4-2017

What Happens When Social Pressures Collide? The Role of Environmental Pressures Throughout Life

Jeffrey Lyons
Boise State University

What Happens When Social Pressures Collide? The Role of Environmental Pressures Throughout Life

Jeffrey Lyons
Department of Political Science
Boise State University

Abstract

How do competing social influences shape individual partisanship over the course of the life cycle? People enter and exit a host of environments over the course of the lifespan, and these environments provide social pressures that can conflict or reinforce early socialized attitudes. Socialization could be an agent for either opinion change, or opinion stability. Using the Youth-Parent Socialization Study and constructing partisan environmental measures at the county-level, I explore this question. The findings demonstrate that environments exert significant socializing influence over the lifespan, moderating the persistence of early forces. This helps to reconcile two competing perspectives on the enduring nature of familial socialization. When environments throughout life provide reinforcing social pressures, parental influence persists over time. However, when early socialized influence is challenged over time by the political environment that citizens reside in, the influence of early parental socialization is offset and nullified.

Keywords: socialization, context, partisanship, social influence

Political socialization comes in many forms, and from numerous sources. These processes are undoubtedly consequential for the political attitudes and behaviors of the American citizen. But what happens when social influence is delivered to the individual from different sources, and what happens when these different socialization pressures collide? How does the individual who is predisposed to be a Democrat because of early familial socialization respond to a change in environments later in life to a context which provides Republican leaning social pressures? Our understanding of the formative power of early processes suggests a relatively static individual, for whom socialization was consequential, but primarily early in life (Campbell et al. 1960; Sears and Funk 1999) and later changes in influence are not likely to be material – often called the "persistence hypothesis" (Sears 1989; Miller and Sears 1986).

However, it is also suggested that social pressures extend beyond early years and originate from one's surroundings (Newcomb et al. 1967; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), raising the possibility that individuals are reasonably dynamic through their lives and political attitudes and behaviors respond to the changes in influences or environments that occur (Miller and Sears 1986). These two different sets of socializing pressures can be in congruence or conflict. If later environments and the social pressures they supply conflict with early influences, it may be the case that they can undo the early familial socialization process which has garnered the preponderance of attention in the formation of partisanship (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Tedin 1974; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). When social forces conflict, which influences maintain and which are mitigated?

The implications are not only a more complete understanding of social influence, but also different suggestions about the socialized citizen. A problem with the socialized perspective of partisanship is that it struggles to explain the changes we observe in party identification over time (though see Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Dinas 2013). The persistence model implies a great deal of stability in partisanship as socialized influences are fixed over time once the citizen has left the household because of enduring early influences. The findings presented here help to reconcile this issue, maintaining a view of

partisanship as being largely socialized, but recognizing that competing social forces over time that can either reinforce early influences fostering persistence, or challenging them and freeing the individual from his or her partisan roots.

Further, this speaks to a theoretical discussion amongst scholars of social influence about what types of relationships foster social influence. Much of the literature on early socialization comes from a social cohesion perspective where strong, intimate ties – such as those with parents – generate the most influence. Others argue for structural equivalence – the idea that influence comes from those with similar social and structural positions, regardless of the intimacy of the ties. Looking at how familial influences from early in life (social cohesion) endure in the face of less intimate influence but from contextually supplied peers (structural equivalence) joins in this conversation by demonstrating the degree to which social influence originating from the social cohesion perspective holds up in the face of pressures from sources that are structurally equivalent. Exploring this tension that can arise from conflict between the two kinds of social influence is instructive for developing a more complete understanding of the interplay that occurs between different types of influence.

I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, which follows a sample of Americans over 4 survey waves from 1965-1997. This survey is uniquely suited to addressing the questions presented here because it contains measures of early parental social influence, as well as observations of the same individuals over a 32 year time period. The findings paint a picture of social influence that is extended over the life cycle where the agents of socialization shift from the parents to broader environments once people leave the home. Over the course of the panel, micro and macro-environmental socialization accounts for as much variation in individual partisanship as do the pre-adult social forces that garner the bulk of attention in the socialization literature.

Perhaps most notably, this creates an exchange between persisting parental socialization, and contemporaneous environmental social pressure. When these influences align and environments reinforce early processes, the effects of parental socialization persist over the life-cycle, conforming with our understanding of the enduring legacy of these effects. However, when environments challenge the influences learned in adolescence, they appear to terminate parental socializing effects, presumably initiating a detachment from predispositions and opening the door to partisan change – consistent with the "revisionist hypothesis" which questions the degree to which early processes crystallize party identification (Sears 1989).

Socialized Partisanship: The Family and Surrounding Environment

The notion that partisanship is formed through social processes is well established. The preponderance of evidence pointing to these social roots focuses on the pre-adult years as being both formative and lasting over time. The family appears to be the most influential agent of pre-adult socialization for forming party affiliations (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Tedin 1974; Hyman 1959; Jennings and Langton 1969; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; Kroh and Selb 2009; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), though less instrumental for other political attitudes and issue opinions (Tedin 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Connell 1972; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; though see Dalton 1980; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009 for exceptions). The family is so formative in large part due to the amount of time children spend with their parents, the lack of strong prior political orientations in pre-adulthood, the intimate nature of the relationships, as well as their receptivity to the messages they are provided with from family sources (Sears and Levy 2003).

While family appears to exert the strongest pull on partisanship, pre-adult socialization does not end outside of the home. Peer and friend networks serve to shape political orientations (Beck 1977; Campbell 1980; Settle, Bond, and Levitt 2011), as do the schools that provide young people with many of their social contacts (Levin 1961; Langton 1967; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Campbell 2006). However, these micro-environments in the form of the home, friendship networks, and schools are both a product of, and constrained by the macro-environments they are embedded within such as the neighborhood, community, county, and state. These macro-environments also provide independent socializing influences in childhood and adolescence that mold individual political persuasions (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Campbell 2006; Pacheco 2008; Wolak 2009; Gimpel and Lay 2005).

The implication being that social pressures matter significantly early in life when the citizen's beliefs are relatively unformed and yielding, but that once early adulthood has been reached the individual's partisanship has fully formed and there is little room left for social influence. Erikson and Tedin (2011) echo this view, "Regarding persistence, two major points merit elaboration. First, political attitudes are malleable through the impressionable years. Second, after the impressionable years, political orientations harden considerably" (155). Yet, we know that the influence of early socialization, notably the transmission of partisanship from parents to children diminishes with time over the life cycle (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976; Achen 2002).

To the extent that we have explored socialization later in life, spouses have garnered much of the attention. Spouses tend to represent some of the most prominent discussion partners that individuals have (Beck 2001). The close ties between spouses, and constant interaction set the stage for substantial amounts of influence to be conferred. From a social cohesion perspective, this generates frequent exchanges of information with a trusted source, and as such, spouse's ability to impart socially supplied information and influence is potentially unparalleled (Kenny 1994).

We observe spouse's influencing each other's attitudes across a host of non-political domains such as career (Smith and Moen 1998), health (Homish and Leonard 2005, 2008), and consumer (Wilkes 1975) decisions. These influences extent to more politically related stances such as individual's vote choice (Kenny 1998), and partisanship (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). In Germany and Great Britain, and the congruence between spousal partisan attitudes appears to increase over the duration of the marriage (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), and we observe spouses influencing each other's attitudes in Australia as well (Hayes and Bean 1994). While questions of spousal influence versus selection persist (e.g. Alford et al. 2011), some have noted that the congruence of spousal attitudes over time is more suggestive of influence (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Jennings and Stoker 2001).

If partisanship is not entirely stable over time and the effects of early socialization diminish through the years, what influences step in to fill the void left by the lasting parental social imprint? We believe that spousal affiliations in-part fill this void, but for many, spouses are also held (relatively) constant over time. The one kind of social pressure that often does vary considerably over time is that which originates from the places where we live and the broader distributions of beliefs and opinions that we are surrounded by.

Environmental Socialization Over the Life Cycle

Neighborhoods, communities, and broader environments provide the individual with many of the same social pressures that were received from parents in pre-adulthood (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). While these pressures may be more mixed in nature and less pervasive than pressures from the family home, they provide many of the same influences. In fact, surrounding contexts appear to influence partisanship for children and adolescents independent of parental effects. Community heterogeneity (Campbell 2006) and partisan/demographic characteristics (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003), state campaign environments (Wolak 2009), and politically competitive contexts (Pacheco 2008) all socialize youths to a host of political attitudes and behaviors. Collectively, the argument is that these extra-parental environments supply children and adolescents with information which shapes opinions, stimuli that foster engagement in politics, and norms of which views and behaviors are acceptable and which are not. Why should these pressures cease when the individual matures and leaves the home?

Citizens receive information from co-workers, pressures to conform from peers and neighbors, observe partisan in-group and out-groups via bumper stickers and yard signs, and encounter the distribution of opinions in their environment at barbeques and the water cooler at work. Whether through the provision of partisan information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), a sense of norm adoption (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988), or simply not wanting to be the outcast, these daily social interactions that people have with those around them operate much the same as the influences from the family that were encountered earlier in life. Further, the social contacts that surround citizens on a daily basis are likely to occupy similar social and structural positions. People live in neighborhoods and work in professions predominately with those of similar

socioeconomic characteristics. These structural similarities can be powerful conduits of social influence as individuals absorb norms and expectations of those who are like them (Burt 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).

What these later environments may lack the consistency and pervasiveness of messages that youths are exposed to, they make up for in duration. By most accounts, parents have roughly 6-8 years in which to socialize the partisanship of their children (Hess and Torney 1967). For reasons pointed out earlier these 6-8 years are extremely formative, but consider the individual who leaves home, relocates for a job and spends a 30 year career in a different environment. The lasting imprint of the early years should begin to wane over time (Jennings and Niemi 1991), and the adult environment should begin exerting socializing influences of its own. The expectation that follows is that environmental socialization is a lifelong process. Early in life the environment that matters most is the family and the household, but once people enter adulthood and leave the home, the agent of socialization expands to the surrounding macro-environment consisting of towns, communities, and cities. These environments and the distributions of opinions within them fill the void left by ebbing parental influence and become a more formative socializing agent for the remainder of the life cycle.

> H_1: *Political environments will exert formative socializing influences once the individual leaves the home and will endure over the course of the life cycle.*

Environments can serve to either reinforce or challenge other social pressures. Reinforcing environmental social influence occurs when the citizen was socialized by a Republican mother or father, and then resides in a Republican leaning environment, or vice versa for Democrats. Conversely, challenging social pressures occur when the individual is socialized by Republican parents and resides in an environment consisting of Democratic leaning pressures. The same holds for spousal influence. An individual who is married to a Republican spouse and lives in a Republican context receives reinforcing pressures, while one is married to a Republican spouse and resides in a Democratic environment receives challenging influences.

When environments present social pressures reinforcing the early influence exerted by the family or contemporary influence from the spouse, the individual is receiving consistent messages, information, and influence. The attachments formed early in life are fortified. Dissonant information is relatively uncommon, and even when confronted, it is easy for the individual to avoid or reject it in the presence of an abundance of agreeable influence. On average, the formative power of early influence wanes over the life cycle (Niemi and Jennings 1991). However, when these antecedent social influences are reinforced over the life cycle by congruent social pressures provided by the environment, the expectation is that they will maintain influence. The suggestion being that the persistence of early pressures over the life cycle is dependent upon later environmentally supplied social influence reinforcing and sustaining the early influences. When environments reinforce early influence, the persistence hypothesis should find support.

However, not all citizens reside in environments that provide these fortifying influences. Many are surrounded by political contexts that challenge the social influences from youth or their current spousal pressures. When the predisposed citizen is confronted on a daily basis with pressures to conform, information, and opinions that challenge his or her early socialized beliefs, there are several possible outcomes. The first of these possibilities is that parental influence will persist in the face of social cross-pressures. After all, for adults, many views are crystallized (Sears and Funk 1999). Partisanship serves as a "perceptual screen" (Campbell et al. 1960: 133) through which the political world is viewed in fashions that continue to reinforce prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2000). Once formed by pre-adult social forces from the family, adult partisanship is also resistant to change because citizens are unlikely to be encountering the consistent and pervasive messages from many (if any) other social sources throughout life that they encountered in the home during their childhood. If this perspective is correct, it suggests that all other forms of social influence over time are filtered through the influences provided in youth and adolescence.

On the other hand, the possibility that these environmentally supplied cross-pressures nullify early influence also exists. Cross-pressures affect partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Keele and Wolak 2006). These individuals are pulled in different directions as the influences provided by one's parents are called into

question on a daily basis by the distribution of opinions that surround the citizen. A person socialized by Republican parents but who resides in a Democratic environment faces a challenge to these early influences at work and church, in the neighborhood and in the grocery store. Views about norms and acceptable beliefs from youth are replaced by different value sets and perspectives. While the early years clearly present an important time for beliefs to be formed, it seems quite plausible that environmentally supplied contemporaneous influences will come to supplant these beliefs. The persistence of environmental pressures to conform over time is likely to erode the lingering adolescent influence, resulting in a newly socialized citizen who has been cast free of his or her parents' influence. Put simply, when environments challenge other forms of social influence, these agents of constraint lose much of their formative power. For these citizens, the revisionist perspective may correctly characterize the persistence of early socialization.

A similar narrative likely holds for spousal influence as reinforcing or challenging pressures can create harmony between social pressures, or discord. Micro-environments (such as the home) can moderate the effects of macro-environments suggesting that individuals can use their spouses to insulate themselves from the broader environment and avoid any influence (Huckfeldt et al. 1995). However, it may also be the case that these macro-environments are able to lessen the influence of spousal partisanship when they challenge and cross-pressure the individual. I argue that while it seems highly unlikely that broader environments have the ability to nullify contemporaneous spousal influence, the influences provided by the environment may lessen this influence when they create cross-pressures.

> H_2: *When political environments reinforce other forms of socialized influence (parents and spouses), these socializing agents will have a more persisting influence over the course of the life cycle than when political environments challenge them.*

Data and Results

The Youth-Parent Socialization Study which follows respondents from their senior year in high school at age 18 in 1965, over three additional waves in 1973, 1982, and 1997 provides a unique opportunity to address these questions by combining measures of early parental social influence with long-term panel data including contextual identifiers (from the restricted data file) so that respondents can be placed in a political environment. Not only is the data longitudinal, but there are a number of years between waves allowing for a range of socializing influences from a host of sources to be tested. This enables early familial socialization to be weighed against later environmental influence that citizens encounter throughout their life.[1]

Following a host of research in the study of political environments (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Miller 1956; Putnam 1966; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Chinni and Gimpel 2010), I construct measures of the political environment at the county level. Unfortunately, the geographic identifiers are not available for the 1973 wave of the survey, so the analysis focuses on 1965, 1982, and 1997. I am able to use presidential election returns for the election preceding each of the survey waves (1964, 1980, 1996 elections) to construct a measure of how Democratic or Republican the county is.[2] I subtract the Democratic presidential vote share

---

[1] The Youth-Parent Socialization Study is arguably the best observational data in the American context for weighing questions of socialization. However, there are some shortcomings that warrant mention. The sample is not entirely representative of the population. It is an overwhelmingly white sample, and those who did not complete high school were excluded. Further, cohorts who were socialized to politics in the 1960s experienced an unusually salient political climate that is unlike those who were socialized a decade earlier or later. Despite these sample issues, there is not a theoretical reason to suspect that these dynamics influence the relationship between environmental social forces and parental and spousal influences.

[2] Some concerns exist regarding the use of election data to build measures of context. Most prominently, using election returns maximizes candidate effects (Abrams and Fiorina 2012). While this point certainly warrants consideration, there are also reasons to believe that using election data is beneficial. The goal of the measure is to capture distributions of partisans, and we know that individual partisanship and their votes in presidential elections correlate very highly (e.g. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). As a result, using voting behavior to construct measures of the nature of social pressures one is exposed to has been commonplace in some of the most seminal works on social influence (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). On a more practical note, the primary alternative would be to use voter registration files which are only available in a little over half of the states, and raise theoretical questions about the degree to which they are updated to reflect changes in macropartisanship. Election data is able to capture swings in aggregate party affiliation that we know occur in response to national conditions (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989).

from the Republican presidential vote share in the county to measure the partisan composition of the county. [3] This creates a variable where positive values indicate a Republican leaning county political environment, and negative values represent a Democratic leaning county political environment. Table 1 shows the distribution of this variable for all three survey waves.

[Insert Table 1 About Here]

There is a wide range in the variable over all three waves, with some respondents residing in very Republican counties (the highest values) while others reside in heavily Democratic counties (the lowest values). [4]

As noted earlier, one of the strongest features of the Youth-Parent Socialization Study is that we also have measures of parental political preferences from the 1965 wave to measure the kind of early political socialization that the respondent received. Both mother and father's partisanship on the seven-point partisanship scale from 1965 are included in models of respondent partisanship as measures of this early socialization influence. We also have measures of the respondent's spouse's partisanship as another measure of micro-social influence. This variable is not available for the first wave of the survey, though presumably few respondents had a spouse during their senior year of high school. [5]
A problem that does arise with this measure is a substantial amount of missing data since the 1965 wave is missing, and even when asked in later waves large numbers of respondents did not have a spouse. In the 1982 wave, 41% of the sample did not have a spouse (383 respondents), and in the 1997 wave 28% did not have a spouse (258 respondents). In order to maintain a reasonable number of observations in models and include the spousal partisanship measure despite this missing data issue, I use the "dummy variable adjustment" method. [6]

First, I show the results of three cross-sectional regressions, one for each of the survey waves in the analysis. These models demonstrate the ways in which various macro and micro social environments and social pressures influence the partisanship of the respondent at different stages in his or her life cycle. Highlighting

---

[3] For example, if the Democratic candidate received 55% of the presidential vote in the county and the Republican received 35% of the vote, the county would be coded as a 20, indicating that it is a Democratic leaning environment, and by a magnitude of roughly 20 percentage points.

[4] The means suggest that in 1965, most respondents were residing in fairly heavily Democratic leaning counties, in 1982 the mean county was Republican leaning, and in 1997 the mean county was slightly Democratic. In general, these means comport with our understanding of partisan mood in the country, suggesting that they are relatively representative of the distribution of environments nationally.

[5] The Youth-Parent Socialization Study contains only ZIP code identifiers which are an inherently messy contextual unit. [5] If political data were available at the ZIP code level dating back to the first wave in 1965 to allow for the creation of environmental measures at this level that would be ideal. Unfortunately they are not, requiring ZIP codes to be converted into counties where we have the relevant environmental data. ZIP codes change some over time, and ZIP codes occasionally cross meaningful boundaries such as county lines making them somewhat difficult to accurately place the individual into the correct county environment. What this means is that for some respondents where I have the ZIP code of residence, they could actually be in one of two counties. This likely creates some error in constructing the county political environment measure. However, the extent to which the respondent is placed in the wrong county is quite limited. Though some ZIP codes do cross county lines, when this occurs, it is most often very minimal. [5] For the 1965 wave, 67% of the ZIP codes were 100% within one county so there was no error, and roughly 92% of the ZIP codes were over 90% within one county. This means that for 92% of the sample there was either no error in county assignment, or at worst a 1 in 10 chance. In the 1982 wave, 75% of the ZIP codes were 100% within one county so there was no error, and roughly 93% of the ZIP codes were over 90% within one county. For the 1997 wave, 74% of the ZIP codes were 100% contained in one county creating no error, and 92% were over 90% in a single county. When ZIP codes cross county lines, I use the primary county as the respondent's political environment.

[6] This method involves assigning an arbitrary value to the missing data, I assign missing cases the value of -1, and then including a dummy variable in the regression that is coded 1=missing, 0=not missing on the spouse's partisanship measure. While this method is not acceptable when data are truly missing (i.e. if the respondent had a spouse but we were not measuring his or her partisanship), it is acceptable in cases such as this where the value truly does not exist because the respondent does not have a spouse (Allison 2001). In fact, Allison uses this very issue of spousal characteristics to illustrate situations in which the dummy variable adjustment method is appropriate. In footnote 5 he states "For example, married respondent's may be asked to rate the quality of their marriage, but that question has no meaning for unmarried respondents. Suppose we assume that there is one linear equation for married couples and another equation for unmarried couples. The married equation is identical to the unmarried equation except that it has (a) a term corresponding to the effect of marital quality on the dependent variable and (b) a different intercept. It's easy to show that the dummy variable adjustment method produces optimal estimates in this situation" (Allison 2001: 88).

the multiple sources of social influence that exist raises the potential for these sources to be in conflict or congruence. The dependent variable in these models is the respondent's partisanship on a seven point scale ranging from strong Democrat at the low end to strong Republican at the high end.

[Insert Table 2 About Here]

What emerges from these cross-sectional regressions is a clear pattern of social influence dynamics over the life cycle. At wave 1 in 1965 when the respondent is roughly 18 years old and presumably still living at home with his or her parents, the household micro-environment exerts a tremendous influence, consistent with our understanding of parental partisan socialization (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1968). Across the full range of mother's partisanship from the most Democratic to most Republican, we see a 2.25 point shift in the respondent's partisanship in a Republican direction, and the same range of the father's partisanship produces a similar but slightly larger movement of 2.49 points on the 7 point scale of partisanship. Further, at this stage in life, the macro environment does not appear to be consequential. None of the other variables in the model were significant. This pattern of influence changes notably however by wave 2 in which the respondent is roughly 35 years old.

By 35 years of age, the lasting imprint of parental socialization is still evident, but the magnitude of the effect has diminished. There is a significant and positive effect of the county-level political environment on the partisanship of the respondent. Those residing in more Republican environments display a more Republican partisanship. The magnitude of the effect provided by these environments is not inconsequential. Moving from the minimum (the most Democratic county in the sample) to the maximum (the most Republican county in the sample) produces a shift of 1.86 points on the 7 point partisanship scale in a Republican direction. Put differently, if a respondent were to be a Democratic-leaning Independent and residing in the most Democratic county in the sample and were to relocate to the most Republican county we would expect his or her partisanship to shift roughly 2 points to becoming a Republican-leaning Independent.

Micro-environments in the form of the household are still highly influential, but the source of micro influence has shifted to the spouse. In fact, by age 35, the spouse is more influential than either parent was at age 18. Moving from the minimum value of spousal partisanship (a strong Democrat) to the maximum (a strong Republican) produces a 2.63 point shift in a Republican direction for the respondent. The lasting effect of parental partisanship is still present at age 35, though the magnitude of the effects are smaller than for both spouses and macro environments. Put differently, by this stage in an individual's life, parental socialization still matters, but environments have become more consequential. Looking across the range of parental partisanship from the most Democratic to most Republican mother produces a .68 shift in a Republican direction for the respondent, and the same shift for the father produces a 1.1 magnitude change for the respondent. The largest change that emerges is that macro environments become influential at this later stage in life.

A very similar pattern emerges at wave 3 when the respondent is roughly 50. The county macro-environment continues to exert a strong influence on the individual of a similar magnitude to the one that we observed in wave 2. Going from the most Democratic to most Republican county results in a 1.66 point shift in a Republican direction on the 7 point partisanship scale. The effect of early micro-environments from the family diminish further from their effects at age 35. Mother's partisanship is no longer a significant predictor of child partisanship, and father's partisanship remains relatively constant in influence from age 35, with a magnitude of a 1.11 point shift across the full range of values. Finally, the effects of spousal partisanship increase from age 35 to age 50, with the magnitude of the effect jumping from 2.63 at age 35 to 3.47 at age 50. Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the socialization effect sizes across all three waves demonstrating the dynamics of social influence across the life cycle.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

This suggests that while social environments clearly are consequential in shaping partisanship, the sources of social influence are not static across the life-cycle. Micro-environments in the form of household influences (whether they are parental or spousal) always matter, but macro-environments matter after the teen years and their effects, though smaller than those of the micro-environment, are still sizeable. The consistent effect of micro-environments is potentially due to the intimacy of the ties between people and their

parents or spouses as argued by the social cohesion perspective. However, the fact that we see correlations emerge for individuals and their political surroundings after they have left the home suggests that less intimate sources do exert pressures to conform. Social influence matters from both immediate and more distant sources, and is not a process that is complete following the early parental effects. In fact, by the time the individual is 50, the lasting imprint of these early formative years has diminished dramatically and is dwarfed by the contemporaneous influence of the spouse and macro-environment. Though early parental social pressures do have a lasting legacy, the social pressures supplied by the environment are actually more consequential by the time the individual is 35.

These patterns and multiple sources of socializing influence point to the potential for competing social pressure. What happens when the contemporaneous environment supports the early social influence passed on from parents, and what happens when it challenges it? Do the early social influences that have dominated our understanding of partisan formation persist, or do environments throughout life have the ability to either reinforce or negate and replace early predispositions?

To explore this question, I create a measure of whether the contemporaneous environment either reinforces or challenges the early social influence provided by the mother and father, as well as the extent to which these environments reinforce or challenge contemporaneous spousal influence. This dichotomous variable is coded 1 if the contemporaneous environment is Republican in nature, and the influence from the socialization agent was Democratic or if the contemporaneous environment is Democratic in nature and the influence from the socialization agent is Republican. This creates a measure of environmentally supplied social cross-pressures. Those who are not cross pressured, the individual who resides in a Republican environment and was received early Republican social influence, and the individual who resides in a Democratic environment and received early Democratic social influence are coded 0. This variable is interacted with the direct effect of early parental social influence, as well as contemporaneous spousal influence, to determine the moderating effect that environmentally supplied cross-pressures have on these direct effects.

Table 3 shows the moderating effect of these cross-pressures in the interaction term between parental and spousal partisanship and the environmentally supplied cross-pressures measure. Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of parental and spousal influence when the environment reinforces the parental and spousal influence (no cross-pressures), and then the environment challenges these influences (environmentally supplied cross-pressures exist). The results strongly support the hypothesis that broader environments do not simply serve as a source of direct social influence as was demonstrated previously, but that these environments have the potential to create cross-pressures which serve to negate the effects of early parental socialization, and reduce the powerful effect of contemporaneous spousal influence.

[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 About Here]

We see no significant moderating effect of environmental cross-pressures at age 18 for either mother or father's partisanship. This is not surprising since there was no direct effect of the environment at these early stages in the previous models that were discussed. However, at both 35 and 50, there is a significant moderating effect. In both of these waves, when the environment that the individual resides in challenges the social influences supplied by the mother and father early in life creating environmentally supplied cross-pressures, there is no effect of the early socialization processes.

Conversely, when the environment supplies reinforcing socializing pressure, there is a lasting effect across the duration of the panel for both mother and father's influence. Recall from Table 3 that the effect of the mother's partisanship waned significantly over the panel to the point where it was not a significant predictor of partisanship at 50, but we see here that when the environment reinforces the early influences there is a significant effect of mother's partisanship across the duration of the panel.

A similar pattern emerges for the effect of contemporaneous spousal influences. When the environment challenges the spouse's partisanship creating social cross-pressures, the spousal effect is significantly lower than when the environment reinforces it. However, in the case of spousal partisanship, even though the effect is lessened by the challenging environment, there is still a significant effect remaining. Environments can mitigate, but not eliminate contemporaneous spousal influence.

The cross-sectional regressions are instructive for seeing how sources and magnitudes of influence change over the lifecycle, and help to establish the ways in which environmental influence becomes more prevalent over time. However, they do not allow for inferences to be drawn about which sources of influence matter the most over the life cycles, or for the contributions of different sources of influences over time to be weighed against one another. I turn to a random-intercept panel model which utilizes all three waves of the survey to address these questions.

These effects show a distinct pattern of how colliding social influences affect the citizen over the life cycle, but leave unclear what the collective effects are over the course of the life cycle. I estimate three random-effects panel models to assess how these conflicting social pressures influence the citizen over the course of the life cycle. The first two models are focused on the effects of cross-pressures between the environment and parental social influence, and the third is focused on environmental and spousal cross-pressures. In a similar fashion to the panel models presented earlier, I exclude spousal partisanship and education from the first two models as they are missing for the 1965 wave and keeping them in the model would drop this year. Table 4 presents these results and Figure 3 show the marginal effects of each form of social influence when the environment either supports and reinforces the influence, or challenges it creating cross-pressures.

[Table 4 and Figure 3 Here]

When environments challenge the father's partisanship, we see that the marginal effect of the father's partisanship is lessened, though the two effects are not statistically different from one another at the 95% confidence level. For the mother's and spouse's partisanship however, the marginal effect of the influence is significantly lower when environmentally supplied cross-pressures are present than when they are not. Over the course of the life cycle, these reinforcing and conflicting influences appear to be quite formative. When reinforced, early socialized influences persists, likely producing the stable partisan that much research has noted. However, when challenged, it appears that the partisan is cut loose of his or her predispositions, potentially becoming an unstable or unreliable partisan.

In sum, I have shown consistent evidence regarding the nature of social pressures and influence that extend beyond an individual's formative years, and how these varying influences either compete with or reinforce one another. Specifically, I have focused on how the political environments that citizens reside in shape their partisanship over the life cycle providing direct influence, as well as interacting with other social pressures either reinforcing or nullifying those effects. The results demonstrate that over the life cycle, the lasting imprint of parental socialization ebb while the effects of the broader political environment increase once the citizen leaves the home. Not only do these environments become more important than early parental socialization over the life cycle, but they also interact with both parental and spousal social pressures. When environments reinforce these influences, we see a significant and enduring effect of parental and spousal partisanship on the individual across the lifecycle. However, when environments challenge the influences supplied by parents and spouse's creating cross-pressures we see that these other forces are weakened (in the case of spousal socialization) or eliminated (in the case of parental socialization). Environments emerge as an important source of direct social influence, as well as a force that moderates the effectiveness of other social processes.

One of the largest concerns and criticisms of work on social influence is that when we observe correlations they may be a product of selection rather than influence. In the case of the results presented here, these are valid concerns. It may be the case that people are selecting spouses and places to live as a result of their prior attitudes or prior social influences. Appendix A explores these possibilities in depth with a series of models testing spousal and environmental selection in a number of ways. The results are mixed with respect to spousal selection. There is not strong evidence that the respondents in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study are selecting spouses based upon the main respondent's prior party identification. There is suggestive but

far from robust evidence that strength of partisanship in youth influences the individual's propensity to marry a spouse whose party identification is different from the individual's in youth and is different from that of his or father. There is no evidence that pattern exists for spousal partisanship that challenges the mother's party affiliation. Finally, there is no evidence that the respondents are selecting (or 'sorting') into reinforcing political environments, nor that those who move to places which challenge their parent's partisanship are more malleable than those who do not. The main conclusions are that there is some caution warranted in interpreting the spousal effects that I have shown, but no evidence that similar skepticism is warranted for the interactions with county partisan context. See Appendix A for a thorough discussion and testing of selection effects.

Discussion and Conclusion

The environments that surround individuals on a day to day basis appear to be a powerful source of social influence. Over the course of the life-cycle, these environments exert just as much pressure on the individual's partisanship as does early familial socialization which has received much of the attention for shaping party identification. Once the individual leaves the home following adolescence, we do see a persisting legacy of early influence, but contemporaneous environments actually exert a more significant effect on partisanship. Two suggestions follow: First, socialization is a lifelong process whereby partisanship is continuously updated and shaped by the distribution of opinions and influences around the individual. Second, the sources of social influence shift over time from parents and family, to environments and spouses.

Beyond the direct socializing effects that environments have, people's surroundings moderate the effects of other forms of social influence, including those from the family. Social influence is layered. Considering the effects of various socializing agents in isolation misses much of the story regarding how these various influences interact over time, producing a socialized partisan, or not. There is no doubt that early processes have the potential to endure over time, but whether they actually do so or not, appears to be largely dependent upon whether the environments that people encounter throughout the lifespan reinforce these early influences.

This point speaks to a debate within the socialization literature over the extent which socialization produces stasis or can foster dynamics. I find support for both, with contemporaneous socializing influences from the political environment moderating which explanation holds. When socialized reinforcement occurs, parental influence persists over the course of the panel, supporting the persistence model. However, when environments challenge early influence, parental pressures are negated once the citizen has left the home, presumably opening the door for other influence and instability, supporting the revisionist model. To understand the effects of early socialization, we need to understand the effects of contemporaneous socialization.

What makes environments unique and important as a form of social influence is that they typically vary significantly within individuals over time. Other forms of social influence, primarily parental social pressure, suggest stasis as the individual is set on a trajectory early in life that is rarely to be deviated from. Environments on the other hand vary dramatically across both space and time, and suggest a more malleable picture of the partisan citizen where socialization can foster change rather than stability. The evidence presented here points to a picture of social influence fostering changing political preferences. The suggestion is that socialization should be thought of a continuous process throughout life, and one that involves the interaction of multiple sources of influence.

The other insight that follows pertains to the two prominent theories of social influence – social cohesion and structural equivalence. The early socialization literature, couched in the social cohesion argument that intimate ties transmit social influence clearly holds weight here. We observe the lasting legacy of early familial socialization over much of the lifecycle, as has been noted by many. However, the rising influence of political environments as individuals age and leave the household also provides strong support for the structural equivalence argument that those who hold similar structural positions exert the most influence. I have shown here that when these two theories collide, structurally derived influence can mitigate early

influence from intimate sources. Put differently, understanding the extent to which cohesion and equivalence shape citizen preferences depends in part upon the extent to which these independent sources of pressure either reinforce or challenge one another.

Appendix A (To be made available online): Selection into Marriage and Environment

Social forces are rarely exogenous. In many circumstances, individuals have the ability to select into social contexts, and much research suggests that the dominant tendency is one of 'homophily' where people prefer to surround themselves with social pressures that are congruent or reinforcing of their priors. That is, people may be selecting their spouses based on similar partisanship, and may be selecting places to live when they move that have congruent distributions of partisans (e.g. Bishop 2008). This presents a notable threat to inference when studying the effects of social pressure, as correlations between these measures and individual attitudes could be a product of selection rather than influence. To explore this possibility, I look at whether such selection appears to be taking place in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study.

I begin with the question of whether or not individuals are more likely to have a spouse with similar partisanship. While it is impossible to fully test spousal selection with this data, we can look to see how wave 1 party identification (unmarried) predicts wave 2 spousal partisanship for those who marry. To do this, I use the individual's party identification in the 1965 wave when the respondents are unmarried (with the exception of 7 individuals who are married at the time of this survey wave) to predict the party identification of their spouses in the 1973 wave when 74% of the sample has become married. This is not a perfect way to assess partisan spousal selection as there could be influence on the spouse's partisanship by the main respondent that is being captured by the 1973 measure of spousal party identification and thus is not a perfect reflection of selection. First, I show the results of a simple bivariate regression modeling the effects of individual partisanship at wave 1 on spousal partisanship at wave 2 in Appendix Table 1.

Appendix Table 1: Effect of 1965 Party Identification on 1973 Spousal Party Identification

Party Identification, 1965	.131*
	(.040)
Constant	2.36*
	(.126)
N	508
R-Squared	.02

Notes: p<.05. Sample restricted to those who are married during 1973 wave.*

We see that there is a positive and significant effect of individual partisanship at wave 1 on the party identification of their spouses at wave 2. While there are likely a number factors at play which explain this, it is consistent with what we would expect to see if people select spouses with similar affiliations to their own. The magnitude of this effect is not overwhelming however, across the full range of individual party identification we would expect a .79 shift in spousal partisanship on a 7-point scale.

While this model is suggestive, it does not control for the other factors that could be influencing the partisanship of the person whom the main respondent marries. I consider this in Appendix Table 2. Here, I control for race, expecting that Whites will have spouses who are more Republican, gender expecting that males will have spouses with more Democratic partisanship, the Republican context measure from 1965 that was used earlier expecting to find that individuals who were raised in Republican counties will be more likely to have Republican spouses, and the partisanship of the main respondent's parents as people may select mates who resemble their families.

Appendix Table 2: Effect of 1965 Party Identification on 1973 Spousal Party Identification

Party Identification, 1965	.061
	(.071)
Race (White=1)	1.20*
	(.368)
Gender (Male=1)	.029
	(.182)
Republican Context, 1965	.011*
	(.004)
Mother's Partisanship, 1965	.055
	(.062)
Father's Partisanship, 1965	.020
	(.062)
Constant	1.50*
	(.360)
N	369
R-Squared	.08

Notes: p<.05*

We see that in this model, several significant predictors of spousal partisanship emerge, but the individual's identification in 1965 is not one of them. Rather, race and the partisan context in 1965 become the significant variables explaining the party identification of the main respondent's spouse. Whites had more Republican spouses than non-Whites, and those who were raised in more Republican counties had more Republican spouses. Accounting for a range of other factors, one's partisanship at 18 does not appear to be a significant predictor of the partisanship of his or her spouse eight years later.

What does this mean about threats to inference pertaining to spousal partisanship? We have seen that there does not appear to be a strong effect of wave 1 partisanship on wave 2 spousal partisanship for those who marry over this span. This suggests that selection of like-minded spouses – while certainly not out of the question – appears to be somewhat limited in this data. What remains a possibility is that the kinds of people who are willing to marry spouses of the other party are fundamentally different than those who are not. If these differences could influence their propensity to alter partisanship later in life, then this would represent a threat to inference for the findings presented. If weak partisans are more likely to marry an out-party spouse, then this could be the case. Also, if those whose parents provide conflicting partisan pressures are more likely to marry an out-party spouse, then we might expect these individuals to be more subject to later pressures.

Appendix Table 3 models a binary dependent variable where 1 represents those who were a Republican in the 1965 wave and are married to a Democrat in the 1973 wave, or vice versa, and a 0 represents those who were Democrats in the 1965 wave and married a Democrat, or vice versa. Of particular interest is whether those who marry an out-party spouse are more prone to changing partisanship. To explore this, I model whether strength of partisanship in 1965 and parental partisan conflict predict one's propensity to marry across party lines (between 1965 and 1973).

Appendix Table 3: Explanations of Who Marries a Spouse with Opposing Partisanship

Strength of Partisanship, 1965	-.249+
	(.134)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	-.055
	(.073)
Constant	.337
	(.293)
N	418
R-Squared	.01

Notes: p+<.1. Logit coefficients are shown.

A suggestive effect emerges. Stronger partisans in 1965 were less likely to be observed with a spouse in 1973 whose partisanship conflicts with the main respondent's party identification in 1965. This effect is significant at the $p<.1$ level. What this means is that those who are more malleable early in life (weak partisans) are more likely to marry a spouse who is of the opposing party. This could potentially be magnifying spousal effects throughout the panel. The effect of having conflicting parental partisanship which could also result in more malleability is insignificant.

It is also possible that there is something unique about those who marry a spouse with partisanship that conflicts with the party identification of one's parents. If those with weak early attachments are more likely to marry someone who has a party affiliation that conflicts with the partisanship of one's parents, we could observe larger effects of spousal partisanship displacing parental socialization, not because of spousal influence but because of selection. Appendix Tables 4 and 5 explore this possibility.

Appendix Table 4: Explanations of Conflict Between Spousal and Father's Partisanship

Strength of Partisanship, 1965	-.259*
	(.106)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	.036
	(.068)
Constant	.202
	(.225)
N	447
R-Squared	.01

Notes: p<.05. Logit coefficients are shown.*

Appendix Table 5: Explanations of Conflict Between Spousal and Mother's Partisanship

Strength of Partisanship, 1965	-.169
	(.107)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	.026
	(.068)
Constant	.025
	(.228)
N	441
R-Squared	.00

Notes: p<.05. Logit coefficients are shown.*

We see that there is a negative and significant effect of strength of partisanship on the likelihood of marrying a spouse who has a different party affiliation than the respondent's father. Those with weaker party affiliation in 1965 were more likely to marry a spouse with partisanship that was different from his or her father's than

13

those with stronger partisanship. If weaker partisans early in life are more susceptible to influence later in life, then this selection could explain part of the moderating effect that we observe, rather than spousal influence. However, we do not see this effect emerge for mother's partisanship, nor is there evidence in either table to suggest that conflicting parental partisanship influences the party affiliation of the respondent's spouse.

Thus, there is some reason to suspect that the results presented pertaining to spousal influence are in part of product of selection and not influence. This is not entirely surprising, and common when dealing with social phenomenon. However, there is also reason to be less concerned. I do not find compelling evidence that spouses are chosen for their partisan congruence with the individual, and the evidence that those who select spouses which are congruent with their early partisanship and with that of their parents is spotty. The only finding which is significant at the 95% confidence level is that weak partisans are more likely to select a spouse whose partisanship challenges that of their fathers than are strong partisans. In sum, caution is warranted with the moderating results of spousal partisanship that are presented in the paper, but there is no evidence of pervasive selection effects that should draw heavy skepticism.

Turning to whether selection into reinforcing environments appears to be taking place, the evidence suggests that this is not a primary concern in this survey. First, I look at simple crosstabs of those who moved between the 1973-1982 survey waves, and those who moved between the 1982-1997 survey waves. If selection into congruent environments is a concern, we should observe that when people move, they are more likely to end up in a county that is of their same partisanship than a county that is of opposing partisanship. The first table shows the number of Democrats and Republicans in 1973 who moved to Democratic and Republican counties between the 1973 and 1982 waves. The observations are limited to those who moved out of their states between waves. No clear pattern that would suggest a partisan sorting process is evident. The main factor that we observe is more people of both parties moving to Republican counties. This is likely in part a function of macropartisanship trends making more Republican counties across the nation in 1982. Regardless of this trend, there does not appear to be a clear bias suggesting partisan sorting into counties is taking place.

Appendix Table 6: Where Partisans in 1973 Moved

	Democratic County, 1982	Republican County, 1982
Democrat, 1973	28	83
Republican, 1973	9	50

Notes: Table shows the number of individuals who moved out of state between 1973-1982, and what kind of county we observe them in during the 1982 wave.

This conclusion is reinforced by looking at the moves which took place between the 1982-1997 waves. Here we observe that of the Democrats who made substantial moves between survey waves, more of them moved to Republican counties than Democratic counties. While slightly more Republicans moved to Republican counties than Democratic counties, the difference is hardly large enough to suggest a sorting process.

Appendix Table 7: Where Partisans in 1982 Moved

	Democratic County, 1997	Republican County, 1997
Democrat, 1982	36	38
Republican, 1982	30	35

Notes: Table shows the number of individuals who moved out of state between 1982-1997, and what kind of county we observe them in during the 1997 wave.

While the crosstabs do not offer a picture consistent with the geographic sorting argument, there are some small differences that emerge. To test whether these small differences are statistically significant, I run simple bivariate logit models where the dependent variable whether the individual resides in a Republican or Democratic county at wave 2, and the independent variable is party identification at wave 1. The sample is restricted to only those who moved out of state.

Appendix Table 8: Effect of Party Identification in 1973 on Partisan County in 1982

Party Identification, 1973	.086
	(.101)
Constant	1.11*
	(.291)
Pseudo R-Square	.00
N	209

Notes: *Logit coefficients shown. Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1973 and 1982.*

Appendix Table 9: Effect of Party Identification in 1982 on Partisan County in 1997

Party Identification, 1982	.059
	(.089)
Constant	-.025
	(.308)
Pseudo R-Square	.00
N	151

Notes: *Logit coefficients shown. Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1982 and 1997.*

In Tables 8 and 9 we see that the effect of wave 1 party identification on wave 2 partisan county environment is insignificant across both the 1973-1982 and 1982-1997 waves. It appears from both the crosstabs and the logit models that partisan selection into congruent environments does not appear to be a substantial concern in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study.

The final question that is raised is whether those who move and find themselves in a context which challenges the partisanship of their parents are different from those who do not. Specifically, we want to know whether they are more likely to be influenced or have their partisanship altered. Similar with the models shown exploring spousal partisanship, I use strength of partisanship from the prior survey wave as well as whether there was partisan conflict between parents in wave as measures of how susceptible to change the individual is. If those who find themselves in contexts which challenge parental partisanship are different on these dimensions (i.e. weaker partisans or had parental partisan conflict) then we may be concerned that the interactions shown in paper between environment and early parental partisanship are capturing selection and not influence.

In the models that follow, I use a binary dependent variable where 1 is when conflict exists between the social pressures supplied by the environment and those from the parent early in life (Democratic county and Republican parents or Republican county and Democratic parents), and a 0 when they are supplying congruent pressures (Democratic county and Democratic parents or Republican county and Republican parents). I run a total of four models. One model for this conflict between environment and father's partisanship and one model for mother's. I run them with dependent variables from both 1982 and 1997. Because we are interested in whether selection into these environments is producing differences, the models are run on those who moved between waves.

Appendix Table 10: Explanations of County that Challenges Father's Party ID, 1982

Strength of Partisanship, 1973	.352*
	(.174)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	.125
	(.109)
Constant	-.677*
	(.332)
N	161
Pseudo R-Squared	.03

Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown. Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1973-1982.

Appendix Table 11: Explanations of County that Challenges Mother's Party ID, 1982

Strength of Partisanship, 1973	.409*
	(.175)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	-.147
	(.110)
Constant	-.666*
	(.334)
N	162
R-Squared	.03

Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown. Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1973-1982.

Appendix Tables 10 and 11 show the effects of these models for conflict between the environment in 1982 and parental partisanship in 1965. We see that strength of partisanship is positive and significant in both models. However, this means that those who found themselves cross-pressures by county environments and early parental partisanship were more likely to have been strong partisans in the prior wave. That means that it should be harder to find effects of environmental influence rather than easier, as it is stronger partisans from 1973 who are in these situations following a move in 1982. Thus, fears that it is more malleable individuals who are finding themselves in these cross-pressured situations, thus magnifying effects, appear to be the opposite of what is occurring.

Next, I turn to the models from the 1997 wave in Appendix Tables 12 and 13.

Appendix Table 12: Explanations of County that Challenges Father's Party ID, 1997

Strength of Partisanship, 1982	-.176
	(.233)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	.106
	(.136)
Constant	.439
	(.439)
N	117
Pseudo R-Squared	.01

Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown. Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1982-1997.

Appendix Table 13: Explanations of County that Challenges Mother's Party ID, 1997

Strength of Partisanship, 1982	-.122
	(.235)
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965	-.083
	(.133)
Constant	.468
	(.453)
N	115
R-Squared	.00

Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown. Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1982-1997.

Here we see no effect of either strength of partisanship or parental partisan conflict. It appears that there is no selection into cross-pressured environments on either of the measures capturing how open to influence we expect the respondent to be.

As a result of the findings presented here pertaining to selection into environments, we can be more confident that the effects we observe of county environments moderating the influence of parental social influence are a function of influence rather than selection. Certainly, this is not an exhaustive list of all of the kinds of selection that could occur, but they do provide extensive evidence across a range of years and some of the more troubling kinds of selection that could be occurring.

References

Abrams, Samuel J., and Morris P. Fiorina. 2012. "The Big Sort That Wasn't: A Skeptical Reexamination." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 45: 203-210.

Achen, Christopher H. 2002. "Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 24(2): 151-170.

Alford, John R., Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 152-167.

Alford, John R., Peter K. Hatemi, John R. Hibbing, Nicholas G. Martin, and Lindon J. Eaves. 2011. "The Politics of Mate Choice." *The Journal of Politics* 73(2): 362-379.

Allison, Paul D. 2009. *Fixed Effects Regression Models*. Sage Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Science, 07-160. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Allison, Paul D. 2001. *Missing Data*. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-136. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Alvarez, R. Michael, and John Brehm. 1995. "American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy: Development of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 1055-1082.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign.* University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Brown, Thad A. 1988. *Migration and Politics.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Burt, Ronald S. 1987. "Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural Equivalence." *American Journal of Sociology* 92: 1287-1335.

Campbell, Bruce A. 1980. "A Theoretical Approach to Peer Influence in Adolescent Socialization." *American Journal of Political Science* 24(2): 324-344.

Campbell, David E. 2006. *Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic Lives.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1981. "Issue Evolution, Population Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change." *American Political Science Review* 75(1): 107-118.

Chinni, Dante, and James G. Gimpel. 2010. *Our Patchwork Nation: The Surprising Truth About the Real America.* New York, NY: Gotham Books.

Coleman, James E., Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel. 1966. *Medical Innovation: A Diffusion Study.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Connell, R. W. 1972. "Political socialization in the American family: The Evidence Re-examined." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(3):323-333.

Dalton, Russell J. 1980. "Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability Versus Generational Transfer." *The American Political Science Review* 74(2): 421-431.

Dawson, Richard E., Kenneth Prewitt, and Karen S. Dawson. 1977. *Political Socialization.* 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown.

Dinas, Elias. 2013. "Why Does the Apple Fall Far From the Tree? How Early Political Socialization Prompts Prompts Parent-Child Dissimilarity." *British Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 827-852.

Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L. Tedin. 2011. *American Public Opinion Ed. 8.* New York: Pearson Longman.

Finifter, Ada W. 1974. "The Friendship Group As a Protective Group For Political Deviants." *American Political Science Review* 68 (2): 607-625.

Gimpel, James G., J. Celeste Lay, and Jason E. Schuknecht. 2003. *Cultivating Democracy: Civic Environments and Political Socialization in America.* Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

Gimpel, James G., and Celeste Lay. 2005. "Party Identification, Local Partisan Contexts, and the Acquisition of Participatory Attitudes." Pp. 209-227 in *The Social Logic of Politics,* ed. Alan S. Zuckerman. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hayes, Bernadette C., and Clive S. Bean. 1994. "Political Attitudes and Partisanship Among Australian Couples: Do Wives Matter?" *Women & Politics* 14(1): 53-81.

Hess, Robert D., and Judith V. Torney. 1967. *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children.* Chicago, IL: Aldean.

Hornish, Gregory G., and Kenneth E. Leonard. 2005. "Spousal Influence on Smoking Behaviors in a US Community Sample of Newly Married Couples." *Social Science and Medicine* 61(12): 2557-2567.

Hornish, Gregory G., and Kenneth E. Leonard. 2008. "Spousal Influence on General Health Behaviors in a Community Sample." *American Journal of Health Behvior* 32(6): 754-763.

Huckfeld, Robert, and John Sprague. 1995. *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and influence in an election campaign.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Huckfeldt, Robert, Eric Plutzer, and John Sprague. 1993. "Alternative Contexts of Political Behavior: Churches, Neighborhoods, and Individuals." *Journal of Politics* 55(2): 3665-381.

Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul Allen Beck, Russel J. Dalton, and Jeffrey Levine. 1995. "Political Environments, Cohesive Social Groups, and the Communication of Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 1025-1054.

Hyman, Herbert H. 1959. *Political Socialization.* New York: Free Press.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1968. "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child." *American Political Science Review* 62(1): 169-184.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1974. *The Political Character of Adolescence.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1978. "The Persistence of Political Orientation: An Overtime Analysis of Two Generations." *British Journal of Political Science* 8(3): 333-363.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Kenneth Langton. 1969. "Mothers Versus Fathers: The Formation of Political Orientations Among Young Americans." *The Journal of Politics* 31(2): 329-358.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Laura Stoker. 2001. "Political Similarity and Influence Between Husbands and Wives." *Institute of Governmental Studies.* UC Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies. Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9s54f2mc#.

Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. 2009. "Politics Across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined." *Journal of Politics* 71: 782-799.

Kenny, Christopher. 1998. "The Behavioral Consequences of Political Discussion: Another Look at Discussant Effects on Vote Choice." *The Journal of Politics* 60(1): 231-244.

Kroh, Martin, and Peter Selb. 2009. "Inheritance and the Dynamics of Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 31: 559-574.

Langton, Kenneth P. 1967. "Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process." *American Political Science Review* 61(3):751-758.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet. 1944. *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Levin, Martin L. 1961. "Social Climates and Political Socialization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25(4): 596-606.

Lodge, Milton, and Charles Taber. 2000. "Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Reasoning." In A. Lupia, M. McCubbins, and S. Popkin [Eds.] *Elements of Political Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of Rationality*. Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, Jeffrey. 2011. "Where You Live and Who You Know: Political Environments, Social Pressures, and Partisan Stability." *American Politics Research* 39(6): 963-992.

MacDonald, Jason A., and William W. Franko, Jr. 2008. "What Moves Partisanship?: Migration, State Partisan Environment Change, and Party Identification." *American Politics Research* 36(6): 880-902.

MacKuen, Michael, and Courtney Brown. 1987. "Political Context and Attitude Change." *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 471-490.

MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *American Political Science Review* 83(4): 1125-1142.

Miller, Warren E. 1956. "One Party Politics and the Voter." *American Political Science Review* 50(3): 707-725.

Miller, Steven S., and David O. Sears. 1986. "Stability and Change in Social Tolerance: A Test of the Persistence Hypothesis." *American Journal of Political Science* 30(1): 214-236.

Newcomb, Theodore M., Kathryn E. Koenig, Richard Flacks, and Donald P. Warwick. 1967. *Persistence and Change: Bennington College and its Students After 25 Years*. New York: Wiley.

Niemi, Richard G., R. Danforth Ross, and Joseph Alexander. 1978. "The Similarity of Political Values of Parents and College-age Youths." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42: 503-520.

Niemi, Richard G., and M. Kent Jennings. 1991. "Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 970-988.

Keele, Luke, and Jennifer Wolak. 2006. "Value Conflict and Volatility in Party Identification." *British Journal of Political Science* 36: 671-690.

Kriner, Douglas L. 2006. "Examining Variance in Presidential Approval: The Case of FDR in World War II" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(1): 23-47.

Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz. 2009. "Partisan Dynamics and the Volatility of Presidential Approval." *British Journal of Political Science* 39: 609-631.

Pacheco, Julianna Sandell. 2008. "Political Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political Competition on Youth Voter Turnout." *Political Behavior* 30: 415-436.

Putnam, Robert D. 1966. "Political Attitudes and the Local Community." *American Political Science Review* 60(3): 640-654.

Rice, Tom W., and Tracey A. Hilton. 1996. "Partisanship Over Time: A Comparison of United States Panel Data." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(1): 191-201.

Sapiro, Virginia. 2004. "Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 1-23.

Sears, David O. 1989. "Whither political socialization research? The question of persistence." In *Political Socialization, Citizenship Education, and Democracy*, ed O Ichilov, pp. 69–97. New York: Teachers College Press.

Sears, David O. 1983. "The persistence of early political predispositions: The roles of attitude object and life stage." In Ladd Wheeler and P. Shaver, eds., Review of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy, vol. 4: pp. 79-116.

Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1999. "Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults' Political Predispositions." *Journal of Politics* 61(1): 1-28.

Sears, David O., and Sheri Levy. 2003. "Childhood and Adult Political Development." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press.

Searing, Donald, Gerald Wright, and George Rabinowitz. 1976. "The Primacy Principle: Attitude Change and Political Socialization." *British Journal of Political Science* 6: 83-113.

Settle, Jaime, E., Robert Bond, and Justin Levitt. 2011. "The Social Origins of Adult Political Behavior." *American Politics Research* 39(2): 239-263.

Smith, Deborah B., and Phyllis Moen. 1998. "Spousal Influence on Retirement: His, Her, and Their Perceptions." *Journal of Family and Marriage* 60(3): 734-744.

Taber, Charles and Milton Lodge. 2006. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Leaders." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 755-769.

Tedin, Kent L. 1974. "The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents." *The American Political Science Review* 68(4): 1579-1592.

Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill, Jr. 1988. "Churches as Political Communities." *American Political Science Review* 82 (2): 531-548.

Wilkes, Robert E. 1975. "Husband-Wife Influence in Purchase Decisions – A Confirmation and Extension." *Journal of Marketing Research* 12(2): 224-227.

Wolak, Jennifer. 2009. "Explaining Change in Party Identification in Adolescence." *Electoral Studies* 28(4): 573-583.

Zuckerman, Alan S., Josip Dasovic, and Jennifer Fitzgerald. 2007. *Partisan Families: The Social Logic of Bounded Partisanship in Germany and Britain*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tables:

Table 1: County Republican Context Variable for 1965, 1982, and 1997

	Minimum	*Maximum*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*N*
1965	-90.2	70	-22.27	21.48	842
1982	-61.5	72.7	9.88	19.51	891
1997	-75.9	52.4	-5.68	20.58	898

Table 2: Cross-Sectional Effects of Socializing Influences on Direction of Partisanship

	1965	1982	1997
Republican Context	.001	.014*	.013*
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
Mother's Partisanship (1965)	.321*	.097*	.015
	(.035)	(.039)	(.040)
Father's Partisanship (1965)	.355*	.157*	.160*
	(.033)	(.038)	(.039)
Spouse's Partisanship	-------	.376*	.496*
		(.036)	(.032)
Education	-------	-.033	-.078
		(.049)	(.049)
Race (White=1)	.026	.906*	1.01*
	(.198)	(.232)	(.239)
Gender (Male=1)	.141	.338*	.661*
	(.103)	(.115)	(.119)
Unmarried	-------	1.27*	-1.49*
		(.174)	(.190)
Constant	.714*	.174	.146*
	(.193)	(.246)	(.255)
N	659	685	704
R-Square	.55	.35	.42

Notes: p*<.05, two-tailed test.

Table 3: Moderating Effects of Challenging Environments on Familial and Spousal Social Influence

	Father's Influence			Mother's Influence			Spousal Influence	
	1965	1982	1997	1965	1982	1997	1982	1997
Father's Partisanship	.313*	.235*	.240*	.351*	.172*	.153*	.174*	.144*
	(.046)	(.047)	(.047)	(.034)	(.039)	(.040)	(.039)	(.041)
Mother's Partisanship	.327*	.110*	.026	.294*	.178*	.126*	.110*	.051
	(.035)	(.040)	(.041)	(.049)	(.048)	(.049)	(.041)	(.042)
Spouse's Partisanship	-------	.373*	.503*	-------	.362*	.494*	.447*	.574*
		(.036)	(.033)		(.036)	(.033)	(.041)	(.039)
Environment Challenges Father's Influence	.056	.287	.388*	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------
	(.057)	(.184)	(.176)					
Environment Challenges Mother's Influence	-------	-------	-------	-.217	.333+	.471*	-------	-------
				(.224)	(.194)	(.186)		
Environment Challenges Spouse's Influence	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	.295*	.525*
							(.146)	(.152)
Father's PID X Environment Challenges	-.114	-.166*	-.163*	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------
	(.223)	(.058)	(.051)					
Mother's PID X Environment Challenges	-------	-------	-------	.066	-.176*	-.190*	-------	-------
				(.058)	(.060)	(.053)		
Spouse's PID X Environment Challenges	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-.208*	-.158*
							(.058)	(.046)
Race (White=1)	-.061	.951*	1.06*	-.066	.985*	1.09*	.974*	1.08*
	(.207)	(.239)	(.244)	(.202)	(.238)	(.242)	(.239)	(.247)
Male	.174+	.266*	1.06*	.177+	.268*	.712*	.301*	.731*
	(.103)	(.118)	(.122)	(.103)	(.119)	(.123)	(.120)	(.124)
Education	-------	-.077	-.140*	-------	-.056	-.116*	-.070	-.117*
		(.050)	(.050)		(.050)	(.050)	(.051)	(.051)
Unmarried	-------	1.28*	-1.55*	-------	1.26*	-1.50*	1.14*	-1.54*
		(.176)	(.194)		(.178)	(.194)	(.183)	(.191)
Constant	.772*	.150	-.090	.777*	.060	-.188	.102	-.257
	(.201)	(.271)	(.260)	(.197)	(.273)	(.259)	(.267)	(.266)
N	697	683	692	689	674	684	659	678
R-Squared	.55	.34	.40	.55	.34	.40	.36	.42

Notes: *p<.05, +p<.1, two tailed test

Table 4: Effects of Environmental Socializing Influences Over the Full Panel, 1965-1997

Father's Partisanship (1965)	.294*	.242*	.185*
	(.034)	(.030)	(.036)
Mother's Partisanship (1965)	.171*	.233*	.073+
	(.031)	(.036)	(.037)
Spouse's Partisanship	-------	-------	.328*
			(.024)
Environment Challenges Father's Influence	.580*	------	-------
	(.117)		
Environment Challenges Mother's Influence	-------	.673*	-------
		(.122)	
Environment Challenges Spouse's Influence	-------	-------	.444*
			(.104)
Father's PID X Environment Challenges	-.108*	-------	-------
	(.034)		
Mother's PID X Environment Challenges	-------	-.134*	-------
		(.035)	
Spouse's PID X Environment Challenges	-------	-------	-.156*
			(.035)
Political Knowledge	-.050	-.048	-.082*
	(.030)	(.030)	(.037)
Race (White=1)	.966*	.957*	1.18*
	(.183)	(.181)	(.217)
Gender (Male=1)	.315*	.341*	.508*
	(.094)	(.094)	(.111)
1982	.186*	.159+	-------
	(.094)	(.094)	
1997	.343*	.340*	.056
	(.083)	(.084)	(.079)
Constant	.463*	.411*	.545*
	(.209)	(.207)	(.255)
Number of Observations	1,954	1,932	1.216
Number of Groups	702	694	707
Wald Chi-Square	575.72	592.58	480.40
R-Square Within	.05	.05	.07
R-Square Between	.43	.44	.40
R-Square Overall	.29	.30	.35

Notes: *p<.05, +p<.1

Figures:

Figure 1: Effect Sizes of Social Environments Across the Life Cycle

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Parental and Spousal Influence When Environments Either Support or Challenge

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Parental and Spousal Influence When Environments Support or Challenge, Full Panel 1965-1997