1-1-2017

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This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Routledge an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group in Educational Philosophy and Theory of January 2017, available online at doi: 10.1080/00131857.2016.1182415
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Abstract
As a landmark philosopher of language and of mind, Ludwig Wittgenstein is also remarkable for having crossed, with apparent ease, the “continental divide” in philosophy. It is consequently not surprising that Wittgenstein’s work, particularly the Philosophical Investigations, has been taken up by philosophers of education in English. Michael A. Peters (1999), Christopher Winch (2002), Smeyers & Burbules (2010), and others (e.g., Aparece 2005) have engaged extensively with the implications of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy for education. One challenge they face is Wittgenstein’s use of the word “training.” It appears throughout his discussions of language learning and in his periodic references to education. This is made all the more problematic by realizing that the German term Wittgenstein uses consistently is *Abrichtung*, which refers exclusively to animal dressage or obedience training, and which connotes also the breaking of an animal’s will. I argue that this little-recognized fact has broad significance for many important Wittgensteinian insights into education. I conclude by considering how an unflinching recognition of the implications of Wittgenstein’s word choice might cast him as a pessimistic or tragic philosopher of education and upbringing—following “pessimistic” German-language traditions—rather than as one compatible with “progressivist” Anglo-American orientations.

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein (1953) articulates a highly original account of language and its acquisition that is central to his later philosophy. He begins by utterly rejecting the “philosophical concept of meaning” (p. 3) that he sees as underlying Western thought—at least since Augustine’s famous description of language learning as a kind of pointing and naming. Wittgenstein regards such a way of understanding meaning as appropriate only for a system more primitive or simplistic than what we otherwise know as “language.” Wittgenstein admits that “Augustine… does describe a system of communication,” but adds that “not everything that we call language is this system” (p. 3; emphasis added). Wittgenstein sums up what he sees as the limitations of this account of language with a particularly rich metaphor:

Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think only not yet speak (pp. 13-14)

Wittgenstein sees this Augustinian account of language learning as ultimately circular. It attempts to account for the way in which languages are learned, but it can only do so by assuming that the child already knows another language. This “other” language might be a kind of silent language of thought or a simple repertoire of pointing and naming. Such a pre-existing system which would then provide a frame of reference through which the “real” language could be taught. This would make all language learning like a kind of second-rate ESL (English as a Second Language) instruction, in which a new, “second” language can be taught and learned through the use of an already-existing “first” language. Augustine, in other words, presupposes what he claims to explain, and as Wittgenstein (1953) has famously remarked, all “explanations come to an end somewhere” (p. 3). This problem or question of the initial foundation or starting point for learning language, convention and “forms of life” is itself foundational to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, to language games and rule following.

In order to address the limitations of Augustine’s (and others’) accounts of original language learning, Wittgenstein proposes an “expansion of language” beyond simply pointing and naming. He develops his famous notion of the “language game” to begin this foundational exploration. Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that ostensive definition—and
other, more playful forms involved in childhood language learning—provide only one example of a language game. They are only one game among many that together constitute a much larger game, “the whole process of using words” (p. 3):

I… will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game. I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the “language-game.”… the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 5)

Despite the fact that the notions of “language game” and of “form of life” are both absolutely fundamental for Wittgenstein, he does not give them explicit definition. But based on the way he uses both these terms, it is clear that they are prerequisites for or perhaps constitutive of nearly any condition of individual or collective thought or action—of common understanding, certainty, belief, justification, and even “the phenomena of hope” itself, as Wittgenstein says (p. 174). Despite this difficulty and ambiguity, Wittgenstein is able to conceive of a wide range of language games and associated forms of life: “It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. – Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others” (p. 8).

Among these innumerable others, Wittgenstein imagines languages that might be used for “reporting an event,” for “speculating about an event” and—significantly for this paper—for “a child … when it learns to talk” (1953, p. 4). Speaking further of this last example, Wittgenstein emphasizes that “here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training” (p. 4). Training, in other words, represents a form of life, a kind of language game, in which “the child learns… language from the grown-ups” (1958, p. 77). Imagining a “society” in which “the only system of language” consists just of commands made by one type of person upon another, Wittgenstein describes such childhood training in his Blue and Brown Notebooks as follows:

The child learns this language … by being trained to its use. I am using the word “trained” in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by means of example, reward, punishment, and suchlike. (1958, p. 77; emphasis in original).

Although Wittgenstein occasionally uses other words when discussing education broadly—for example he mentions “instruction” (Unterricht) and a type of didactic “provision” (beibringen) when discussing ostensive teaching—his insistence on language learning and training through reward and punishment is both consistent and systematic. For example, appealing to the notion of “rule following” in games, Wittgenstein argues that “following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way” (1953, p. 81). Of course, there are also other examples of Wittgenstein’s use of the word “training.” In his Lectures (1932-1935) Wittgenstein again insists that training is comparable to “drill,” and emphasizes that language learning is indeed analogous to the most arbitrary exercises in stimulus and response:

Training can be described as consisting of two steps (1) the trainer’s doing certain things, (2) the occurrence of certain reactions on the part of the subject, with the possibility of improvement. Teaching a language always depends on a training which presupposes that the subject reacts. If the subject does not react in a given case, that is, does not understand. Reference to understanding will then not appear in the description of the training. But nothing is omitted from the description by omitting reference to understanding. (p. 102)

Wittgenstein is not only describing training in the austere terms of the subject’s reaction to a trainer “doing certain things,” he is further arguing that any reference to “understanding” in such an account at most refers to the presence or absence of an appropriate “reaction.” Any additional connotations or denotations carried by the word “understanding,” Wittgenstein believes, can simply be discarded.

A final example is found in the Zettel, a collection of fragments made by Wittgenstein himself and “left by him in a box-file” (Anscombe & Wright 1970, p. v). This collection has long been available in a bilingual edition. In one of these fragments, Wittgenstein applies his notions of language learning and rule-following to education very broadly. He observes that “Any explanation has its foundation in training,” and adds parenthetically but sententiously, “Educators ought to remember this.” (1967, p. 74e).
Consistent use of terms like drill, orders, reward, punishment and references to animal responses and reactions (rather than to, say, “support” or “understanding”) all contribute to the impression that Wittgenstein is not presenting training as a highly differentiated or nuanced notion. Indeed, one could say that Wittgenstein goes out of his way to bring the term “training” into relation with the way “we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things.” Moreover, Wittgenstein’s willingness to connect this elemental notion of training to education and educators in a general but practical manner suggests that he is not simply using the term rhetorically, heuristically or hypothetically (a point I argue in more detail below). Instead, it presents readers with a substantial and uncomfortable challenge.

At the same time, all of these observations are enormously amplified and ramified by careful consideration of the German term Abrichtung, the word Wittgenstein uses consistently in reference to “training” in his German notes, drafts and texts. Gertrude Anscombe, student and translator of Wittgenstein, used “training” consistently for Abrichtung in her translation of the Philosophical Investigations and also in Wittgenstein’s Zettel (see: Luntley 2008, p. 696). Wittgenstein himself followed this “rule” for translation in moving between German and English in preparing his own Brown Book. Abrichtung is notably different from the English “training,” however. The standard German (Duden) Dictionary defines Abrichtung as directed toward “(an animal, esp. a dog) to train for particular action and abilities; dressage.” Langenscheidt’s German-English dictionary provides two entries for the term: “(animal) train,” also, “teach an animal tricks; (horse) break in,” adding these example phrases: to “train an animal to…” or to “train a dog to attack people.” The second entry provided for Abrichten in Langenscheidt’s refers to woodwork or machine work. It identifies the act of “trueing” something; “to justify, pare, plane, straighten or level.”

A further helpful literary illustration is provided in the standard 16-volume Grimms’ German Dictionary. It highlights the appearance of Abrichtung—as well as its animal associations—in Goethe’s East-Western Divan, quoting that the “ass” Christ rode into Jerusalem would “not have been better trained” had it also been “driven to Mecca” (1827). Training or Abrichtung, in other words, occurs on the level of a beast of burden reaching its destination. And on these terms, even the most basic theological or cultural difference that would separate the Abrahamic religions (and their holiest places) one from another are utterly irrelevant.

Since the time of Goethe and the Grimm brothers, the term also appears to have taken on a further popular connotation. When one enters the term Abrichtung into Google’s image search, German Shepherds and Rottweilers being “trained” to serve, hunt, defend and attack are prominently displayed. However, book-covers showing women with whips or in bondage form the clear majority of the top search results (for example, one is called Slave: the Abrichtung of my Wife). Even in English, of course, “training” has a similar connotation in sadomasochistic sexual culture as a purposefully slavish and demeaning kind of behavioural conditioning. Of course, Wittgenstein could have chosen other words that are closer to the English “training”—such as Ausbildung or Einarbeitung, with their connotations of initiation and apprenticeship—but he clearly and consistently opted for the more difficult connotations and denotations of Abrichtung instead.

One of the very few to confront Abrichtung openly and at some length, Michael Luntley has remarked: “Any account of Wittgenstein on training must confront this issue and explain what is going on in the text when Wittgenstein assaults the reader with inappropriate language” (296-297). However, in his later publications on Wittgenstein, Luntley does not provide such a confrontation and explanation. Instead, he bravely faults Wittgenstein for a “deficiency:” “Such a notion of training is, on its own, insufficient as a basis for language learning. It is also doubtful that Wittgenstein ever thought that it was” (2015, p. 70). However, I cannot speculate on what Wittgenstein thought, and what alternative basis for language learning he might have had in mind.

But in examining what Wittgenstein wrote and did, this paper does not reject his choice of words—despite their unyielding harshness—simply as “inappropriate” or an “assault” on his readers. At the same time, it also acknowledges, but avoids undue speculation on Wittgenstein’s own teaching: There is the biographical reality of his frustrations and angry outbursts recalled by his Cambridge students (see below). More significantly, though, there are the literal and brutal assaults visited by Wittgenstein as a school teacher on his young charges in the mid-twenties (Monk 1991, pp. 224, 232-233). As a school teacher in rural Austria, Wittgenstein regularly pulled the hair and boxed the ears of his pupils, sometimes drawing blood. At one point he struck a boy on the head with sufficient force to cause him to collapse on the floor, unconscious. Wittgenstein’s immediate response was to leave the classroom, the village and also his post as a teacher. Hearings were held at a district court, but the case was suddenly dropped, perhaps through the influence of Wittgenstein’s wealthy family.
Johannes Giessinger sums up the situation presented both by Wittgenstein’s actions and words from a German-language perspective:

It is true that learners are often portrayed by Wittgenstein as passive and subservient (unterwürfig). This may correspond to Wittgenstein’s pedagogical conceptions—as well as to his practice as a school teacher. Seen this way, it is perhaps not accidental that Wittgenstein so frequently uses the word Abrichtung, a term that sounds so repugnant to many. (p. 44)

Wittgenstein’s portrayal of learners as passive and subservient, of training as drill, as a kind of breaking of the will, of orders, and automatic and unthinking responses is rather unambiguous. Confirming Giessinger’s cautious supposition that Wittgenstein’s use of the term Abrichtung is indeed purposeful (rather than accidental), this paper proceeds on the premise that to obfuscate or conceal the meanings of Wittgenstein’s words in either German or English is ultimately to do him a disservice. The remainder of my necessarily brief but hopefully unflinching exploration of this these meanings of Abrichtung and training and their implications proceeds in three steps: 1) I provide an example of re-readings of some of Wittgenstein’s passages, above, taking into account his use of Abrichtung and other German terms. 2) I then illustrate the implications of such re-readings in connection with examples from educational scholarship on Wittgenstein. Finally, 3) taking up Janik and Toulmin’s efforts to resituate Wittgenstein in a continental context, I outline a possible interpretation of Wittgenstein as a “tragic” philosopher of education—one who sees teaching learning and upbringing as unavoidably destructive, even violent.

Wittgenstein’s statements on training take on a sometimes surprising tone when they are re-read using the German term Abrichtung—and in combination with his other German vocabulary. For example, when Wittgenstein concludes one of his descriptions of childhood language learning in his Philosophical Investigations (cited above), he should (also) be read as stating that “here the teaching of language is not Erklärung” but rather, “Abrichtung.” In other words, teaching of language does not involve explanations, statements or even declarations (Erklärung refers to all three in German), but rather a kind of drill, conditioning or animal obedience training. Similarly, when Wittgenstein writes in his Zettel (also as quoted above in English) that “Die Grundlage jeder Erklärung ist die Abrichtung (Das sollten Erzieher bedenken),” he is also speaking about more than “training” has suggested to many, perhaps more than just explanation, and he is also addressing readers well beyond education. For Erzieher (educator) and Erziehung (educator) in German refer to “upbringing” in general, but clearly also includes the more formal “educator” or institutions of “education.” Wittgenstein is saying that the basis for explanations, declarations and statements is to be found in a kind of animal dressage, or in even in the breaking of the learner’s will. And he is adding parenthetically that parents and caregivers, as well as teachers should remember this.

In the light of these re-readings, interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as one germane to progressive and contemporary educational thought and practices appear at least questionable if not untenable. Indeed, as Giessinger (quoted above) observes, “the progressive educational (reformpädagogische) idea of human learning through independent discovery,” on Wittgenstein’s account, can only be regarded “as a dangerous illusion” (2008, p. 1). Examples of such interpretations include many in English that regard Wittgenstein as a relatively sanguine philosopher of teaching and learning, for example, Paul Smeyers and Nicholas Burbules’ text titled “Education as an Initiation into Practice.” This text follows many other interpretations of Wittgenstein’s use of the word “training by carefully differentiating it from the cruder implications of a term like “conditioning.” Highlighting his many references to training as rule following, Smeyers and Burbules conclude that for Wittgenstein, training plays a crucial role in education, but this is in an important sense different from conditioning in that the association is structured by a practice that is, according to Wittgenstein, rule governed (or normative).… Notice that on this account there is no necessary incompatibility between initiation into an existing practice and transforming that practice in some way; indeed, the first is a condition for the second. (pp. 185-186; emphasis in original)

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Training in Wittgenstein, in other words, does not entail a unidirectional and arbitrary demand for conformity made by the trainer on the trainee, or by arbitrary convention on the child. It is instead a two-way relationship between educator and educand, and also between the educand and pre-existing practices. Such an interpretation becomes untenable, however, when training is seen as carrying the narrow denotative meaning that Wittgenstein himself affirms, as well as the term’s many disturbing connotations that Wittgenstein makes no apparent effort to suppress.

A second example is provided by Christopher Winch—son of Wittgenstein scholar Peter—in his 2002 book, *The Philosophy of Human Learning*, which uses “insights derived from the work of Wittgenstein… [to mount] a vigorous attack on influential contemporary accounts of learning, both in the ‘romantic’ Rousseauian tradition and in the ‘scientific’ cognitivist tradition” (1998, np). Winch devotes an entire chapter to the question of Wittgenstein’s use of “training.” At the conclusion of this chapter—and again ironically in the light of the practical connotations of the word *Abrichtung*—Winch argues strenuously for the clear differentiation of animal *conditioning* from a much more nuanced notion of human “training:”

…training is to be distinguished from conditioning. It is a form of teaching that, if effective, leads to the confident deployment of skill and technique in a wide variety of situations. In the case of human training, it invariably involves the use of language and rule-following, thus making it more complex and qualitatively different from the most complex forms of animal training. It can, therefore, promote independence and autonomy. In so far as the case against training rested on a kind of anti-authoritarianism derived from the work of Rousseau, it has been shown to be confused. (2002, pp. 50-51)

One might also say that no small amount of confusion rests with Winch himself. Despite opening his chapter on training with Wittgenstein’s reminder to educators that “explanation has its foundation in training”—and sourcing it directly to the bilingual edition of the *Zettel*—Winch is apparently oblivious to the original German. Winch goes on to imagine a set of meanings and connotations much more complex and ambivalent that the term *Abrichtung* could ever meaningfully license. Wittgenstein’s notion of training or *Abrichtung*, he is in effect saying, can apply only to humans. This not only flies in the face of what is available to Wittgenstein’s readers in English, but also represents the diametric inverse of meanings that are unavoidable in *Abrichtung*.

Of course, it goes without saying that I am not taking Wittgenstein’s characterizations of training as offering a set of literal prescriptions for educational practice. The idea that the Wittgenstein’s use of *Abrichtung* should be understood as playing a special figurative, rhetorical or theoretical role in his philosophy—one notably different from other terms—is one of the most frequent objections raised to preliminary versions of this paper. The argument is that Wittgenstein was either led or compelled to use the term *Abrichtung* to make a point, to serve or preserve the larger systematic coherence of his thought. He wanted to create a clear contrast between *Abrichtung* and his opposed notion of explanation (Huemmer 2013), for example, or to put in place an unshakeable foundation for all subsequent rule-following, understanding and language-playing. However, to imply that Wittgenstein was either forced or limited in his choice and juxtaposition of terms is hardly a compliment Wittgenstein as a philosopher and writer, and even raises questions about the confidence with which he is to be read and interpreted. Regardless, I of course do not believe that Wittgenstein—despite his own actions as a teacher—is literally instructing anyone to treat our students sadistically or to break their will.

In considering the role of this term in relation to any other in Wittgenstein, I can only ask: How did Wittgenstein treat other problematic terms in his late work, and how might we have similarly approached the challenges presented by the word *Abrichtung*? Much of the substance of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* consists of a patient exploration of specific terms, phrases and situations that are at first suggested as possibilities (often beginning with “Let us imagine…”), and then considered in their individual facets and implications. Rule-following and language games, to mention but two familiar examples, are both explored in this way; Wittgenstein takes us through various games and their rules, and considers examples of signs along a path, or of rules articulated in simplified communicative situations. How might *Abrichtung* be explored in a similarly conjectural, hypothetical manner? One could look to specific instances *Abrichtung*, just as Wittgenstein considers specific instances of games and rules. We might be further invited to imagine how a wild horse can be broken by its rider, a dog made to heel, or how a child might be “trained” not to touch a candle flame or a stovetop element. Wittgenstein might further imagine a specific instance of *Abrichtung* in the context of the two steps he identifies as indispensable in training: the trainer “does something” and “the occurrence of certain reactions [are shown] on the part of the subject” being trained. But taking
any of these examples further does not seem to point to an easy escape from the harsh implications of Abrichtung. Instead, it is just as easy to imagine the intensification and multiplication of these implications through further conjectural exploration. Wittgenstein is not providing a literal prescription for instruction, but instead, he insists that his readers regard the harshest conditioning, drill and discipline as unavoidable in education and learning. My task now is to consider how this can be productively understood.

To consider the possible implications of the term Abrichtung for Wittgenstein’s late thought, I believe it is necessary effect a change or shift in the perspective from which it is generally viewed and in the context in which his work is generally placed. To oversimplify, this is a shift from what might be called an “English-language” to a “German-language” perspective. It is a shift whose intrinsic complexity is compounded by the fact that Wittgenstein was active in both of these linguistic and cultural milieus, and that he is interpreted variously in each. With these caveats, I begin by noting that in Wittgenstein’s biography, such a divide is most readily demarcated by his education and work on the Tractatus on the continent, and his engagement, mostly later in his life, in Cambridge. Thankfully, the work of “re-establish[ing] the significance of links between Wittgenstein and the Viennese, German-language thought and art of his time …observed as a result of his later associations with the English-speaking philosophers” has been undertaken (Janik & Toulmin 1973, p. 9). It is done in an exemplary manner in Wittgenstein’s Vienna by Allan Janik and one of Wittgenstein’s former students, Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin frames the analysis with a recollection of Wittgenstein: He and his fellow students in Cambridge “struck Wittgenstein as intolerably stupid. He would denounce us to our faces as unteachable, and at times he despaired of getting us to recognize what sort of point he was trying to get across to us” (p. 21). However, the question for both Toulmin and Janik is whether this “incomprehension” might have actually been entirely “genuine.” To paraphrase, Toulmin asks whether a significant amount of Wittgenstein’s thought is “lost in translation.”

Janik and Toulmin of course answer this question in the affirmative; they argue that “much of his material had origins that his English audiences knew next-to-nothing about, and many of the problems he chose to concentrate on had been under discussion among German-speaking philosophers and psychologists since before the First World War” (p. 22). The authors take Wittgenstein’s 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as their principle example:

Yet if we see the publication of the Tractatus exclusively as an episode in the history of philosophical logic, one significant feature of the book remains totally mysterious. After some seventy pages apparently devoted to nothing but logic, theory of language and the philosophy of mathematics or natural science, we are suddenly faced by five concluding pages (propositions 6.4 on [see: 2001, pp. 86-89]) in which our heads are seemingly wrenched around and we are faced with a string of dogmatic theses about solipsism, death and “the sense of the ‘world’” which “must lie outside the world.” (p. 23)

In the concluding section of this paper, I explore the possibility that something similar applies to Wittgenstein’s later works as well, particularly when it comes to the question of training or Abrichtung. My “strong” hypothesis is that the coherence and force of Wittgenstein’s later thought might become clearer through a similar excursion outside the bounds of what one typically finds in English-language interpretations of his work. More humbly, I hope to highlight how the contingencies of accommodating Abrichtung in the later Wittgenstein’s thought might open new or unfamiliar possibilities for conceptualizing learning, education and upbringing.

The philosophy of education in German-language contexts has not shied away (for better or for worse) from dark, anti-democratic and deeply pessimistic views of education and upbringing. For example, under the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer, Nietzsche envisioned education in terms strikingly consistent with Wittgenstein’s own notion of training and also of “genius:” Education, for Nietzsche, begins with the discipline of those educated and culminates in the celebration of the genius of a courageous few. Notably, Nietzsche’s articulation of this vision in his “Schopenhauer as Educator” is still considered canonical in Germany educational theory today.

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2 Wittgenstein remarked that “Genius is talent exercised with courage.” He has also noted that “There is no more light in a genius than in any other honest man—but he has a particular kind of lens to concentrate this light into a burning point” Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 40, 41.
In 1931, Wittgenstein famously identified Schopenhauer together with Frege, Russell and a number of German and Austrian pessimists as being “passionately tak[en] up” in his own “work of clarification.” The German and Austrian inspirations for his work include the satirist and playwright Karl Kraus (author of “The Last Days of Humankind”), secessionist and pedophile Alfred Loos (author of “Ornament and Crime”), Jewish misogynist and anti-Semite Otto Weininger (author of On the Last Things) and historian and German nationalist Oswald Spengler (author of Decline of the West).

These characterizations and titles suggest a dark view of the world and our place within it. They give the impression of a profound cynicism that appears in English educational discourse perhaps only in moments of the most radical critique (e.g., Joel Spring) or the most clandestine conservatism (e.g., B.F. Skinner). Of course, in listing names like Loos and Spengler, I am not suggesting that some nationalist or anti-Semitic animus lurks within Wittgenstein’s later reflections. I am instead attempting to underscore both the relatively unfamiliar and heterogeneous nature of Wittgenstein’s inspiration, and also its desultory character.

However, there is one much more familiar figure, a fellow Jewish exile from Vienna in England who Wittgenstein also includes in his listing deeply engaging, creative and influential thinkers. This is Sigmund Freud, who as Rush Rhees recalls, Wittgenstein was shocked to (re)discover in 1919, and who he consistently thought “worth reading” afterwards. Rhees quotes Wittgenstein directly:

“I happened to read something by Freud, and I sat up in surprise. Here was someone who had something to say.” I think this was in 1919. And for the rest of his life Freud was one of the few authors he thought worth reading. He would speak of himself—at the period of these discussions—as “a disciple of Freud” and “a follower of Freud.” (1967, p. 41)

Although Rhees is speaking of the time prior to the appearance of the Tractatus, even later in his life, Wittgenstein engaged with Freud critically but seriously, reaffirming the “cleverness,” “originality” even the “brilliance” of his contemporary (1998, pp. 42, 62).

When Wittgenstein was just taking up his position at Cambridge, Freud published Civilization and its Discontents (1930/1962) [Das Unbehagen in der Kultur] a deeply pessimistic text written in the aftermath of the First World War. In it Freud generalizes his psychoanalytic insights on neurosis and repression to society or civilization as a whole. In this, Freud develops the conclusion that “civilization is built up upon a renunciation of drives [Triebverzicht].”

There are a number of things lost (in some cases, mistaken) in the Strachey translation of Freud into English as well. More importantly, it is often noted that Trieb, the word for “drive,” is systematically mistranslated by Strachey as “instinct.” I have corrected this with reference to the original German text, otherwise relying on Strachey for rendering Freud into English. I thank Joris Vlieghe for his assistance with this issue.

A considerable amount of aggressiveness must be developed in the child against the authority which prevents him from having his first, but none the less his most important, satisfactions, whatever the kind of instinctual deprivation that is demanded of him may be; but he is obliged to renounce the satisfaction of this revengeful aggressiveness. (p. 129)

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Freud here speaks of a double renunciation or repression: First, there is the initial denial of the child’s first satisfaction—paradigmatically, the mother’s breast— and second, the renunciation of the aggressive response to which this initial denial gives rise.

For Wittgenstein, a similar renunciation, or perhaps more accurately, brutalization is also clearly located in early childhood. Of course, for Wittgenstein, it does not unfold as an oedipal psychodrama, but in terms of the acquisition of everyday language and “forms of life.” Wittgenstein sees a kind of renunciation (or rather, castigation) and self-alienation as required in language learning, and in one’s assimilation to pre-existing forms of life. In this process, for both Freud and Wittgenstein, the child is alienated from his or her own “original” nature. Freud defined this original nature of the child in explicit, sexual and familial terms: as deeply instinctual and aggressive, even violent. But Wittgenstein defines it only tacitly, through negative implication. In using a term like Abrichtung, Wittgenstein is strongly suggesting that this nature is fundamentally animal, and that it is also profoundly alien to—even diametrically opposed to—rules and conventions. Wittgenstein’s descriptions also suggest that this nature is intrinsically “responsive” or “reactive” in character.

The world of adults, to highlight still further points of similarity shared by Wittgenstein and Freud, is seen as largely cultural: It is formed through rules, conventions and language games—or for Freud, communal demands and affirmations. To the child, these conditions represent more an artificial imposition than an adaptation of innate, natural circumstances. Rules, reactions, and language games, or “civilization” itself presents a kind of artifice that must be painfully and forcefully imposed on humans and their original nature.

Thus, in both Freud and Wittgenstein, education is clearly not seen as an affirmation, augmentation and extension of the student’s or child’s given or natural situation, disposition, or even learning abilities. Instead, the child’s original nature is only to be denied. And this is done precisely so that those being educated become something quite different from what their given natures would initially dictate—specifically that they become a part of culture and of forms of life in all of their complexity and artifice. They become players in language games with their arbitrary and tautological rules and requirements.

This, of course, is a view of education that is radically different from the progressive tradition and also from the educational prescriptions of cognitivist and some neurological work. It is much closer to more traditional German theories of education and upbringing. These frequently go under the name of (philosophical) anthropology or pedagogical anthropology, with anthropology understood in the sense used by Kant (e.g., in asking “What is man?”) or Foucault (e.g., “the Anthropological Circle” in his History of Madness).

Consistent with both Wittgenstein and Freud, these anthropologies tend to emphasize the child’s transformation from a creature of nature into a fundamentally cultural, rule-following or “conventionalized” being. These accounts often begin with the thesis that the existence and upbringing of humans is fundamentally different from that of animals. Instead of being provisioned with physical means to survive cold nights (e.g., a covering of fur) or to fight off predators (e.g., sharp teeth or claws), humans are marked precisely by the absence of such attributes. The human being is thus generally seen as a “deficient being,” a Mängelwesen as Arnold Gehlen (1988, p. 13) has put it. Of all the animals, it seems that human children spend by far the longest time under parental protection and support—stretching from years into decades. This extended time is viewed as providing the missing constituents in human “being,” which are above all cultural in nature. And these are provided precisely through practices of upbringing, education and enculturation, as Rousseau famously summarizes:

We are born weak, we need strength; we are born totally unprovided, we need aid; we are born stupid, we need judgment. Everything we do not have at our birth and which we need when we are grown is given us by education. (1762/1979, p. 38)

Freud and Wittgenstein, of course, view these processes of “humanization” as necessarily entailing renunciation and brutality. However, continental pedagogy and anthropology has traditionally portrayed even the earliest processes of enculturation as facilitated by empathic and mimetic affinities between adult and child. German theories in particular also have recourse to the notion of Bildsamkeit, referring literally to the “form-ability” of the child, and also identify an intrinsic desire on the part of the child to become individual and adult.
A further implication is found in the fact that *Abrichtung* is not simply an abstract aspect of our species-being. It does not simply apply to some imaginary child in the present or the future. It is ourselves, and it also the adults who have "conditioned" us in our own past, who are marked by its brutality. As Giesinger (2008) states, adults like us who are now responsible for "training" children only have recourse to our own experiences of the inhumanity of our own brutalization, meaning that a cycle of loss and castigation is on some level constantly repeated. In this broad sense, *Abrichtung* can also be seen as presenting a kind of threshold separating the "enculturated" adult from the "uncultured" young child. In this sense, it can also be seen to separate that which is social, vocal, rule-bound and coherent from its opposite: that which is asocial, silent, irregular and incoherent. By passing through the harsh conditioning implied in *Abrichtung*, the child progresses from a place that is in a sense beyond meaning, articulation and explanation, to one that is clearly integrated, communicable and articulable. Referencing the later Wittgenstein, the German educationist Klaus Mollenhauer (2014) has labelled the experience on the "other" side of socialization and training as that which is "unspoken" or "unspeakable." Mollenhauer adds that it is precisely this experience that is falsified when it is brought into the rules and conventions of language. Echoing Freud (but not so much Wittgenstein), Mollenhauer even goes so far as to speculate that within this "unspoken" experience "resides in the unconscious and … [the] source of our desires, hopes, fantasies, and utopias …In art as in [our own and other’s] childhood[s], we seek to interpret such manifestations" (pp. 64–65).

Of course, educationally speaking, the threshold separating the unspoken and inchoate from language and forms of life is crossed only in a single direction. Education, unlike art, psychiatry or psychoanalysis does not typically concern itself with a return back to the other side of this dividing line. The deeply educational predicament presented by this unidirectional passage resonates with what Janik and Toulmin have identified as some of the more challenging, normatively- and ontologically-loaded statements in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*: To observe the “limits of my language” as meaning “the limits of my world” (2001, p. 68) may well be to point towards pre-linguistic or non-linguistic possibilities that are at once clearly delimited yet also closed to sense-making. And at the risk of sounding clichéd, one might also be tempted to see the “tragic side” of education as given expression in Wittgenstein’s famous conclusion, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (p. 89). The processes of educating and socializing—like the whole sphere of adult human activity and articulation—lends itself to endless interpretation and reconsideration. However, that which lies outside of these limits may well be an important even indispensable part of human experience—but it is one which we cannot readily (if at all) bring to reflection and articulation, and whose subliminal subsistence we are often rather unhappy to acknowledge.

In the end, Wittgenstein’s view of education culminates in a tragic paradox. This is one that most scholars in education and perhaps even philosophy would be tempted to avoid or at least minimize: That what makes us human, what brings us into any and all forms of human life is precisely the inhumanity of our conditioning and adaptation to them. Openly acknowledging this brutality and inhumanity does not come easily. However, it can lead to very different understandings of education from those jejunely progressivist or reductively cognitivist and biologicist.

In reflecting on education, I believe it is important to (re)introduce what Foucault has once described as lying at “the centre of [the] …limit-experiences of the Western world… the refusal, the forgetting and the silent collapse of tragedy” (p. xxx). It seems likely that remembering the tragic would also suggest possibilities for reinterpreting Wittgenstein’s other key notions such as “language game,” “explanation” and “forms of life” in ways that are both productive and compelling. Again paradoxically, it may be that precisely when Wittgenstein is at his most dark, vexing, and alienating, he is also at his most richly rewarding.

**References**


