

PERSONAL SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

by

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ABSTRACT

What is the impact of migration patterns on perceptions of personal security in the European Union countries over the past half-decade? Although the numbers of migrants from outside the EU are undeniably massive, their impact upon domestic public opinion is understudied. Following recent work that explores themes of fear of migrants in EU native populations (Bustikova 2014, d' Appollonia and Reich 2008, Ivarsflaten 2008), I propose a multivariate model that explains variation across EU countries in citizens' views of personal security that includes migration rates, unemployment rates, crime rates, the presence of terrorism, and views of government performance. The results suggest that controlling for these several factors, increased migration rates have a statistically significant effect on increasing personal insecurity among the EU citizenry.

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INTRODUCTION

As a Turkish officer lifted Alan Kurdi's little body, who was found washed up on the Turkish shore of the Mediterranean Sea on September 2, 2015, the world suddenly refocused on the Syrian tragedy. The two-year old boy was just one member of a family on the run. Alan, whose mother and brother drowned with him, belonged to a clan from Syria's long-oppressed Kurdish community. The family barely spoke Kurdish and identified themselves as Syrian and joined no faction. When war broke out, political ties and ethnicity became life-or-death matters, so they had no choice but to flee toward Europe (Barnard 2015). While Alan Kurdi's story is tragic and generated global attention, the reality is, his story is all too common. Europe has been under recent migratory pressure.

Europe has been receiving a significant number of migrants fleeing the Middle East and Africa in search of a better life. The European Union has become a desirable destination for migrants since the creation of the European Union in 1992, due to its wealth, access to employment, open borders and 28 member countries in which migrants can settle. The European Union has become an especially desirable destination for migrants from the Middle East and Africa. According to the Eurostat Database, there has been a substantial increase in the number of asylum applications within the EU, as the number of asylum seekers grew from 432,000 in 2013 to 627,000 in 2014 and nearly to 1.3 million in 2015 (See Figure 1, below). What's more shocking is the number of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. According to the data from Eurostat, since 2008,

about 198,500 unaccompanied minors have entered Europe seeking asylum. What's even more frightening is that the 2015 total accounts for nearly half of unaccompanied minors that have entered the EU since 2008 (Connor and Krogstad 2016).




Figure 1 Asylum Seekers in the EU 2010-2014 (Source: Eurostat)

Although there has been a great deal of research on the policies implemented to control immigration flows to the member states, the analysis of European citizens' public opinion regarding immigration has not been deeply explored. Just and Anderson (2014) highlight how positive opinion by EU citizens toward immigrant populations encourages political participation on the part of immigrants, though these opinions are measured prior to the current migration crisis. Nor have personal security questions been tapped by scholars as indicators of unease about immigrants.

International migration is a difficult subject to measure and there are many factors to bear in mind. First, migration can be repetitive in the life of an individual, meaning that one can migrate more than once. Second, most developing countries lack the ability

to provide statistical measurements for the number of citizens migrating to other countries. Finally, migrants can be categorized differently, for example, some might have a status as a migrant worker, student, refugee, asylum seeker, or even an illegal immigrant. Research is difficult to synthesize because it includes diverse data sets, dependent and independent variables, and theoretical perspectives.

European Union citizens and leaders have debated whether immigration in the EU is a problem or a solution. Many citizens of the EU fear that these immigrants will bring social, political, and economic problems to their home state. The fear of migration felt by EU citizens is based on misinformation. The media portrays migration in a negative manner, which fuels fear in the population. Citizens are under the impression that there is some sort of invasion. The impact of negative news stories about immigrants motivates individuals to contact their elected representatives, requesting them to adopt restrictive policies (Butz and Kehrberg 2016). EU citizens also fear immigration as a threat to society's cultural, religious and national identity. This fear is in part based on concrete examples, such as the competition for low cost housing or the need for quality schools in areas with a highly diverse ethnic mix. In sum, many European citizens express an unspecified feeling of uncertainty and uneasiness about the future, which is associated with migration (Canoy et al. 2006: 31). They also believe that immigrants will take away jobs, lower wages, and degrade national culture (Angelos, 2016). These views have political consequences. Recent parliamentary elections in the EU reveal that right-wing nationalist parties have won a great deal of support, ranging from 4-5% in Germany and Italy to the mid-teens in Sweden and France, and above 20% in Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland (McCarthy 2016).

Popular feelings of insecurity in which the outside world is perceived as a threat, relates to factors which sometimes have little to do with migration. These factors include the belief of difficulty to provide the degree of required security and the notion that individuals rather than states feel threatened by problems such as terrorism and the spread of infectious diseases. The inability to resolve structural problems in the European economy and Europe's high unemployment is another factor contributing to negative feelings about immigration. Poor functioning of the labor market inhibits integration and leads to social exclusion, which impacts both members of the host country as well as immigrants (Canoy et al. 2006: 4).

However, most citizens do not realize that immigration can also have a beneficial economic effect. Immigrants are more likely to be of working age, which means they are more likely to be paying taxes; this could help relieve the fiscal burden in many member states. And because immigrants are more likely to be younger, they are less likely to have healthcare expenses, long-time care, and the need for education. Within this heated debate I explore a broad question of: What is the impact of migration patterns on perceptions of personal security in the European Union? I am particularly interested in examining migration across time and changes in perceptions of personal security. The perception toward immigration as a threat to personal security has been a major issue for right-wing political parties. With the ongoing migration crisis, right-wing and xenophobic political attitudes have been increasing. Support for right-wing political parties among native populations have also been on the rise (Knabe, Rätzl, and Thomsen 2013: 568). Toward that end, I use the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *As the number of migrants that cross into the European Union countries increase, public opinion on the importance of personal security increases.*

This hypothesis asserts that an increase of individuals from war-torn countries (The Middle East) or from very poor countries (Africa) will create anxiety and fear among EU citizens.

To measure public opinion on the importance of personal security, this study utilizes the Eurobarometer database. To operationalize the influence of migrants, this study relies on the Eurostat database. A multivariate data analysis of 28 member states during the period from 2009 to 2014 shows evidence that, *ceteris paribus*, citizen's concern with personal security increases in countries with high numbers of migrants. This finding suggests that there needs to be more tightened immigration policies in order for citizens to feel safe in their home state.

This paper continues by exploring the broader context of debates about migration, welfare, work, belonging and entitlement, by looking at past literature on the impact of immigration in the EU. Next, I state five sub-hypotheses that are spun off of Hypothesis 1 for testing in the empirical modeling section. I propose two models over the 2012-2015 time period, and then estimate them using multiple regression analysis. I then interpret the results and offer some conclusions.

COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

The literature analyzing public opinion on immigration and its influence on personal security is small but with the recent increase in immigration to the EU, there has been much more focus on this area of study. A number of works identify individual-level characteristics that are connected with attitudes toward immigrants, while other works focus on the macro-level variables.

On the macro-level, one of the recent issues that has dominated the political debate relates to the impact of immigration on the state's economy. According to Knabe, Rätzl and Thomsen (2013), immigration from developing countries to developed economies can have positive effects for the host country. They predict that the growth of the labor force in developed countries will decline in the next 20 years, and that this will eventually lead to rising elderly dependency ratios. The authors see immigration as a solution to this future problem. They believe that migration could help to mitigate the fiscal cost of a rapidly aging population. Germany is a prime example of a developed economy who is experiencing this problem far worse than any other developed economies (Knabe, Rätzl, and Thomsen 2013: 567).

Geddes (2008: 146) emphasizes that labor migration has been, is and will continue to be an important structural feature of European economies and that it will also continue to generate wealth. But more recently, the welcoming of new labor migrants from outside the EU has been connected "to the perceived need for new workers to offset some aspects of demographic change and to close specific labor market gaps (Geddes

2008: 146).” The effects of migration focuses on certain economic activity and its results in uneven distribution within member states. So, while there are overall benefits in terms of gross national product, there are those who do not benefit and are forced to compete with migrants in search for employment (Geddes 2008: 146).

Despite the potential benefits immigration can bring to developed economies, public opinion on immigration has declined in the face of high unemployment and strained welfare systems in many European countries. Native populations are concerned that “immigrants take out more from the economy than they put in (Preston 2014: 569).” Furthermore, Boubtane, Coulibaly, and Rault find no evidence of migration causing higher average rates of unemployment, but rather find evidence that host country unemployment has a negative impact on immigration (2013: 401).

The economic theory plays a large role in understanding how immigration affects host countries. One dimension that has not been explored much until recently is the implications of immigration in terms of criminality. This dimension is one of the most important in evaluating personal security. According to Nunziata 2015, economic theory explains the relationship between immigration and criminality, it says “...the association between immigration and criminality may originate from the differences in the opportunity cost of committing a crime, as it is experienced by migrants and natives (Nunziata 2015: 698).” Living in a host country, immigrants do not have the same economic opportunities as the natives, leaving them to engage in criminal activities. In addition, immigration may increase the labor supply in certain skill groups, reducing wages and employment opportunities and increasing the propensity for those with such skills to commit crimes.

With the current immigration crisis, immigration has been linked to increased criminality and gang formation, resulting in a negative perception that immigration is a threat to personal security. More recently, a number of studies have reported a causal link between immigration and gang formation. Decker, van Gemert, and Pyrooz find that in Europe the impact of migration on gangs reflects a complex mix of factors that also includes cultural and media influences. They argue that to understand gangs in Europe, it is necessary to understand how gangs form as well as the changes that trigger for gangs to form. The authors identify that gangs are originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. Based on this statement, the relationship between group conflict, fear, and threat are abundant in cities that are full of new ethnic groups, especially in communities with low incomes (Decker, van Gemert, and Pyrooz 2009: 399).

In addition to criminality, immigration is linked to terrorism. After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, immigrants and asylum seekers have become labeled as the enemy. According to Williams, Koch, and Smith terrorism profoundly affects individuals and governments. “At the individual level, research indicates that terrorism has a dampening psychological effect [and that it] negatively affects an individual’s assessment of life satisfaction (Williams, Koch, and Smith 2013: 345).” At the government level, “terrorism may lead to counter-productive outcomes for the terrorist (Williams, Koch, and Smith 2013: 345).” For example, in the face of a terrorist incident, coalitions with little or no ideological preference are more likely to form, like right-wing anti-immigrant groups.

Choi and Salehyan provide us with three reasons why hosting more refugees provokes terrorist incidents:

First, the conflict from which the refugees fled may spill across borders as militants attack refugee encampments in order to punish or intimidate their political rivals. Second, insurgent groups and terrorist organizations may recruit from within the refugee camps. Previous studies have shown that poor young males with few economic opportunities are most likely to join violent factions. Low opportunity costs for joining along with finding a sense of purpose may incline people to leave the camps and enlist in an armed group. Third, the presence of refugees and foreigners in general may prompt right-wing anti-immigrant groups to attack people who are ethnically and culturally different (Choi and Salehyan 2013: 57).

The authors propose a fourth factor, humanitarian aid. They argue that the presence of aid resources, such as food, medical supplies, and vehicles during refugee crisis allows violent groups to prowl and steal the supplies. In addition, relief workers are targets and are often kidnapped or held for ransom (Choi and Salehyan 2013: 57).

With the increase in immigration and integration problems, right-wing populist groups have become more favorable. Schneider (1985:16) sketches a politico-economic system which shows how economic conditions influence the citizens' evaluation of government performance: the worse (better) the economic conditions are, the less (more) satisfied the citizens are with the government. The rising popularity of right-wing populist and far-right parties is most recently seen in the Austrian presidential election. According to a report in *The New York Times*, Norbert Hofer of the nationalist and anti-immigration Freedom Party lost the country's presidential election by the slimmest of margins (49.7 percent of the vote). His campaign focused on strengthening Austria's borders and its military, limiting benefits for immigrants and favoring Austrians in the job market. Even though Mr. Hofer lost, it was the first time the Freedom Party, which

was founded in the 1950's by former Nazis and Teutonic nationalists, came close to receiving 50 percent of the popular vote (Aisch, Pearce, and Rousseau 2016).

Negative consequences of failed integration has also played a major role in the rise of right-wing parties. According to Ivarsflaten (2008), integration of new minorities into the labor market is failing. She states that “this failure is seen in that unemployment among immigrants is significantly higher than that of long-term citizens across most of Western Europe (Ivarsflaten 2008: 8).” She also states that most member states “were unprepared for the culture conflict that evolved between some in the new Muslim minority and the majority population. Attempts to facilitate or force integration have been controversial, such as the French legislation to ban the wearing of religious symbols in schools (Ivarsflaten 2008: 8).” According to d’Appollonia and Reich, “anti-immigrant propaganda, which conflates ‘terrorists’ with ‘foreigners’ has been fueled by all the consequences of failed integration. These consequences include unemployment and ‘*insecurite*’ (a French word signifying the combination of vandalism, delinquency, and hate crimes arising from immigrant enclaves) (d’Appollonia and Reich 2008: 227).” Recent research shows that there has been more growth in xenophobic attitudes and incidents. It is reported that Islamic communities have become the target of growing hostility: “a greater sense of fear among the general population has exacerbated already existing prejudices and fueled acts of aggression and harassment in many European member states (d’Appollonia and Reich 2008: 227).”

Further undermining personal security is the evidence that among the top ten countries in the world that provide foreign fighters to ISIS as a percentage of their domestic Islamic populations, seven of them are in Europe (Benmelech and Klor 2016,

Table 5). Additionally, Bustikova's analysis demonstrates that the rise of electoral success of right-wing parties in Europe greatly derives from capitalizing on citizen fears that accommodating minorities (and immigrants) will leave their concerns and issues behind in importance (Bustikova 2014). Right-wing politicians can exploit these perceptions, fanning the flames of personal insecurity.

The redefinition of immigration as a security question is embedded in a wider political process in which immigrants and asylum seekers are portrayed as people who generate a challenge to national identity, the provision on welfare benefits, and personal security. To summarize, existing research suggests a host of individual-level and macro-level factors that are associated with attitudes toward immigrants and personal security. I anticipate that more individuals will find personal security to be more important as more migrants enter EU member states. I include control variables in this analysis to make my test of the effects of immigration on opinions as unambiguous as possible. Following the logic, I use four databases; Eurostat, Frontex, Eurobarometer, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to develop five sub-hypotheses:

Sub-hypothesis 1: *The higher the number of immigrants entering the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security is in the member state.*

Sub-hypothesis 2: *The higher the unemployment rate is in the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state.*

Sub-hypothesis 3: *The higher the popularity of the government in the member state, the higher the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state.*

Sub-hypothesis 4: *The higher the crime rate in the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state.*

Sub-hypothesis 5: *The higher the number of terrorist attempts in the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state.*

EMPRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA

I test the sub-hypotheses that I have laid out above using two multivariate models that seek to explain variation in personal security across EU countries. The two conceptual models are below:

Model 1: Personal Security 2012 = f (Asylum 2010, Unemployment 2012, Democracy 2012, Intentional Homicide 2010, Terrorist Attempts 2009-2014)

Model 2: Personal Security 2015 = f (Asylum 2012, Unemployment 2014, Democracy 2012, Intentional Homicide 2012, Terrorist Attempts 2009-2014)

The Eurobarometer survey serves as my main data source for measuring European attitudes towards the importance of personal security. Personal security serves as my dependent variable. Specific personal security questions in the 2012 and 2015 Special Eurobarometer surveys (number 380 and number 432, respectively) permit analyses of European opinion, as well as a rough assessment of trends in responses over time. My operational definition for personal security is a personal belief that the city, town or village the respondent lives in is a secure place. I measure attitudes toward personal security by responses to the following question:

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about public security? Your city\ town\ village is a secure place to live in.”

This question allows the respondents to have a position on how secure their city/town/village is to live in. Respondents indicating that they “totally agree” believe their city/town/village is a secure place to live in, while those choosing “totally disagree” believe their city/town/village is a dangerous place to live in.




Figure 2 Personal Security in Major Immigrant-Receiving Countries: Percent “Totally Agree” and “Agree” (Source: Eurostat)

Figure 2 shows general trends in perceptions of personal security in Italy, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, four major immigrant destinations. Decreases in personal security scores indicate increased feelings of insecurity, so France, Germany and Italy have increased insecurity. Only the United Kingdom has greater feelings of security. This might be due to more restrictive immigration policies in the UK, for example having to show a passport in order to enter the country. Relatively, Italy’s overall low levels of personal security could be attributable to its geographic vulnerability. It receives the most immigrants from North Africa along the Mediterranean Sea coast.

Turning to operational definitions of my independent variables, my main operational definition for the number of new immigrants per year comes from the Eurostat database. They define asylum as a form of international protection given by a state on its territory. It is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his / her country of citizenship and / or residence, in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. My supplemental operational definition comes from the 11/2014, 05/2015, and

11/2015 Eurobarometers. I measure attitudes toward immigrants from outside the EU by responses to the following question:

“Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of People from outside the EU.”

This question prompts respondents to take a position on their feelings toward immigration of people from outside the EU. Respondents indicating that immigration from outside the EU is “very positive” are pro-immigrants, while those selecting “very negative” are considered anti-immigrant.




Figure 3 Perceptions of Immigration of people from outside the EU (Source: Eurostat)

Figure 3 illustrates the heightened negativity of immigrants outside the EU. The mean negative score jumps up eight points over the period of November 2014 to November 2015, while the mean positive remains flat and consistent. This means that EU citizens are feeling more and more negatively toward immigrants from outside the EU. This could further drive up scores on insecurity.

My main operational definition for the unemployment rate comes from the 2010 to 2014 Eurostat database. They define unemployment rate “as a percentage of unemployed persons of the labor force based on International Labor Office (ILO) definition. The labor force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who are without work during the reference week, are available to start work within the next two weeks, and have been actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three months.”

My main operational definition for popularity of the government comes from the 11/2012 to 05/2015 Eurobarometer database. I chose popularity of the government to be my independent variable as opposed to a dependent variable because governments that are perceived by citizens to have stable, transparent and functioning democratic institutions will be more responsive to personal security concerns on the part of the citizenry than those governments that do not have stable and functioning democratic institutions. I measure attitudes toward the popularity of the government by responses to the following question:

“On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?”

This question prompts respondents to take a position on their feelings toward the way democracy works in their country. Respondents indicating that they are “very satisfied” with the way democracy works in their country, are pleased with the performance of their government officials. Respondents selecting “not at all satisfied” are completely dissatisfied with the government’s performance.

My main operational definition for crime rate comes from the Eurostat database which includes categories such as intentional homicide, assault, sexual violence, rape, sexual assault, and theft. Eurostat defines intentional homicide as “an unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person. Data on intentional homicide also includes serious assault leading to death and death as a result of a terrorist attack. It excludes attempted homicide, manslaughter, death due to legal intervention, justifiable homicide in self-defense and death due to armed conflict” (Eurostat 2015).

Assault is defined as a “physical attack against the body of another person resulting in serious bodily injury, it excludes indecent/sexual assault threats and slapping/punching. ‘Assault’ leading to death should also be excluded.” (Eurostat 2015)

Sexual violence includes both rape and sexual assault. Rape is defined as a

sexual intercourse without valid consent. Offences of statutory rape where the victim is below the age of consent are classified separately as sexual offences against children. Sexual violence rape includes an unwanted sexual act, an attempt to obtain a sexual act, or contact or communication with unwanted sexual attention not amounting to rape. It also includes sexual assault with or without physical contact including drug-facilitated sexual assault, sexual assault committed against a marital partner against her/his will, sexual assault against a helpless person, unwanted groping or fondling, harassment and the threat of a sexual nature (Eurostat 2015).

Theft is defined as a “depriving a person or organization of property without force with the intent to keep it. “Theft” excludes Burglary, housebreaking, Robbery, and Theft of a Motor Vehicle, which are recorded separately” (Eurostat 2015).

My main operational definition for terrorist attempts comes from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In order to consider an

incident for inclusion in the GTD, three aspects must be present; the incident must be intentional, the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, and the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors" (Global Terrorism Database 2016).

DATA ANALYSIS

I estimated the conceptual models reported above using OLS regression modeling techniques from the Stata 13 statistical software program. The results of the model estimations are below.

Table 1 Explaining variation in personal security scores across the EU countries in 2012 and 2015

	Model 1 Dependent Variable: Personal Security 2012	Model 2 Dependent Variable: Personal Security 2015
Asylum 2010	-.000003** (1.70)	
Asylum 2012		-.000002* (1.31)
Unemployment 2012	.25 (.34)	
Unemployment 2014		.36 (.62)
Democracy 2012	.56*** (4.07)	.46*** (2.94)
Intentional Homicide 2010	-.03** (1.40)	-.02 (.96)
Terrorist Attempts 2009-14	-.0003* (1.05)	-.0001 (.55)
Constant	.31*** (2.69)	.30*** (2.57)

R-squared (adjusted)	.43	.21
Standard Error of Estimate	.12	.12
N	26	26

(Figures in parentheses are t-ratios)

*** = significant at .05 level, one-tailed test

** = significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

* = significant at .15 level, one-tailed test

The results in Table 1 strongly confirm sub-hypothesis 1, that higher migration rates have a statistically significant impact on views of personal security in the EU member state, and sub-hypothesis 3, that the higher the popularity of the government in the member state the higher the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state. The results in Table 1 partially confirm sub-hypothesis 4, the higher the crime rate in the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state, and sub-hypothesis 5, the higher the number of terrorist attempts in the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state. The results do not confirm sub-hypothesis 2, the higher the unemployment rate in the member state, the lower the citizen's perception of personal security in the member state. The strongest conclusions that we can make from the analysis are higher migration rates decrease personal security perception while political satisfaction increases personal security perception.

In the process of making these interpretations, we observe that overall the models explain a substantial amount of variation in personal security, controlling for theoretically plausible factors over a half-dozen year time period that was arguably one of the most volatile for human migration in the history of the European Union. A nuance to these findings as well, is that there appears to be a lagged effect of migration rates on

perceptions of personal security, indicating that even more insecurity is likely to be displayed by EU natives after this most recent wave of migration into the EU.

The statistical performance of this model is solid. The independent variables in Model 1, taken together, significantly explain variation in views on personal security in 2012, based on interpreting the F-test result of 4.91 which is significant, $p = .004$. We can thus conclude that the model is a good one to refer to if we wish to explain the range of scores of personal security views in the EU member countries. To be very specific about the explanatory power of the model, the adjusted R-squared statistic tells us that 56 percent of the variation in personal security views is explained by the independent variables, and that 44 percent of the variation is not accounted for by the independent variables. Thus, the model does not comprehensively explain all personal security scores, but it does explain a good amount of the range of those scores across the EU.

For every one percentage point increase in the views of how democratic their country is in May 2012, views on personal security increase by six-tenths of a percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. This is a substantial increase, as values on the independent variable shift by 15-20 points across the EU countries. This indicates that perceptions of how well governmental institutions function play a great role in evaluating one's own security situation.

For every additional person seeking asylum in the EU in 2010, views on personal security decrease by .000003 of a percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. A further interpretation is that for every additional thousand people seeking asylum in the EU in 2010, views on personal security decrease by three-one thousandths of a percentage

point, *ceteris paribus*. This is not a large decline at all substantively speaking, but it is statistically significant in that impact, so the decline is real.

For every one percentage point increase in intentional homicides in 2010, views on personal security decrease by three-one hundredths of a percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. To give this finding perspective, it would take a ten percentage point increase in intentional homicides in the EU member country to lower personal security scores by three-tenths of a percent. EU citizens do take into account crime rates in assessing their personal security, albeit in a rather small amount, substantively speaking.

Finally, in terms of the technical performance of Model 1, it does not suffer from significant heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan chi-square test = .02, $p = .90$). It also does not suffer from multicollinearity (average VIF = 1.61, below the critical VIF value of 5). These indicators allow us to believe that these significant and substantive results are secure from common regression estimation pitfalls.

Overall, Model 2 is weaker than Model 1. Model 2's independent variables, taken together, do not significantly explain variation in views on personal security in 2015. The F-test result of 2.31 is not significant, $p = .08$. The adjusted R-squared value is .37, meaning that 37 percent of the variation in personal security views is explained by the independent variables. This is less than two-thirds of the variation explained in the 2012 measurement of personal security. We are thus left to conclude that by 2015, our model has degraded in its ability to explain the range of personal security scores.

For every one percentage point increase in the views of how democratic their country is in May 2012, views on personal security increase by one-half of a percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. As in Model 1, the respondents captured in Model 2 are heavily

reliant on how governmental institutions are performing in their country in order to feel secure on a personal level. The substantive jump is quite high in EU citizens' personal security with that percentage point increase in evaluating how democratic their country is.

For every additional person seeking asylum in the EU in 2012, views on personal security decrease by .000002 of a percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. A further interpretation is that for every additional thousand people seeking asylum in the EU in 2012, views on personal security decrease by three-one thousandths of a percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. As in Model 1, this result is not substantively overwhelming, but is indicative of a real consideration for personal security by EU citizens based on migration patterns into the EU.

As with Model 1 from a technical standpoint, we can safely conclude that the model does not suffer from significant heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan chi-square test = .00, $p = .99$). Model 2 also does not suffer from multicollinearity (average VIF = 1.51, below the critical VIF value of 5). Thus, the results of the model estimation are not biased to any significant extent by common issues with regression analysis.

When comparing the results for my 2012 personal security dependent variable to the 2015 personal security dependent variable, I find that the model weakens in its R-square statistics for 2015, and that the t-ratios are also smaller in 2015 as opposed to 2012. This could mean that the 2015 dependent variable has not changed a lot compared to the 2012 dependent variable, while the numbers of migrants increased dramatically in 2015. It could also be that the dependent variable is a lagging indicator, meaning that public opinion may be changing more slowly than we imagine to the migrant situation.

CONCLUSION

We live in an era where human mobility is taken for granted, but what many of us don't know is the fact that there are "over 244 million international migrants worldwide who are searching for economic opportunity, peace and security" (GMDAC 2016). There are well-known advantages to both countries that send migrants and to those that receive them. The countries that send migrants send their talent away, but do receive compensation in the form of (often considerable) remittance payments from their migrants. The countries that receive migrants, of course, employ those migrants and grow their economies while plugging labor gaps in their national economies (GMDAC 2016).

Despite all the positive benefits migration brings to member states, immigration is still frowned upon, especially in the EU, as countries such as Hungary go to extreme lengths to manage it with razor wire fencing at the borders (Baker 2016). Undeniably, discussions about the relationship between immigration and security are heated if countries resort to razor wire to address the controversy. This project explores the relationships between migration across time and changes in perceptions in personal security, with focus on the question of impacts of migration patterns on the perception of personal security in the European Union. Five factors were in focus: The number of immigrants entering each member state, unemployment in the member state, popularity of the government in the member state, crime in the member state, and the frequency of terrorist attacks in the given member state.

I tested two multivariate models of 28 member states during the period from 2009 to 2014. These models show evidence that, *ceteris paribus*, citizen's concern with their own personal security increases in countries with high numbers of migrants. This finding suggests that there needs to be more tightened immigration policies in order for citizens to feel safe in their home state. The EU will not gain any benefit from a political climate where migrants are mainly perceived as a security threat. Policy makers as well as media therefore have to treat migration in a responsible manner. Influencing or changing public perception is a difficult task as people take up information selectively based on preferences and opinions they already hold. However, the urgency for better managed migration requires a serious attempt at improving perceptions of migration and personal security (Canoy et al. 2006: 32).

My findings suggest that the current immigration and security policies rest on shaky assumptions. EU countries increasingly lack democratic accountability, judicial legitimacy and are largely ineffective in bringing about a Union closer to its citizens (Munster 2009: 141). Munster points out that "continuous articulations of insecurity may eventually undermine the legitimacy of the EU as a credible political actor, as articulations of insecurity risk being interpreted as the incapacity of the EU to manage these issues effectively (Munster 2009: 125)." The migration crisis has not been caused by the refugees but rather by the EU's response to the influx. The problem is not solely that of the EU, the European Parliament or the European Commission to solve; it is up to the member states themselves to propose solutions. My findings reinforce the idea that Europe is facing a most difficult challenge in balancing the potential of economic growth

with the perceived threats to personal security and that the EU needs to pay heed to domestic public opinion as it seeks continent-wide solutions to the migration crisis.

There is a need for a comprehensive global approach to help mitigate the migration crisis. As in the past, it is in the interest of today's Europe to be open for trade and for investments, and equally open for people. Europe competes with the rest of the world to hold and attract creative talent. For Europe to become an attractive place migration needs to be properly managed and migration policies require broad citizen assent. This will only become possible if genuine problems associated with migration can be tackled and negative public perceptions addressed. Public perceptions can be influenced directly in a variety of ways. I propose multiple approaches that will help improve perceptions of migration and personal security:

1. A first step to counterbalance unfavorable perceptions of migrants is by giving migrants a "human face". By showing real life stories of asylum seekers, job seeking migrants or the trafficking of women on mass media and otherwise, public perception on migration has proved to be able to advance. Personal contacts with migrants and asylum seekers lead to a more favorable attitude. Policy makers, NGO's and other organizations can organize this.
2. A second step to counterbalance unfavorable perceptions could be that the European Commission can work directly with European or national migrant and Muslim representatives and organizations to help develop a more positive public image for their constituencies and bolster effective integration.
3. A third step could be to put in place effective temporary refugee communities that include all basic services such as hospitals, schools, and shelters. In these

communities immigrants will learn the language, culture, and rules of the host country which will help relieve the feeling of unease by locals. EU countries need to be cautious in not making these communities permanent.

With these recommendations I believe that European societies can better address the migration issue and enhance people's feelings of personal security. Without adequately addressing the migration issue tragedies such as that of the Kurdi family sadly are likely to be repeated and the European public may repeat the Brexit vote in numerous countries. Nothing short of the fate of the European Union is at stake.

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