

DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: FRAGMENTS FROM THE PAST FOR
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATION STUDIES

by

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DEDICATION

To my family.

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ABSTRACT

The book *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is relevant to the study of communication in society. Originally written in the 1940s, its twenty-first century reissue is re-edited and newly translated with the subtitle “Philosophical Fragments.” The book is explored in the thesis as a contribution to a reinterpretation of the study of communication in society. As a defining work of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, it shows that reason guides practice and the culture of the social world through distorted, illusionary operations, operations that are reductive, instrumental practices supported by conceptions of them. Reason-in-practice is an instrumental logic inherited from the Enlightenment, a logic taken for granted. The critique of this logic requires explorations of Hegel and Marx, as the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* shows. The critique describes the economic entrapment that restricts freedom through the culture industry that aligns with capitalism to promote consumerism and endless sameness. The culture industry encourages economic distortions with instrumentalizing forms of entertainment, promising something new while endlessly cheating the consumer of the capitalist promise of a better life. The notions of instrumentalism described in *Dialectic* were seen as permeating all social institutions, including the academy. Scholarship as a result obeys expectations of endless production, producing research economically manipulated for the capitalist expressed through instrumental demands and practices. Businesses that would benefit from “results” produce, then a culture industry that benefits capitalism in the form of research “results” that only appear on the surface to be separate from direct economic rewards. Unreflective

scholarship is especially unaware of this role of legitimizing capitalism through support of the dominant culture. Even “critical research” succumbs to this by avoiding emancipatory impulses against control and regulation that occur in the name of capitalist progress.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer is an important artifact in communication scholarship. Originally published in German as witness to the barbarity of WWII (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944/1947) and reissued in 1969 (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1969), *Dialectic* saw its first English translation in 1989 (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1989). An entirely new translation appeared in 2002 (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002), and is the source emphasized throughout this thesis. This thesis takes selected themes in one of the most important books in the history of Critical Theory,¹ to provide in Chapter 2 a critique of instrumental reason, of the culture industry, and of communication scholarship. Those themes are then extended in Chapter 3 to the study of the social, where connections to communication scholarship are reconsidered in light of the renewed interest in and relevance of *Dialectic*.

The book itself serves as a historical analysis, to explain the limits of Western reason as the limits of the Enlightenment. One key restriction, the authors argued, was that the Enlightenment privileged the material reality over thought. Yet the true value of the *Dialectic* lies in its ideas, ideas which, for this thesis, serve as a source of legitimacy for the claims ahead. Specifically, those claims are that capitalism is totalitarian, that its

¹ “Critical Theory” is capitalized throughout the text as it applies in particular to the Frankfurt School of thought.

impulses are leaking into the pores of the social, from works of the institutions, to the values of society, through overarching impulses of instrumental logic. The authors highlight the instrumentalizing of the Western world through their analysis and critique of culture. They offer a critique of instrumental logic that, this thesis contends, applies to the realm of communication scholarship in particular, social sciences in general. Thus this project takes the form of a critique of instrumental reason. Properly understood, that critique is about a logic that drives and reflects capitalism. *Dialectic* was one of the essential pieces by the Frankfurt School scholars, who engaged a historically grounded critique of culture by use of dialectics and antagonistic logic as primary ways of analysis in Critical Theory. The goal of this thesis is to continue a discussion on the importance of theory, and dialectics as a guide to understanding society. The critique ahead also strives for a reconceptualization of communication as an idea that guides scholarship. The goal is to expose the functional role often assigned to communication, as scholarly research that produces arbitrary methods that legitimize research practices suiting capitalism. This project calls for break from such legitimation practices, expressed in instrumental ways that *Dialectic* would have the field rethink. That rethinking entails some important philosophical concepts and orientations in the field, which *Dialectic* urges awareness of ways of scholarship that lose themselves in the pervasive ways of capitalism.

The pervasive ways of capitalism are, Marx and Engels (1848) explained, impacting multiple levels of social structure, from institutions to individuals. The change is constant, never settles, is destructive but perpetuated for the continuation of production:

Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. (p. 16)

The processes of continuous integration are never concluded. Capitalism “must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish everywhere,” which describes destruction as the requirement to keep on explaining markets (Hobsbawm, 1998, p. 39). For its success, the perpetuation of capitalist forms is endless. But they do not end in the realm of economics. They spread through social sphere, normalized institutionally and ideologically. This means that capitalism also “nestles” in communicative experience. Reflecting on the destructive effects of capitalism after World War I, associates of the Frankfurt School saw that the deformation of human practice could hardly be overestimated (Honneth & Ingram, 2009, p. 55). Benjamin and Adorno agreed that “the social and historical world of modernity” became a “space frozen in “second nature,” where human relationships had lost their transparent meaning, mediated by practical reasons, since the very experience of nature had been transformed” (Honneth & Ingram, 2009, p. 56). More important in the transformation of nature was the guiding logic whose principles changed the ways in which the world was conceptualized. The Enlightenment was a turning point, from myths and fantasy, to man-made knowledge (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 1). While the jump seemed to deliver a more reliable way to reduce uncertainty through scientific method, regressive tendencies against the Enlightenment also were reflected in new mythologies and ideologies that would encourage hegemonic

relations under the advanced forms of capitalism. The more "developed" the world had become, the more instrumental its ways became, through the accumulations of wealth, and the instrumental-technological understandings supported, in what became a knowledge industry.

Power before the Enlightenment was conceptualized in mythology. The theme of domination in mythology contrasted with the modern relation of oppressor and the oppressed in labor. "Labor" was not only limited to the relationships that existed among people, but also to the ways in which people conducted their lives. Even the slightest fractions of historical trends show that productive impulses parallel human repression in conceptual and administrative ways, for purposes of maintaining the social order. "The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 28). When mythology lost its value to the scientific reason that was born in the Enlightenment, the traditions of emancipation started to reproduce in other forms.

The theme of oppression from mythology migrated to instrumental reason and methods and as such serves as an interesting discussion for scholarship of the social and the economic. Labor in educational institutions becomes another medium for reproduction of dominant forms of reason, where the faculty as a labor force becomes a discussion for Marx (Postone, 2005, p. 71). Traditional theory that subscribes to scientific methods treats knowledge as part of capitalist production, where "knowledge production" turns knowledge into a commodity. This reflects unreflective impulses that serve domination. Unreflective doing perpetuates the schema of the existing structure based on material reality, dismissing thought and reason as contemplated by Hegel and Marx, which was later expanded on by the Frankfurt School. The contrast between science and

thought that Hegel established was also about the separation of the material from the idea.

The thesis explores what the separation of material and idea means, for the culture industry, scholarship, labor, and, most importantly, humanity. One of the main philosophical sources in this range for Critical Theory came from Hegel, who critically reviewed the old Greek philosophy of reason by historicizing it. In addition, Hegel explained that one capable of reason is also caught in a subject-object dichotomy. As Marcuse (1999, p. 9) interprets Hegel, for one to be capable of subjective thought, a prior "realization" of the subject's position is part of the human ability to reason. Knowledge depends on self-realization. With self-realization, then, comprehension of knowledge includes one's place in its production and oppression (Marcuse, 1999, p. 9). In an ideal situation, Hegel's assumption of reason in the history of human experience "presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities" (Marcuse, 1999, p. 9).

Reality includes potential, then, according to Hegel, who found truth and knowledge joined in the historical development of the French Revolution. Hegel asserted that "thought ought to govern reality" (Marcuse, 1999, p. 6). Failure to incorporate the role of reason in freedom meant unrealized human potential to achieve freedom in reality (Marcuse, 1999, p. 9). According to Hegel, freedom that presupposes reason, and the realization of freedom, gives existence to the subject (p. 9). The investigation of knowledge thus lies in the relationship between the subject and object in light of emancipatory potentials.

Marcuse (1999) explained that reason is also a historical force (p. 10). In Greek philosophy, reason derived to solidified truths in material form was not enough. Only when Hegel expanded beyond the comprehension of reason through dialectical analysis did the Frankfurt scholars have a way to uncover ideas about the world in affirmative connections with the Enlightenment period. The period that illuminated men before nature, also embraced a position that assumes world as an entity of broken parts. Theory that guided practice before was now replaced with the methods as primary source of reason.

Through the incorporation of scientific methods, humans became masters of the world. Such processes, prone to reduction, turned ideas into facts. Hierarchy of knowledge nurtured a submissive position to facts. Examining the history of thought revealed that some forms of knowledge were promoted over others. Those prevailing trapped the human subject in contradictions with both nature and the social community. The disconnection among human beings caused by the individualistic interests above those of the community resulted in an alienated individualistically oriented social world (Marcuse, 1999, p. 34-35). The concept of an individual detached from the community comes as a reflection of an individualistically oriented environment. The analysis posed by Hardt (2010) of the recent state of communication falls in contrast to Hegel's concept of a free individual that strives for the betterment of the community. This new world, grounded in laws over possession, distanced thought about inner needs by emphasizing external material factors, which are also trapped in such laws (Marcuse, 1999, p. 34). Historical analysis, as Hardt (1992) described in the example of an individual, turned communication research in search for evidence, with focus on scientific knowledge and

social progress (p. 5). The dismissal of dialectics and search for evidence lessened the historical consciousness at large (Hardt, 1992, p. 5). Contradictory nature or negative philosophy of studied objects became true reason in Hegelian philosophy. Concepts developed by Hegel that were based in the ideas of freedom, subject, mind, and notion were a great influence on the first generation Frankfurt School critical theorists (Marcuse, 1999, p. 5). Adorno and Horkheimer applied an antagonistic method of investigation, also known as dialectics, to reveal how modern thought is still entrapped in the bounds of the Enlightenment.

The perpetuation of the Enlightenment is reflected in highly reductive orientations studying the social world. The focus instead of the big picture is reduced into fragments. The narrow frame changed the perception of the world in reductionist terms. The human ability to make claims derived from methodological procedures changed the perception of what knowledge meant. In Hegelian terms, philosophical thinking and history deal with reason alone (Marcuse, 1999, p. 5). The problematic of reason lies in the bind between ideas and material reality. For the human, as Hegel explained, freedom meant a constant struggle of thought breaking away from the material.

In opposition to Hegel's assumptions, the Enlightenment treated the material world as explanation for reason, limited in its methods (Marcuse, 1999, p. 26). The ideas, rather than serving to guide practice, are dismissed by the instrumental logic (Marcuse, 1999, p. 26). Material reality reduced in such a way, did not manifest because of applied reason. In contrast to reductive methods of instrumental logic, dialectics opened up ways to integrate multiple venues of explanation that in relation to historical analysis lead to enriched understandings of society. Through an incorporation of deductive or negative

reason advocated by Hegel, truth claims transform into a continuous theoretical formation. The social reality therefore and claims to truth always lie in history. Although Hegel argued that modern society is trapped in false reasons of material, which Marx later expanded on as the grounds of economic necessity, the reason can find its way through forms of dialectical logic (Marcuse, 1999, p. 93).

The process of inquiry in mathematics or positivism for social scholarship was guided by capitalistic forces of production and practicality, not merely for methodological assessment. Forces of capitalism are thus always organizing for the integration of multiple disconnected fragments into a universal whole by the merit of productive totality. Communication scholarship could not escape such operationalization. Forms of social science research unaware of reproduction of capitalism took on the reductive and instrumental approaches to assume claims trapped in the reason of the Enlightenment. In effort to abolish myths, Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) explained, the Enlightenment tangled a new web of myths that followed the procedures of instrumental reason. Methods that became reinforced through life, work, and in much scholarship, became ways of legitimization.

The process of instrumental legitimization has as a general mode of scientific and social arrangement became taken for granted. Rather reinforced than critically assessed, capitalism as a subject of investigation in research and scholarship remained a distant object of study. Because its premise is commodity and commodity is in tight relationships with material production, the entwinement of scholarship with capitalism is inherently taken for granted in modern culture and scholarship. As an overarching system of cause and effect, capitalism guides social scholarship, but is dismissed in research with charges

of over-generalization or too-broad a focus of study. The limits of instrumental logic support that dismissal, and fail to overview the complexity of the whole, which *Dialectic* aimed to accomplish. As a result, capitalism is studied in fragments without an overarching assessment of the individual parts. The subtle impact of reductionist logic perpetuates the continuous illusion of the system, over a multitude of venues in the level of ideas, as well as through the social structure.

The break from the investigation of the whole causes objects of study to be analyzed individually. It supports moves in scholarship from a wide to a narrow spectrum, and consequently fails to make distinct connections among inter-related arenas of the social structure and of life experiences. As Ollman (2001) explained, failure to see the big picture results in findings that fail to reconcile causes and effects into a sensible whole. Studies done with methodological procedures in social sciences do not investigate historical and social, but rather assume psychological truths of contemporary human behavior, thus research already stands on pre-established assumptions that deal with individuals instead of the social and favor the present over the past. The individual is separated from the social with the help of a reductive logic separated from a theory of society, with scholarship oriented to productive values that satisfy the objectives of capitalism: individuals over community, methodology over theory.

To take a step further, this thesis explores the extension of capitalism as a form of instrumental logic in communication scholarship. Instrumental logic does not perform reflexivity, but rather focuses on production. Instrumental logic that causes distance between thought and action fails to focus on questions of humanity. Instead, the important issues are related to terms of social production in markets, newness,

improvement, and change. Capitalism fails to speak of missed opportunities for the betterment of the humankind, but rather advocates for the betterment of the existing social processes without an actual reflection or concern for change. Communication research is focused on change in technical adjustments of human behavior or administrative practice. Possibilities for critique of the systemic issues are suppressed and avoided by integration to the norm. Capitalism advocates for improvement and newness and does not allow for changes that would cause jeopardy to the economic structure. Adorno, Horkheimer, and other members of the Frankfurt School argued that the preconditions for development of dehumanizing social structure are always in relation to control and power. People in the economic processes become a commodity.

The problem of instrumental approaches is that they are working in and for the realm of the existing socio-economic structure. The start of material, cookie cutter mechanization, and a need for unification developed in the industrial era. The industrial revolution presented another component to an already confused social identity. Issues of private and public interests started meshing due to a stake in economically influenced structure. "The attempt to relieve the public sphere of the intrusion of private interests failed as soon as the conditions under which the privatization of interests was to be accomplished were themselves drawn into the conflict of organized interests" (Habermas, 1991, p. 145). As soon as the social action against authority showed any signs of prosperity, it was shut down through exchange of private societal power for political power (Habermas, 1991, p. 220). Habermas (1991) saw bourgeois power against the state as an achievement that turned toward domination of the people in the emerging industrial capitalism of the late nineteenth century. Today, concepts born of capitalism connected to

"the conservative strata of a high bourgeoisie in many ways intimately involved with privilege," and "refeudalized public" are increasingly subject to existing capitalist power relations that are the source of political decision-making (Habermas, 1991). In capitalism, communication is systematically oppressed and democracy through the processes of distortion, disabled. For Hegel, instrumental logic trumps the rational forms of reason that carry with the potential for social transformation. The same reductive reason in Marxist terms of labor trumps realization of freedom through the restraints of the material. Transformation of the public consequentially had blurred the lines between the private and the social spheres (Habermas, 1991, p. 181). Capitalism extended the unified principles of instrumentality to social institutions, from education to labor organization, in the name of change and progress.

The failure to recognize instrumentalization in relation to the Enlightenment is the failure to recognize the capitalist principle that reproduces endless sameness. Scholarship about the social is in part responsible for maintenance of the instrumental reason. Ever more instructive and fragmented scholarship branches to the study in communication, joining a production line approach to education.

Scholarship should challenge assumptions of the norm, which would mean to doubt, reassess, rethink, and not simply conform to the taken for granted. Those are the guiding principles of Critical Theory derived from long-standing philosophical deliberations from Kant, Hegel to Marx. The process of dialectics incorporates engagement of what Hegel named negative philosophy, which through negation, delivers the true fragments of reality.

Capitalism has leaked into all pores of society. A philosophical assumption of Critical Theory is that there are undeniable connections of forces that confine society. Capitalism works because of the functional operations that protect its interests and nourishment it receives from the culture industry. Culture as a counter weight to the formal system of maintenance implicitly takes on a nurturing role as an economic foil. The nurturing role of culture detaches focus from emancipatory possibilities in the system of labor, replacing emancipation with the false comfort that consumerism promises.

Culture expanded the forms of legitimization born out of the Enlightenment to operational methods that, Horkheimer and Adorno explained, became slave to instrumental rationality. The totality of instrumental logic of capitalism spread to the realm of art. Different forms of art that used to challenge the dominant norms were reduced to forms by the processes of classification (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002). Although Adorno had hope for art as the venue of freedom from human emancipation, his analysis in *Dialectic* derived to an opposite conclusion. Art became a slave of the system. Art as a form of genuine expression that once carried the potential for human liberation became servant to the norm.

Aspirations of capitalism that had transparent goals in economic terms became stronger and yet subtler in the culture industry. Adorno in his various works on critique of culture wrote about the mystifying function of the culture industry (Jay, 1991, p. 114).² To Adorno, "mystifying" meant an offer the culture industry could not keep, the promise

² Jay's references from 1991 are translated to fit the context from the book *Adorno* from Slovenian back to English.

of pleasure and fun (Jay, 1991, p. 114). In order to keep the capitalistic threshold intact, the culture industry provided with entertainment, which served as reinforcement of the ideas of the dominant. The demand for eternal pleasure became an illusion that trapped the consumer to buy into the norm. As with other economic products that disguise what they deliver, according to Hegel false reality and according to Marx economic dependency, the culture industry is wrapped in a veil of false consciousness (Jay, 1991, p. 114). Products of the culture industry guide the consumers to reinforce the reality through prescribed models of behavior. In artificially produced reality, the media act as an instrument of control and surveillance.

Products of the culture industry are not material. Their real value is connected to other venues that are economically stimulating (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 96). The true beneficiaries of the system are those with economic stakes to realize profit. To keep the existing structure afloat, alternative ways of insurance were set to keep the structure secure.

In discussing Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, Marcuse incorporates Hegel and Marx, whose philosophies were major influences on the Frankfurt School. It is their questions about logic, reason, and the nature of being that helped guide the questioning of humanity, freedom, and emancipatory impulses in the society.

CHAPTER 2: SELECTED THEMES IN *DIALECTIC*

For the discussion of how *Dialectic* is still applicable today, a few particular themes are important for reconsideration. The *Dialectic* is placed in the period of the European desperation during the World War II. Although, the war was not a primary influence on the publishing of the book, the ongoing changes in the world had an important impact on the content that carried explanations for emancipatory powers that arose. The piece is multi-faceted. First, the analysis of historical trend in the *Dialectic* addressed large problems in logic that prevailed in the social world, and exposed the processes under which truths were derived to as unprecedented forms of reality. Second, the analyses explained claims of knowledge are highly dependent on methods that count as legitimate, and those methods are a consequence of a certain type of logic. Third, the combination of the two factors above explain that the culture evolved and embraced a particular type of legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Western contemporary world, Adorno and Horkheimer claimed, is trapped in the limits of the Enlightenment.

Important themes that stand out in the *Dialectic* deal with epistemology, or what counts as knowledge, and how, in dialectical terms, knowledge transforms the historical analysis of culture. A major theme is the capitalistic unrest represented by the history of the culture industry in modernity. The culture industry presents the totality of instrumentalized conceptions of the social, and at the same time exposes the entrapment of the social in the instrumentalizing demands of the Enlightenment.

The critique of culture includes interests in identity, subjectivity, asceticism, bourgeois rationalism, and individual morality, each the result of practical reason that Critical Theory emphasized but which were left behind in increasingly applied, “practical” scholarship (Jay, 1973, p. 51- 52).

The analysis and critique of culture however did not originate from the social investigations of the Frankfurt School. Major theoretical and philosophical concepts that Frankfurt scholars applied in Critical Theory were based on philosophies of great names in history. Critical Theory emerged from sequences of critiques of thinkers and philosophical traditions expressed through continuous conversations guided by dialectical method as analysis of social phenomena (Jay, 1973, p. 41). Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse revived long-standing debates in philosophy from Kant, Hegel to Marx, which resulted in the establishment of the Frankfurt School. The major influence on Critical Theory grew out of joined Hegelian philosophy and Marxist theory. Hegel drew on old Greek philosophical concepts of logic, being, and political discourse. Later on Marx, a student of Hegel built on the existing ideas with emphasis on changes in social relationships and communication reshaped by the economic impulses. The difference between the two was in the form of dialectics that shaped their assumptions about the world. Hegel’s emphasis was on reason shaping world history, whereas Marx emphasized a material dialectics, where ideal reason was “nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought” (Marx, 1887, p. 14).³ Their method was opposite, but for Critical Theory turned important as it contemplated

³ *Capital* - Vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition (1873).

the way in which people think as the guide to reality, as well as presented a challenge to the material that derives from dialectical tensions. The dialectic method became a process of analysis by which the contradictions in nature of the obvious were understood beyond the material. Dialectical method as conceived by Hegel was an extension of Greek's concept of reductive logic that extended only to the material world. The addition of historical analysis in dialectics posed a challenge for critical theorists to integrate philosophy and social analysis in order to explore the possibilities of social transformation through human praxis (Jay, 1973, p. 42). Adorno claimed dialectics was "the attempt to see the new in the old instead of simply the old in the new" (Jay, 1973, p. 69). It was the process of dispelling illusions, Adorno explained, that assigned incredible power of human control over nature, which changed the relationship between subject and object for humanity and social well-being (Jay, 1991).

On Subject and Object

Scholarship engaged in the practice of reducing claims to truth was engaged in the dominant, capitalistically guided society. Following the capitalistic promise of progress, scholarship remained closely related to instrumental, methodological ways that through the "scientific" conduct of research became prevalent to make claims about the world. Positivism supported the orientation, which only accounted for instrumental ways of interpreting, ways that do not account for the material reality of the past. As dismissive of everything beyond the empirical, concerned with pure knowledge through mathematical conduct, positivistic perspective aligned in clear opposition to Critical Theory. Continuous were the efforts of positivism, to reconcile subjectivism and objectivism in unattached brackets, which changed the ways of communication research. Examining the

social and individual broken into two separate, disconnected inquiries Hegel and Adorno claimed, was an impossible, misleading task (Jay, 1991, p. 59). As did many critical Frankfurt School scholars, Adorno also criticized the assumptions of positivism, which argued for constitutive creation of the social world as the “second nature,” nature for the social world on the model of the natural sciences. Critical Theory dismissed such notions and held dialectics as the logic to reveal truth in arising social tensions. As such, Critical Theory stood for diversification of the fields, and dialectical logic as the way to see their connections on a larger scale (Jay, 1973, p. 55).

The legacy of the Enlightenment to separate reason into mathematical method and philosophy was at the core of Hegel and later Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of knowledge (Marcuse, 1999, p. 144). The compulsion to organize for self-preservation, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) explained, is a turn against nature in a form of society’s control over it (p. 149). The formation of knowledge according to a particular organization into brackets is the structure of science. For Horkheimer and Adorno, such formation of knowledge presented a clear case of instrumentality as it degraded the whole into tautology. “Science is repetition, refined to observed regularity and preserved in stereotypes” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 149). Mathematics employs quantitative methods to derive results that, Hegel explained, quantify external characteristics of being and, consequently, lose being itself (Marcuse, 1999, p. 144). Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) similarly argued that the “mathematical formula is consciously manipulated regression” to the pre-Enlightenment, when “magic ritual was...the most sublimated form of mimicry” (p. 149). Quantitative methods, however, did not remain limited to mathematics. An extension of the Enlightenment, reinforced through capitalism,

established methodological procedures as methods of legitimization that extended into different branches of social sciences.

Positivism that some considered grew on the principles of the “Evil Empire,” for others counted as “hallmarks of good science” (Anderson, 1996, p. 65). Although the reason of positivism was in historical analyses used for deprivation of humanity, the latter *good* image of positivism is still pushed forth in the contemporary investigations of the society. Critical Theorists remain in opposition to Comte’s philosophy that argues for separation of theoretical statements from observational (Anderson, 1996, p. 65). Yet again, the separation between the theory and observation claims impossible divorce between subject and object. In a sense, Hegelian philosophy assumed correlation among the subjects and objects coinciding in reality. Many, still to this day, claim to separate the two. In the realm of social sciences, such separation applies to object of analysis and the subject that executes the study. The process of forming notions of dialectic, Hegel explained, laid in the movement of history, where subjects become objects in the reproduction of instrumental practices (Marcuse, 1999, p. 158). Reason extracted from the material experience, Critical Theorists claimed was problematic, as positivism transformed reason in operationalized tactic causing distance between reason and practice. Separation of reason and practice through its continuation takes on a role of a ticking bomb, which can easily turn the progress into a failure. In positivism, the assumption is that observation without an assigned theoretical component should stand for a fact of reality through the process of mathematical deduction (Anderson, 1996, p. 65). Based on Hegelian philosophy, such a method to claims of truth is not only illusionary, but also based on a false assumption of reality. Frankfurt School scholars

built on Hegelian philosophy and continued the fight against the prevailing positivist claims to truth. The stakes for the humanity based on prevailing logic in the hands of power are a large gamble if continued without reexamination.

In philosophy, dialectical method is the one that exposes the negative tensions that create reality (Marcuse, 1999, p. 158). The possibilities of explanation of reality then by exploration of the negative tensions are endless. Hegel's assumptions of a continuous investigation of reality influenced the Critical Theory in their philosophical assumptions that were later engaged by the Frankfurt School. Critical Theory looked for claims to truth contained in the society's own claims (Jay, 1973, p. 63). The dialectic reflection works towards the analysis of taken for granted social contradictions. Only by the unconventional ways of engaging reason, beyond the scientific methods, reality of case studies is exposed. "The concept, usually defined as the unity of the features of what it subsumes, was rather, from the first, a product of dialectical thinking, in which each thing is what it is only by becoming what is not" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 11). Truth for Critical Theory derives from a breakdown of what appears to be real. Therefore, reason trapped in methods is turned into instrumental reason that operates in accordance with the forms of production. Critical Theory that did not acknowledge universal Truth claims but rather as Hegel explained, the notion of universality. He claimed that truth is "not the fixed or stable sum-total of abstract characters," but particular differences of the facts joined in universality (Marcuse, 1999, p. 158). In a sense, the true characters of either social world or materiality cannot ever be fully determined or explained in factual terms. Ideas cannot be reduced to facts (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 4). "Dialectical

development is not ‘the external activity of subjective thought,’ but the objective history of reality itself (Marcuse, 1999, p. 158).

Hegel’s philosophy dealt with the relationship between subject and object, particular and the universal, individual and the community. These relationships show fundamental codependency of the oppositions. Those reside in every natural relationship, and are applicable to the social world. The whole is universal by the merit of the particular. As dialectical analysis in capitalism derives to the conclusion that a particular moment entails the content of the whole, a similar notion relates to social scholarship (Marcuse, 1999, p. 159).

Another concept that Hegel took from Greek philosophy was the idea of reason as equal to being (Marcuse, 1999, p. 129). Hegel treated reason and freedom as requirements of true being; in which reality is materialized by the contradictions settled in the idea (Marcuse, 1999, p. 164). Marcuse (1999) explained that cognition is more than mere action or knowledge, it is trapped in the history that is not merely one’s own, but universal (p. 164). As such, Greek philosophy did not suffice for the idea of logic as one that could easily be resolved. “Mankind has become conscious of the world as reason, of the true forms of all that it is capable of realizing” (Marcuse, 1999, p. 164). There is no separation between the system of science and truth, which makes the idea absolute (Marcuse, 1999, p. 164). If, as Marcuse explained, there is no separation between science and the truth, the thoughts are what guide realizations. It is the perfect synchrony of thought and logic that acts to explain the reality. The absolute idea is not attached to the material content as the end result of rationalization, but is throughout present in contemplation as certain logic (Marcuse, 1999, p. 164- 165). In such a way, one cannot

separate themselves from the “results” because even the most instrumental form of logic explains the involvement of a subject in the study and ultimately confirms universality Hegel argued about. “The absolute idea is the true notion of reality and, as such, the highest form of cognition” (Marcuse, 1999, p. 165). The notion that there is no separation between the subject and object, and that objectivity is a historical process, problematizes the attempts of particular focuses in social scholarship that tried to create the separation of subject and object, to make claims of certainty. Only the unsettled idea of dialectical thought can therefore unite the opposites into a harmonious whole (Marcuse, 1999, p. 165). Hegel explained that “the absolute idea is the *subject* in its final form, *thought*” (Marcuse, 1999, p. 165). To Marx (1887), social reality represented the world in which material was reflected in the human mind (p. 14). Consciousness for the Frankfurt School depended on both Hegel and Marx. With Hegelian philosophy, Critical Theory discussed tensions that dealt with power and emancipatory purposes that arose in totalitarian structures, whereas in Marx’s theory, consciousness derived from dialectical tensions in society that varied by the degree of productive power in society. For Marx, social conditions and laws governing them varied alongside productive power (Marx, 1887, p. 14). The Frankfurt school thus joined the two perspectives into a dialectics for Critical Theory. If Critical Theory has a trend, it is to never settle ideas into a structured whole. The argument is that there is always potential for truths arrived to from different angles that bring different paths of logic. Central to investigation and analyses were questions of power and relationships of freedom and emancipation. To transform philosophical ideas into practice, Critical Theory rejected any fixed definitions. Nietzsche was used to argue

that great truth ought to be criticized instead of idolized (Jay, 1973, p. 65). Critical Theory and dialectics, in such regards, are not reserved for any particular articulation.

Hegel argued that thought is what ought to guide reality. Critical Theory that rejected the idea of researcher as autonomous and separate from the social study in opposition to the reductionist impulses never prevailed in the realm of social studies. Pragmatism in turn negated the thought as fully capable of representing the truth, and by creation of the subject – object dichotomy in terms made way to claim objectivity. “Defining means that something objective, no matter what it may be in itself, is subjectively captured by means of fixed concept. Hence the resistance offered to defining subject and object” (Arato & Gebhardt, 1995, p. 498). It is impossible to completely detach a personal human experience from the social and vice versa. Kant explained that terms subject and object have a priority before all definition (Arato & Gebhardt, 1995, p. 498). Objectivity cannot be conceived without a subject and subjectivity without an object (Arato, Gebhardt, 1995, p. 498).

Similar is the experience of social sciences that are entrapped in the idea of method as the “objective” way to engage in research. Thought reduced to methods also reduces human experiences to general functions. Processes of “standardization of the intellectual function through which the mastery of the senses is accomplished” produce a passive reception of undivided opinion, which “implies an impoverishment of thought no less than of experience; the separation of the two realms leaves both damaged” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 28). An argument of Critical Theory and dialectics is that the separation of being and reason is not possible, thus if one tries to engage the

separation of the two, the experience of reality is not genuine. Attempts to distance thought from practice accomplishes the gap for inhumane practice.

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* argue that subjectivity does inherently not exist, because its existence would suggest a world without outer forces shaping one's opinions. However, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) suggest there is subjectivity that exists in socially objective terms. In other words, there is a fraction of subjectivity and objectivity that people engage, but always only in the frame of the pre-existing structure. The subjectivity is thus a replica of many outer impulses that influence the individual. For the Frankfurt scholars, those impulses are mainly enforced by the social nature of capitalistic society.

The human being's mastery of itself, on which the self is founded, practically always involves the annihilation of the subject in whose service that mastery is maintained, because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity, of which the achievements of self-preservation can only be defined as functions- in other words, self-preservation destroys the very thing which is to be preserved (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 43)

The destruction of subject means that in order for the structure or objectivism to exist, the subject has to be obliterated. The subject object discussion extended to the emancipating forces of power and instrumental logic of the system became the core interest of the Frankfurt School.

The analysis of culture and its totality, which became the project of the Frankfurt School, reached its true potential once Hegel and Marx were considered together. As Hegel focused on logic and humanity, Marx extended the theory in relation with the, at

the time, expending industrial revolution and the relationships of economic dependency it created. Marcuse (1999) tied dialectics and totality by placing Marx's concepts of capitalism next to Hegel's notions of logic (p. 158). Both of them rejected simplified ideas of reality. Hegel and Marx did not prescribe to any positive judgments or judgments in general, that solidify the truth in any set statements. The obvious material objects do not expose the reality, but merely mask it through their appearance. While Hegel asserted that subjects are dependent on objects, as a form of experiencing the world, Marx's analysis showed that historical processes of mass industrialization and development of capitalism influenced social operations in economic ways. "The concept of capitalism is no less than the totality of the capitalist process, comprehended in the 'principle' by which it progresses" (Marcuse, 1999, p. 159). Marcuse explained the breakdown of the system through the contradictory forces of capitalism, especially their negative forms of reality that also shape reality. The real character of material is exposed by the weak spots of the whole, which reveal truth for what it is. Moments of crises show the true content of independent parts of the system (p. 159). In relation to capitalism, it is the crises that expose the hidden, manipulative forms of its operation.

Exposed is the mastery of reduction that, critical theorists found, is related to other complexes of society, including language and scholarship. The reduction strategy reduces meaning to explicit statements as instrumental operations that conflict with critical thinking. Critical thought shows the importance of ambiguity for complex terms (Marcuse, 1999). The limit and failure of communication scholarship lies in the structured thought, action, and repetition without reflection. Marcuse argued that reduction creates the illusion of freedom through acts of oppression. Analysis of

historical process reveal that the illusion of freedom brought about the ill balanced human relationships enabled the acts of domination. As Frankfurt School scholars Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse claimed, repressive tendencies of emancipated human thought derive from the Enlightenment period.

The Enlightenment changed the conceptualization of the world and offered a solution to preference through application of reason. Rationality offered a way to legitimize individualism, by engaging in a systematic method of thinking. The premise of the Enlightenment was social progress. Mechanisms of rational thought built into a hierarchy of systematized social operations, institutions, and relationships. The standardization of procedures for the rational appropriation of terms caused a social fracture and inequality, but nevertheless became a mode of legitimization. Even though the Enlightenment provided with a system of rational thought, the process of rationality operated on bias.

Approaches to the formation of knowledge that challenged instrumental ways of research was in opposition to the firm concepts traditional theory is striving for. The rejection of the absolute Truth, although a guiding force for sociology of knowledge was rejected in Critical Theory (Jay, 1973, p. 64). The multitude of explanations that are primarily interested in the questions of humanity thus present a different approach to study of culture. Horkheimer argued that Critical Theory is concerned with the truth content in philosophical concepts and issues on the contrary to dismissing truths from previous philosophies, which was the practice of the sociology of knowledge (Jay, 1973, p. 63-64). The difference between the traditional versus Critical Theory becomes clear, as the former is concerned with building the hierarchy of knowledge, and the latter entails

all possible venues that would improve social practice. Ironic is the dismissal of Critical Theory as superior by the multi-faceted approach to theory of society. In contrast to traditional theory, which claims the potential to build knowledge through reductive and particular methodologies, Critical Theory describes such instrumental claims of knowledge as processes of legitimation. They lie in deep correlation to the ideas of the Enlightenment and furthermore productive facets of capitalism.

Fixed Methods

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer trace the historical analysis to explain how the world became trapped in the notion of legitimacy by the implementation of reductive methodological procedures. The Enlightenment, which revealed alternative ways of logic, also embraced forms of deduction as means to derive knowledge. The premise of man-organized and contained reality was to diminish the fear of the unknown. As reason had a firm connection to the deductive logic, results derived to, were heavily dependent on mathematical calculation. Such procedures only allowed for certain type of truths to hold as recognized. Multiplicity of the explanations about the world were positioned and arranged, history to fact, things to matter (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 4). Understandings of the world through myths, therefore, if not quantifiable, were dismissed as an illusion, as non-important factor in the process of scientific validation. Some fell short and became the products of scientific structure. "Myth sought to report, to name, to tell of origins – but therefore also to narrate, record, explain" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 5). Just as the record of myths, so was historical continuum rather a compilation of recognized events that would carry the weight of accuracy. The facts therefore do not offer the continuation or analysis of

events, but answers. Encapsulated historical ideas become a part of sustainable circuit that is continued by repetition. When history becomes trapped and encapsulated without re-examination, ways of thinking and doing, without an investigation or analysis, create points of stagnation. The procedures of discovery trapped in rigid frames bear no potential for rediscovery.

The arid wisdom which acknowledges nothing new under the sun, because all the pieces in the meaningless game have been played out, all the great thoughts have been thought, all possible discoveries can be construed in advance, and human beings are defined by self-preservation through adaptation - this barren wisdom merely reproduces the fantastic doctrine it rejects: the sanction of fate which, through retribution, incessantly reinstates what always was (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 8)

The critique of the Enlightenment by Adorno and Horkheimer shows no hope for reason bottled in methodology to bring any re-conceptualized ideas but simple continuation of what already is. If even critique deviates from what is understood to be the natural operating of society, then the reproduction of sameness encourages instrumental notions of critique. Reproduction of sameness is also one of the main themes in the chapter on the culture industry in the *Dialectics*.

The process of systematic reduction and classification spoiled even what critical scholars claimed was the only venue for true expression, art. Art once historically representative of social resistance in the culture industry restricted to styles became legitimized as a part of the culture industry itself. Adorno explained that only authentic works of art are not reproduction of what already is (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 34). Art and science should be separated as different parts of culture, "in order to make them

jointly manageable as areas of culture, finally causes them, through their internal tendencies as exact opposites, to converge" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 34). Separated, yet united in the way by which they are managed, art and science are understood as reductions to form and style.

Culture Industry

Art forms were absorbed into the culture industry. Various possibilities of understanding abstractness in art were reduced and pre-classified for the consumer. Expertise nullified varieties of styles and forms into sameness (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 102). As writers, artists, and musicians once went against the dominant grain, the culture industry managed to trap them into a system by reducing forms of expression into particular style - "the dominant form of universality" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 103). At this point, it is worth mentioning that universality described in the culture industry is not the same as universality of truth explained by Hegel. More so the type of universality expressed in the critique of the culture industry by critical scholars points to the totalitarian universality created by capitalism. Art classified in particular ways was taken over by the same standards as other products in capitalism. Transformation of the art forms into a predictable value system deemed the existing order absolute (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 103). To draw the parallels between the industrial production and art hints to a correlation of the universality of the system and its ideology. Such analysis led Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) to the conclusion that all art claims are also claims to ideology (p. 103). "Being nothing other than style, it divulges style's secret: obedience to the social hierarchy" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 103). The deviances become entrapped in the frame of the dominant.

Adorno explained that class based society has to be understood as capitalistic (Jay, 1991, p. 90). Capitalism stands for competition, development, and progress, yet in spite of the production dynamics, the relationships of class society remain static (Jay, 1991, p. 91). People have no way to escape the power of economy and the transparency of the owner and the owned; the lines in advanced industrial world are successfully blurred (Jay, 1991, p. 91). Sameness is embraced through universal integration and logic that supports it, reduced to a pure value-free consumerism. Culture industry promotes the fact that they are a business, so the junk of production is legitimized as intended junk (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 95).

Examples of reproductive ideology are reality shows. Reality shows embrace capitalistic characteristics and in same instance uncover its false promises. Similarly to once deviant artists, culture industry consumers are sucked into the powerful capitalistic model.

For Adorno, in true Hegelian fashion, art in general, and music in particular, are not simply cultural products, they are also forms of cognition (*Erkenntnis*); and this needs to be read in the proper understanding of the way that art and culture play a role in the process of human personal and cultural development, of *Bildung* (Thompson, 2010, p. 38)

If Adorno once described art and music as potential for liberation of the human, in the *Dialectic* his analysis derives to the conclusion that they are synchronized parts of the capitalistic machinery. Nowadays synchronization is even more subtle and elaborate. The example of integration within the entertainment industry and its hidden purposes applies to radio and TV. The culture industry advertises for the “best new thing,” but the claim is not accurate. The TV production orients itself by means of consumption. Reality TV

shows consist of competition follow ideas of capitalism to preciseness. It is the ratio that the culture industry manipulates. Although the ratio of one's success is small, it works perfectly with the ideology. The premise of the show is to win under the assumption that all competitors have a fair chance to succeed. That is also the overall promise of capitalism. Competition, financial reward, subtle advertising, and reshaping one's identity, are important components that are equally reproduced in the media and pushed forth in capitalistic reality. The purpose of promise of winning is double folded. On one side, if one person gets to change their life as well as financial situation, that brings hope to many. On the other hand, there is only room for one *true* winner. Tap on the shoulder for the rest is similar to Adorno's analysis of cartoons, in which media consumers are guided to dream, just until the show ends they realize nothing has changed (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 106). "The culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it endlessly promises" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 111). In this way, his analysis brought together the two examples of emancipatory impulses, without ever comparing them explicitly. One of Adorno's reflexive past, as he was growing up in the era of fascism, and the other, subtle manipulative ways of totalitarian operationalization of the culture industry (Huysen, 1975, p. 4).

The culture industry through the process of integration and its totality manages to manipulate and discipline its consumers through the scenarios it presents. The production forces create alternative reality. "The products of culture industry are such that they can be alertly consumed even in a state of distraction" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 100). Each manifestation of the culture industry serves to embrace it as a whole (Horkheimer &

Adorno, 2002, p. 100). The contrast between advancement and regression of the material world speaks to illusionary hope the culture industry sells.

The culture industry serves as a guide, a reassurance, that there are ways to deviate from the norm. Yet, the deviance is already confined in the norm. The products of the culture industry only serve to reproduce the dominant assumptions. The songs are mere versions of what was already played, if they are not recycled songs, they are reduced in versions of a particular genre that differs by shades of tones. Nuances in the system are introduced through the extension of the old. New twists serve as additions, not to change the existing, but to merely to tweak it, to embrace the power of what is already in place (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 101). In a system based on reproduction, newness is not a viable option. The culture industry understands the value of an idea only for its congruence with already-existing norms. Horkheimer and Adorno's (2002) assumption was that the machine is rotating on the spot (p. 106). The push for the new is contradicted by reliance tests of the past. Change remains the unrealized false promise of needs satisfied through newness. "For only the universal victory of the rhythm of mechanical production and reproduction promises that nothing will change, that nothing unsuitable will emerge" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 107).

Furthermore, advertising that accompanies the shows is in virtual synchrony with the content (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 128). For instance, shows will incorporate the names of sponsors in every possible frame of reference. If the show is about losing weight, names of food products are incorporated into the process. It is hard to ignore the ways in which the culture industry utilizes multiple economic venues to trap the consumers into consumption. "The culture industry does not sublimate: it suppresses"

(Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 111). The entrapments in its illusionary forces are an example of totalitarian work of capitalism. As Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) explain: “To be entertained means to be in agreement” (p. 115). The impulses for democracy are destroyed through the content making process, lacking genuine participation of individuals, and run on corporate demands. All media operations already reside in the Enlightenment mentality, and are submissive to processes of reduction, classification, and power.

Compared to the totalitarian countries in Europe during the World War II era, when Adorno and Horkheimer wrote their analysis, contemporary world in principle is not much different. Integrating capitalistic impulses over the course of time became ever more pervasive, and at the same time more subtle within the system of reinforcement. The culture industry with the integration achieved true synthesis of capitalistic principles meshing economic stimuli with those of entertainment.

Adorno's (2002) analysis points to the fact that the culture industry creates the needs of consumers (p. 115). Consumers must find their way in the preset models imposed by the industry (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 98). The assumption that people are responsible for production proves incorrect, since the schematism of production is responsible for the classification of the goods (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 98). People are not left to choose the answers alone but are presented with a narrow selection of choices fractured by the cost. The price is ultimately what sorts people into classes, which is indeed the capitalistic ideal.

Culture becomes no one's responsibility. Rooted in pure reason of the Enlightenment, culture's reproductive value or doing are already affirmed as legitimate.

Before the culture industry, the processes of classification had already been set firmly in place. “The general designation “culture” already contains, virtually, the process of identifying, cataloging, and classifying which imports culture into the realm of administration” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 104). In terms of the culture industry, a self-offered excuse is that people demand for its continuation (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 95). “The mentality of the public, which allegedly and actually favors the system of the culture industry, is a part of the system, not an excuse for it” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 96). The problem is Adorno and Horkheimer believed that system works in harmony to support the dominant idea of capitalism. The culture industry is in contrast to the economic just another force of maintenance and reproduction of capitalism. No longer does the culture industry need to try hard for the continuation of the system. As Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) explain, the preconditions for participation had been tactfully implemented through the bond of economic necessity and inclusion. Complex systemic dependency among social institutions managed individuals' social involvement through the terms of economic engagements. The culture industry is not based on any material commodity, it is instead a weak and dependent industry (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 96). It strives on manipulation and continuous engagement with its dependents. Assessment of capitalism depends on unmasking the “quantity of amusement” that is “converted into the quality of organized cruelty” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 110). Analysis aims for an understanding of the totality that capitalism has created, one that includes an illusionary, materialistic reality.

Business as a frame of reference is used as a contribution to the ideology that perpetuates production by the formula of supply and demand. The business model is

applied to scholarship. It has become a trend to classify social orientations to particular focuses of study. Labeling reduces the width of expertise into fragmented parts of the whole. The orientations and focus fail to capture the connections with other orientations, thus creating a specialization that assumes no large-scale unity. Broken into parts, scholarship becomes a fragment of capitalistic reproduction. By the principles of reduction, social scholarship has become the structure that continues the cycle of unreflected upon and unexamined whole. The existing structure is preserved by the instruction that conforms to the existing economic demands. Classifications serve a purpose and imitate instrumental logic of capitalism. A reduced orientation in scholarship works better for the demands of the market, and serves to the machinery with pre-determined forms of specialization.

Missed Relevance

The closest that critique of the culture industry came to relevance with social studies was a poor reception of Adorno's piece on Jazz. In the piece that was referred to as elitist and protective of the "old world" against the new forms of popular culture, Adorno only explored for ways in which "the formal aspects of art affect the life-world of individuals; the ways in which either the simplification of form or its complexification have the ability to transform the ways that we receive what art works try to communicate to us and, as a consequence, whether they lead toward a critical engagement with society or reconciliation with it" (Thompson, 2010, p. 37-38). The assumptions about emancipatory value of the culture industry explored in *Dialectic*, thus applied in the realm of music as an extension of the Hegelian idea of consciousness and society, placing Adorno's aesthetic theory "much more embedded in his broader social theory" than

previously conceived of (Thompson, 2010, p. 38). The analysis of jazz was an important case study by which Adorno was able to re-conceptualize his “musical and cultural criticism in the face of the charges of elitism” (Thompson, 2010, p. 38). Adorno's claim was that “good” works of art were able to “resist the status quo by revealing it as false” by carrying the promise of happiness “only through the revelation of the world as a place which should not be as it is” (Thompson, 2010, p. 39). True acts of art Adorno claimed negated the existing social order (Thompson, 2010, p. 39). In comparison to work produced in capitalism there was no contradiction within the frame of production, the analysis of the culture industry in *Dialectics* explained, the social order and the culture industry work in synchrony. For Adorno, the “capacity of an artwork to provide an oppositional tendency to the reified world” was what counted as “truth content” (*Wahrheitsgehalt*) (Thompson, 2010, p. 39). The expression of Critical Theory that came through in Adorno's analysis was the opposition to the Enlightenment established norms that accounted for the true and the real.

Critical Theory explained reification problematic because “lack of critical reflection in modern society was a function of capitalism and the way that political economy had structured culture and patterns of social relations” (Thompson, 2010, p. 47). For orthodox Marxists, structure was dismissed as “supernatural” yet, critical theorist claimed, it should be investigated as a problem of its own (Thompson, 2010, p. 47). The conversations about political economy and its influence on communication scholarship are even now mainly absent in the analysis of culture. The concern Thompson (2010) expressed further was that “the culture industry poses a threat to democratic life” because it “encourages conformity, a reconciliation with non-democratic forms of life, i.e., those

forms of life which are defined by asymmetrical relations of power such as those created by the market and its imperatives” (p. 48). This in particular shows in contemporary scholarly practices of the day, where instruction in the frame of the existing economic world is supported more than education as critical thinking or the development of theory. Thompson (2010) continued, “critical consciousness is dependent upon autonomous self-reflection” (p. 48). Although Thompson ideal of autonomous self-reflection, he builds on the Hegelian principle of self-recognition in the face of the social structure. The problem is that individuals are entrapped in the totality of social operations and as a community persistently guided by its false reality. Ideally, the notion of democracy is “predicated on the capacity for individuals to think for themselves” (Thompson, 2010, p. 48). In light of democracy and totality, Adorno's analysis gains a great deal of self-reflection. He derives to the conclusion that music serves as a mediator between consciousness and social reality (Thompson, 2010, p. 48). Adorno's aesthetics explains how easily cultural forms conform to the dominant, therefore contribute to the mediation between cultural and political (Thompson, 2010, p. 48). In a similar vein, the concepts as applied to all social institutions take the form of a culture industry critique, a critique that is also a critique of the dominant economic structure. The culture industry is thus seen as a set of social institutions that create large narratives for social consumption through communication. Communication scholarship and the culture industry are therefore considered fair game in large-scale analysis.

CHAPTER 3: THE CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON, CULTURE INDUSTRY, AND COMMUNICATION SCHOLARSHIP

The focus of this chapter is the extended critique of instrumental reason and its analysis of the culture industry to the field of communication scholarship. As Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) explained in the discussion of the culture industry, capitalistic impulses reproduce and expand the instrumental reason throughout the social realm. Continuous growth and expansion of capitalism that produce new markets in the Western world started to show the impact on social reconfiguration. The continuous push for progress left behind all history good and bad and without much reflection the *world* was out chasing “the next best thing.” Such concept of progress multiplied in venues of scholarship, as the focus shifted to methodology and recommendations for practical improvement, as opposed to reflexivity.

From the beginnings of the Frankfurt School to when Horkheimer and Adorno entered the debate on the American culture, their assumptions grew stronger in dialectical form. The critique of contemporary culture joined Marxist analysis and its historical investigation. The critique of the dominant ways of scholarship from a Marxist perspective was in the United States received poorly (Hardt, 1992, p. 133). The prevailing pressures of positivism and dogmatic approach to communication studies in particular were skeptical of Marxist theorists whose assumptions came from a different

social background than the United States (Hardt, 1992, p. 133). Political hints were in communication and cultural studies from the start.

Forgotten History of the Field

A clear definition of communication already assumes a functional role or a purpose. Hardt (1992) defined the political issues involved, warning that administrative practices overtake the field instead of analyses of ideological and intellectual expressions that define communication (p. 2). The need for a critique of the field is met through Adorno and Horkheimer's arguments developed in the *Dialectic*. Efforts to unite the communication field focused on instrumental operations (Hardt, 1992, p. 2). It was never a conscious plan to organize communication according to historical ins and outs of the field, but rather to the needs of institutional administration. Communication has a rich history and speculation since its beginnings, but the highlights of the field go alongside with the administrative practices. Before the 1980s, research in communication supported governmentally oriented politics. Edward T. Hall, for example, worked for the Foreign Service Institute, an official branch of the U.S. Government, to investigate cultural relationships that followed military practices (Moon, 1996, p. 71). Studies in the field of communication in the United States were influenced by the needs of international politics, exploiting control and power as the concern of knowledge produced in the field (Moon, 1996, p. 71). Culture was reduced to cultural "traits" so that they could be identified and manipulated, and language was analyzed for how it served the instruction of official personnel working in the international affairs. Moon (1996) wrote that influences in communication studies were "including the political and capitalist interests of the United States, the impact of diffusion studies, and the felt need to establish

interdisciplinary status through the adoption of social scientific approaches” (p. 75). The focus of capitalism for either administrative practices or purposes of the culture industry became ever more involved with the idea of audiences. DeJana (2006) analyzed the interpersonal and mass media approaches that developed in media effects studies. As mass media were the fast spread of information, they also became a new venue of exploration in communication scholarship. DeJana (2006) explained that the creators of the dominant paradigm realized that participation of their “target” audiences as important (p. 13). Instead of dropping the notion of target audiences, the participants were made to conform to the dominant practice (p. 13). The dominant paradigm also did not change the dominant linear orientation in approaches to communication (DeJana, 2006, p. 13). For the researchers, “the audience now considered to be active” became a new challenge that scholars needed to change and develop (p. 13). Development of assumptions that reduced the idea of people into consumers, became qualifiers for the emancipatory power of communication, which are taken for granted under the methods serving as forms of legitimacy.

The process of study of culture, Adorno had stressed instead of simple guideline to criticism of culture, should strive for constant development of theory. The complexity and growth of the society became an obvious concern for theory. Adorno provided a wide range of ways to discuss and address the issues of culture (Hardt, 1992, p. 141). He also argued that Critical Theory should not be limited to either supreme or subjective forms of cultural analysis (Hardt, 1992, p. 141). “Critical research in the tradition of Critical Theory, with its speculative approach to contemporary culture and society, sought to challenge the theoretical basis of traditional social research” (Hardt, 1992, p. 142). This

statement offered two considerations. One offered Critical Theory as a method to cultural analysis and the other a challenge to the conventional social research.

The aftermath of World War II that left a mark on Western thought and Critical Theory also accounted for themes of totalitarianism, fascism, and communism that threatened the establishment of the democracy where capitalism was still looking to accommodate (Hardt, 1992, p. 136). A critique exposing the failing parts of capitalism was needed in the face of already missed opportunities to assess the social realm that would avoid the repetition of the detrimental history of the world.

But the unyielding push for capitalism intertwined with the ideas of democracy and freedom had set the stage for emancipation of human thought. Consequences of historic impacts that reshaped the society in life and scholarship were guided by the dominant impulses. The lack of criticality subsidized with conformity to the dominant was, and remains, a problem of communication scholarship, either in historical or contemporary analysis (Smythe, 1954; Hardt, 2010; McLuskie, 2013). To return to the concept of audiences, which derived simultaneously with the notion of organizations, became and remained in the forefront of communication research (McLuskie, 2013, p. 10). Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) in the light of the social conditions opposed to the notion of audiences, which were through instrumental ways exploited to the point of cruelty.

Involvement of power that abuses economic stimuli cannot be abandoned. Marxist deliberations on the economy are thus still prevalent as the economics are disturbing the development of social theory because of the high focus on production and outcomes that offer continuation of the system through control and repression. Adorno

and Horkheimer tried to revive the remained fragments of freedom and humanism, even though such ideas seemed to have failed before (Hardt, 1992, p. 136). Hardt at the round table in 2010 addressed the lack of unity in the field of communication. The question for Hardt (2010) was “what do we know about our own field?” He explained that the field struggles to establish a unified idea and historical knowledge of communication. Hardt (2010) continued that the lack of unity is the reason why research resorts to the most prevalent trends, either of technical innovation (TV and other media) and institutional demands. This produced a literature in the field of communication and media studies that analyzed and criticized “mainstream” research (McLuskie, 2013) as “the dominant paradigm” (Gitlin, 1981). Failure to acknowledge the influential contributions of dominant trends in the field in the past caused forgetfulness of important contents in communication scholarship steering away from it by the production demand fed by economic stimuli (Hardt, 2010). Prospects of communication that work based on the economic stimuli are conforming to the mainstream and lack critical reflection (Hardt, 2010; McLuskie, 2013). Economically stimulated scholarship works hand-in-hand with power and fails to provide substance for the betterment of social; rather it works to exploit the notion of audience for the benefit of those who instruct the research. For example, “more than 75% of the annual budgets of Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research, Hadley Cantril’s Institute for International Social Research, and Ithiel de Sola Poole’s Center for International Studies came from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and other government sources”⁴ (Soley & Feldner, 2006, p. 213). Paul

⁴ For more details on the research, see Simpson (1994).

Lazarsfeld, who also had a brief relationship with Adorno and Horkheimer in the United States, “took the notion of communication very seriously” but after not receiving research financing “went back into what he liked to do, and that was talk about methodology” (Hardt, 2010). Critical theorists with important contributions for the field were quickly forgotten as the instrumental orientations moved toward practical results instead of contributing to the theory of society. Disconnects between research and the social benefits of research were a main concern in Hardt's (2010) assessment of the 21st Century communication scholarship. Instrumentalities of administrative research then for the benefits of the dominant relate to the production in the culture industry or particularly by supply and demand of labor described by Marx (Marcuse, 1999, p. 298-301). Regardless of the good intention to revive the fragments of history that dealt with emancipation of humanity, critical reflection did not become prevalent in social studies. It was only the Critical Theory, which acknowledged history as the primary source for understanding practice (Hardt, 1992, p. 137). On the contrary, pragmatism built on the idea that truth derives from terms of consequences. A dismissive attitude towards history in pragmatism implies prediction as a social thought, and the practices that follow. Horkheimer saw the connection between pragmatism and growth of the industrial power in the United States. His concern was that pragmatism modeled modern industrialism that saw the human being in terms of the factory (Hardt, 1992, pp. 137-138). Horkheimer's analysis seemed to reflect Marx's contemplations of humanity in the industrial world. The connection between the two worlds, social and economic, highlights the importance of political economy in social studies. Political scholarship the United States, where capitalism seems to slip through the cracks as an important component of research, still

relies on instrumental logic as the normative way to treat communication phenomena. But in societies where society is in clear struggles to organize according to capitalistic prescriptions, true dynamics of dialectical logic emerge. In case of communication, complexity of non-material assumptions about the world became, as a well-known practice of capitalism, a project of commodification (Prodnik, 2013, p. 46). Pragmatist social analysis ignored history and took for granted industry and politics, which perhaps explains a different theoretical orientation in the field (Hardt, 1992, p. 138). As Hardt explained, orientations that discount history, economic, and political structure lose the ability to understand the prior connections needed for reflection on the present. In many ways, pragmatism missed establishing knowledge that connects individuals, technology, and communication important for the struggle to overcome domination and oppression (Hardt, 1992, p. 138). American communication research frozen in time is in nature empirical, ahistorical, and unreflective (Hardt, 1992, p. 5). The pragmatic impulses shaped the connection of communication to the celebration of instrumental values and practicality.

“In this context, communication research has operated with a functional definition of the individual that emerged from the requirements of a technologically driven society in which cultural attitudes, that is, the potential of literary or historical explanations of social existence, gave way to the demands of industrial growth and technological superiority” (Hardt, 1992, p. 5).

“The idea of “exploiting” the given technical possibilities, of fully utilizing the capacities for aesthetic mass consumption, is part of an economic system which refuses to

utilize capacities when it is a question of abolishing hunger” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 111).

The claims to progress are only as accurate as evidence of regression. If instrumental ways of communication research are as accurate in solving problems as they are assumed to be, then one should ask why it is the *privileged* capitalistically oriented Western World that developed such methods.

From Economics to Fragmentation to Lack of Unity

Communication as an idea and practice in scholarship is often referred to in the kind of concrete terms that take their cues from capitalism. In “Some Observations on Communications Theory,” Dallas Smythe (1954) contested the idea of audiences that became prevalent in media studies, while he conducted a historical investigation of media effects and communication (p. 19). With the spread of mass media, scholarship became invested in the effects of media on its consumers. The focus was directed towards potential “results” of media messages as opposed to particular emancipatory practices. Smythe (1954) offered a critique of empirical scholarship studying the effects, and made a historical argument on the development of the media. The issue he exposed had to deal with instrumental nature of empirical communication research (Smythe, 1954).

Restrictive nature of administration and instrumentality relates to the same claim Adorno and Horkheimer made in their argument on scientific research in the *Dialectic*. To prove the artificial approach of research based on instrumental methods alone, Smythe traced the idea of media in different time frames. The most important argument was found in the ever present problematic of separation between subject and object. The critical theorists argued that reality is a manifestation of reason. Reason can be trapped in “objective”

methods that are emancipatory, or in philosophical terms, those best for humanity. Instrumental reason, however, strives to achieve distance between theory and practice and achieves subjugation of the human subject. Therefore, instrumental rejection of scholarly involvement can quickly produce humans exploited to work for the dominant power.

Smythe (1954) in what he called historical snapshots analyzed the control over personal and public communication. The media took control in a shift of agency from subjects to corporations (p. 26). At first news spread by word to mouth and were fully dependent on the individual (Smythe, 1945, p. 26). The individuals that were once sources and active participants in the news making process have lost their active involvement by instrumental distortion. During the Reformation, which included the Industrial Revolution and processes of modern media, private control started to shift to public control (Smythe, 1954, p. 27). Mechanization and establishment of religious corporations influenced communication in technical ways; “communications began to be mechanized, began to be business” (Smythe, 1954, p. 28). The point of conversion from individuals to corporations not only changed communication but also the economic element that with widespread urbanization reshaped society (Smythe, 1954, p. 29). The forces of economic dependence divided the people by class, which became normalized in capitalistic ideas of individualization and fragmentation of the community.

Even the physical reality offers a clear distinction of city's functions through an organized separation of the general to the specific. The city functions are artificially created Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) explained; the appearance of functions is to imitate the model of culture built on “false identity of universal and particular” (p. 95).

Furthermore, content-less structures are reflected in the social classes. Without clear instructions, order is clearly established. Once external structure serves to reaffirm the social hierarchy, the rest of the social fragments follow to complete the whole. In aspiration to understand the whole, a study of culture and psyche revealed how the culture not only serves as building blocks of economic base, but also supports the status quo (Jay, 1991, p. 81). As the physical arrangement of the city, so are people confined in the social positions arranged by the dominant structure (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 96). The cooperation and involvement in the system is crucial. Not only does integration of people provide with matter for continuation, it assures that everyone remain faithful to the system in hopes to bring about a change. It is the blind hopefulness in the structure and its totalitarian impulses that reassure the power to remain unharmed. Smythe (1954) expanded on Hegel's idea of alienation and Marxist notion of economic dependency, further connecting them to the claims of so influenced Frankfurt scholars when approaching for their time the culture industry where mass media created an environment focused on manipulation (p. 30).

Methods of communication research deflect attention from their role in supporting power, while avoiding a theory of communication. The reason why communication theory was not taken seriously was the financial rewards outside the academy (Hardt, 1992, p. 144). Once research is separated and funded from other sources, it does not work in the interest of the interdisciplinary approach of social theory of communication (Hardt, 1992, p. 144). The expansion of reduction in capitalism to the field of communication scholarship was reflected in separation of political communication from mass communication, and therefore created a greater divide among “expert groupings seeking

recognition of their narrow specializations” (Hardt, 1992, p. 144). The expertise was serving a functional rather than theoretical orientation. As Hardt (1992) explained: “...the tradition of empirical sociology and all its features of an atheoretical, ossified system of delivering functional communication in the interest of dominant social and economic powers” (p. 144-145). Hardt (1992) argued that the field of communication was in a desperate need to clarify the unity, while also unfamiliar with the rest of fields that influenced it in the past (p. 3). With reproduction of instrumental logic, the scholarly orientations are becoming more fragmented, dismissing important theoretical ideas to promote practicality. Without a theoretical background, the cases of research are those serving to build theory. “More importantly these deliberations reflect the dilemma of a field whose search for a theoretical grounding proceeds without an adequate understanding of its own intellectual history as a significant source of knowledge about its position among and within various disciplines” (Hardt, 1992, p. 3). Here the essential communication concepts come to mind. Different orientations of the field assume different positions and are now separated matrixes and traditions into a metamodel (Craig, 2007, p. 125). The concept of culture in cultural studies entails a different meaning than in a study of culture in Critical Theory. The intercultural studies take the meaning of communication as the implication of methods that best capture a designated group as culture. On the contrary, a study of culture in Critical Theory deals with the assumptions well-grounded in philosophy and theory. Instrumental logic fractures culture, as it has in the past, and continues to serve technical purposes.

The critique of practicality and unfamiliarity of the historical development of communication remained Hardt's commentary about the field until the 21st century. The

contemporary communication scholarship continued the line of reduced and exact understandings of communication. Hardt (1992) explained that “cultural” studies based on external expertise in social studies implicitly strive for more solidified definitions of communication. Furthermore, Hardt argued that instances of search in areas beyond communication prove the disconnection from field's historical understanding. The legitimization of communication, according to Hardt, happens in the demand for relevance to contemporary analysis of culture (p. 3).

Commodity Production

The Frankfurt critique that the contemporary world is still entrapped in the bounds of the Enlightenment extended Hegel's logic and Marx's theory of capital. These extensions took the social sciences into analyses of the pervasive capitalist interdependence of social institutions. In his analysis of labor, Marx explained the theory of value and the law of value, through which material products are put into social consumption (Marcuse, 1999, p. 298- 301). Theory of value explains the value of commodity is based on the “quantity of abstract labor socially necessary for their production” and the law of value is called the process by which “commodity producing society distributes labor-time at its disposal among the different branches of production” the law of labor (Marcuse, 1999, p. 298- 301). This theory and law extends to realms of social operations where prevailing socio-economic processes are taken for granted and considered natural. This also serves to explain that “the surplus product is created by labor alone and, in capitalism, is appropriated by the capitalist class” (Postone, 2005, p. 71). Like any normalization, this stands in the way of particular forms of reason necessity for democratic participation in which the evolution of reason contemplated by Hegel

failed to evolve. “Rational development of the human species has been disrupted by the generalization of commodity exchange in such a far-reaching way that living conditions as a whole under capitalism have taken the form of objectified relationships” (Honneth & Ingram, 2009, p. 60). Social institutions without democratic participation oriented toward dominant market demands.

The process in which “labor-power becomes an abstract quantitative unit” social labor is contemplated differently from the natural condition of human existence in which labor turns into an attempt of adaptation of nature that occurs in capitalism (Marcuse, 1999, p. 299). Labor in capitalism attempts to produce commodities, which are products of an exchange value (Marcuse, 1999, p. 300). If the production of commodities would follow Hegelian principle of wants, then all the commodities should serve to gratify human wants (Marcuse, 1999, p. 300). Yet how are the needs of “labor-time to various types of production” distributed in capitalism, which “provides for no complete association or planning?” while “the supplying of society with use-value is thus governed by the law of value, which has superseded the freedom of the individual” (Marcuse, 1999, pp. 300-301). The dance of production to consumption is highly dependent of the “gratification in the form of exchange value” over which an “individual, has no power whatever” (p. 300). Furthermore, the production in capitalism is not based on “real needs” but rather “solvent social needs” (p. 302). In this way, an “individual's desires and wants are shaped” and “restricted to the situation of the class” to which one belongs (p. 302). As analysis shows, the socio-economic structure is not a “supernatural” one, it works by the principle of market. As a dictating force, it captures wants as artificial demands that satisfy the dominant market, thus letting the market dictate the

“production” that will further be “consumed.” Not only are the spreading economies crises-ridden, they also entail destruction of nature, which exemplifies the ultimate Enlightenment inspired want to control it, as Adorno and Horkheimer emphasized throughout the *Dialectic* (Postone, 2005, p. 77). Economically dependent social structure results in needs that fail to be reflected upon. In terms of scholarship, conformity is a result of failure to critique is a missed opportunity for reflection about the nature of demand, production, and consumption.

Over the course of time, the processes of reduction and instrumental reason characterize the majority of social institutions. Because of the totality capitalism imposes, it is impossible to stand back from the large frame and avoid the involvement. The Frankfurt School's critique of culture found social scholarship and science to be both part of the logic of the Enlightenment and the productive forces of capitalism. History and institutional arrangements encourage totalitarian impulses of capitalist “demand,” so that by the principle of labor they assure “products” to suit the predominant economic structure. “Results” of such production serve to establish overriding norms of efficiency and as society develops value of production over re-examination. Institutions assure obedience of its members by training them in efficiency criteria supported by instrumental logic. Unlike dialectical reason, instrumental reason blinds its users to the contradictions they live through capitalism. Such blinders require a constant supply of legitimation.

The ways of legitimization include academic research practices, especially the extensions of the methods of hard sciences into the social sciences. The extension here supports instrumental reason that differs from dialectical reason, which examines rather

than classifies. Through capitalism, the totality of pervasive economic forces overrides reason that through reflection aims for the betterment of the human condition. According to Marcuse (1999), Hegel offered a diagnosis that explained the difference between instrumental and dialectical reason (p. 252). He did so through an analysis of the interdependence among parts of the social world, an interdependence placing philosophical concerns about the nature of truth into a socio-historical world of reason.

This is the orientation to universality in Hegel. It is derived through negation, which had connected the two worlds of nature and history. Marcuse (1999) explained that in the times of the French Enlightenment philosophy aligned with the rising middle class in which principles of reason were not defined in clear terms (p. 253). The change of reason in accordance with the middle class speaks to democratic involvement and class-conscious action (Marcuse, 1999, p. 253). The processes of negation of the material and the critique of the existing structure move from philosophy in the direction of social theory (Marcuse, 1999, p. 253). “The meaning of the world as rational implies, first, that it could be comprehended and changed by man's knowingful action” (p. 253). As instrumental logic, matters became solidified and thus harder to break beyond the restraints of the material. Only when Hegelian philosophy is joined with Marxist theory is the relationship between philosophy and social theory able to explain what Hegel was after: the totality of social order. Through dialectical theory as a social theory, the social order is exposed as the reach of capitalism from economics into the social and cultural practices of society.

The connection between philosophy and social theory explained the universal acceptance and bounds of instrumental logic. Enlightenment rationale that made

scientific methods into forms of legitimization divided reason and practice by means of power. The principle by which science reduced the world into factual components negated the philosophical aspects of multiple explanations and shut the potential for alternative ways of understanding the world. The objectification of the world was assumed only through material ways, through forms of deduction, which first, easily misrepresent the truth and create false reality, and second, open up the potential for human emancipation. It was Marx, who after Hegel, elaborated on the idea of reality, and exposed the optimism Hegel ascribed to thought. If Hegelian philosophy would prevail in social practice, the problem of human emancipation in capitalism as Marx assessed would not apply. However, the economic development of society established new ways of human dependency and alienation at the same time. Hegel explained that any object for a human was primarily the object of want or desire and assumed that division of labor will form based on a system of wants by the same principle as the state and society (Marcuse, 1999, p. 259). Marx saw the notion of the object in terms of labor, which depended on external power (Marcuse, 1999, p. 259). As Hegel related the reason to being, he also assumed that the society would adequately shape according to the principles of reason (Marcuse, 1999, p. 260). Universality in Hegel's concept of reason would only be realized if the truth were present in every single element that confines it (Marcuse, 1999, p. 260). Marx exposed that element of difference that breaks the universality and the negation of reason is the working class (Marcuse, 1999, p. 261). If the only engagement in society for the working class is through forms of labor then they are taken the potential to be fully free (Marcuse, 1999, p. 261). Marx explained that the working class has no stake in physical objects such as private property or profit, which

limits people from achieving freedom; the working class thus is already made free, the question remains in the emancipatory nature of the social system (Marcuse, 1999, p. 291). The parallel of Marx's analysis of labor and Hegel's idea of reason apply to contemporary social situation. Universality in contemporary Western world is not equivalent to Hegel's notion of true relationships in nature; rather universality in capitalism is an economic dependence or totality of instrumental logic. If all the relationships in capitalism are primarily economic, the analysis applies from individuals to social institutions. The all-integrative system of co-dependence based on economic productivity further extends to the realm of education, research, and scholarship. The division of labor is formed upon the economy. Scholarship considered in terms of capitalism depends, as do all other social institutions, on forces of production. "Business becomes an objective entity that gives man a certain standard of living, a set of interests, and a range of possibilities that mark them off from men engaged in other businesses" (Marcuse, 1999, p. 291). Marx's theory shows that the proletariat is the only group engaging in production as labor, but forces of capitalism also create a new universality based on logic the of economic dependency. Under those circumstances, un-reflected instrumental methods become so heavily integrated in the existing social order that they become forgotten as constructed acts of a certain reason. "The separation of thought from being implies that thought has withdrawn before the onslaught of 'common sense.' If, then, truth is to be attained, the influence of common sense must be swept away and with it the categories of traditional logic, which are, after all, the philosophical categories of common sense that stabilize and perpetuate a false reality. And the task of breaking the hold of common sense belongs to dialectical logic" (Marcuse, 1999, p. 123). Under such

circumstances, the reason derived from the Enlightenment becomes praised as reason to achieve the truth, which dialectics revealed as false.

The social order based on the logic of the Enlightenment as instrumental logic is not matters merely of the past. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) explained that “thinking, as understood in the Enlightenment, is the process of establishing, a unified, scientific order and of deriving factual knowledge from principles, whether these principles are interpreted as arbitrarily posited axioms, innate ideas, or the highest abstractions” (p. 63). Similar conceptualizations of knowledge still apply today. Particularly in communication studies, linguistics, and political economy, quantitative methods are prevalent to make claims that assume human behavior and truths about the social world (Chengli, 2014; Benicio Valaderes, 2014).⁵

Truth reduced to numbers does not satisfy the justification of the research. Results of research never expose the reality; they are not able to counter a defense without a narrative that accompanies it. The formation of the “rational” systematic unity shows the arbitrariness of the processes that treat knowledge. Similarly, such arbitrary notions apply to social formation and its failure to incorporate reason Hegel argued for. In terms of the Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno argued instrumental reason “contributes nothing but the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements of fixed conceptual relationships” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 64). But unity in dialectical reason is not fixed. From a dialectical perspective, a fixed set of concepts means a fixed world. Yet the illusion of

⁵ The discussion extends to the content in their presentation, which incorporated quantitative support as means of legitimacy, claims of knowledge that explained cultural and historical phenomena.

fixed concepts in the world binds practice to the illusion. Instrumental reason calls abstraction from and through the material world against the reflectiveness of dialectical reason. Because of that the opposition towards the methods of the Enlightenment are marked as delusion, falsehood, “rationalization,” no matter how hard the philosophers try to make the case for the betterment of humanity that transpires through reflexive critique of history (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 64). Because the principle of dialectics is an engagement in the antithesis of the material, which fails to satisfy needs of material production that count as legitimate in capitalism. Universality as instrumental reason is utopia with consequence, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) explain, working in the interest of the industrial society to coordinate implementations of instrumental reason. This is the prevailing form of what Hegel described as the dialectic of the universal and the particular (p. 65). In the move to the particular, the cultural analysis by the Frankfurt School finds its openings for Marx's critique of false reason. Now, cultural life can be “apprehended in terms of manipulation and administration” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 65).

When communication research reduced complex ideas into fragments in an efficiency-oriented environment, ideas became restricted to their functional roles. Key assumptions about the nature of communication are left to be assumed instead of investigated. This, Critical Theorists argue, conceals power relations and promotes exploitation – exploitation in the name of “communication.”

The argument of *Dialectic* on the limits of the Enlightenment related directly to concern for human emancipation over nature. Potential that Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) saw as harmful was the “unreflecting naivety, which tends toward violence” (p.

159). The reduction of thought that with tendencies of reason would justify or abuse nature was the main critique of *Dialectic*. “Whatever intellectual energies are concentrated on an external intention, wherever it is a matter of pursuing, ascertaining, grasping -- of exerting those functions which have been sublimated from the primitive overpowering of animals into the scientific methods of controlling nature -- the subjective process is easily overlooked in the schematization, and the system is posited as the thing itself” (p. 159). The reduction of thought creates an easy separation from the substance it contains. To objectify a thought as its pathological counterpart turns the process into an arbitrary one, an inessential subjective purpose to the matter at hand, that does violence to thought that “later will be done in practice” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 159).

This un-reflected reproduction of methods provides illusions of firm definitions of communication without justifying them except through invoking the dominant social-cultural-economic arrangements. Quantitative methods bypass such examinations. Hegel argued that if science is reduced to mathematics that means the ultimate surrender of truth (Marcuse, 1999, p. 145). In essence, Hegel's argument against mathematical logic was to break free from the restraints of the 'observable facts' as a form of reproduction of the scientific common sense (Marcuse, 1999, p. 145). Such procedures were a result of the long-time development of positivism. “The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form (Marcuse, 1999, p. 145). In Hegel, the analysis of the objective world is not a result of its true nature, but of the contradiction it carries with the acknowledgment of being. The material reality is thus only a beginning point of assuming things' true essence (Marcuse, 1999, p. 146). “The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to

distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation” (Marcuse, 1999, p. 146). Therefore, things are only realized as such, through the analysis of their contradictory nature. The dialectical thinking works on negative philosophy. It is the state of negativity that is thing's true essence, and the distortion the very essence itself (p. 148). In contrast, positivism does not engage in analysis beyond what is. Therefore, the relationships that result from positivism are for Hegel's philosophy incomplete, mere reductions of essentially untruths.

Approaches in communication studies that engage quantitative methods based on mathematical deliberations conceal assumptions. The assumption that communication can be reduced to primary facts itself expresses a controlling orientation in research. The research that embraces the separation of reason and science shows the dependence to the Enlightenment. Assumptions based on premature deliberations, claims to facts, point to the failure to elaborate beyond the material, to uncover the real dialectical tensions of the objects of study. What appears as real in material terms does not mean reality in theoretical terms. Again, reflecting Hegel's philosophy, reality is derived to through the process of examination of the opposite to what is. Only in negative relationships, through dialectics, reality has a chance to come through but does not produce results. Dialectics fails to satisfy the totality of capitalism in a material sense, but carries the potential for social action.

In capitalism, those who do not conform to the dominant ways of the society are “condemned to an economic impotence which is prolonged in the intellectual powerlessness of the eccentric loner” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 106). In capitalism, the socio-economic processes align under the same principle of totality.

Reason of dialectical logic could stimulate a social change that would cause a distress to power of the existing structure. Marx's theory of capital claims that economic forces guide relationships, socially and functionally. The failure to comply with the principles of capitalism, or even the extends of its manipulative forms, will result in deliberate exclusion. Under the principle of all social institutions, universities are also entrapped in the same frame of economic dependence. The person becomes the extension of his/her economic reality.

No one is anything other than his wealth, his income, his job, his prospects. In the consciousness of everyone, including its wearer, the economic mask coincides exactly with what lies beneath it, even in its smallest wrinkles. All are worth as much as they earn, and earn as much as they are worth. They find out what they are through ups and downs of their economic life. They know themselves as nothing else. If the materialist critique of society once opposed idealism by asserting that it is not consciousness which determines being but being consciousness, and that the truth about society is to be found not in its idealistic notions of itself but in its economy, up-to-date self-consciousness has meanwhile discarded such idealism. People judge their own selves by their market value and find out who they are from how they fare in the capitalist economy (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 175)

The impulse in capitalist society is functionality. As a consequence of pervasive forces of capitalism, the need for production extended to the field of social sciences. The main concern for such production has to deal with true and false needs for the society and the nature of wanted results. As a result, reductionist methods that serve to apply instrumental logic by breaking down the ideas into solid truths or facts about human nature thus became prevalent in the realm of social scholarship. The focus in scholarship rather than on establishment of theory for the betterment of human practice shifts to

prescriptive instruction, which is the opposite of learning. According to Marxist theory of labor, in capitalism professors turn into instructors; embedded in the formal regulations posed by the demand for the production. The key is to nurture the labor force for capitalistic needs. As a result, potential disruption is reduced in the primary stages of socialization, and removed from the forefront of the ongoing. Critical thought and social critique are eluding from the mainstream scholarship. Conformism and reproduction of sameness are awarded. And in terms of a capitalistic totality, those disconnected from the mainstream are easily convicted of inadequacy (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 106).

The mainstream in capitalism reshaped the process of education according to its needs. The reflection from Marx to the Frankfurt School that investigated “true versus false needs, lack of class consciousness, alliance between government and business, militarism, and authoritarian language” in capitalism may cause a serious theoretical reflection upon social practice (James, 2006, p. 17). Such analysis, although clearly applicable today more than before, is continuously dropped from the curriculum of higher education. Beverly James (2006) stated that “with the dumbing down of American higher education and the commodification of learning,” Critical Theory lost its position in scholarship (p. 17). The theorizing of perpetuate false reality created by the constant production of material is now barely up for a discussion even in the realm of education. James (2006) explained Marcuse's work *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) in which he expands on Marx's themes of domination and totality that in evasive capitalism extend to our daily lives (James, 2006, p. 21). Marcuse went as far as saying that “men and women are no longer conscious of their own oppression” (James, 2006, p. 21). To the extent that the consciousness is connected to wants as determined by Hegel, and the exploitive

nature of economic dependency assumed by Marx, Marcuse came to the conclusion that because of technological advancements in late capitalism, people have become slaves to the needs of the dominant interests (Marcuse, 1964, p. 1).

The intensity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, possessing or rejecting something is seized as a *need* depends on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary given the prevailing societal institutions and interests (Marcuse, 1964, p. 4)

The wants that Hegel described as objects of desire, Marcuse claimed, are shaped by the interests of dominant institutions. His critique furthermore extends to Marx, in which individuals through the process of commodification become tamed in the restrictions of labor and sameness. As long as the consumption aspect satisfies the false individual and social needs capitalism creates, the human remains a firm believer in the Enlightenment rationality. The dominant realm exploits the idea of material comfort. The interests of the social inquiry are not focused on aggressiveness, misery, injustice, but rather fun, relaxation, and consumerism (Marcuse, 1964, p. 5). The material ideas distract from the emancipatory restrictions of the economic structure. Capitalism demands full attention. From working long hours, to excesses that have become “necessity,” one must conform to receive the paycheck (James, 2006, p. 22). “Freedom to live otherwise - to explore less lucrative but more satisfying job possibilities in the public or non-profit sector, to take time off to travel, learn a new language, read art history - is severely restricted” (James, 2006, p. 22). The ability to live becomes the ability to adjust to the system. The busy daily routines ensure that capitalistic promise of success through

continuous sameness becomes the center focus of life. System creates distractions such as the culture industry to draw attention away from real social problems of political nature. The essence of the system lies in relationship with the economic forces. The economic forces are the ones directing political action and educational “needs.” Marx predicted the possibility of revolutionary change that would arise from the conflicting interests, yet the culture industry as Horkheimer and Adorno explain, managed to assimilate and neutralize the potentially disruptive elements (James, 2006, p. 23).

The Potential of Theory

Critical Theory understands communication opposite to terms of reduction but instead as an ongoing theoretical formation. The process of theory is not conclusion reduced to facts, rather a continuous investigation of claims of truth, claims of knowledge. “Philosophy is not a synthesis, a basic science, or an overarching science but an effort to resist suggestion, a determination to protect intellectual and actual freedom” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 202). In efforts for Critical Theory not to become reduced in the same way as other approaches to research and art because Adorno says “truth content” in forms of art. This relates to scholarship, introducing the need for continuous resistance to the totality of the system. Critique aims against conformity, to claim the last remaining strands of what Adorno would name “truth content” (Thompson, 2010, p. 39). The aim of Critical Theory is to break free from the constraints of mainstream constituted methods and forms of knowledge. The assumptions that methodological approach suffice to understand and uncover the complexities, Adorno explained, is to trap harmony in empirically fractioned notes, which is indeed possible, but far from accounting for all the force fields that complete the harmony (Jay, 1991, p.

51). Applied to communication studies, alternative scientific approaches dismiss the larger frames of theoretical investigations. The reduction to methods in communication scholarship removes the connections of harmony to fractioned notes. The opposite happens in theoretical investigation, where connections are of key importance for greater understanding of the fragments. A problematic of postmodern communication social studies is that they are far removed or in many events separated from historical and economic impulses. The un-reflexive production that is in capitalism focused on constant results failed to realize the importance of social processes that impact the conceptualization of the world. In scholarship, the production mode shows a naïve understanding of capitalism and the significance of reducing theoretical dichotomies so that culture is explored in a non-linear understanding of modern world dynamics (Postone, 2005, p. 79).

Without the exploration of relationships among the social and economic factors, studies are simply loose threads of investigation that overlook the important connections. The real complexity of the social lies in historical investigation of thought and knowledge.

The reductionism of complexity to certainty traced by the Frankfurt School was found in the social and economic conditions in capitalism. The deceitful system that pushes agenda based on the best economic outcome, in terms the beneficiaries, are those who already are in privileged positions, calls for thorough investigation of all the bits and pieces of ideas that grew out of the kind of call for progress. So-called progress, in the contemporary world, is based on the dismissal of the mythical, distancing from the historical, and always in relation to power.

Totalitarian impulses reproduced in capitalism are entangled in the subtle social operations that are reflected in communication research. Reduction and sameness as the main premise of universal integration of social fragments serves to maintain the balance. The preservation does not work in obvious ways anymore. The rulers, those in charge of economic stability and preservation of order, do not engage in the maintenance of the ideas directly. Economic dependence traps people into the system, and serves as the control mechanism for reproduction and maintenance.

Tracing those theoretical highlights becomes an essential part of an ongoing, never-ending debate that guides to the best praxis in the future. It is the complex process of re-assessment that Critical Theory argued for. While only a few have been highlighted in this chapter, the nature of an alternative approach to communication as a field is suggested by a combination of dialectical theory and the history of suppressed themes in communication research.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

Nowadays the trend of universalism and reproduction of sameness through well-established, legitimate ways of doing research explicitly shows the realization of Adorno and Horkheimer's predictions.

There was a broad critique grounded in the dynamics of capitalism and material cultural practices. Efforts to dismiss Critical Theory as an overly broad orientation (Hardt, 2010) that lacks solutions are efforts to turn away from social complexity. Issues of subject and object, for example, are rarely discussed in social scholarship today except as a kind of taken-for-granted matter. Communication is merely assumed, a priori existent phenomenon lacking depth, and continuously distancing from the historical and the political. Such tendencies are in many ways representative of ever more blurred lines among ideology of the culture industry and essential human existence. The critique in *Dialectic* reveals that capitalism through promotion of reason based on instrumental logic is helping to produce the artificial reality. Reality has failed to realize the Hegelian notion of reason as a unity of truth and knowledge. Because of this failure, Critical Theory scholars argue for social critique from a historical lens to better understand society. “Social critique is a critique of knowledge and vice versa” (Arato, Gebhardt, & Piccone, 1982, p. 503). What counts as knowledge is in pre-existing relationships of power, through which knowledge becomes a way of legitimizing claims about the world.

The idea of capitalism is a constant strive for progress and newness, whereas a continuation of old ideas and patterns shows constant stagnation in the eyes of illusionary progress. But as the analysis about the dominant realm brings awareness of the constant reproduction of sameness, the hope for change through deviance in already ingrained processes of the structure create false hope for change. Pervasive forces of capitalism are becoming reproduced in all social forms. Lack of critical inquiry in social operations is an example of morphing capitalistic ideas at work. As art, so did scholarship through reductionist logic become entrapped in merely reproductive functions of capitalism, or in other terms entrenched in the Enlightenment.

In capitalism, ideas translate into meaning only if to serve a particular purpose. Only through satisfying an economic utopia in one way or another the meaning is found. Art, entertainment, and life become dependent on categorizations predetermined to have meaning. Anything *obscure* or irregular is recognized as such as well, as a set example of recognition and consequentially a part of the dominant structure. Therefore, instrumental logic has such a high value in capitalism, as it relies on facts as the primary source of claims to knowledge. Under the guise of facts, humans become alienated and submissive to the power and production that works to satisfy the needs of capitalism in material and economic ways, down to acceptance of labor as a natural state of human kind. The economic machine is ultimate; to function means to function accordingly with the principles of the existing.

The question becomes, “Who creates the rules?” The culture industry is totalitarian and inescapable. If one wants to dismiss its harmonizing impulses by deeming them of lesser importance, a life of isolation is a consequence.

The culture industry is everywhere. It is pervasive and because of the economic component, in capitalism, turns into a lethal power of control and manipulation. The culture industry explains the subtle ways and complex relationships and dependencies between social and economic ways that influence values and meanings. The culture industry disciplines through examples of production. Examples of right and wrong serve as guidance of being, and pleasure as the ultimate denominator. Ironically, pleasure is only an idea, another unobtainable capitalistic promise.

The definitions and facts acquired through the application of instrumental logic, always already lie in the existing social paradigms. Social paradigms are not isolated from one another. They are integrated and influenced by the universal. To ignore the interdependence of the paradigms in a wider range means a dismissal of important variables in the investigation of the social. Influenced by the enlightened thought is contemporary scholarship in the reductionism expressed by narrow orientations. Signs of repetition and stagnation lead to uncover the rigged game. Avoidance of the history in research to promote the facts, points to failure of separation from the dominant ideological fragments that perpetuate instrumental logic.

The contemporary turn in communication scholarship is oriented towards a search for solutions, instead of depth of the theoretical investigations. In relation to the assumptions made in Critical Theory, such trend is in direct relation with capitalism. The prerogatives of capitalism are newness, production, consumption, commodity, which was in early stages by critical theorists marked as threatening factors of inclusion and reproduction of sameness, today flourish in all aspects of communication. Critical analysis explains that social sciences miss the mark of investigation of the whole by

focusing on singular pieces of the puzzle, instead of reflecting at a picture as a whole (Hardt, 2010).

Propositions of change by mere appropriation of the existing through small fragments in either realm of the culture industry or scholarship will fail to emerge. Assumptions of change are working inside the constraints, through actions and language reinforcing the existing structure. Sameness and continuation of the old by addition and implementation of assumptions that built on the existing offer an empty promise. Dismissing a radical critique contributes to the wishful thinking that change can actually emerge from small to a large scale. Even if such thinking likely coming from a social-constructionist or a pragmatist is accurate without understanding acquired through historical analysis and reflection, the prescribed solutions have no potential to improve the system but merely cover up the problems of the structure that produces them.

In a system that is based on reproduction, newness is not a viable option. The way in which the culture industry understands the value of an idea is based on how it applies to the already existing norm. Horkheimer and Adorno's (2002) assumption was that the machine is rotating on the spot (p. 106). The push for new is contradicted by the reliance to only that tested in the past. With the wheels constantly in motion, the change remains as unrealized as false promise of newness. "For only the universal victory of the rhythm of mechanical production and reproduction promises that nothing will change, that nothing unsuitable will emerge" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 107).

Our one-dimensionality had become our one-dimensional rationality (Marcuse, 1964). The understanding of the world under the limited frame dismisses alternative views of understanding. The transcendence of thought in philosophical terms is no longer

necessary for the achieved “enlightened” world. Reason that conquered doubt leaves no mystery to solve. A man had become a part of the process of production and reinforcement of the dominant power. The production narrowed in the un-reflected empirical conduct to benefit the power, under the impression that modes are constantly shifting as an empirical conduct fact of life, making it difficult to decipher capitalism and to imagine alternatives to experiences of “the real.”

Belief that the Enlightenment put a stop to bias and inequality was hopeful, yet critical scholars uncovered the illusion of selective processes and ideologies under which claim making still operated. Regardless of the warnings, the mainstream knowledge production continued the trail of the dominant discourse. The search for the answers is never found in historical reflections or re-interpretations of philosophical content, but is rather an endless goose chase for material reflections of here and now. In communication scholarship, the metaphorical goose chase is a search for answers found in particular social contexts. Problem that had occurred even in the social studies is the reduction of social complexity under the pretenses that a narrow frame through precise methods offers legitimized answers. Nevertheless, such practices dismiss viable influences in a search for greater understanding of human interaction and communication, and instead through practice try to find solutions to communicative actions. Prescriptive methods in communication scholarship are a consequence of production mentality that fosters demand, demand for production and results. Such mentality is old; it belongs to times of the industrial revolution when production became essential. Such a mentality continued as a consequence of a successful preservation that served, and continues to serve, a *particular* purpose. Such a mentality is also unsuccessful, because the continuation of

sameness brings no novelty. Indeed, such a mentality is frozen in time. Removed from history, aspiring for change, but stuck in a same continuous motion, for what purpose? Critical Theory attempted to answer these questions and present possible analysis of a historical development of the world, while accounting for the influences of power that shaped the ideas along the way. An example of a historical undertaking of the Enlightenment was accounted for in the book of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The book created a critical outlook that regarded and integrated different social and philosophical developments for the complex social analysis. As a consequence of historical analysis guided by the will of understanding society and culture, the emerging themes uncovered the explanations of forms of dominance and oppression. Those emerging themes, based on traces of philosophy and history, are useful tools for uncovering yet un-addressed forms of social *meanings*. Themes emerging from *Dialectic of Enlightenment* are still very much relevant as guides to evaluate how contemporary communication scholarship missed a mark on providing thoughtful analysis for these complex structures of society, and through narrowed practices failed to build on or contribute to a rich theory of society.

The most significant example in “classical” Critical Theory is also contemporary. The book *Dialectic of Enlightenment* reflected the oppression of human thought. In the ancient times, the service of meaning making was found in epic tales, in which power, privilege, and inequality were common concepts. Social issues were through the narrative restrained by the rationalization of the normative that served to aid the oppression.

In sum, the field of communication has much to learn from *Dialectic*. This thesis has suggested the following lessons. The Enlightenment implemented instrumental logic

as the principal standard to make scientific claims, not by the case, by insisting on reducing all ideas to facts. Forms of instrumental logic entrapped the social realm in a tight grasp of administrative operations that are emancipatory and repressive. Reason through forms of instrumental logic was reduced to facts limited by the material reality. Dialectics as a form of reason went beyond the immediate and through historical analysis was able to detangle the bonds of contradictions of the Enlightenment reason.

Reason trapped in the material also guided the formation of the physical world and world of experience. The culture industry for example perpetually works in order to satisfy the existing structure. It continuously promises novelty and pleasure, while continuously cheating its consumers of achieving them. The production of continuous sameness serves to perpetuate the dominant capitalistic totality. Totality of production crossed over to the realm of social studies where instrumental logic fragmented ideas into taken for granted forms. Communication studies show its relationship to power when it provides economically stimulating research. The practice that takes for granted the social structure as natural conforms to the ideas of the dominant and works to perpetuate the existing without reflection of the emancipatory practices. In relationship with capitalism, production means progress, and economic stimuli means success. Instrumental orientation to social research in general, communication in particular, fails to provide a better understanding of the social, fails to add to the development of theory of society. In the logic of production, Critical Theory fails to satisfy the needs of consumers, fails to support the dominant, and even fails to avoid questions for the betterment of society that would draw attention to emancipatory works of power. As such, the theory of communication, Hardt (2010) explains, is ever more distant from contemporary research.

The continuation of instrumental research in communication scholarship means a lack of reflection of its practices, and ossifies communication concepts. Concepts of communication have great potential in an instrumentalized world, not to transform society, but to naively repeat the course of history by suppressing emancipatory tendencies through power and domination. Commodification in the realm of communication scholarship is dangerous as much as it is conflicting with ideas of progress. “Progress” for Critical Theory is only possible in continuous engagements with the historical as guides for a better future. In efforts to achieve a better, more encompassing understanding of the social, the continuous investigation of dialectical tensions must take the form of a theory of society. That would be a transformative understanding of reason and logic that assumes the potential for social transformation.

Of course, there is more to learn from Critical Theory. But the failure to see communication research as an expression of the instrumentalizing impulses of capitalism is a failure that at least one key book, renewed for the 21st century, warns against.

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