Evidentiality in the Uto-Aztecan Languages

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CHAPTER 20

EVIDENTIALITY IN THE UTO-AZTECAN LANGUAGES

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20.1. INTRODUCTION

20.1.1. Preliminary remarks

Evidentiality, the grammatical expression of the information source for a proposition, is quite diverse among the languages of the Uto-Aztecan family. This diversity is manifest both in the number of terms and associated functional distinctions and in the formal means used to express evidential functions. The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize and describe properties of evidential expression across the family both as a contribution to a typology of evidential systems in the world's languages and to an understanding of how such systems develop in the context of a well-established, but underrepresented and lesser-known, language family.

Evidential systems in Uto-Aztecan range from the single term expression of the non-eyewitness, indirect, or reportative type to those that have been purported to express four or more distinctions. At least two languages in the family, Cupeño (Takic) and Southeastern Tepehuan (Tepiman), are reported to carry morphological markers of mirativity as well (Hill 2005; García Salido 2014b). All the languages surveyed in this chapter appear to mark, at a minimum, reported information, either with a dedicated reportative marker or as the extension of a quotative particle. Most of the languages also carry an overt

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1 I would like to thank Sasha Aikhenvald, Willem de Reuse, Gabriela García Salido, Jane Hill, John McLaughlin, and Yolanda Valdez Jara for their supportive and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, while taking full responsibility for any mistakes or misguided interpretations that remain.

2 Mirativity indicates typically that the information expressed is new and generally surprising to the speaker (DeLancey 1997). Although often described as part of an evidential system (and can functionally overlap with it), miratives have been demonstrated in a number of languages to be agnostic with regard to information source.
marker of inference as the information source. Very few languages express firsthand perceptual experience as a dedicated grammatical category, and only two in this survey are known to overtly mark direct evidence. Rather, the majority carry no marking either as the default for direct, firsthand experience or as simply demonstrating that the nature of the evidence is unspecified.

As a point of clarification, I utilize the term ‘quotative’ when referring to an element, usually a particle, whose function is to mark directly quoted material when the author of that material is known. Quotative particles frequently accompany an actual speech act verb, and often derive historically from such a verb. In contrast, I take ‘reportative’ to indicate a form that is more clearly evidential in function in that it may not indicate an actual speech act, but rather the source of information as indirect, involving hearsay. Such forms are often translated as ‘it is said’ or ‘they say’ without a definite or clearly specified source. The same form may carry both quotative and reportative functions, as in Northern Paiute (§20.2.1), but there may also be a formal distinction between the two, as we see in Yaqui (§20.7.1).

Mode of expression of evidentials in Uto-Aztecan is also somewhat heterogenous, both within a single language and across the family, where we find forms as 1) part of the verbal inflectional complex (generally as suffixes in the same inflectional zone as aspect and mood marking—that is, following the stem and any derivational affixes, but preceding any subordinating morphology), 2) part of the (mostly) pan-Uto-Aztecan auxiliary (aux) complex (frequently appearing in syntactic second position), and 3) part of a set of non-inflecting particles, sometimes phonologically bound as clitics (mostly following their hosts) at clausal or prosodic boundaries.

20.1.2. Uto-Aztecan languages

The unity of the Uto-Aztecan language family has been well-established, and the unity of the major subgroups is reasonably well settled. There remains, however, a degree of inconclusiveness as to mid-level groupings, and so the relationships between the branches remain a topic of ongoing research and debate. The idea of a primary split of the family into two main branches, Northern and Southern, has long held sway. The details of the family’s internal structure lies well outside the scope of this chapter. I will organize my discussion of evidentials in Uto-Aztecan languages around six established subgroups, consisting each of at least two (Coracholan) and as many as seven (Numic) languages, as well as two singletons (Tubatulabal and Hopi³).

Uto-Aztecan languages span a large geographical area stretching from eastern Oregon in the United States to the north, to El Salvador in the south. Figure 20.1 illustrates the approximate distributional range of the major subgroupings of the Uto-Aztecan family.

³ Little is known about the extinct language Tubar, a purported singleton nestled geographically amid Taracahitian languages, and nothing I have found bears directly on the issues at hand, so it will not be discussed further.
FIGURE 20.1. Geographical distribution of the Uto-Aztecan languages (from Merrill 2013)

On the whole, I have aimed for balanced coverage in terms of the inclusion of material on evidentiality in languages from each of the subgroups. Truly balanced coverage has been hampered by the fact that 1) my own knowledge and experience with the languages of the family favours its northernmost, Numic branch, and 2) my ability to derive reasonably detailed information about evidentiality and evidentials from the available descriptive material results in a certain degree of unevenness.

The latter problem is addressed at various points in this chapter by critically assessing whether or not a form defined in a source as a marker of evidentiality truly has evidentiality as its primary function, or whether, as is often the case, epistemic modality is primary, with evidentiality 'coming along for the ride,' as it were. Alternatively, it is sometimes also the case that what is clearly an evidential marker is not identified as such.
20.2. Numic

The Numic branch of Uto-Aztecan represents the family's northernmost reach. It, in turn, consists of three sub-branches, Western, Central, and Southern, each consisting of two or three languages. The discussion that follows includes information from all three branches of Numic.

Of the three branches, Southern Numic languages have received the most attention where evidentiality is concerned. Munro's (1978) study of Chemehuevi as a point of departure for describing the development and renewal of quotatives across Uto-Aztecan as well as Bunte's (1979) important work on Southern Paiute notwithstanding, there remains a need for more intensive, discourse-centered work on evidentiality across Numic.

I will proceed north to south, however, beginning with a look at the Western branch through Northern Paiute—the language I know best and upon which I have conducted ongoing documentary field and archival work.4

20.2.1. Northern Paiute (Western Numic)

Northern Paiute, according to Thornes (2003), has no dedicated system of evidentiality. In the context of more recent, definitive typological work, however, it is clear that the language does, in fact, grammatically mark information source in two distinct subsystems—its second position clitics and its discourse particles.

In Northern Paiute, the evidence for the quotative particle mi(ʔi) developing properties of a reportative evidential stems from examples like the following, where one occurrence fulfills its role as a quotative and a second is left to carry the (presumably newer) reportative function.

(1) "60?no=sa?a ni ka=tipi atasu yikʷi-tua-ti,' at.the.time=MOD I OBL=earth different make-INCH-NOMZ mi=yaisi inakʷi mi QUOT =then reply QUOT/REP 'Then I shall change the earth,' is what he said, they say.
In its typical quotative function, *mi(ʔi)* appears in concert most frequently with an utterance verb, like ‘tell’ or ‘say.’ This is a defining property of the quotative construction as described in languages across the family. In Northern Paiute, we find *mi(ʔi)* with thoughts (‘internal speech’) as well, in which case it appears with verbs of cognition.

(2) *owi-u watsi-kwi mi sunami-na*

DEM-U hide.SG-FUT QUOT think-PARTIC

‘(I) will hide in there,’ so (she was) thinking.

Reportative evidentials can develop into carriers of epistemic uncertainty or doubt, thereby allowing speakers to ‘shift responsibility’ (Aikhenvald 2004a: 193) away from themselves for the information contained in the message. The frequent use of the quotative particle in traditional storytelling in Northern Paiute may actually serve to assign that responsibility to a higher authority. That authority is the story itself, or perhaps its ancestral source. This helps explain in part why the best raconteurs use the particle so frequently and invoke authenticity (and veracity) as a result.

(3) *u-su isa ka=tiipi manimitu nooʔo-ko mi*

3-NOM wolf OBL=earth create all-OBL QUOT/REP

That one, Wolf, created the earth, all of it, they say.

(4) *hauka yaʔi-si pi-kʷal-tu ti=mia-na mi ti=natikʷina-na*

somehow die.SG-SEQ RESTR-AREA-LOC 1.INCL=go-PARTIC QUOT our=stories-PARTIC

(It) may be, when we die, that is where we go to, our stories say.

In the first example, authority is unassigned. It is later clarified by the second example as the story itself. Without this stylistic device, one risks sounding as though the claim for authority rests with the teller, rather than with the myth or its ancestral source.

Evidentiality in Northern Paiute also involves a modest set of second position enclitics. At least two forms, =*ka (=ga)* and =*kainə (=gainə)*, express inference as the source of information for the proposition. The shorter form, =*ka*, expresses both inference and at least some degree of epistemic uncertainty. In the context of example (5), the narrator has been describing the sound a mother antelope makes when signalling danger to her offspring. The source of the inference is some form of sensory evidence, either visual or auditory.

(5) *tami=ga u=tsagiʔyu-na*

we.INCL=INFER 3=near-NOM-PARTIC

We must be close to it(s baby) …

Example (6) involves inference based upon common knowledge, as opposed to sensory input.

(6) *uu=tiaʔ kassa-ɣyu miʔi, pabaʔyu=ga*

so=thusly wing-HAVE QUOT big-NOM=INFER

… they say (it, the Flying Creature) had wings like that; must be big ones …
In Thornes (2003: 329), I describe the longer =kaina form as involving a 'reaction to an inferred possibility,' as demonstrated by the following examples from narrative:

(7) kidi=gaina mayi-u-si.
    groundhog=INFER/MIR find-PNC-SEQ
    (She) may have found a groundhog!

(8) oo=kaina mi=tiya?i-pi miu ta na-ni-naka-ki-ti
    so=INFER/MIR PL=die.SG-PFV QUOT 1.DU MID-IP/speech-hear-APPLIC-TNS
    Perhaps those who have passed on want us to hear them.

In example (7), the speaker is recounting past events, quoting herself in the context of suddenly hearing the family dog's bark during a root-digging expedition with her family. The speaker in example (8) is describing for the benefit of her listeners how she and others had heard the voices of their ancestors conversing on the wind. In both of these examples, the speaker was not necessarily hedging on certainty, but rather was expressing that the information contained in the main proposition was newly realized or surprising—a very mirative-like function. Sapir (1930: 89) analyses a similar form, -gainia, in Southern Paiute as indicating 'unexpected inference'; a description that also strikes a mirative chord. The proper analysis of the Northern Paiute forms appears to be as evidentials marking inference, with one also analysable as a mirative strategy in certain contexts. Mirativity has been attested in at least two other Uta-Aztecan languages, namely, Cupeño (Takic) and Southeastern Tepehuan (Tepiman). These are discussed in §20.5.1 and §20.6.2, respectively.

20.2.2. Shoshoni and Comanche (Central Numic)

Dayley's (1989a) description of Tumpisa Shoshone includes, among a set of 'modal adverbs,' the quotative particle mii, clearly cognate with Northern Paiute mi(?i), and carrying a similar set of functional and distributional properties. The particle follows either 1) direct quotes (the quotative function) or 2) 'generally accepted truths which people talk about (Dayley, 1989a: 313).' The use of the quotative following direct quotes and in combination with a following speech act verb appears most frequently in the data Dayley provides, but one does find that it has crossed the line into reportative evidential territory in examples like the following from Dayley (1989b: 101):

(9) so?oppüh üma-na toyapi mii
    much rain-PARTIC mountain QUOT
    They say it rains a lot in the mountains.

5 Recently, in discussing a traditional narrative involving the monster nimidzoho (lit. People-Crusher), one of the conversants exclaimed: ha?u paba?y=Gaina, usu nimidzoho? 'How big was that People-Crusher?' asserting both surprise and dismay at what the creature was capable of, as opposed to making a simple request for information.
In Western Shoshoni, the cognate particle *mee* (alt. *mai*) is ubiquitous in narrative. Silver and Miller (1997: 38) claim that, as a reportative evidential particle, it is an obligatory marker of every clause in traditional Shoshoni narrative. This stylistic feature is similarly described for reportatives across Uto-Aztecan (e.g. Tiibatulabal and Southeastern Tepehuan). In most cases, the reportative appears to be used when the speaker wishes to abdicate or displace responsibility for the veracity of the information being conveyed. In Southeastern Tepehuan, the reportative particle pervades all genres of speech, from traditional narrative to casual conversation and gossip. In Northern Paiute, as previously stated, the use of the reportative particle may actually serve to strengthen the veracity of the information by assigning a higher authority as source of information, in keeping with a set of cultural beliefs that strongly values the knowledge contained in traditional stories.

Comanche is described by Charney (1993) as having both an obviously cognate quotative particle *me* and a particle marking inference of the form *kia*. As *me* 'occurs with and without verbs of speaking;' (Charney 1993: 189), one may assume that, as described elsewhere in Numic, it covers both quotative and reportative evidential functions. The inferential *kia* is associated with varying degrees of epistemic uncertainty, reflecting a speaker's judgement, but, like inferentials elsewhere, does not occur with the first person singular. As we will see in the next section, however, such a co-occurrence may nevertheless lend a mirative reading to the proposition.

Interestingly, analysis by McLaughlin (1984) of an older corpus of Comanche texts focuses on the suffix *-ki*, which McLaughlin finds with great frequency in texts that regard situations outside the speaker's direct experience. Although also found suffixed to *me* (the quotative discussed in Charney (1993)), McLaughlin's focus is on the development of *-ki* as both quotative and what he calls a 'discourse evidential' across the four subgroups that constitute Northern Uto-Aztecan. His work provides important support for the cycle of development and renewal described throughout the family by Munro (1978).

### 20.2.3. Colorado River Numic

Miller, Elzinga, and McLaughlin (2005) advocates for the renaming of the Ute-Southern Paiute-Chemehuevi dialect chain as 'Colorado River Numic'(CRN). This eliminates the artificial separation of what, by some measures, are mutually intelligible, if quite divergent, regional varieties. The evidential forms found in one or another variety most certainly predate CRN, and likely Southern Numic (perhaps even Numic) as well. Sapir's classic (1930) Southern Paiute work, amplified and clarified in later work by Bunte (1979),

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6 A third particle, *tia*, is discussed by Charney (1993: 186–8) as a 'narrative onset particle,' while Canonge (1958) typically translates it as 'it is said.' (Thanks to John McLaughlin for alerting me to this.) I include it here for comparative interest, since one also finds a similarly formed quotative suffix, *-tea*, in Sonora Yaqui (cf. §20.7.1).

7 McLaughlin's proposed reconstruction of the quotative-reportative *mii* in Northern Paiute (and its cognates across Numic) as a combination of a demonstrative *ma* plus one of several reconstructed verbs of speaking *ya* in Uto-Aztecan is intriguing, but still merits more support. Bethel et al. (1993), for example, list *mihaei* in Western Mono as a full verb meaning 'say,' thereby completing a developmental pathway along which the demonstrative is not needed and is in keeping with patterns of renewal noted elsewhere in the family.
demonstrates the presence of an inference-based evidential with tinges of mirativity as well as a quotative-reportative.

Quotative particles and their historical relationships to one or another Proto-Uto-Aztecan word for 'say' have been thoroughly and convincingly described in Munro (1978), with Chemehuevi as a starting point. The Southern Paiute particle y’a functions as a quotative. The evidence for its functioning as a reportative evidential is scant, but a more thorough exploration of texts would clarify whether its broader patterns of use are in keeping with pan-Numic and general Uto-Aztecan trends.

Inferential particles are also found in Southern Paiute. Under a section entitled 'enclitics of modal and sentence-connective significance,' Sapir (1930: 89) describes a form -gainia 'too; also' as having a 'frequent modal use ... to indicate a somewhat unexpected inference,' making it both formally and functionally akin to Northern Paiute =kaina, described in §20.2.1.

Bunte (1979) describes at least one of a set of verbal suffixes (or enclitics) that mark evidentiality in Southern Paiute. Featured prominently in her thesis is the verbal suffix/enclitic -kai (likely a contracted version of -kainia), whose function is that of an inference-based evidential, illustrated by contrasting pairs such as the following:

(10)  a. aipac-un / kamunci / pakanju-ka
      boy-ART / rabbit.OBL / kill.SG-EVID

   b. aipac-un / kamunci / pakanju-ča-ŋw
      boy-ART / rabbit.OBL / kill.SG-PAST-3sg.INV

The boy killed the rabbit.

In (9a), the evidence upon which the speaker bases her statement is inference, perhaps seeing the visual evidence of the dead rabbit coupled with knowledge of the shooting habits of a particular boy. By contrast, (10b) is based upon the fact that the speaker actually saw the boy shoot the rabbit and is simply relaying the fact of this past event to the listener. Direct experience, Bunte assumes, is simply unmarked in Southern Paiute.

It is interesting that Bunte (1979: 131) also describes the enclitic -ča ‘PAST’ as referring 'to information learned through direct sensory experience,' thus providing a functional counterpart to the inferential -kai, and what one finds in many three-term evidential systems. Since all of her examples of -ča corroborate an interpretation as a past-tense marker, however, it is unclear whether it can indeed be described as a direct visual/sensory evidential.

Note the following contrastive pair with a first person participant:

(10)  c. taxuyal-ča-ni. d taxuyal-kai-ni.
      thirsty-PAST-1sg   thirsty-EVID-1sg
      I became thirsty.   I was obviously thirsty.

In (10c), the speaker has direct sensory evidence of their own physical state. The (10b) example, by contrast, is described by Bunte as follows. ‘... when a Paiute friend picked up a glass of water ... [and] ... quickly drank up the water' (1979: 131) without being fully aware that they would do so. It would therefore appear to be the case that the Southern Paiute inferential marker takes on a very mirative-like function in conjunction with a first person participant. Presumably, the speaker otherwise has direct evidence for states experienced
firsthand, and so when the experience is unexpected or surprising, the speaker refers to it as gained through inference.

Bunte's observations regarding the inferential -kai extend to its distribution. Firstly, she observes that it commonly occurs with verbs of perception. This makes sense, she concludes, since one cannot readily bear witness to the perceptions of others. As we have seen, one also requires inference in matters pertaining to one's own experience when that information is somehow unexpected, new, or surprising.

The inferential in Southern Paiute is also not restricted with respect to tense. In particular, one finds it co-occurring with the future, essentially casting a future possibility as a prediction based on an assessment of the available evidence.

Secondly, Bunte (1979: 134) explores the distribution of -kai against clause type or speech act. She notes that ‘-kai is not usually used with the negative ... (T)he only exception to this seems to be that some negative imperatives do use -kai.’ As far as I can determine from the discussion and examples she provides, the function of inferential -kai in the context of the prohibitive is to stop the addressee from continuing to do something the speaker has evidence to infer that they have already begun doing. Compare:

(11) kaču-ak kani-ar pini-?ap
    not-3.VIS house.NOM-ART see-NEG
    Don't look at the house.

(12) kaču-ak kani-ar pini-kai-ap-ak
    not-3.VIS house.NOM-ART see-EVID-NEG-3.VIS
    Stop looking at the house.

The contrast is thus between a prohibitive ‘don't V(erb)’ and an arrestive ‘stop V(erb)ing.’ The interaction of evidentiality and non-declarative speech acts merits a great deal more exploration, as does its use with future/irrealis situations more broadly.

20.3. TÜBATULABAL

Titubatulabal has historically been considered a singleton within Northern Uto-Aztecan and is not described as carrying a system of evidential markers per se. This stems mainly, perhaps, from the lack of a modern, comprehensive grammatical description. Voegelin (1935: 171) does describe, however, in a section on ‘Particles: what he calls a ‘quotative conjunctive particle, -k!g idia ... attached to some (sic) word in the sentence for indirect discourse.’ This particle, or, perhaps more properly, enclitic, is translated in the description as ‘it is said’; as one might expect of a reportative evidential. From a distributional standpoint, we see it appearing in second position following a connective (‘then’ or ‘and’) and clause-finally following the main verb, as in the following:

(13) hani:p kima-kidža
    house-his come-QUOT
    It is said he is coming home.
This distribution is similar to that described for Cupéno's main reportative evidential enclitic -ku'ut (Hill 2005: 64).

Also of interest in Voegelin's (1935: 171) description is another particle, -gi't, (actually, a contracted speech act verb) that is, in narrative speech, 'attached with a frequency which gives a peculiar stylistic effect; generally every third word, sometimes every word or every second word directly quoted.' This 'peculiar stylistic effect' is of course reminiscent of that described for Shoshoni and other languages (both within and without the Uto-Aztecan family), but to an even higher degree of frequency.8 The available material on Tubatulabal is not complete enough to determine with certainty whether or not other evidential distinctions, in particular, ones marking inference, are present in the language. Munro (1978) draws a connection between this frequent conjunctive particle -gi't in Tubatulabal and the Cupéno reportative evidential enclitic -ku'ut.

20.4. Hopi

The Hopi language, another singleton under Northern Uto-Aztecan, carries both a hearsay/quotative particle yaw (14c) in contrast with an inferential particle (14b) kur (Hill and Black 1998: 892). Hill and Black also include the particle kya (14d) in the set as marking a statement that is based on conjecture—a variety of inferential that does not require physical evidence. Direct, firsthand evidence is unmarked (14a) in Hopi.

\[(14)\]
\[
a. \text{ isikwi hovåati} \quad \text{My meat spoiled.} \\
b. \text{ isikwi kur hovåati} \quad \text{My meat seems to have spoiled.} \\
c. \text{ isikwi yaw hovåati} \quad \text{I hear my meat spoiled.} \\
d. \text{ isikwi kya hovåati} \quad \text{(I'm afraid) my meat may have spoiled.} \\
\]

It is important to note that these 'modal' particles may appear anywhere in the sentence and are not restricted to second position. Further, to this point I have addressed the unmarked case in evidential systems as the unspecified case, where information source is concerned. Aikhenvald (2004a: 75ff) discusses this concern in some detail. In this chapter, I am mainly reporting from the available resources on the languages, and so do not claim an evidential value for the unmarked case unless the source explicitly expresses one.

The quotative yaw is clearly cognate with Southern Paiute yâ and with speech act verbs elsewhere in Uto-Aztecan, e.g. Cupéno (cf. example (15) in §20.5.1) and Luiseño yax. It is also very likely the case that the Northern Paiute conjunctive particle yaisi also fits within this complex historical scenario involving a Proto-Uto-Aztecan verb of speaking. In the Northern Paiute case, such a verb rendered in its non-final form (the suffix -si marks a sequential converb) has come to mean 'and then; so' and is, like reportative evidential

8 One cannot help but wonder here whether or not this high frequency of use of what I would term the quotative particle in Tubatulabal might not be an artifact of the recording of the texts, which were dictated to Voegelin. It is at least possible that the speaker's rate of speech was meant to accommodate the linguist, and that the particle marks a prosodic (phrasal) or phonological word boundary.
particles elsewhere, ubiquitous in narrative, but without the evidential associations typical of them. The rise of mii as a quotative/reportative particle in the Western and Central branches of Numic can thereby be motivated.

It is interesting to note that there is also possible cognacy between Hopi's inferential kur and the Cupeno reportative enclitic =ku'ut, despite their seemingly disparate functions. Michael (2015) describes a taxonomy of evidential systems similar to that of Willett (1988) within which the reportative and inferential functions fall under a broader category of information source, namely that of indirect evidence.

20.5. TAKIC

Takic consists of two branches, Cupan and Serranan, and possibly a third, if one distinguishes Tongva (Gabrielino) from Serranan (Jane Hill p.c.) The following analysis is based upon the most detailed descriptive material currently available.

20.5.1. Cupeño (Cupan)

In her comprehensive description of Cupeño, Hill (2005) notes evidentiality appearing as part of the language's elaborate system of second position (en)clitics in a zone often characterized as the auxiliary (aux) complex in Uto-Aztecan studies. In initial position of this clitic complex one finds the reportative evidential =ku'ut, the mirative =(a)m, and the dubitative =she. Although Hill (2005: 66) places all three into a single evidential category, appearing in first position of the auxiliary clitic complex, only the reportative appears to have information source as its primary function. The mirative is used to express 'unimpeachable firsthand knowledge where the speaker is usually speaking at the moment of discovery.' The dubitative appears primarily to express a low degree of epistemic certainty.

There are several formal-distributional properties that distinguish the truly evidential =ku'ut from the others as well. Firstly, it does not (cannot) appear with other clitics in the same auxiliary complex, but can appear more than once in a single sentence. It favours second position, and is found 'most commonly ... cliticized to the discourse particle me' (Hill 2005: 64) translated as 'and.'

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9 I would like to thank Jane and Ken Hill for sharing their work-in-progress manuscript on Takic clitics. This section owes a great deal to their diachronic insights and to the section on 'the Cupeño auxiliary complex in comparative perspective' in Hill (2005: 93–104).

10 From Steele (1979: 446), 'the AUX of Proto-Uto-Aztecan contained elements marking the notional categories of Modality (modal particles), Tense (tense clitics), and the number and person of the subject of the sentence (clitic pronouns).’ The reconstruction of AUX to Proto-Uto-Aztecan is challenged in Hill (2005: 94), who assesses it as an areal phenomenon. The issues involved are very complex and lie well outside the scope of the present paper.

11 One cannot help but remark upon the formal similarity this particle has to the Numic quotative-reportative particle and whose pattern of distribution is strikingly similar to Tübatulabal's conjunctive particle -k/güža. The vowel of the particle is subject to vowel harmony, as seen here.
This example, from Hill (2005: 66), illustrates two patterns of reportative clitic distribution, syntactic second position and clause-finally. When it appears clause-finally in narrative, it serves a cohesive purpose by chaining one clause to the next. Also, as described in §20.2.1 for Northern Paiute, the reportative can serve to boost the veracity of narrative content. In discourse, as Hill (2005: 46ff) describes, the frequent presence of the reportative and the variability of its use are tied to genre and point of view, which can be shifted through its strategic deployment. Further, when narratives of certain genres reach their peak, reportatives are symbolically absent, lending a sort of firsthand immediacy to the description of unfolding events in Cupeño. More detailed descriptions of such usage patterns in discourse are essential for a comprehensive typology of evidentials.

20.5.2. Luiseño (Cupan)

Under a section describing ‘syntactic enclitics,’ Kroeber and Grace (1966: 66ff) describe the quotative kunu- (with allomorphs kono- and kun-), cognate with the Cupeño reportative enclitic =ku’ut and carrying the same reportative evidential function, as in the following:

(16) pi?=kunu nakmuk pom-teela-y
and=REP hear 3.PL-speech-ACC
It is said he understood their speech.

Luiseño =kunu (listed as kuna ‘it is said’ in Hyde (1971: 225)), along with other clitics pertaining broadly to mood, appear in the first of four positions within the system of ‘composite enclitics,’ a phrase that captures well the widespread auxiliary (aux) complex in Uto-Aztecan. This composite, in turn, appears in syntactic second position in the clause, as in the sister Cupan language Cupeño and numerous other Uto-Aztecan languages.12

20.5.3. Serrano

Kenneth Hill, in work with some of the last speakers of Serrano (Hill 1967: 17), applies the term ‘evidential’ in a very broad sense, thus including forms whose primary functions lie beyond the coding of information source. As a strategy for unifying a subset of formal categories, appearing as verbal suffixes with fixed rules of attachment, boundary phenomena, morphophonemic properties, etc., Hill defines evidentials as ‘... specify[ing] the validity of the statement.’

12 Notably, in O’odham, the composite itself serves as the host to other second position enclitics, namely, the modals.
If one restricts the definition of evidential to those forms that have as their primary function the coding of information source, a simpler subsystem emerges that also accounts for some of the distributional facts. Chief among these are restrictions on the co-occurrence of the quotative kwana and inferential xa particles. Although they may both co-occur with the dubitative ta, they may never themselves co-occur—a formal restriction explicable on a functional basis. The dubitative, from a functional perspective, centres more on epistemic modality rather than information source. On this basis, I would assume only that Serrano has a system of evidentiality that is typical of what we see elsewhere in the family, namely a two- or three-term system, reportative and inferential, with direct evidence formally unmarked.

### 20.6. TEPIMAN

The Tepiman branch of Uto-Aztecan includes two major sub-branches, Piman and Tepehuanic. Here we explore one language from each branch, one of which appears to have a more fine-grained evidential system than any other language in the family.

#### 20.6.1. O’odham

O’odham\(^{13}\) sentences often begin with a clitic complex (the AUX, cf. fn.10) which includes the evidential marker -ki. This form follows the subject pronominal and tense marking. The complex itself forms a constituent that may include the second position modal enclitic, as in examples (17)–(18) (Saxton 1982: 128).

\[(17) \text{n-t-ki } \text{hims wo } \text{čikp-ō} \]
\[\text{I-TNS-EVID MOD } \text{FUT work-PFV}\]
\[\text{I evidently should have worked.}\]

The actual information source associated with the evidential -ki in (18a) is not specified in the description, although there are clues, comparative and language internal, to infer its general function. Contrasting it with the quotative -s in (18b) and the 0-(un)marked 'experiential' forms in (18c) (plus a comparative analysis of O’odham’s nearest relatives) provides the necessary background to support a reasonably clear analysis of evidentiality in O’odham.

\[(18) \text{a. am a-t-ki } \text{juu-ō} \]
\[\text{LOC MOD-TNS-EVID rain-PFV}\]
\[\text{It evidently rained there.}\]

\[\text{b. am a-t-ś } \text{juu-ō} . \]
\[\text{LOC MOD-TNS-QUOT rain-PFV}\]
\[\text{It reportedly rained there.}\]

\(^{13}\) A cover term for both Papago and Pima within Upper Piman, the data in this section are from Papago.
Based on these examples and what is found throughout the family, in particular in other Tepiman languages like Southeastern Tepehuan (cf. García Salido 2014a,b), I would assume that -ki functions primarily as an inferential evidential marker. Example (18a) would be uttered if the speaker had witnessed evidence of rain, but not the actual occurrence. In case the source of information is second hand or hearsay, (18b) is appropriate. Lastly, (18c) exemplifies the unmarked direct experience case.  

20.6.2. Southeastern Tepehuan

García Salido (2014b) describes the Southeastern Tepehuan (also known as O’dam) language as having five particles that distinguish information source plus pix, a marker of mirativity. The different evidential functions include two reportative particles—sap for unknown information and sak for information known to the speech act participants—bak (~tak), a particle marking inference, a direct evidential particle dhu (~dho), and pui, indicating that the information source involved sensory input.  

Examples from this system include the following, taken from Willett (1988, 1991):

(19) ma?n mupai? sap kloka' gu ma?nkam
one over.there REPI/EVID lived the person
It’s told that a man once lived in those parts.

(20) pai? na sak pui? titi? Jaara/šja?m
there that REP2/EVID thus called crab.on
There where it’s called Crab Place.

(21) vahli bak kugi
COMPL.went INFER AFFIRMATIVE
Then he must have left.

(22) tukua? dho
DISTR.eat DIR.EVID
He's eating (reponse to question).

14 Jane Hill, in personal communication, suggests another one, =p, meaning something like ‘must have’ as in this lovely AUX clitic string at=t=s=p=ki ‘I guess they say we must have . . . (lived there).’
The documentation of two (or in this case, three) evidential markers is somewhat uncommon in Uto-Aztecan, as elsewhere, but not unheard of, as Valdez Jara (2013: 197) also reports for Urique Tarahumara.

15 Gabriela García Salido, in personal communication, hesitates to assign pui’ to ‘true evidential’ status, indicating that it seems to encode ‘veracity of information’ instead, which, as we see in other evidential systems, may impinge upon the evidential domain by extension from its primarily epistemic value. Willett (1991: 162) does not include pui’ among the evidential particles he describes for the language.
The reportative (unknown to listener) *sap*, is used to indicate that the information was acquired indirectly, and is otherwise unreliable. The uncertainty expressed by the speaker is enhanced iconically by its frequency in the discourse (García Salido 2014b: 101). This particle is also used in combination with a speech act verb to indicate an indirect quotation. A second reportative, *sak*, somewhat unusually indicates that the information being conveyed, although acquired secondhand, is already known to both the speaker and the listener, and therefore its validity is not in question, as it is with *sap*. Willett (1988: 69) calls this 'thirdhand evidence.'

The particle *bak* (or *tak*) is used to indicate that the speaker infers the truth of the information based upon firsthand experience, generally of some sort of sensory input (seeing, hearing, smelling, etc.). The 'direct evidential' particle *dhu/dho*, by comparison, appears to be used with firsthand statements of fact and is, García Salido claims, mandatory unless the actor in the proposition is first person. Presumably, the speaker would not be reporting their involvement in the proposition as hearsay. This particle appears closest to what Aikhenvald (2004a) describes as an eyewitness evidential.

The particle *pui'*, glossed by Willett in example (20) simply as 'thus', properly belongs to a 'modal' category, according to García Salido (2014b: 105–7). Its use entails the sensory experience of the speaker as participant in the events coded or certainty on the part of the speaker that the events involving a third person actually occurred. This latter use provides a kind of counterpoint to the reportative-unknown particle *sap*, which may rather be used to defer responsibility. Although atypical as a marker of evidentiality, elsewhere (García Salido 2014a; García Salido and Reyes 2011) it is included in the evidential system of Southeastern Tepehuan (but see fn. 15). It is formally distinct from the other evidentials in its capacity to be encliticized to other particles.

The mirative particle *pix*, although not evidential per se, is included here, since miratives often exhibit functional overlap with evidential markers of inference. It marks surprising or unexpected information (often interpreted as a sudden occurrence).

(23) Dai na-gu' añ na-ñich mu xi-chiti na-pai’
only SUBORD-ADVZ 1SG.SU SUBORD=1SG.SU.PFV DIR IMP-see SUBORD-ADVZ
gu sudai’ gu tu’ marui pix ba=x-miji
DET water DET something cockroach MIR COMPL=COP-inside
Then I looked out where the water was (coffee), and there was a cockroach!

García Salido reports that the sensorial *pui'*, particle and the mirative frequently co-occur in discourse, apparently to assert both the speaker's responsibility regarding the veracity of the information and the unexpected nature of it.

(24) pui' pix jup-tu-ja-ajim
SENS MIR ITER-DUR-3R/R/M-arrive.sick
They got sick suddenly.

In summary, then, Southeastern Tepehuan appears to be unusual among languages of the Uto-Aztecan family, both in the number of terms (four plus a mirative) and in the fact that direct, eyewitness evidence is overtly marked in the language.
20.7. TARACAHITIC

The following discussion incorporates information from the two main branches of Taracahitic, Tarahumaran, and Cahita. We will look first at Yaqui (also known in the literature as Yoeme) before turning to available information from several sources on Tarahumaran languages.

20.7.1. Yaqui

Dedrick and Casad (1996) label two verbal suffixes in Sonora Yaqui ‘quotative,’ -tea and -roka. The quotative suffix -tea (143ff) is variously translated as ‘they say’ or ‘is named.’ I was able to find only one example of the suffix supporting a clearly reportative function.

(25) ‘au bamfh-tua-me lâuti muk-née-’e-tea
      REFL hurry-CAUS-NOMZ soon die-FUT-E.V.-QUOT
They say that one who hurries will die soon.

Based upon the available material on the language, however, the primary function of -tea is not clearly one that identifies information source. In closely related Mayo, there appears to be a cognate particle ‘teewa, which carries a reportative function in two of the first three lines of an illustrative text (Burnham 1984: 57), one which appears here as example (26):

(26) xu? ‘gwo?i ii’xan ‘tuisi te’ba?ore-y ‘teewa
      DEM coyote COP much hunger.have-IMPERV QUOT
The Coyote was very hungry (it is said).

Another Sonora Yaqui verbal suffix, -roka, is labelled quotative as well, but appears only to mark the main verb in an indirect quote complement, and so does not appear to carry a reportative evidential function. Given the cycle of renewal in the speech act verb > quotative > reportative sequence of development described by Munro (1978), I include it here, particularly since it could bear a historical relationship to the reportative evidential enclitic =ra in Tarahumara. The two Yaqui suffixes labelled ‘quotative’ by Dedrick and Casad (1996) would thus represent an early stage in the renewal of a reportative evidential.

16 A third branch, consisting of the extinct language Opata (also known as Tegüima), has received extensive treatment in Lombardo’s (1702) grammar, recently edited by Guzmán Betancourt (2009). The source appears promising, and ought to provide, upon closer inspection, some fruitful insights for comparison. A particle ma is described (Libro Quinto, Section XVIII, p. 265) as following the first word and is approximated to the archaic Spanish expression dizque, ‘it is said,’ a reportative evidential function. Subject pronouns also appear attached to it as suffixes or enclitics, forming an aux-like structure. I am profoundly grateful to Willem de Reuse for making me aware of this interesting resource, although, due to time and space constraints, I will not discuss it further.

17 In this and other resources, especially those involving texts, one finds that reportative evidentials often go unrepresented in the translation, presumably for stylistic reasons.
20.7.2. Tarahumaran

Urique Tarahumara (Rarómuri), according to Valdez Jara (2013) has three clear evidential distinctions, which she treats as verbal enclitics. These are a reportative =ra, and inferential =re, and an auditory =cane, which Caballero (2008: 109), in her description of Choguita Rarámuri, associates historically with a verb form meaning to 'make noise; say.'

The reportative =ra demonstrates typical quotative functions with specified information sources and accompanying speech act verbs as well as evidential functions with unspecified, secondhand information through hearsay. Caballero (2008: 425) illustrates a rather unusual same subject versus different subject allomorphs of the reportative enclitic (=ra versus =ra, respectively), and Valdez Jara (2013: 197) demonstrates the co-occurrence possibilities of the reportative and auditory evidentials in examples like the following:

(27) *ramue=ka we rolo-cane=ra-e be'säriko
     1PL=FOC a.lot snore-AUD.EVID=REP-PAST last.night
  We snored a lot last night, people said.

In this and other examples, the speaker is reporting on the auditory experience of a third party to the hearer. The reportative, therefore, has scope over the proposition, whose information source was the sound of snoring. Caballero (2008: 157ff) describes some of the unique formal properties of the auditory evidential that impact both its phonological form (it has mono- and di-syllabic allomorphs) and its morphological distribution (it may appear either preceding or following the desiderative suffix).

In addition to these unusual distributional and phonological facts, the system itself violates an implicational universal proposed in Willett (1988), namely that sensory evidentials would consist, at a minimum, of a visual component. Tarahumara appears only to have an auditory evidential marker encoding sensory evidence.

Valdez Jara (2013: 198) also describes an inferential evidential marker =re, which is restricted in its distribution to the copula ka only, as in the following:

(28) ye=ka rokosőli ká-re
     this=FOC spider be-INFER
  It seems a spider/parece una araña.

For Western Tarahumara, Burgess (1984: 52) identifies a suffix -le on verbal and adjectival stems that he translates as 'appear; evidence of.' Based upon a small example set, it would seem that -le codes inference based upon visual evidence.

(29) go'lé-le
     eat-EVID-PAST
  There is evidence that he ate. (It can be seen that an animal got into the garden)

The form is clearly cognate with =re in Urique Tarahumara, as [r ~ l] is a common, if not regular, sound correspondence across Tarahumaran. As such, Western Tarahumara -le does not appear to carry the same distributional restrictions as Urique Tarahumara =re.
20.8. Coracholan

The Cora language, along with Huichol (Wixarika), make up the Coracholan branch of Uto-Aztecan. It is analysed by Casad (1984) and discussed in Aikhenvald (2004a) as having a four-term evidential system. These terms consist of one form, *ku*, indicating direct, usually visual, evidence, the particle *sein* coding evidence based upon inference, and two forms labelled as quotative particles, *nü'u* and *yee*. All four terms appear as particles, although the *ku* direct form appears frequently in syntactic second position and as a host to other clitics.

The main differences between the quotatives appears to be that *nü'u* is closer to what one may consider a true reportative evidential, indicating that the source of information is more or less underspecified, generally third person narrative or hearsay. The particle *yee* and its allomorphs, on the other hand, appear mainly in first and second person contexts. Willett (1988: 68) interprets the difference as thirdhand reported versus second-hand evidence. Compare:

(30) ma-ti'ih nü'u m-i šüušu'u ra-ta-pli-tya-a they-then QUOT/REP they-RES flower DISTR-PERV-carry-make-APPLIC
And then, they say, they were giving him a flower.

(31) šatau hakanye yee heice'e you:PL.COMPL.PERV.REFL exert QUOT more
Pour on the coals, you all, harder!

As we find repeatedly throughout Uto-Aztecan, the quotative particle *yee* finds its diachronic roots as a verb of speaking in the protolanguage, and so could be on track for developing reportative properties. At this point, it is not entirely clear to me that *yee* is functioning as an evidential, although Casad (1992) presents a detailed analysis of its various semantic extensions, some of which have been grammaticalized. Both Southeastern Tepehuan and Cora have two quotative/reportative particles, but the available resources do not align their patterns of distribution and functions as clearly as one may be led to believe by Willett's (1988) survey. More detail and examples than I have found are needed to truly assess the functional (dis)similarities holding between the Cora and Tepehuan systems.

The particle *sein* is labelled as an evidential in Casad (1984) but without further descriptive detail as to its function, which appears to be inferential in nature.

(32) ah pú'-i hā'=-hi-(y)a'-a-káa-va-ci sein i then SU.PRONOUN-SEQ be.loc=NARR-away-outside-down-fall-PAST INFER ART tyaška scorpion
Apparently the scorpion dropped down from there.

The evidential particle *ku*, according to Casad (1984: 179), is 'used by the speaker to emphasize the veracity of the content of his utterances.'
The label ‘evidential’ would seem to be misleading by this definition, which otherwise would be subsumed under a modality of epistemic certainty, rather than primarily coding information source. Willett (1988), citing data from Casad (1984), states that ku marks eyewitness evidence, making it one of just two languages (the other being Southeastern Tepehuan) in the Uto-Aztecan family I have found that overtly mark direct evidence. Again, it is impossible to fully assess these claims without more contextual examples.

Cora ku may be cognate18 with Cumeño =kut, which, although clearly a reportative, is also used to bolster the strength of the assertion. I have not found any more detail regarding the discourse properties of evidential markers in Cora, although it may be the case that the association of reported information with the assertion of epistemic certainty is widespread in Uto-Aztecan. Nonetheless, the claim of a four-term evidential system in Cora may require some revision.

20.9. AZTECAN

Although no explicit mention is made in Tuggy (1979) of evidentiality in Tetelcingo Nahuatl, two particles, under the broad label ‘quotatives’ are present that carry some by now familiar functions. The form nel is translated ‘they say’ and mati, as ‘evidently; I guess.’ The latter of the two, derived from the verb ‘know’ appears to be primarily a marker of epistemic modality, with some inferential uses. It will therefore not be given more consideration here, and the source does not exemplify it further.

The quotative particle nel, on the other hand, bears the key properties of a reportative evidential, while also maintaining properties more narrowly associated with a quotative. Tuggy (1979: 14) analyses it as bimorphemic ne-li (REFL/PASS-say) and further describes it as a ‘disclaimer . . . [that is] . . . used by some older speakers to introduce a direct quote.’ Tuggy (1979) analyses it as bimorphemic ne-li (REFL/PASS-say) and further describes it as a ‘disclaimer . . . [that is] . . . used by some older speakers to introduce a direct quote.’

Sullivan (1998), in a section entitled ‘adverbios de afirmación, negación, y duda’ (adverbs of affirmation, negation, and doubt) glosses the particle nell (nel) as ‘in truth; truthfully’ and briefly describes its high frequency of use in huehuetlatolli or ‘the speeches/tales of old/the elders.’ After inspecting the examples closely, however, I find that the reportative function would readily work in the (admittedly decontextualized) examples given, and fit with the general pattern.

The use of the quotative particle both 1) in contexts aside from marking directly quoted material, and 2) as a disclaimer of responsibility for the truth of the statement in which it appears are the properties that signal its use as a reportative evidential found throughout Uto-Aztecan. Pittman (1954: 38), in an earlier description of Tetelcingo Nahuatl, also appears to assign the reportative function as primary by describing nel as the means by which a

18 Were this the case, however, one would expect a different vowel [i] to appear in the Cora form (Jane Hill p.c).
‘narrator disclaims responsibility for a statement or narration.’ The quotative use is described as secondary, a means for connecting a particular utterance verb to quoted material (and, presumably, a particular source).

Mention of a quotative/reportative evidential in Aztecan is found in Hill’s (2005) Cupeño grammar, where the particle *kil is described as such in Tlaxcalan Nahuatl, and used to support the reconstruction of a Proto-Uto-Aztecan quotative *kul ‘with a meaning implying that the information so marked is not verifiable by speaker observation (99).’

Classical Nahuatl (Andrews 2003: 158) carries the particle *kil, translated ‘it is said,’ whose function is expressed in indirect speech wherein ‘the reporter takes no responsibility for the information reported.’ This form is exemplified in the following, preserved in the orthography of the source (quil = kil) with the exception of vowel length, represented here with a colon:

(34) quil mach mo: yahqueh
it is said notably it is (not) quite likely they went
It is said they did not go.

Hill proposes cognacy between Tlaxcalan Nahuatl (or general Aztecan) *kil and a Takic reportative *kun (possibly also related to the Tibbatulbal git reportative, as suggested by Munro (1978: 157). Further studies are needed to explore the properties of evidentials more comprehensively in the Uto-Aztecan languages, in particular with regard to 1) conceptual and distributional restrictions on their use, 2) discourse-pragmatic functions in expanded corpora of naturally occurring speech, and 3) the reconstruction of evidentiality within the family and beyond. Toward this latter end, the next section briefly summarizes some of the historical developments in the family.

20.10. GROWTH AND RENEWAL IN UTO-AZTECAN EVIDENTIAL SYSTEMS

Much of what has been presented here, in terms of historical developments, expands on the general trends identified in Munro’s (1978) discussion of the ‘quotative pattern’ in Uto-Aztecan. The facts appear, upon closer examination, to be even more nuanced, whereby the same set of reconstructable speech act verbs can be shown to have developed quotative and reportative evidential functions across the family, while in at least one case (Northern Paiute) developing into a discourse conjunctive particle. The individual languages illustrate various points along a developmental continuum from speech act verb to quotative to reportative evidential marker, with renewal occurring when a new (or repeated) speech act verb enters the continuum.

19 Again, my indebtedness to Jane Hill for bringing this form to my attention cannot possibly be overstated. The form quil = kil is also discussed in Hill and Hill (1986) as ‘appear(ing) with evidentiary force even where there is no locutionary verb’ (1986: 335) in spontaneous Mexicano (Nahuatl) speech, converging with Spanish que in certain functional contexts.
From the descriptions consulted for the present chapter, those of three languages from three distinct subfamilies make explicit mention of mirativity or mirative marking. Although widely accepted to be both formally and functionally distinct from evidential systems, they often appear to interact with such systems. In two cases, it appears that mirativity (the encoding of unexpected, new information) is the primary function of the enclitic (Cupeño) or particle (Southeastern Tepehuan). In Northern Paiute, mirativity appears to be an extension of one of two inferential second position clitics. These observations are in keeping with Aikhenvald's (2004a: 200ff) generalization that an inferred evidential often 'acquires mirative readings in many three-term systems.'

As noted previously, there are important properties of the evidential systems described for Cora (Coracholan) and Southeastern Tepehuan (Tepiman) that set them apart from the rest of the Uto-Aztecan language family. Both languages exhibit specific marking for direct (firsthand) information source. Elsewhere in the family, the norm appears to be that direct evidence is the unmarked case. Also, Cora and Southeastern Tepehuan carry two reportative markers, distinguished mainly by the nature of prior knowledge of the information reported upon. The territorial proximity of the languages suggests a possible areal feature. As it turns out, there are even more grammatical properties specific to these languages that distinguish them from other Uto-Aztecan languages, such as finite (as opposed to nominalized) dependent clauses, rich directional systems, and similarities in place name formation (Gabriela García Salido p.c.), among others. Therefore, their evidential systems are not alone in demonstrating possible contact influence between them or with neighbouring, unrelated languages. Such issues merit significantly more exploration than can be taken up here.

### 20.11. Summary of Evidentiality in the Uto-Aztecan Languages

Although not widely known for having elaborate systems of evidentiality, the Uto-Aztecan languages nonetheless exhibit a heterogeneity of dedicated evidential morphemes as well as a range of forms that are primarily epistemic in function, but also carry some evidential features.

The range of functions associated with dedicated evidential markers includes, in order of frequency, reportative, inferential, perceptual eyewitness, and direct perception/firsthand evidence. Again, I distinguish quotative from reportative functions in that the latter is about general indirect or hearsay sources of information, while the former marks particular speech acts where the author of the information is known and explicit. The tipping point from one to the other occurs when the speaker is displacing authority for the information without identifying it.

Evidential markers may co-occur, as we have seen in Southern Paiute, Cupeño, O'odham, and Tarahumara. In all cases of evidential sequences, one appears always to be a reportative. Given that the reportative is also the most common evidential type found in the family, the observation does not make for a robust generalization, but is only suggestive as an avenue for exploration with a wider array of languages.
The expression of evidentiality in the Uto-Aztecan language family is manifested in a diverse array of forms and functional extensions. One of the major challenges in conducting a survey like this lies not only in the uneven nature of the extant documentation of the languages, but also in how the information is organized within that documentation. First, whether the functional range of a particular form is primarily concerned with information source must be determined, while at the same time considering whether or how an evidential strategy may be developing into an evidential proper. This presents a particular challenge since, as is often the case in the grammaticalization of a particular functional domain, cognate forms may be at different stages of development as evidentials or renewal in distinct, but related, languages. As Mithun (1986) points out in her survey of evidentiality in Northern Iroquoian, there also exists broad synchronic variability in the function assigned the forms.

There is a related, but perhaps more practical, challenge for the typologist and comparativist. Where does one look for markers of evidentiality in the available descriptions, particularly since such markers are not often so identified? Reportatives may be found in discussions of quoted or indirect speech acts, or in sections relating to clause combining in narrative or other genres of connected speech. Determining their value as reportative evidentials, as opposed to quotative markers requires their use without an accompanying speech act verb or a unit of quoted speech. Inferential evidentials, on the other hand, may be found most commonly within discussions of modality, epistemology, and doubt. Their value as true evidentials may be too nuanced without more extensive study of texts and work with native speakers to determine whether the veracity of the information is a primary or secondary function of the form in question. The introductory chapters of this volume take up these and other issues surrounding the identification of evidential markers in more detail (see also Aikhenvald 2004a; Nuckolls and Michael 2014, *inter alia*).

Finally, in many instances of a quotative taking on reportative evidential functions, analysts working with the languages sometimes forgo representing their presence in translation, either in individual examples or actual text corpora, presumably due to the stylistic awkwardness involved in doing so. Although understandable from an interpretive perspective, it is clear that in many cases such a seemingly minor omission may carry consequences for the description in that it masks the subtle role markers of evidentiality may play in conveying contextual information. Again the careful study of the role of evidentials in a variety of discourse contexts is needed if we are to approach a full understanding of evidential systems in Uto-Aztecan languages.