to procon.org's assessment of 100 countries' prostitution policies. Procon.org collected data from the CIA World Factbook in 2009 and coded for each country whether brothel ownership (*Brothel*) and pimping (*Pimping*) were illegal, partially legal, or legal. I code illegality as 0, partial legality as 1, and complete legality as 2. To develop time series data, I investigated whether each country passed new laws related to prostitution, brothel ownership, and pimping from 2006 to 2009 and in 2010 and adjusted the coding accordingly. I expect countries with higher scores (greater legality) of prostitution to be more likely to be destination countries. Of note, procon.org's coding also codes countries for legality of prostitution itself, but the coding for prostitution is ambiguous. A number of different policies could cause a country to receive a score of "partially legal" prostitution—one country might criminalize some but not all forms of prostitution; another might criminalize the buying but not selling of acts related to prostitution. Furthermore, this variable was highly correlated with brothel legality. Therefore, although Cho et al. (2013) found legality of prostitution significant and legality of brothels and pimping insignificant, I focus on legality of brothels and pimping in my main analysis and include prostitution's legality in a separate robustness test.

Corruption was difficult to measure. I took several different approaches. Primarily, I used the commonly-used Corruption Perceptions Index (*CPI*) (2006-2010) from Transparency International (2017). The CPI uses surveys and expert validation to rank countries on a scale of 100 (not corrupt) to 0 (very corrupt). In a separate robustness

test, I used the Human Rights and Rule of Law from fundforpeace.org's Fragile State Index (FSI) (2006-2010). The index uses three streams of data—quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation—to arrive at a country's score. The Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator (*HR*) measures freedom of press, judicial independence, military corruption, political repression, political violence, denial of due process, and current or emerging undemocratic rule. Countries with higher scores for each of the indices are more fragile; thus, I expect countries with higher scores to be more likely to be destination countries.

I include seven control variables for several legal, political, and socioeconomic factors. First, I control for levels of democracy with the Polity index (*Polity*), ranging from -10 (undemocratic) to 10 (democratic) (Polity, 2016); I expect high *Polity* scores to make a country more likely to be a destination country. I then control for whether the country has domestic laws that specifically target human trafficking (*Domestic Laws*) and whether those laws are actually enforced (*Enforce*); I use data provided by HTI where countries receive scores from 0 to 2 indicating no, partial, or full laws and no, partial, or full enforcement. I expect both of these variables to negatively associate with destination countries. I also control for infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) (*Infant Mortality*) and logged tourism receipts (*Tourism*) as measures of development. I operationalize these factors with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) from worldbank.org (2006-2010) with the expectation that infant mortality and tourism receipts will positively associate with destination countries (the World Bank, 2017). Finally, I use two measures from the Fragile Countries Index (FSI) to capture country stability. The index includes twelve measures, but after excluding Economic Decline (which also measured illicit trafficking such as that of drugs and people), I still found that Security Apparatus

(*Security*) and Factionalized Elites (*Elites*) were highly correlated to the remaining indicators, so I used just those two to capture the effects of the index. Because higher scores indicate more fragility, I expect higher levels of *Security* and *Elites* to make a country less likely to be a destination country. Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the number of observations (N), the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the minimum (Min), and the maximum (Max).

Table 1. Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent					
General Destination	415	0.83615	0.37059	0	1
Prostitution Destination	415	0.78554	0.41094	0	1
Labor Destination	415	0.66024	0.4742	0	1
Debt Bondage Destination	415	0.11807	0.32308	0	1
Domestic Servitude Destination	415	0.19277	0.39495	0	1
Child Prostitution Destination	415	0.58313	0.49364	0	1
Child Labor Destination	415	0.41928	0.49404	0	1
Independent					
Drug Destination	415	0.31566	0.46534	0	1
Drug Transit	415	0.70121	0.45828	0	1
Drug Source	415	0.21446	0.41094	0	1
Brothel	415	0.48193	0.84215	0	2
Pimping	415	0.15663	0.52663	0	2
CPI	415	6.72263	2.33756	1.5	9.6
Polity	415	1.41446	4.7309	-10	10
Domestic Laws	415	1.41205	0.5077	0	2
Enforce	415	1.41205	0.607	0	2
Infant Mortality	415	17.6152	17.8622	2.2	96.3
Tourism	415	21.8847	1.69372	16.3004	25.8472
Security	415	2.52782	2.52782	0.9	10
Elites	415	4.86568	4.86568	0.7	89

Results

Table 2 displays the results of the probit model for each of the seven dependent variables. Most of my variables performed as expected, although their significance varied from model to model. Destination and transit countries for drug trafficking generally make countries more likely to be destination countries for human trafficking. *Drug Destination* increases likelihood of a country being a destination for human trafficking in general and for prostitution in particular while *Drug Transit* makes a country more likely to be a destination for child prostitution and child labor trafficking. Interestingly, source countries for drug trafficking are less likely to be destination countries for human trafficking (*Drug Source* negatively associated with general destination and labor destination). This suggests that trafficking flows of humans somewhat mirrors trafficking flows of drugs, supporting Hypothesis 1.

My primary prostitution-related variables produced interesting results. Increasing the legality of brothels made countries more likely to be destination countries for domestic servitude and child prostitution but less likely to be destination countries for debt bondage. Increasing the legality of pimping made countries less likely to be destination countries for prostitution, labor, and domestic servitude but more likely to be a destination country for debt bondage. This offers mixed support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that increasing legality of all forms of prostitution would make a country more likely to be a destination country. I discuss possible explanations for these findings below. Overall, I believe my results support the findings of Cho (2012) that legal prostitution increases inflows of human trafficking.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (*CPI*) scores performed unexpectedly. CPI was only significant in one model—domestic servitude—but a higher *CPI* score made a country less likely to be a destination country. This was inconsistent with Hypothesis 3. Again, I discuss this more below.

Table 2. Probit Analysis Results

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.620***	0.758**	0.0517	0.47*	0.324	0.192	0.24
	(3.75)	(2.83)	(0.30)	(2.10)	(1.76)	(1.12)	(1.45)
Drug Transit	0.169	0.318	0.348*	-0.778***	0.411*	0.580***	0.443**
	(0.80)	(1.65)	(2.07)	(-3.84)	(2.19)	(3.58)	(2.78)
Drug Source	-0.777***	-0.628**	-0.772***	0.0914	-0.0755	-0.211	-0.602**
	(-3.42)	(-3.06)	(-4.02)	(0.37)	(-0.35)	(-1.22)	(-3.26)
Brothel	0.226	0.279*	0.210*	-4.417***	0.319**	0.386***	0.0421
	(1.78)	(2.54)	(2.15)	(-11.21)	(3.21)	(3.80)	(0.43)
Pimping	-0.494**	-0.433**	-0.413**	4.584***	-0.880***	-0.476**	-0.408**
	(-2.79)	(-2.77)	(-3.02)	(11.09)	(-4.27)	(-3.17)	(-2.82)
CPI	0.136	0.0591	0.0654	0.0979	0.267***	-0.00285	0.00018
	(1.59)	(0.85)	(1.04)	(1.25)	(3.51)	(-0.05)	(0.00)
Polity	0.0843***	0.0699**	0.0450*	-0.00000363	-0.0494	0.0364*	0.0768***
	(3.83)	(3.13)	(2.35)	(-0.00)	(-1.88)	(1.98)	(3.52)
Domestic Laws	0.315	0.385*	0.618***	0.250	0.0689	0.344*	0.206
	(1.57)	(2.19)	(3.94)	(-1.12)	(0.39)	(2.39)	(1.45)
Enforce	-0.102	-0.0626	-0.618***	-0.167	-0.195	0.270*	-0.207
	(-0.60)	(-0.41)	(-4.15)	(-0.87)	(-1.26)	(1.99)	(-1.47)
Infant Mortality	0.00407	0.0073	0.0169**	-0.00454	0.0138	0.0162**	0.0228***
	(0.69)	(1.34)	(2.90)	(-0.59)	(1.88)	(2.84)	(4.09)
Tourism	0.330***	0.299***	0.504***	0.225*	0.204**	0.173**	0.342***
	(4.62)	(4.24)	(7.06)	(2.18)	(2.99)	(3.09)	(5.46)
Security	0.0941	0.00768	0.0955	0.0663	0.0789	-0.0470	0.132*
	(1.26)	(0.12)	(1.66)	(0.77)	(0.93)	(-0.85)	(2.38)

Elites	0.00716	0.00852	0.00102	0.0103	-0.0534	0.0041	0.000062
	(0.74)	(0.82)	(0.09)	(1.02)	(-0.63)	(0.35)	(0.01)
Constant	-8.111***	79.29***	-11.99***	-6.101***	-7.074***	-5.260***	-9.463***
	(-4.94)	(-4.44)	(-7.49)	(-2.93)	(-4.88)	(-4.10)	(-6.53)
X^2	93.95***	72.29***	94.86***	705.55***	69.83***	75.85***	72.06***
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

My control variables generally performed as expected. More democratic countries associate with *General Destination* and *Child Labor Destination*, which aligns with my expectations. Democratic countries encourage freedom of behavior as well as freedom of movement of goods, which can facilitate trafficking. Democratic countries also tend to be wealthier and more stable, meaning that traffickers can expect to charge buyers more. *Domestic Laws* and *Enforcement*, however, also made countries more likely to be destination countries—contrary to my expectations, as I discuss more below. *Infant Mortality* (idenfitied by Bales, 2007; Aronowitz, 2001) was only significant for child labor, in which case it was positive. *Tourism* also performed as expected: it was significant and positive for general destination, prostitution, labor, and child labor. The country fragility measures (*Security* and *Elites*) were insignificant.

Finally, I identified changes in predicted probability for each of my dependent variables based on changes in my independent variables. Table 3 displays the predicted probability changes of interest for models 1-4 from Table 2. Table 4 shows the predicted probability changes of interest for the remaining three models. I test the impact of changing *Drug Destination*, *Drug Transit*, and *Drug Source* from a 0 (the country is not a destination, transit, or source country) to a 1 (the country is a destination, transit, or source country) while *Brothel* and *Pimping* change from a 0 to a 1 and a 2 (brothels or

pimping are illegal, partially legal, or completely legal). For *CPI*, I test the impact of changing from the mean (4.82) to one standard deviation below and above the mean. I italicize the significant relationships.

Table 3. Predicted Probabilities 1

		Value Change		Changed Probability		Percent Change	
General Destination							
Base Probability: 75.49							
Drug Destination	*0*	*1*		*98.96%*		*23.47%*	
Drug Transit	0	1		69.85%		5.64%	
Drug Source	*0*	*1*		*46.41%*		*-29.18%*	
Brothel	0	1	2	81.86%	87.29%	6.37%	5.43%
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*57.54%*	*38.21%*	*-17.95%*	*-19.33%*
CPI	2.48	4.82	7.16	38.21%	84.13%	6.97%	8.65%
Prostitution Destination							
Base Probability: 78.88%							
Drug Destination	*0*	*1*		*93.94%*		*15.52%*	
Drug Transit	0	1		68.08%		10.44%	
Drug Source	*0*	*1*		*56.37%*		*-22.15%*	
Brothel	*0*	*1*	*2*	*85.77%*	*91.15%*	*7.25%*	*5.38%*
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*49.50%*	*46.81%*	*-29.02%*	*-2.69%*
CPI	2.48	4.82	7.16	65.07%	82.38%	4.30%	3.87%
Labor Destination							
Base Probability: 37.83%							
Drug Destination	0	1		39.74%		1.91%	
Drug Transit	*0*	*1*		*25.45%*		*12.37%*	
Drug Source	*0*	*1*		*13.79%*		*-24.04%*	
Brothel	*0*	*1*	*2*	*46.02%*	*54.38%*	*8.19%*	*8.36%*
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*23.27%*	*12.71%*	*-14.56%*	*-10.56%*
CPI	2.48	4.82	7.16	31.92%	43.64%	5.91%	5.81%
Debt Bondage Destination							
Base Probability: 1.58%							
Drug Destination	*0*	*1*		*4.75%*		*3.17%*	
Drug Transit	*0*	*1*		*8.53%*		*-6.95%*	
Drug Source	0	1		1.97%		0.39%	

Brothel	*0*	*1*	*2*	*0.00%*	*0.00%*	*-1.58%*	*0.00%*
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*99.27%*	*99.99%*	*97.69%*	*0.72%*
CPI	2.48	4.82	7.16	0.87%	2.81%	0.71%	1.23%

Table 4. Predicted Probabilities 2

	Value Change			Changed Probability		Percent Change	
Domestic Servitude Destination							
Base Probability: 9.34%							
Drug Destination	0	1		15.87%		6.34%	
Drug Transit	*0*	*1*		*9.34%*		*22.34%*	
Drug Source	0	1		8.08%		-7.74%	
Brothel	*0*	*1*	*2*	*15.87%*	*24.83%*	*11.91%*	*8.74%*
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*1.39%*	*0.10%*	*-7.95%*	*-1.29%*
CPI	*2.48*	*4.82*	*7.16*	*2.56%*	*24.20%*	*6.78%*	*14.86%*
Child Prostitution Destination							
Base Probability: 69.15%							
Drug Destination	0	1		75.49%		6.34%	
Drug Transit	*0*	*1*		*69.15%*		*22.34%*	
Drug Source	0	1		61.41%		-7.74%	
Brothel	*0*	*1*	*2*	*81.06%*	*89.80%*	*11.91%*	*8.74%*
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*50.80%*	*32.28%*	*-18.34%*	*-18.52%*
CPI	2.48	4.82	7.16	69.15	68.79%	0.00%	-0.36%
Child Labor Destination							
Base Probability: 20.61%							
Drug Destination	0	1		27.76%		7.15%	
Drug Transit	*0*	*1*		*20.61%*		*10.41%*	
Drug Source	*0*	*1*		*7.64%*		*-12.97%*	
Brothel	0	1	2	21.48%	22.97%	0.87%	1.49%
Pimping	*0*	*1*	*2*	*10.94%*	*5.05%*	*-9.67%*	*-5.89%*
CPI	2.48	4.82	7.16	20.33%	20.610%	0.28%	0.00%

These predicted probabilities reflect the substantive impact of changing the value of the independent variables. For instance, not only did *Drug Destination* positively associate with *General Destination*, the change is quite large. The predicted probability

of a country being a destination country for human trafficking in general, when the country is not a destination country for drugs, is already 75.49%. Becoming a destination country for drugs increases the probability of being a destination country for human trafficking to 98.96% (a 23.47% change). *Drug Destination* also affected large positive changes in the probability of countries being destination countries for prostitution and debt bondage.

Drug transit countries, meanwhile, are less likely to be destination countries of debt bondage but more likely to be destination countries of labor, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor. What is the substantive difference? The positive changes are all much larger than the negative change for *Debt Bondage Destination*. For *Labor Destination*, becoming a transit country increases the predicted probability by 12.37%; for *Domestic Servitude Destination*, by 22.34%; for *Child Prostitution Destination*, by 22.34% again; for *Child Labor Destination*, by 10.41%. Meanwhile, moving from non-transit to transit only decreases the predicted probability for *Debt Bondage Destination* by 6.95% (from 8.53% to 1.58%).

In all four models where *Drug Source* is significant, the effect is negative and quite large. Becoming a drug source country decreases the predicted probability for *General Destination* by 29.18%; for *Prostitution Destination* by 22.15%; for *Labor Destination* is similar: 24.04%; and for *Child Labor Destination* by 12.97%. With a few exceptions (such as Canada), drug source countries tend to be poorer. This alone would make them less attractive to human traffickers angling to get the highest profit from victims. Meanwhile, although drug transit and drug destination countries both involve

routes into the country, the organized criminal groups in drug source countries use their networks to move goods *out* of the country.

The variables *Brothel*, *Pimping*, and *CPI* have three potential values. Fortunately, predicted probabilities give a more nuanced perspective than a linear fit, so I can see the different impact of increasing legality of brothels, for example, to first partially legal and then fully legal.

Brothels make countries more likely to be destination countries of prostitution (by 7.25% and 5.38%), labor (by 8.19% and 8.36%), domestic servitude (by 11.91% and 8.74%), and child prostitution (by 11.91% and 8.74% again). Contrast this with *Brothel*'s effect on *Debt Bondage Destination*. It is negative but quite small: moving from completely illegal to partially legal decreases the probability of a country being a destination country for debt bondage by only .71 percentage points; moving from partially legal to fully legal has no impact.

Pimping has a negative effect on *General Destination* (-17.95% and -19.33%), *Prostitution Destination* (-29.02% and -2.69%), *Labor Destination* (-14.56% and -0.56%), *Domestic Servitude Destination* (-7.95% and -1.29%), *Child Prostitution Destination* (-18.34% and -18.52%), and *Child Labor Destination* (-9.67% and -5.89%). *Pimping* has a huge impact on destination countries for debt bondage. Moving from completely illegal to partially legal causes a 97.69 percentage point change (from 1.58% to 99.27%). Moving from partially legal to fully legal only makes a country 0.72% more likely to be a destination country. However, both *Debt Bondage* and *Pimping* are variables with little variance among my 83 cases, which is probably resulting in an over prediction. The different effects of legalizing brothels and legalizing pimping adds an

interesting take to the results of Cho (2012), who found that countries where prostitution is legal are more likely to be destination countries of human trafficking.

CPI is only significant for one model: domestic servitude. In this case, increasing a country's CPI score to the mean from one standard deviation below the mean increases the probability by 6.78% (from 2.56% to 9.34%). A score increase to one standard deviation above the mean has a bigger impact of 14.86% (from 9.34% to 24.2%). Less corruption continues to make countries more appealing as destination countries for domestic servitude, perhaps reflecting that police officers who are less corrupt are less likely to interfere in homes where domestic servitude victims are exploited.

Together, my statistical analysis offers strong support for Hypothesis 1 (Drug Trafficking), mixed support for Hypothesis 2 (Legal Prostitution), and no support for Hypothesis 3 (Corruption). First, drug trafficking flows certainly seem to mirror human trafficking flows, suggesting that drug trafficking organizations that bring drugs through or to a given country can use those same resources to bring human victims into that country. Second, legalizing brothels seems to capture the connection between legalizing prostitution and human trafficking identified by Cho (2012), but legalizing pimping has the opposite effect, likely because brothels enjoy greater security and institutionalization which would appeal to johns in destination countries. Finally, CPI is generally insignificant—though, as discussed below, that might simply reflect its shortcomings as an aggregate measure.

Robustness Tests

I performed several robustness tests (see Appendix A). First, I wanted to capture the impact of adding procon.org's measure for legality of prostitution for Hypothesis 2.

The legality of prostitution was insignificant except for its relationship with *Domestic Servitude*, where it was negative. This contradicted Hypothesis 2, but I have little faith in the validity of the measure, as I explain below, so I am willing to consider the results of *Brothel* and *Pimping* satisfactory for supporting Hypothesis 2.

For Hypothesis 3, I considered other measures of corruption. First, I used a measure for state legitimacy captured by the Fragile States Index. Though the indicator did include measures of transparency and government corruption, it also measured political processes, political opposition, and political violence. It was insignificant. Then, in a separate test, I used the Rule of Law Index from the World Justice Project, which disaggregates its "Absence of Corruption" factor into absence of corruption in four separate categories: the executive branch, the judicial branch, the police and military, and the legislative branch. I tested for correlation between these separate categories (with data from 2012 and 2013) and the CPI data I collected from 2010, finding that CPI, while not correlated with absence of corruption in the executive or legislative branches, was more correlated with absence of corruption in the judicial branch than in the police and military. Since I expect street-level corruption to matter more, this might explain why CPI was generally insignificant in my models.

The Human Trafficking Index (HTI) from which I derived my dependent variables also included several other variables worth exploring. For one, HTI included eighteen variables for other types of trafficking flows: for each type of trafficking (prostitution, labor, debt bondage, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor) whether a country is a source country, a transit country, or whether the country experiences internal trafficking. These other variables were largely insignificant and I

expect there is high correlation between them, but I include the results for a probit regression using those eighteen variables as independent variables in the appendix to this research.

HTI also includes several variables related to the countries' response to trafficking: procedures to identify victims, protective services offered to victims, and punishment of victims for acts committed as victims.

Bales (2007) suggests that high unemployment and a high percentage of the population that is male and over the age of 60 should both make countries more likely to be destination countries, so I ran an analysis including both variables with data from the World Bank. Unemployment was only significant for *Labor Destination*, *Debt Bondage Destination*, and *Child Labor Destination*. According to expectations, it was positive in each case. The percent male over the age of 60 was, counter to expectations, negative in three instances: for *General Destination*, *Debt Bondage Destination*, and *Domestic Servitude Destination*. It was only positive for *Child Labor Destination*; it was otherwise insignificant. Another test involved using a dichotomous variable for landlocked countries (with data from Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago's (2011) Geodist dataset provided by CEPII) because many such countries are less developed. It was negative for *Domestic Servitude Destination*, *Child Prostitution Destination*, and *Child Labor Destination*.

I also used logged GDP (with data from the World Bank) as a measure of development in place of *Infant Mortality*, but it was only significant for *Child Prostitution Destination* and *Child Labor Destination*. Counter to expectations, it was negative in both instances. The percentage of seats held by women in parliament (with

data from the World Bank) was insignificant, despite the research provided Schönhöfer (2017) which suggests that more women in parliament leads to better antitrafficking strategies. I included a measure of resource rents with GDP in an attempt to control for the resource curse, which I expected to positively associate with destination countries. Indeed, I found it significant and positive for every model except *Domestic Servitude Destination* and *Child Prostitution Destination*, for which it was insignificant.

Discussion

My results concerning Hypothesis 1 are promising. Drug Destination and Drug Transit were statistically significant in multiple models and were consistently positive—the exception is Drug Transit's negative relationship to Debt Bondage. The substantive impact, however, was much larger in the positive directions than in the negative direction. The trends—the positive trend of *Drug Destination* and *Drug Transit* and the negative trend of *Drug Source*—give me confidence in drawing a connection between the movement of one kind of illicit goods (drugs) and the movement of another kind of illicit goods (human victims).

This creates several implications. For one, if human trafficking flows do indeed mirror drug trafficking flows, I infer that this is because criminals use similar networks and take advantage of similar weak points. If only drug destination countries were significant, I might infer that the primary explanatory variable concerns the demand for illicit good and that wealth might be more impactful. However, given that drug transit countries are also significant while GDP is actually insignificant, I instead infer that organized criminal groups' facilitation of illicit trafficking is a powerful factor of human trafficking.

It is also possible that the illicit flow of drugs encourages the creation and acceptance of illegal economies in destination countries. Destination countries for drugs might inspire a market for illicit goods in general and a country that consumes large amounts of drugs on the black market could have less qualms about participating in other illegal behavior, such as the exploitation of other people.

There are at least two ways to respond to drug trafficking's connection to human trafficking. The most obvious, perhaps, is to eliminate drug trafficking routes. If human traffickers are enjoying the convenience of drug trafficking routes, officials who attack such networks and shore up such weak points would force traffickers to use other, less convenient resources. The other option would be to legalize drugs, thus minimizing the market for drug trafficking might indirectly hinder human trafficking to destination countries.

My results concerning prostitution-related measures are intriguing. Legality of brothels and pimping produced contradictory effects. Legal brothels make countries more likely to be destination countries of prostitution, labor, domestic servitude, and child prostitution but less likely to be destination countries of debt bondage. I expect that legalizing brothels creates a demand for victims of sexual exploitation but also creates a mentality that has no moral aversion to using other people for personal gain. Sex work inevitably increases the exploitation of vulnerable individuals who perhaps would not choose such a job if they had other options, yet legalizing brothels causes sex work to become normalized, formalized, even institutionalized. This means that johns need not bother with the moral calculus of their actions. In addition to excusing johns of concerning themselves with the legality of their use of prostitutes, legalizing brothels

creates a society that that sees the moral risks inherent to sex work as acceptable; such a society could be prone to accept the moral risks involving other forms of exploitation as well. The additional organization of brothels would also make it easier for traffickers to supply victims with false documents.

Legalizing brothels had only a slight negative effect in the case of debt bondage. I would expect legalizing brothels to make debt bondage more likely because the formal institution of brothels lends itself to the imposition of fees and fines on victims; the negative relationship might simply be because my analysis did not include enough cases of debt bondage. Overall, *Brothel*'s many positive effects cause me to consider the results for *Brothel* supportive of Hypothesis 2, that legalizing prostitution makes countries more likely to be destination countries of human trafficking.

Legal pimping, on the other hand, makes countries more likely to be destination countries for debt bondage but less likely to be destination countries for general destination, prostitution, labor, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor. Because the results for *Pimping* are so overwhelmingly negative, I conclude that my results for *Pimping* do not support Hypothesis 2. One possible explanation for why pimping decreases that likelihood of a country being a destination country of human trafficking is that pimping is associated with less affluence; while brothels can signal higher quality to clients and, therefore, tend to operate in high-end markets, pimps are more associated with low-end markets (Farmer and Horowitz, 2013). If high-end markets tend to be destination countries (countries of greater wealth and opportunity), legalizing brothels should enhance countries' appeal as destination countries yet legalizing pimping would decrease the appeal as destination countries.

It is worth noting that the percentage the population that is male and over the age of 60 reduced the likelihood of a country being a destination country for trafficking in general and debt bondage and domestic servitude in particular, only increasing the likelihood for *Child Labor* (see Appendix A). This contradicts previous research finding that the more men over the age of 60 should make a country more likely to be a destination country (Aronowitz, 2001). Then again, johns in the U.S. are more likely to be younger, so perhaps the measure of men over the age of 60 fails to capture the demand side of sex trafficking (Brewer et al., 2008). Considering this, I am hesitant to rule out the demand effect of legalizing prostitution, especially through legalizing brothels.

My corruption results present a bit of a puzzle for Hypothesis 3. CPI was only significant in one case and it was positive—countries that are less corrupt are more likely to be destination countries for domestic servitude. This might be uniquely related to domestic servitude in that employers of victims of domestic servitude might enjoy diplomatic immunity (U.S. State Department); a robust rule of law might therefore shield exploiters from investigation and prosecution.

Another possible explanation for the difficulty concerning corruption, aside from the fact that corruption itself is difficult to measure accurately, may be that corruption and its connection to police effectiveness can have opposite but simultaneous effects, particularly in destination countries. On the one hand, corruption can enable traffickers to move victims freely; greater corruption thus makes it easier for a country to become part of the international network of human trafficking. On the other, effective law enforcement (involving less corruption) can cause victims to have more relative value; in this case, less corruption makes a country more attractive as a destination country from

traffickers' perspective. Furthermore, effective enforcement of laws against victims who enter destination countries illegally effectively traps victims by making them more dependent on traffickers and employers.

I also want to consider the separate effects of the existence of domestic laws against human trafficking and the enforcement of those laws. Domestic laws make countries more likely to be destination countries of prostitution and child prostitution; enforcement of those laws further increases the likelihood of a country being a destination country of child prostitution. My research supports the minority position of Akee et al. (2014), which is that laws against trafficking and their enforcement make countries more likely to be destination countries by increasing the value of victims within that country, particularly for victims of sexual exploitation. One possible implication of this interplay is such laws should not be propagated unless they are matched with strict enforcement or enforcement that punishes johns. Yet even strict enforcement might ultimately entice traffickers to bring victims of sexual exploitation to that country.

Domestic laws and their enforcement have a different effect on labor trafficking. Although domestic laws positively associate with labor destination countries, enforcement of those laws negatively associate with labor destination countries. This might reflect that corruption and enforcement at the street level—by police and border patrol—matter more than corruption and enforcement at other levels of government. Given the Corruption Perception Index's correlation with absence of corruption in the judiciary rather than absence of corruption in the police and military, perhaps a disaggregated measure of corruption would be more effective. After all, corruption in the judiciary is only relevant during prosecution of traffickers or, when victims are accused

of crimes, during prosecution of victims. Considering that corrupt officials begin enabling exploitation at the border and on the streets by ignoring evidence of forced labor long before cases reach the judiciary, a disaggregated measure of corruption at the street level might be more significant.

Some of the variables I included in my robustness tests performed unexpectedly. First, my measure for whether countries punish victims was consistently positive—this might relate to corruption (Hypothesis 3) or the legal understanding of prostitution (Hypothesis 2). If related to Hypothesis 2, the idea that punishing victims makes countries more likely to be destination countries give credence to the semi-legal approach of punishing clients but not prostitutes themselves. The percentage of the population that is over 60 years old and male, which Bales (2007) found to positively associate with destination countries, was actually negative in every model in which it was significant. Unemployment, typically understood to be less common in destination countries, was positive in every model in which it was significant. Taken together, this suggests that the distinction between developed and less developed countries probably has a more nuanced effect.

Limitations

Despite rising awareness of human trafficking, many difficulties face efforts to perform quantitative research. One glaring difficulty is the use of different legal definitions between governments. In 2000, the United Nations adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which defines human trafficking as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons” through twelve different means, from coercion to giving or receiving payments or benefits (United

Nations General Assembly, 2000: 2). A case need involve only one of those twelve elements, regardless of whether or not the victim consents to the arrangement. Other governments add or subtract to the U.N.'s requirements. For example, the U.S. State Department defines human trafficking more narrowly. A case only becomes a sex trafficking case if the adult becomes involved in prostitution by means of coercion, force, deception, or debt bondage. Subsequent consent is relevant; initial consent is only irrelevant if, after giving consent, the trafficker then maintains the victim's position through "psychological manipulation or physical force" (U.S. State Department, 2017: 16). The State Department's approach risks excluding real cases of exploitation to which victims initially consented.

Human trafficking itself is difficult to measure quantitatively across many countries and over time. Some data sources exclude certain types of human trafficking (such as debt bondage) to focus on others (such as sexual exploitation) while others conflate the types. The best I could do was find the HTI which ultimately measures trafficking flows. (The index also measures numbers of persons prosecuted, but not every country provided data for this measure such that to include it would severely reduce the scope of my research.) Trafficking flows does not distinguish between rates of trafficking: I know that Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland are all destination countries, but I don't know if Argentina is a destination for *more* victims. Another difficulty with HTI is that it codes countries by primarily relying on the U.S. State Department's annual Trafficking In Persons reports. While these reports do include data for many countries over many years, the report has come under fire due to lack of data

and subjectivity and understanding of cultural differences (Schartz, 2017; Wooditch, 2011).

I faced a similar problem with collecting data for drug trafficking. I relied upon reports published by the U.S. State Department which focused on trafficking routes that affect the United States, though in some cases it included countries that are involved in international trafficking only within a given region. Unable to find a database, I coded the variables myself based on what I read in the report; this leaves room for error and perhaps another researcher would interpret the reports differently. Regardless, the report discusses trafficking routes but does not give numbers on drugs trafficked for every country. Thus, though I know both Spain and Thailand are destinations for drugs, I don't know which is a destination for *more* drugs. Similarly, I know that both Kenya and Austria serve as transit countries, but I don't know which country has *more* drugs cross its borders.

Another challenge came in the form of coding the legality of prostitution in various countries. I used procon.org's measures as a start and then investigated whether legislation changed from 2006 to 2010, updating accordingly. Again, perhaps another researcher would update differently—either registering slight changes in legislation or ignoring changes that I registered depending on whether they sought a more or less sensitive measure. One glaring difficulty with procon.org's measurement is the ambiguity of "partially legal" as a level of legality. In some cases, "partially legal" would apply to cases like Sweden, where the purchase of sex rather than the offering of sex is criminalized. Other cases like Bangladesh and Japan, are also coded "partially legal" even though in Bangladesh female prostitution above 18 years of age is legal but male prostitution is illegal while in Japan only non-coital sexual acts are not illegal.

Other challenges come from attempting to measure corruption. Indices like the CPI are useful in that they apply to many countries over many years, but the aggregated data makes it difficult to identify what forms of corruption are the most impactful. Corrupt border patrol officers likely have a very different impact on human trafficking than corrupt senators who in some instances may be involved in human trafficking but in many cases are guilty of upper-level close-door deals and manipulation that have little to do with human trafficking. Measures of from FSI such as SL and HR are also aggregate; they touch on issues related to corruption, but SL also asks questions about the political institutions such as elections and HR asks about civil and political freedoms. A given country's score might be a reflection of those other issues rather than levels of corruption.

CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDIES

Now I consider some specific countries to both test and illustrate the results taken from my statistical analysis. I select cases based on the mixed-methods nested analysis approach designed by Lieberman (2005). This approach uses the large-N statistical analysis to inform case selection for the subsequent small-N analysis. Lieberman recommends using the small-N analysis to direct either model-testing or further model-building. Because I am generally satisfied with the results of my large-N analysis, I use the following case studies to test the applicability of my results, bearing in mind which examples support which hypotheses (see Table 5).

I selected specific cases in two ways. First, I considered only destination countries. I then found cases with variance in my primary explanatory variables: drug trafficking routes, legality of brothels and pimping, and corruption. I selected cases where the variables seemed to perform based on my expectation as well as cases where they performed unexpectedly. Second, I considered only non-destination countries. Again, I found variance in drug trafficking routes, legality of brothels and pimping, and corruption and investigated some cases where those variables performed expectedly as well as cases where they did not to explain why those countries were not destination countries.

Table 5. Case Studies

Country	**Drug Flow**	**Prostitution**	**CPI**	**Destination**	***Hypothesis Supported***
United States	Destination	Brothel: illegal Pimping: illegal	7.25	Yes	*1: Drug Flow*
New Zealand	No	Brothel: legal Pimping: legal	9.45	Yes	*2: Prostitution*
Uruguay	No	Brothel: illegal Pimping: illegal	6.625	No	*1: Drug Flow* *2: Prostitution* *3: Corruption*
Bangladesh	Transit	Brothel: legal Pimping: legal	2.1	No	*None*
Albania	Transit Source	Brothel: illegal Pimping: illegal	2.9	No	*2: Prostitution*
Mexico	Transit Source	Brothel: illegal Pimping: illegal	3.4	Yes	*1: Drug Flow* *3: Corruption*
Thailand	Destination Transit	Brothel: illegal Pimping: illegal	3.6	Yes	*1: Drug Flow* *3: Corruption*

The United States, New Zealand, and Uruguay

First, I consider the United States, New Zealand, and Uruguay. I group these three together because all three are destination countries with relatively good scores for corruption but interesting variance regarding drug trafficking flows, legality of prostitution, and the behavior of police officers. Comparing these three illuminates several points but I want to focus on corruption as, despite relatively high Corruption Perceptions Index scores, the role of law enforcement plays out differently between them. The United States and New Zealand are also both wealthier countries and serve as destination countries for various types of tourism. But beyond the role of wealth, the role

of law enforcement seems to explain why the United States and New Zealand are destination countries for human trafficking whereas Uruguay is not.

The United States

The United States is a destination country for every type of human trafficking except for domestic servitude. The United Sates is a destination country for drugs, has strict laws against prostitution (except in Nevada), and enjoys a high average CPI score of 7.25. It also experiences various kinds of internal trafficking. The U.S. as a destination country is only consistent with Hypothesis 1 (Drug Trafficking). I find that the wealth of the U.S. allows traffickers to expect a high price for victims brought into the U.S. The established resources and networks of drug traffickers simplifies the human trafficking process. Finally, failure to protect victims of sexual exploitation and a crackdown on illegal immigration (without regard for the possibility that illegal immigrants are victims of trafficking) hinder the legal battle against human trafficking.

In 2005 in the United States, the Department of Justice estimated that between 14,500 and 17,500 victims were trafficked annually into the United States (Siskin and Wyler, 2011). Victim demographics reveal more patterns: noncitizens comprise more victims of labor trafficking than do U.S. citizens; noncitizens also comprise more victims in labor trafficking than in sex trafficking while U.S. citizens are more likely to be victims of commercial sexual exploitation (Siskin and Wyler, 2011).

Despite the war on drugs declared in 1971, the U.S. has long been a lucrative market for drug trafficking organizations. In the 1980s, Reagan sought to tie U.S. foreign policy to this war on drugs by focusing on interdiction (Jenner, 2011). By the early 1990s, about a third of heroin and marijuana imported into the U.S. came from Mexico

(Astorga and Shirk, 2010). In addition to interdiction efforts (using the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. military), the U.S. has also funded operations worldwide to battle drug trafficking at different points (Jenner, 2011). Both interdiction and international projects have been costly and only minimally effective at stemming the flow of drugs into the U.S.—by increasing the price of drugs, interdiction increases profits to traffickers; and "experts believe that seventy percent of a drug needs to be intercepted worldwide to substantially reduce the size of the industry," an elusive goal (Jenner, 2011: 913).

Though the illegality of prostitution creates social norms against pimps and brothels, but those norms are undermined by a media that glamorizes pimping and prostitution (Kotrla, 2010). The illegality of prostitution has a greater impact on street-level police and on victims themselves, causing victims to think of themselves as criminals rather than victims (Kotrla, 2010). The fact that law enforcement can more easily enforce prostitution laws than anti-trafficking laws only reinforces this mentality (Heiges, 2009). Rather than going to the police for help, victims fear the police. In many cases, responses to trafficking are counterproductive for young victims who typically find themselves placed in juvenile detention centers or insecure facilities or returned to the very circumstances from which they originally fled (Kotrla, 2010).

Despite the TVPA which attempts to protect victims from human trafficking, the U.S.' hardline approach to law enforcement produces other harmful effects concerning labor trafficking: "border interdiction strategies, harsh penalties for undocumented migrant workers, and insufficient labor protections for all workers, but particularly undocumented migrants" all ultimately enable trafficking by putting smugglers as well as employers in a position of power relative to migrants who can easily become victims of

forced labor (Chacon, 2006: 2979). Even migrants who come to the U.S. legally but then overstay their visas can easily become victimized (Chacon, 2006). Though victims of trafficking can stay in the U.S. under a T visa, T visas are not commonly issued. In order to receive one, victims must have experienced "severe forms of exploitation," aid the prosecution of their exploiters, and demonstrate that returning to their home country would result in "extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm" (Chacon, 2006: 3011). As with sex trafficking, victims of labor trafficking are aware that they would be considered criminals rather than victims and, therefore, do not feel comfortable going to the police for help.

In addition to causing victims to feel like criminals, effective law enforcement creates a power imbalance between victims and exploiters. According to Chacon (2006), smugglers' roles are expanding in the face of increased border security in the U.S. such that, as migration becomes more difficult, migrants turn to smugglers who exploit migrants' vulnerability with higher costs for more services, sometimes resulting in coercive relationships with migrants who become trafficking victims. Furthermore, as increased border security traps migrants within the U.S., the migrants are unable to escape to their home country. This gives them little choice but to endure exploitation by current employers who may turn a blind eye to migrants' lack of papers—until migrants begin organizing against workplace exploitation in violation of labor laws, at which point employers threaten to report them to immigration officials (Chacon, 2006). In other words, more effective enforcement of select laws combined with stringent border security can redirect victims into the traps of traffickers instead of deterring trafficking.

New Zealand

New Zealand's tourism popularity and proximity to poorer South Asian countries encourage traffickers to expect a high profit from bringing vulnerable victims to New Zealand. Then victims of sex trafficking remain vulnerable to exploitation (even though prostitution is legal) because geographic and social isolation make it difficult for them to find help from the police, who seem uninterested in actually regulating prostitution. New Zealand is not involved in international drug trafficking, brothels and pimping are both completely legal, and its average Corruption Perceptions Index score is quite high: 9.45. Contrary to Hypotheses 1(Drug Trafficking) and 3 (Government Corruption) but in alignment with Hypothesis 2 (Legal Prostitution), it is a destination country. New Zealand doesn't experience any form of labor trafficking, but it is a destination country for prostitution and debt bondage.

New Zealand is fairly insulated from the international drug trafficking networks. Drug trafficking organizations have few resources and must compete with New Zealand's strategic war against criminal organizations. New Zealand battles organized crime with international multilateral treaties as well as thorough internal cooperation: cross-agency, cross-jurisdictional, and international (New Zealand Government, 2011). Though criminal organizations do attempt to corrupt and influence officials, drug traffickers' limited revenue limits their capabilities to corrupt (Wilkins and Casswell., 2003). The 2009 legislation of Gangs and Organized Crime cracked down on group criminal behavior and Immigration New Zealand specifically targets people smuggling offshore (New Zealand Government, 2011).

In 2003, New Zealand decriminalized prostitution with the goals of protecting sex workers' human rights and physical health and protecting children from exploitation. Despite the fact that the prostitution bill allows health officers entry to brothels, the officers can only respond to violence, not prevent it, and although those in favor of legalizing prostitution argue that prostitutes working in brothels are safer than those in the streets, the truth is that they move between types of prostitution "depending on the location of johns, the level of police harassment, and where the most money can be made" (Farley, 2016: 1099). Furthermore, all types of prostitution result in psychological and physical trauma (Farley, 2016). In fact, though street-level pimps may be over a lower class, some prostitutes preferred working streets because they have more freedom to reject drunk or unruly clients (Farley, 2016).

The new bill has also increased the demand side of prostitution by "relieving johns of any doubts regarding the social acceptability of their sexual predation while at the same time inviting them to spend their money" (Farley, 2016: 1088). As for protecting physical health by offering legal redress against violence, that is questionable: prostitutes in New Zealand already had legal options but rarely took advantage of them, preferring to avoid a legal record of prostitution (Farley, 2016). New Zealand's law required the "zoning" of prostitution—which may result in further stigmatizing and isolating prostitutes (Farley, 2016: 1092).

New Zealand's lack of corruption and better law enforcement seem unable to capitalize on the opportunities provided by regulation of prostitution. Although it experiences relatively less organized crime—and the organized crime is more limited—it seems that though legalizing prostitution might result in more protection for prostitutes (if

the prostitutes choose to avail themselves of the legal opportunities), it also increases the demand side. In addition, the zoning laws for prostitution might make it easier for clients to find prostitutes. Combined with New Zealand's relatively high level of development, all of this might explain New Zealand's appeal as a destination country.

Uruguay

Uruguay is not a major country in international drug trafficking, has strict laws against and regulations of brothels and pimping, and enjoys a relatively high average Corruption Perceptions Index score of 6.625. Consistent with all three of my hypotheses, it is not a destination country for human trafficking, though it is a source and transit country for many types of trafficking and also experiences internal trafficking. Despite networks of both drug and human trafficking surrounding it, Uruguay is not a major destination country. Without drug trafficking networks into Uruguay, human traffickers must work harder to bring victims to Uruguay; meanwhile, unlike in New Zealand, police officers respond to complaints of exploitation raised by prostitutes.

Uruguay employs a diligent strategy against drug trafficking and organized crime. The Citizen Security Law involves a charge of crimes of omission, which can be brought against "public officials who do not act on knowledge of a drug-related crime" (U.S. State Department, 2009: 610). In August of 2009, Uruguay created a special court dedicated to organized crime, responding to drug trafficking and corruption among other things (U.S. State Department, 2009). This reflects Uruguay's general approach of prioritizing combatting drug trafficking, resulting in more intelligence in its counter-narcotics divisions and better, non-intrusive inspection equipment at ports (U.S. State Department, 2009). This might also explain why, although Uruguay is surrounded by

drug trafficking in South America, it is not itself involved a significant player in the international drug trafficking network.

Uruguay's history regarding prostitution, brothels, and pimps evinces the combined effect of legalizing prostitution coupled with regulations and responsive law enforcement. Montevideo used brothel regulation as an attempt to ensure "discretion and the sanitary status of the building and the prostitutes, through periodic medical examinations" (Schettini, 2017). The 1930s laid the foundation for contemporary legislation: Gabriel Terra's regime instituted the "prostitute card," a kind of precursor to Decree 651 in 1990 instituting a health card for Uruguayans (Rosengurtt, 2016: 2). Combined with the "sanitary card" required for sex workers as of 2002, the legislation increased the responsibilities for those in charge of sex workers, who are required to undergo periodic sanitary and health checks (Rosengurtt, 2016: 4). The difficulty with brothels is that although prostitutes were less often deceived and kidnapped, contrary to common narratives, the price of renting space in brothels renders prostitutes vulnerable to owners (Schettini, 2017). Yet, regarding pimps, women are not averse to accusing pimps who "broke their rules of coexistence" and reporting them to police, who sometimes expulsed the pimps if they were foreigners (Schettini, 2017).

Uruguay's intentional efforts against corruption and drug trafficking might explain why it is less attractive as a destination country. Furthermore, the history of law enforcement responsive to prostitutes' complaints against pimps together with its many regulations for sex workers might make it unappealing as a destination country, though it does experience internal prostitution trafficking. Perhaps the regulations served to put women more under the control of those taking them for health checks, as similar

regulations did for Thailand, but the regulations coupled with effective law enforcement and relatively less corruption may also deter traffickers from selecting Uruguay as a destination country. Because the regulations are actually enforced, they might inconvenience traffickers enough that traffickers decide to bring victims elsewhere.

Bangladesh and Albania

I group Bangladesh and Albania together because of their common traits. Both do poorly with regard to common pull factors of human trafficking. Neither is well off financially, although Albania enjoys a higher score for democracy. Both are also involved in the international drug trade, but neither are destination countries for drugs. They diverge with regards to legalization of prostitution but although neither are destination countries for human trafficking, both experience internal prostitution and internal child prostitution trafficking. Together, they demonstrate that legalizing or criminalizing prostitution is not in and of itself sufficient to determine a country's appeal as a destination country, particularly if there is not enough wealth in the country to sustain a demand, both for drugs and for victims of trafficking.

Bangladesh

As a poor country, Bangladesh isn't a destination for human trafficking because traffickers do not expect victims brought to Bangladesh to result in a profit. At the same time, Bangladesh is a source and transit country for trafficking as well as a transit country for drugs; illicit goods (drugs and people) appear to go through Bangladesh rather than stopping there. With its contribution to the drug market, legal prostitution, and low average Corruption Perception Index (only 2.1), Bangladesh defies all three of my

hypotheses by not being a destination country for human trafficking, though it is a source and transit country for many types of trafficking and also experiences internal trafficking.

Aside from the significance of its status as a less developed and relatively poor country, Bangladesh has porous land, sea, and air borders and struggles to organize coordinated government responses despite its myriad law enforcement units involved in counter narcotics, with some customs officers like those at Zia International Airport apparently preferring not to inconvenience customers by searching luggage thoroughly (U.S. State Department, 2009). Perhaps because drug traffickers see Bangladesh as a transit country rather than a destination country, human traffickers treat it similarly.

Bangladesh does experience human trafficking, but most of it is internal. For instance, consider its brothels. The largest brothel in Bangladesh, the Tan Bazar brothel, which includes a children's clinic, and advertises certain services available for prostitutions in an attached clinic: "contraceptives, counseling, condoms, STD/HIV treatment, abortion, antenatal and postnatal checkups, infertility care, gynecological care, and treatment of minor ailments" (Farley, 2008: 1114). If Bangladesh is less inviting as a destination country for other reasons (primarily its relative poverty and position as a transit country for human trafficking), perhaps the legality of brothels and pimping only serves to enable internal trafficking within Bangladesh, preying on indigent young women with few economic options.

Bangladesh has historically struggled with corruption in every sector, the result of a history of political unrest and violence (Knox, 2009b). Corruption in law enforcement is the most prominent, with land administration and the judiciary closely behind (Knox, 2009a). The military coup of 2007 resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency and

the suspension of constitutional rights, supposedly to make room for the new "Caretaker Government" to better provide services while simultaneously detaining politicians and business leaders as part of an anti-corruption effort (Knox, 2009b: 454). The new government also implemented institutional reforms: improving the Electoral Commission and amending electoral laws, reforming the Public Service Commission, replacing the Bureau of Anti-Corruption with the Anti-Corruption Commission, and separating the Judiciary from the Executive (Knox, 2009b). However, the military lost the parliamentary election in 2008 and though the following government restored some civil and political rights, the lingering Anti-Corruption Commission failed to effectively tackle corruption at an institutional level (Knox, 2009b).

Albania

Poor like Bangladesh, human traffickers do not expect victims brought to Albania to result in a profit. Drug and human traffickers can use the same resources and networks to bring contraband both from and through Albania. Albania functions as a transit and source country for drug trafficking, has laws against both brothels and pimping, and has an average Corruption Perception Index score of only 2.9. Contrary to Hypothesis 1 (Drug Trafficking) but in support of Hypotheses 2 (Legal Prostitution) and 3 (Government Corruption), it is not a destination country for human trafficking, though it is a source country for prostitution, labor, child prostitution, and child labor and, like Bangladesh, experiences internal prostitution and child prostitution trafficking.

Why is Albania not a destination country? The typical explanation of lack of wealth is certainly at play. Considering that it is still involved in human trafficking as a source country, traffickers are probably not deterred for institutional or political reasons.

Instead, they simply do not consider Albania a worthwhile investment. Rather, potential victims (particularly young women) are so vulnerable due to lack of education and economic opportunity that traffickers find it far easier to bring victims from Albania than to bring them to Albania.

Another reason why Albania is not recognized as a destination country might simply be that Albania is not a destination country for drug trafficking. Instead, an effective organized crime network moves both drugs and people through Albania to Europe rather than to Albania itself; groups that traffic migrants also traffic them through and from Albania (primarily to Italy) rather than to Albania (Cornell, 2012). Albanian human traffickers cooperate with traffickers from Kosovo, where poor peacekeeping efforts combined with legal prostitution led to human trafficking and therefore more money for the Kosovo Liberation Army ultimately strengthened Albanian organized crime (Surtees, 2008; Cornell, 2012). Often trafficked illegally across borders, Albanian victims reach destination countries abroad and feel unable to go to law enforcement for help due to lack of authentic documents (Surtees, 2008).

Political and social instability in Eastern Europe led to a wave of sex trafficking from countries formerly affected by the Soviet Union (and its collapse) to other countries, particularly in Western Europe. Albania is a prominent example. Social norms against prostitution already made victims, once trafficked, virtually unable to return to their home communities which serves to heighten their vulnerability to exploiters (Van Hook et al., 2006). In response to the flow of victims from Albania, the government launched a coalition to combat trafficking involving research, education, and programs related to trafficking as well as efforts to improve law enforcement (including strict punishments

against trafficking) and border control (Van Hook et al., 2006). Brothels and pimping are illegal but pimping is easier to hide; pimps operating within Albania exploit victims through “bars, hotels, motels and private agencies” (Corrin, 2004: 182). Victims are often exploited by soldiers and peacekeepers (Corrin, 2004). In the late 1990s, destination countries (Italy, Belgium, and France) began deporting Albanian women and girls who “were detained in Albanian police stations, treated as criminals and often became the target of police sexual abuse” (Corrin, 2004: 182).

Beyond that, Albania remains vulnerable to human trafficking due to gaps in law enforcement. Despite Albania’s low Corruption Perception Index score, an increased number of cases filed and prosecuted against corrupt officials from 2005 and 2006 demonstrates a commitment by both police and prosecutors to intentionally combat corruption (U.S. State Department, 2009). In 2002, Albanian law enforcement outlawed certain water vessels offshore for a three-year period (U.S. State Department, 2009); nevertheless, while this appeared to hinder drug movement to Italy, it simply redirected human trafficking routes to overland routes (Surtees, 2008). These new routes were enabled by open border policies between Albania and Kosovo, “enabling trafficking in both directions” (Surtees, 2008: 54). Finally, corrupt officials (police officers, soldiers, and peacekeepers) who exploit women and girls find plenty of vulnerable individuals within Albania without needing to look for victims trafficked into the country.

Mexico and Thailand

Mexico and Thailand both have laws against prostitution, but the prevalence of organized crime and ineffective or insufficient law enforcement make it difficult to enforce those laws. They both also suffer the effects of a strong international illegal drug

economy contributing to a demand for many illicit behaviors and goods. This highlights the vulnerabilities created by such inability to control drug trafficking and the importance of effective enforcement of laws against crimes related to human trafficking.

Mexico

Mexico has an extensive illegal economy of both drugs and prostitution. Drug trafficking routes can be used by human traffickers to ultimately bring both drugs and human victims into the country. Mexico's legal institutions are weak, lacking solid definitions of human trafficking, and Mexico's enforcement of its laws at the street level is also ineffective. Mexico is a source and transit country for drugs with laws against brothels and pimping and an average Corruption Perceptions Index score of 3.4. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 (Drug Trafficking) and 3 (Government Corruption) but inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 (Legal of Prostitution), it is a destination country for victims of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. It is also a source and transit country for the same types of human trafficking. It experiences very little internal trafficking.

2006 through 2010 saw Mexico employing military tactics against organized crime and drug trafficking organizations and partnering with the U.S. government—with mixed results. "Militarization has produced a dramatic increase in human rights violations, contributed to corruption and defection among Mexican military personnel, and unnecessarily escalated the level of conflict and violence" (Astorga and Shirk, 2010: 3). The U.S., meanwhile, has donated U.S. equipment and training through the Mérida Initiative, resulting in "a steady stream of arrests and extraditions targeting organized crime, as well as record seizures of drugs, guns, and cash" (Astorga and Shirk, 2010: 3).

The efforts, however, have so far failed to curb availability, consumption and potency of drugs (Astorga and Shirk, 2010). Meanwhile, corruption remains a severe impediment to Mexico's ability to thwart key players in drug trafficking (U.S State Department, 2009).

As for prostitution itself, though brothels and pimping are both illegal, there are no laws against prostitution itself and *zonas de tolerencia* are historic traits of northern border cities since 1945. The "district" *zonas* involve myriad forms of adult entertainment not limited to prostitution whereas "compound" *zonas* reflect the "geopolitical sink principle" in which "immoral institutions have often been confined to areas with limited political clout" (Curtis and Arreola, 1991:339). The compound *zonas* also tend to enjoy more institutional consistency, including gatehouses, police posts, and especially medical clinics where prostitutes (who must register officially) can undergo the required examinations (Curtis and Arreola, 1991). Notably, streetwalkers (called *clandestinas*) are unaffiliated with specific bars and not allowed within the *zona* (Curtis and Arreola, 1991). According to research on *zonas* between 1987 and 1990, politics at the state or *municipio* level can lead to the shutting down of *zonas*, but such reform rarely has rarely lasted due to the income generated by prostitution through taxes, fees, and income as well as through corruption (Curtis and Arreola, 1991). Indeed, later research found that such *zonas* seem to persist: as of 2002, Bucardo et al. found that in certain states of Mexico, "a registry of sex workers is maintained, periodic medical exams for sex workers are required, and the activity is confined to the authorized area of town or designated establishment" (344).

Mexico's legal standards are a weak point: it fails at both effectively prosecuting traffickers and protecting victims (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005). Sex tourism from the U.S.

into Mexico is common, but despite ratifying several agreements against trafficking, Mexico lacks a comprehensive legal definition making it difficult to distinguish between child victims of trafficking and child victims of other kinds of abuse (Gozdiak and Colet, 2005); Mexico further fails to acknowledge other forms of trafficking such as forced labor (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005). Concerning international trafficking, Mexico's National Immigration Institute is overwhelmed by the sheer number of illegal migrants and reports feeling hampered by the government's policy of immediate deportation, which obstructs the institute from thoroughly investigating cases that might be related to trafficking (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005).

Thailand

Thailand's illegal economy creates demand for both drugs and victims of human trafficking. Despite the illegality, street-level officers are unable to quell either drug or human trafficking. Thailand is a destination and transit country for drugs in which brothels and pimping illegal with an average Corruption Perceptions Index score of 3.6. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 (Drug Trafficking) and 3 (Government Corruption) but inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 (Legal Prostitution), it is a destination country for prostitution, labor, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor, perhaps due to its history of a vast illegal economy. It also experiences internal prostitution trafficking and is perceived around the world to provide easy access to sex services (Nuttavuthisit, 2007).

The illegal economy was primarily supported by gambling, "followed by prostitution, drug trafficking, diesel oil smuggling, trafficking labour, and trading in contraband arms" (Phongpaichit, 1999: 3). External gangs such as the Japanese Yakuza

operated in Thailand, giving it international significance in both the drug trade and human trafficking (Phongpaichit, 1999).

During the Vietnam War, Thailand and the U.S. military entered into a treaty allowing U.S. soldiers to find "Rest and Recreation" in Thailand; this combined with increased tourist development increased the sex trade (Nuttavuthisit, 2007: 22). Thailand's efforts to penalize prostitutes' exploiters or prohibit prostitution itself have had little effect in the wake of Thailand's "branding" as a "haven for sexual adventures" in media worldwide (Nuttavuthisit, 2007: 23). Some of the efforts only worsened women's position—under the 1980 policy of 100% condom use, "they suffered the same social contempt as always but with additional coercive tactics such as being taken to clinics for health checks under police or military escort" (Farley, 2016: 1110).

Corruption remains a widespread problem. Historically, the networks created by criminal groups organized vote-buying or even contested general elections, sometimes with the help of policemen who have not only imported and traded drugs but acted as "kingpins in human trafficking; and agents and entrepreneurs in the sex services trade" (Phongpaichit, 1999: 7). Corruption in law enforcement might be explained by low salaries, a superstructure with "too many levels with too little to do," centralized power, no real punishments for wrongdoing, and no outside monitoring (Phongpaichit, 1999: 7). In recent efforts against this, Thailand attempted to implement stronger border control, international cooperation against drug trafficking, more education for villagers in affected areas, and better research methods (U.S. State Department, 2009). Though these efforts effectively reduced drug trafficking in the northern border areas, many traffickers simply created alternate routes (U.S. State Department, 2009).

Connections

There are some common themes apparent from this selection of case studies. First, drug trafficking flows seem to align with human trafficking flows. New Zealand, Bangladesh, and Albania are the only exceptions, but the fact that New Zealand (without international drug trafficking) is a destination country while Bangladesh and Albania (with international drug trafficking) are not can probably be primarily explained by the wealth gap between them. As a wealthier nation, New Zealand is appealing to human traffickers for reasons besides the lack of drug trafficking resources; as poorer nations, Bangladesh and Albania are unappealing regardless of how easy it might be to use transiting drug routes to also traffic human victims. Meanwhile, the rest of my cases suggest that drug transit and destination countries are also likely to be destination countries of human trafficking. Of my 83 countries, only eight (Armenia, Cyprus, Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, and Uganda) are destination countries without also being either transit or destination countries for drugs.

Second, in both cases of legalized and criminalized prostitution, creating separate zones for prostitution, brothels, and pimping serves to isolate prostitutes and makes victims more vulnerable to trafficking. Legalizing prostitution seems to invite human traffickers, despite the extra regulation that such legislation may offer. In some cases, the regulatory requirements only seem to increase the power imbalance between victims of sex trafficking and their exploiters. Increasing the regulations and responsibilities for those in charge of sex workers seems only effective when law enforcement has a positive view of the sex industry.

This connects with the final point concerning corruption. Efforts to combat human trafficking ultimately seem to rest with the response of street-level police officers. Less corruption and more regulation do not automatically mean that law enforcement correctly handles human trafficking. In many cases, police officers attempting to do their jobs only harm victims by treating them as criminals. In the United States, laws against illegal immigration and prostitution make victims more dependent on traffickers. Mexico's policy of immediate deportation obstructs the government's ability to investigate potential cases of trafficking Decriminalizing prostitution in New Zealand allows officers to respond to violence but does not necessarily enable them to prevent violence. Law enforcement seems to be most effective in Uruguay, with an intentional focus on organized crime and drug trafficking and a history of responsiveness to the complaints of prostitutes.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

International human trafficking is a complex problem, affected by factors of the international system (globalization, porous borders, international laws, other forms of illicit trafficking) as well as domestic variables (laws, wealth, country fragility). Those interested in battling international human trafficking should consider taking slightly different approaches depending on whether a country is a destination, transit, or source country of trafficking. Some factors that appeal to traffickers must simply be accepted: for instance, no policymaker would attempt to lower GDP or reduce tourism. Some, such as drug trafficking and corruption, are undesirable regardless of their connection to human trafficking. Other factors are more nuanced: the opposite effects of legalizing brothels and legalizing pimping invites more research on the effects of legalizing prostitution on human trafficking.

My research found support for Hypothesis 1, that drug trafficking flows mirror human trafficking flows. Though source countries for drug trafficking are unlikely to be destination countries for human trafficking, transit and destination countries for drugs are likely to be destination countries for human trafficking. This is likely because criminal organizations can easily use the same resources used for drug trafficking to increase their profits by also trafficking human victims. Furthermore, the inflow of drugs encourages market demands for illicit goods.

I found some support for Hypotheses 2, that legalizing prostitution makes countries more likely to be destination countries. Legal brothels make countries more

likely to be destination countries for child prostitution but less likely to be destination countries for debt bondage while legal pimping make countries more likely to be destination countries for domestic servitude and less likely to be destination countries for debt bondage. The variance in substantive impact, however, supports my hypothesis overall as the impact of effects that align with my hypothesis are larger than the impact of effects that are inconsistent. My research also found that isolating prostitutes (geographically, socially, or legally) seems to encourage trafficking by causing victims to be unable or willing to find help.

I found limited support for Hypothesis 3, that corruption makes countries more likely to be destination country. My measure of corruption was only significant in one model where higher levels of corruption made a country less likely to be a destination country for domestic servitude. I expect this is mostly due to measurement error, but it suggests that researchers should not assume that corruption has the same effect at all levels and in all branches of government; nor should researchers assume that corruption has the same effect in destination, source, and transit countries. My research also found that effective law enforcement is only helpful to victims of human trafficking if individual officers are willing to see individuals as potential victims rather than only as perpetrators of certain crimes (such as illegal immigration or prostitution).

Further research should pursue several goals. First, human trafficking still suffers from a lack of data valid across different countries and through time. Related variables, such as corruption and criminal organizations, could also be refined. Future research should use a disaggregated measure of corruption to distinguish between the effects of corruption in different levels and branches of government. Future research could also use

rates of drug trafficking, rather than merely trafficking flows, and consider other measures of criminal organizations such as weapons trafficking.

Second, more precise definitions would clarify the issues. For instance, researchers should clearly explain what types of human trafficking they are investigating: destination, transit, source, or internal, and prostitution, labor, debt bondage, domestic servitude, child prostitution, or child labor. They should not assume that because a variable has a certain impact on trafficking from source countries that it will have a similar impact on trafficking to destination countries or through transit countries; more research that distinguishes between countries playing different roles in the international network of trafficking will result in a more comprehensive picture of trafficking overall. Researchers should also clarify whether they are approaching the issue from the perspective of victims or of traffickers and select and organize appropriate variables accordingly.

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APPENDIX A

Robustness Test Results

Probit Analysis Results with Prostitution

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.576***	0.728**	0.0394	0.520*	0.229	0.154	0.217
	(3.65)	(2.3)	&0.23)	(2.34)	(1.25)	(0.89)	(1.31)
Drug Transit	0.140	0.281	0.332*	-0.840***	0.464*	0.551***	0.432**
	(0.67)	(1.45)	(1.97)	(-4.20)	(2.33)	(3.40)	(2.70)
Drug Source	-0.802***	-0.680**	-0.816***	-0.0760	-0.310	-0.299	-0.663***
	(-3.50)	(-3.23)	(-4.03)	(-0.29)	(-1.37)	(-1.63)	(-3.39)
Brothel	0.285*	0.365**	0.255*	-4.008***	0.529***	0.511***	0.102
	(2.04)	(3.00)	(2.44)	(-9.04)	(4.33)	(4.60)	(0.99)
Pimping	-0.517**	-0.469**	-0.427**	4.308***	-0.964***	-0.512***	-0.418**
	(-2.88)	(-2.94)	(-3.10)	(9.92)	(-4.47)	(-3.31)	(-2.86)
Prostitution	-0.126	-0.186	-0.111	-0.376*	-0.491***	-0.304**	-0.155
	(-1.06)	(-1.67)	(-1.12)	(-2.45)	(-3.85)	(-3.18)	(-1.69)
CPI	0.137	0.0584	0.0628	0.0824	0.277***	-0.0121	-0.00660
	(1.59)	(0.85)	(0.99)	(1.03)	(3.30)	(-0.20)	(-0.11)
Polity	0.0937***	0.0851***	0.0533**	0.0358	-0.0121	0.0596**	0.0890***
	(4.06)	(3.64)	(2.61)	(1.19)	(-0.42)	(3.04)	(3.77)
Domestic Laws	0.280	0.346*	0.612**	-0.237	0.0593	0.318*	0.196
	(1.41)	(1.98)	(3.90)	(-1.07)	(0.32)	(2.24)	(1.38)
Enforce	-0.0973	-0.0686	-0.627***	-0.221	-0.228	0.251	-0.221
	(-0.58)	(-0.45)	(-4.23)	(-1.10)	(-1.45)	(1.85)	(-1.58)
Infant Mortality	0.00325	0.00577	0.0160**	-0.00988	0.00994	0.0134*	0.0216***
	(0.56)	(1.07)	(2.73)	(-1.21)	(1.34)	(2.36)	(3.87)
Tourism	0.327***	0.296***	0.503***	0.192*	0.207**	0.171**	0.346***
	(4.58)	(4.16)	(7.05)	(2.01)	(2.87)	(3.06)	(5.58)
Security	0.0934	0.00893	0.0944	0.0726	0.0834	-0.0490	0.132*
	(1.24)	(0.14)	(1.63)	(0.87)	(0.96)	(-0.87)	(2.35)
Elites	0.00728	0.00862	0.00125	0.00758	-0.0476	0.00327	-0.000768
	(0.75)	(0.81)	(0.11)	(0.75)	(-0.50)	(0.29)	(-0.06)
Constant	-7.885***	-6.906***	-11.83***	-4.958*	-6.844***	-4.815***	-9.327***

	(-4.82)	(-4.25)	(-7.39)	(-2.42)	(-4.47)	(-3.71)	(-6.43)
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Probit Analysis Results with Landlocked

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.614***	0.749**	0.0628	0.474*	0.319	0.248	0.257
	(3.73)	(2.84)	(0.37)	(2.07)	(1.72)	(1.47)	(1.54)
Drug Transit	0.162	0.292	0.287	-0.857***	0.418*	0.494**	0.400**
	(0.74)	(1.47)	(1.66)	(-4.28)	(2.19)	(3.02)	(2.45)
Drug Source	-0.774***	-0.620**	-0.794***	0.0521	-0.110	-0.219	-0.616***
	(-3.38)	(-3.03)	(-4.07)	(0.21)	(-0.51)	(-1.23)	(-3.30)
Brothel	0.223	0.265*	0.181	-4.148***	0.313**	0.369***	0.0228
	(1.72)	(2.38)	(1.88)	(-10.63)	(3.15)	(3.86)	(0.24)
Pimping	-0.494**	-0.433**	-0.415**	4.286***	-0.894***	-0.525***	-0.428**
	(-2.79)	(-2.78)	(-3.06)	(10.54)	(-4.36)	(-3.63)	(-2.98)
CPI	0.135	0.0545	0.0511	0.0796	0.271***	-0.0261	-0.00679
	(1.60)	(0.79)	(0.81)	(0.98)	(3.55)	(-0.43)	(-0.11)
Landlocked	-0.0344	-0.148	-0.377	-0.600	-0.487*	-0.835***	-0.621**
	(-0.12)	(-0.63)	(-1.72)	(-1.83)	(-2.04)	(-3.90)	(-2.909)
Polity	0.0838***	0.0685**	0.0424*	-0.00405	-0.0478	0.0315	0.0737***
	(3.80)	(3.06)	(2.20)	(-0.16)	(-1.85)	(1.74)	(3.46)
Domestic Laws	0.310	0.369*	0.604***	-0.237	0.0478	0.329844*	0.171
	(1.51)	(2.08)	(3.82)	(-1.08)	(0.27)	(2.09)	(1.20)
Enforce	-0.0973	-0.0456	-0.519***	-0.109	-0.186	0.307*	-0.185
	(-0.57)	(-0.29)	(-3.98)	(-0.57)	(-1.21)	(2.26)	(-1.31)
Infant Mortality	0.00410	0.00747	0.0173**	-0.00366	0.0150*	0.0178**	0.0243***
	(0.70)	(1.37)	(2.89)	(-0.48)	(2.08)	(2.91)	(4.12)
Tourism	0.327***	0.290***	0.489***	0.193*	0.0150*	0.1.36*	0.320***
	(4.42)	(4.05)	(6.75)	(1.92)	(2.08)	(2.91)	(5.02)
Security	0.0930	0.00196	0.0755	0.0383	0.0525	-0.0967	0.105*

	(1.26)	(0.03)	(1.27)	(0.43)	(0.59)	(-1.66)	(1.84)
Elites	0.00730	0.00923	0.00371	0.0116	-0.0326	0.00924	0.00310
	(0.77)	(0.89)	(0.34)	(1.12)	(-0.38)	(0.85)	(0.27)
Constant	-8.036***	-6.931***	-11.40***	-5.115***	-6.794***	-3.935***	-8.695 ***
	(-4.66)	(-4.12)	(-6.99)	(-2.39)	(-4.52)	(-2.90)	(-5.75)
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Probit Analysis Results with Resource Rents

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.651***	0.716**	0.00448	0.479*	0.230	0.165	0.197
	(3.71)	(2.70)	(0.03)	(2.09)	(1.20)	(0.97)	(1.20)
Drug Transit	0.208	0.362	0.366*	-0.778***	0.506**	0.587***	0.471**
	(0.96)	(1.86)	(2.12)	(-3.76)	(2.70)	(3.57)	(2.88)
Drug Source	-0.800***	-0.652**	-0.786***	0.0916	-0.0750	-0.215	-0.624***
	(-3.50)	(-3.12)	(-4.06)	(0.37)	(-0.34)	(-1.24)	(-3.33)
Brothel	0.201	0.269*	0.208*	-4.189***	0.366***	0.392***	0.0477
	(1.50)	(2.43)	(2.15)	(-10.91)	(3.78)	(3.98)	(0.48)
Pimping	-0.38*	-0.394*	-0.386**	4.357***	-0.966***	-0.467**	-0.401**
	(-2.48)	(-2.49)	(-2.79)	(10.83)	(-4.56)	(-3.10)	(-2.73)
CPI	0.142	0.0598	0.05332	0.0979	0.278***	-0.0110	-0.00877
	(1.65)	(0.87)	(0.84)	(1.24)	(3.59)	(-0.18)	(-0.15)
Resource Rents	0.0231*	0.0200*	0.0288**	-0.000140	0.0332**	0.0151	0.0273**
	(2.55)	(2.13)	(3.08)	(-0.01)	(3.03)	(1.62)	(2.63)
Polity	0.101***	0.0871***	0.0639**	-0.000159	-0.0203	0.0469*	0.103***
	(4.39)	(3.96)	(3.11)	(-0.00)	(-0.69)	(2.51)	(4.10)
Domestic Laws	0.272	0.347*	0.587***	-0.250	0.0903	0.319*	0.185
	(1.38)	(1.99)	(3.76)	(-1.12)	(0.50)	(2.20)	(1.31)
Enforce	-0.0271	0.00642	-0.542***	-0.168	-0.116	0.306*	-0.134

	(-0.16)	(0.04)	(-3.60)	(-0.83)	(-0.72)	(2.21)	(-0.94)
Infant Mortality	-0.00269	0.00217	0.00888	-0.00452	0.00622	0.0124*	0.0165**
	(-0.46)	(0.37)	(1.48)	(-0.55)	(0.83)	(2.07)	(2.60)
Tourism	0.330***	0.300***	0.515***	0.225*	0.242***	0.181**	0.361***
	(4.61)	(4.27)	(7.18)	(2.18)	(3.40)	(3.25)	(5.71)
Security	0.107	0.0150	0.102	0.0663	0.0799	-0.0469	0.143*
	(1.40)	(0.23)	(1.75)	(0.76)	(0.92)	(-0.84)	(2.50)
Elites	0.0108	0.0117	0.00474	0.0103	-0.0330	0.00633	0.00320
	(1.11)	(1.10)	(0.43)	(1.04)	(-0.38)	(0.54)	(0.2)
Constant	--8.396***	-7.403***	-12.44***	-6.099**	-8.447***	-5.535***	-10.21***
	(-5.010	(-4.58)	(-7.64)	(-2.97)	(-5.37)	(-4.28)	(-6.78)
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Probit Analysis Results with Women in Parliament

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.665***	0.773**	0.0286	0.525*	0.349	0.188	0.206
	(3.74)	(2.77)	(0.16)	(2.22)	(1.86)	(1.08)	(1.26)
Drug Transit	0.105	0.272	0.309	-0.592**	0.502*	0.500**	0.389*
	(0.48)	(1.32)	(1.77)	(-2.97)	(2.50)	(2.95)	(2.36)
Drug Source	-0.673**	-0.589**	-0.713***	-0.101	-1.0923	-0.0697	-0.432*
	(-2.96)	(-2.88)	(-3.70)	(-0.42)	(-0.44)	(-0.38)	(-2.37)
Brothel	0.239	0.252*	0.219*	-5.249***	0.352***	0.410***	0.0703
	(1.80)	(2.24)	(2.15)	(-11.89)	(3.35)	(3.78)	(0.71)
Pimping	-0.505**	-0.433**	-0.433**	5.446***	-0.844***	-0.525***	-0.430**
	(-2.71)	(2.65)	(-3.05)	(11.61)	(-4.05)	(-3.36)	(-2.97)
CPI	0.0728	0.0299	0.0333	0.354***	-0.525***	-0.430**	
(2.71)	(-2.65)	(-3.05)	(11.61)	(-4.05)	(-3.36)	(-2.97)	
Polity	0.105***	0.0872**	0.0645**	0.0660	-0.0529	0.0174	0.0702**
	(3.70)	(3.11)	(2.73)	(1.76)	(-1.91)	(0.71)	(2.75)
Domestic Laws	0.332	0.388*	0.632***	-0.370	0.0767	0.371**	0.242
	(1.65)	(2.22)	(4.05)	(-1.51)	(0.43)	(2.59)	(1.71)

Enforce	-0.107	-0.0491	-0.624***	-0.133	-0.249	0.335*	-0.202
	(-0.62)	(-0.31)	(-4.18)	(-0.71)	(-1.61)	(2.46)	(-1.45)
Infant Mortality	0.00122	0.00377	0.0149*	-0.00297	0.0173*	0.0127*	0.0220***
	(0.20)	(0.68)	(2.48)	(-0.36)	(2.33)	(2.25)	(3.84)
Women in parliament	0.00334	0.00997	0.00647	0.000123	-0.0115	0.0127*	0.0220***
	(0.37)	(1.22)	(0.85)	(0.01)	(-1.23)	(0.86)	(0.63)
Tourism	0.294***	0.279***	0.488***	0.252*	0.209**	0.134*	0.329***
	(3.88)	(3.80)	(6.76)	(2.17)	(3.02)	(2.28)	(5.11)
Constant	-7.053***	-7.028***	-11.81***	-10.19***	-7.051***	-3.137*	-8.025***
	(-3.37)	(-3.73)	(-6.55)	(-3.66)	(-4.02)	(-2.02)	(-4.91)
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Probit Analysis Results with Percent of the Population Male over 60

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.691***	0.748**	0.0572	0.505*	0.379*	0.189	0.236
	(4.12)	(2.80)	(0.34)	(2.20)	(2.06)	(1.11)	(1.43)
Drug Transit	0.234	0.340	0.346*	-0.768***	0.636	0.575***	0.437**
	(1.09)	(1.76)	(2.05)	(-3.77)	(1.92)	(3.53)	(2.71)
Drug Source	-0.831***	-0.644**	-0.768***	-0.00368	-0.216	-0.198	-0.567**
	(-3.63)	(-3.12)	(-3.98)	(-0.02)	(-0.99)	(-1.13)	(-3.07)
Brothel	0.175	0.255*	0.223*	-4.775***	0.215*	0.402***	0.0791
	(1.33)	(2.27)	(2.25)	(-11.70)	(2.04)	(3.85)	(0.80)
Pimping	-0.44*	-0.401*	-0.430**	4.951***	-0.742***	-0.501**	-0.477**
	(-2.36)	(-2.50)	(-3.08)	(11.56)	(-3.45)	(-3.23)	(-3.16)
CPI	0.178*	0.0718	0.0593	0.136	0.306***	-0.0109	-0.0189
	(2.04)	(1.03)	(0.94)	(1.65)	(3.90)	(-0.18)	(-0.31)
Polity	0.0942***	0.0736**	0.0435*	0.0153	-0.0306	0.0336	0.0694**
	(4.17)	(3.22)	(2.22)	(0.57)	(-1.15)	(1.81)	(3.15)
Domestic Laws	0.217	0.346	0.637***	-0.279	-0.00306	0.356*	0.264

	(1.06)	(1.93)	(4.01)	(-1.26)	(-0.02)	(2.51)	(1.80)
Enforce	-0.0445	-0.0331	-0.633***	-0.108	-0.121	0.252	-0.252
	(-0.26)	(-0.21)	(-4.18)	(-0.55)	(-0.77)	(1.83)	(-1.76)
Infant Mortality	0.000727	0.00530	0.0180**	-0.0125	0.00554	0.0176**	0.0263***
	(0.12)	(0.95)	(2.95)	(-1.51)	(0.61)	(2.97)	(4.30)
Male 60	-0.0351*	-0.0183	0.00938	-0.0621*	-0.0834***	0.0129	0.0300*
	(-2.08)	(-1.53)	(0.75)	(-2.29)	(-4.01)	(1.04)	(2.08)
Tourism	0.330***	0.296***	0.505***	0.243*	0.232**	0.174**	0.342***
	(4.61)	(4.21)	(7.05)	(2.23)	(3.19)	(3.08)	(5.39)
Security	0.0884	-0.000397	0.0893	0.0478	0.0959	-0.0423	0.143*
	(1.17)	(-0.01)	(1.69)	(0.56)	(1.13)	(-0.77)	(0.10)
Elites	0.00725	0.00843	0.00159	0.00783	-0.115	0.00458	0.00117
	(0.75)	(0.81)	(0.15)	(0.79)	(-1.29)	(0.39)	(0.10)
Constant	-7.799***	-6.936***	-12.14***	-5.848**	-6.601***	-5.428***	-9.820***
	(-4.66)	(-4.27)	(7.48)	(-2.68)	(4.24)	(-4.17)	(-6.56)
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Probit Analysis Results with Unemployment Rates

	(1) General Dest	(2) Pros Dest	(3) Labor Dest	(4) Debt Bondage Dest	(5) Domestic Servitude Dest	(6) Child Prostitute Dest	(7) Child Labor Dest
Drug Destination	1.626***	0.767**	0.0411	0.344	0.295	0.189	0.230
	(3.73)	(2.82)	(0.24)	(1.42)	(1.59)	(1.11)	(1.39)
Drug Transit	0.170	0.323	0.352*	-0.860***	0.387*	0.575***	0.428**
	(0.80)	(1.69)	(2.09)	(-4.25)	(2.10)	(3.54)	(2.68)
Drug Source	-0.774***	-0.626**	-0.826***	0.0402	-0.119	-0.218	-0.609**
	(-3.39)	(-3.06(	(-4.13)	(0.15)	(-0.58)	(-1.24)	(-3.24)
Brothel	0.232	0.266*	0.236*	-4.248***	0.326**	0.399***	0.0651
	(1.78)	(2.39)	(2.42)	(-10.15)	(3.28)	(3.92)	(0.67)
Pimping	-0.489**	-0.451**	-0.385**	4.459***	-0.873***	-0.470**	-0.410**
	(-2.78)	(-2.89)	(-2.77)	(9.94)	(-4.22)	(-3.13)	(-2.84)
CPI	0.144	0.0415	0.108	0.123	0.273***	0.00826	0.0208

	(1.64)	(0.50)	(1.76)	(1.44)	(3.59)	(0.14)	(0.34)
Polity	0.0828***	0.0745**	0.0349	-0.0170	-0.0533*	0.0331	0.0722**
	(3.71)	(3.26)	(1.80)	(-0.65)	(-1.97)	(1.77)	(3.25)
Domestic Laws	0.303	0.408*	0.605***	-0.191	0.0802	0.325*	-0.187
	(1.50)	(2.33)	(3.81)	(-0.86)	(0.46)	(2.30)	(1.32)
Enforce	-0.0.891	-0.0984	-0.567***	-0.193	-0.207	0.288*	-0.187
	(0.52)	(-0.64)	(3.80)	-0.87)	(-1.33)	(2.09(	(1.33)
Infant Mortality	0.00469	0.00597	0.0194**	-0.00998	0.0136	00171**	0.0244***
	(0.75)	(1.11)	(3.25)	(-1.30)	(1.80)	(2.91)	(4.30)
Tourism	0.329***	0.302***	0.506***	0.258*	0.204**	0.172**	0.342***
	(4.61)	(4.24)	(6.87)	(2.35)	(2.96)	(3.08)	(5.44)
Unemploy- ment	0.00894	-0.0266	0.0599**	0.0746**	0.0293	0.0233	0.0407*
	(0.35)	(-1.39)	(3.14)	(3.13)	(1.36)	(1.21)	(2.57)
Security	0.0970	0.00295	0.108	0.0581	0.0798	-0.473	0.135*
	(1.30)	(0.0)	(1.85)	(0.62)	(0.93)	(-0.85)	(2.39)
Elites	0.00676	0.00951	-0.0012	0.00944	-0.0593	0.00316	-0.00169
	(0.70)	(0.91)	(-0.11)	(0.93)	(-0.68)	(0.27)	(-0.14)
Constant	-8.225***	-6.959***	-12.77***	-7.277***	-7.244***	-5.464***	-9.845***
	(-4.82)	(-4.25)	(-7.39)	(-2.42)	(-4.47)	(-3.71)	(-6.43)
N	411	411	411	411	411	411	411

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001