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Regional Influences on Political Identity: Canadian and U.S. Urban Comparisons

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Abstract
Scholars have expanded the academic literature to understand the way culture may influence politics but much less work has considered the influence of region on cities and individuals. The article uses existing data to examine whether liberalism is influenced by the region where individuals and cities are located. The study uses the boolean method and Hierarchical Linear Modeling to control for both individual and city level effects in 8 Canadian cities and 46 U.S. cities. The findings support the supposition that place still matters even in an era when globalization threatens to standardize much of what makes up our communities.

Keywords: Regionalism, identity, culture, urban, comparative

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Résumé
Les chercheurs ont élargi la littérature académique pour comprendre la manière dont la culture peut influencer sur la politique, mais beaucoup moins de travail a examiné l'influence de la région sur les villes et les individuelles. L'article utilise les données existantes pour examiner si le libéralisme est influencé par la région où les individus et les villes sont situés. L'étude utilise la méthode booléenne et Modélisation Hiérarchique Linéaire pour contrôler les effets à la fois individuels et au niveau de la ville dans 8 villes canadiennes et 46 villes des États-Unis. Les résultats soutiennent l'hypothèse que le lieu importe encore, même à une époque où la mondialisation menace de normaliser une grande partie de ce qui fait nos communautés.

Mots clés: le régionalisme, l'identité, la culture, urbain, comparatif

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have expanded the academic literature to understand the way culture may influence politics. The works of scholars such as Reese and Rosenfeld (2008), Sharp and Joslyn (2008), and DeLeon and Naff (2004) have all developed ways to test the influence of culture on local politics in the U.S. Recently though, much less work has focused on the way regions may play a role in influencing individuals who, today, reside predominately in urban areas. The relevance of a regional influence may be of more importance today than any other time in history since more people live in urban areas than ever before. In fact, since 2002 more people live in metropolitan areas than rural areas in the U.S. (USDA 2007). In Canada, as of the 2001 census, nearly 80 percent of the population lives in urban areas (Newbold 2010, 132). When we consider all of North America we find that as of 2011, fully 82.2 percent of all of the population lives in urban areas (United Nations 2012, 11).

In addition to understanding whether or not there is a regional influence on urban areas as they grow and become of more importance to our societies, it might also be worthwhile to know if that influence holds across national borders. To test this supposition characteristics that have been previously found to be important predictors of liberalism are examined for individuals in both U.S. and Canadian cities. City and regional level effects are then introduced to learn more about the way their effects interact with individual level characteristics on predicting liberalism. The study reveals region matters in some instances but not in others.

PLACE AND ITS POTENTIAL TO SHAPE OUTCOMES

Sharp and Joslyn examine whether the urban sub-culture influences individuals' racial tolerance. Using an existing dataset, the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCBS), the authors demonstrated contextual factors do influence individual attitudes. One notable feature of their analysis is the use of a statistical procedure to deal with

clusters imbedded in an analysis as opposed to using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). HLM is a technique specifically developed to analyze data with multi-level structures where clustering would naturally occur such as students in classrooms in schools or individuals in cities within regions in specific nations.

Reese and Rosenfeld (2008) explored the connections between civic culture and local policy. Their work highlighted that place matters in terms of its culture and in turn, that culture has an influence on local policy. They also provided a historical reference point for understanding culture and how its definitions have been explored and tested (Reese and Rosenfeld 2008, 357-359). Reese and Rosenfeld, ultimately found that although places may appear similar in several aspects of their culture the policy outcomes may be very different among places as the result of the interplay between individual attributes and that city's governing culture.

DeLeon and Naff (2004) found that gender, race, class, and religion predict political ideology at the national level. They also found there were differences in the patterns of prediction where the local political culture conditions the outcomes when they took these factors into consideration with place (as encapsulated by a New Political Culture Index). Sharp's study (2005) using U.S Census data and the creation of her Unconventional Culture Index also produced similar outcomes to those of DeLeon and Naff. These authors' findings and methods provide the foundation for the work that follows in this article. Drawing primarily from DeLeon and Naff who not only made use of a large data set for comparisons (SCBS) but also their methods that provided one of the bases to examine the way region may condition political identity factors in various urban areas.

In reviewing and beginning with the work of Daniel Elazar (1966), Elazar identified traditionalist, individualistic, and moralistic political subcultures (in various combinations) as the way to set the context for political affairs in the American states. In 1993 Lieske reaffirmed the value of subcultures with his more statically refined definitions (based on race, religious affiliations, and ethnic ancestry) of regional subcultures. Lieske argues his definitions are superior to Elazar's in every way except when predicting political behavior (908). We can also contrast Elazar's work with Rodney Hero's (1998) work some years later where Hero found that the differences in political culture were actually tied to social diversity and this diversity is the underpinning of state and sub-state level politics and policy (1998). Hero noted that "social diversity is an important aspect of all state politics, although its importance takes different forms in different contexts" (1998, 6). In more recent follow ups to Hero's findings, Richard Florida (2002) and others previously noted in this article, have also detailed the way a place—by virtue of its social and ethnic diversity—can imbue an area to attract and retain the "creative class" or be identified with a new subculture index that influences outcomes. In brief, there is no shortage of literature on the relevance of place or context as influential to political and policy outcomes, and in particular by the differences in terms of division by socio-demographic composition. However, recently much less work has focused on the influence of a region with its

shared experiences or beliefs and the way these regional attributes create their own sub-culture and influence on cities and individuals.

REGION AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO PLACE

Much of the literature on regions is somewhat dated. This suggests we have an opportunity to build on what has been learned from the past but also the chance to update what may have changed in terms of region as an influential factor on cities and individuals. There has been considerable debate and ambiguity surrounding the definition of region and its value as an explanatory variable. Patterson illustrates the way the effect of region can be ambiguous but also salient using an example from Samuel Stouffer's analysis on attitudes of tolerance of nonconformity in regard to the threat of communism. Stouffer concluded that regions have a peculiarity about them that cannot necessarily be explained by either individual or urban and rural structures. Patterson poignantly references Stouffer's findings on U.S. regions:

> Southerners are more rural than Northerners. Southerners also tend to have less education. But neither of these facts alone will explain the North-South differences in tolerance of nonconformist. There is something in Southern culture that tends to differentiate Southerners, in cities as well as rural areas, at all educational levels from all other regional groups (1968, 196).

Gastil (1975) also tried to shed light on region, as a dimension, when he identified 13 separate cultural regions in the United States. Even though Gastil published his map of American subcultures, he contended that there are no absolutely right or wrong regional boundaries. He argued regional boundaries should be adjusted to make them maximally relevant to the phenomenon being analyzed (1975, 39).

For some, region was less about territory and more about the way people connected to the prominent features of a place. After controlling for personal identity characteristics such as class and ethnicity, Matthews (1980) demonstrated that the region of residence was a significant independent predictor in federal and provincial relations in Canada. More recently, region in Canada has been seen as a geographic place holder rather than a cause or independent variable (Hiller 2001). Studies such as the one conducted by Cuneo and another by Clement have argued that region was not salient, but rather that social class was more important for predicting outcomes (Cuneo 1978; Clement 1988), further disparaging the relevance of region and its effect on place in collective outcomes (Hiller 2001). Clarke, Pammett, and Stewart (2001) also found region to be less salient than previously thought with a time series regression analysis (1965 to 1990) controlling for political identity factors such as age, gender, income, and religion as well as region in the prediction of political efficacy and governmental trust in Canada. The authors consistently found that regional dif-

ferences tend to be overstated in Canada, and that they were of declining importance in the prediction of political attitudes and beliefs over time.

Garreau took a broader definition of region and argued that there are nine nations that have a different feel, look, and sound from one another in North America. He contended that current political lines did not capture the actual nine nations that co-exist in North America. On Canada, Garreau notes the way cultural similarities cross national borders with provinces and states and cities being more alike in some instances across the two nations of Canada and the U.S. than within them. Specifically, Garreau cavalierly states:

> Canada which is little save moose, Aleuts, and energy wealth in the north of the allegedly temperate strip along its boarder with the United States, has migraines about losing its "identity." It shouldn't. Apart from French speaking Quebec, which is properly a nation unto itself, Canada shares five perfectly respectable and different identities with the northern United States.
>
> Of course, the oil-rich "sheikdom" of Alberta defies Ottawa. Economically and philosophically, Calgary is far more kin to Fairbanks, Salt Lake City or Denver than it is to Ontario. …By the same token, the grain belt of the north, centered in Winnipeg, is visibly and temperamentally part of the Breadbasket. The industries of Windsor, Toronto and Ottawa are part of the Foundry. Vancouver shares far more with Seattle than it does with Halifax, Nova Scotia. And the poor but proud Maritimes are in the same boat as New England (1981, 6-7).

If it is indeed the case that an individual's identity, and a city's political culture and actions, are tempered by the region they call home, then we may need to keep well in mind regional distinctions in order to be successful in politics, public policy, and even cooperation. In Canadian/U.S. comparisons it may be that geographic regional similarities due to similar landscape and migration patterns will supersede national-level differences. It may be there are underlying dynamics between individual-level factors and regional influence that contribute to the unique political cultures of cities in both the U.S. and Canada. Specifically, this study asks, is there a cultural effect of region on the political identity of individuals that can be demonstrated by individual-level survey data in cities across two nations?

MEASURES AND DATA

Measures

In this first portion of the study, individual measures for political identity are used instead of composite factors for two reasons. First, there is literature that now suggests

that as a composite construct, social economic status is not as good of a predictor of political identity as it may once have been in the industrial era (see DeLeon 2004 for discussion of gender, income and education issues and voting in the U.S). Secondly, two of the five factors in DeLeon and Naff's New Political Culture Index, which was demonstrated to predict liberalism quite well in their 2004 study, are the individual measures of income and education. Additionally, not being married is a proxy for nontraditional gender roles, a factor which is also associated with being liberal, as also noted in the DeLeon and Naff study. The attributes that predict political liberalism are well researched and understood as described previously (see DeLeon and Naff 2004, 691-696). Using these well-defined and previously analyzed determinants of political liberalism strengthens the findings in this study.

Self-esteem was specifically included because the cross-national study conducted by Moon, Lovrich, and Pierce (2000) found the greatest difference among the indexes on social trust, self-esteem, and political liberalism across all age groups to be self-esteem. Specifically, Moon et. al. found Canadians were more homogenous in terms of self-esteem than were U.S. citizens. In this current study here, there is no attempt to predict self-esteem, but since there is known variation between the two nations it was appropriate to include self-esteem as a control.[1]

Previous research has established that differences do exist across U.S. regions (see Moon, Pierce, and Lovrich 2001). The cities in this study were classified by region using the same designation of cities in each region for the U.S. as determined in the Moon, Pierce, and Lovrich study. The region for the Canadian cities is determined primarily by geographical correspondence to the previously established U.S. regions with two cities as exceptions. In keeping with Gastil's argument that regional boundaries should be adjusted to make them maximally relevant to the phenomenon being analyzed the cities of Calgary and Edmonton were placed within the South region as opposed to their geographic neighbor the Rocky Mountain region. The reasoning for this is that in terms of political outlook, culture, and economics, these Canadian cities are more similar to the U.S. cities in the South region that are typically more politically conservative and share oil as one of their largest industrial bases of their local economies (see Appendix for a listing of cities by region).

The inclusion of the diversity index allows this study to tap into the theories that suggest more socially and ethnically diverse areas are more tolerant. Diverse and tolerant areas are theorized to be the drivers of the development of creative economies and vibrant cities (Florida 2002; Button, Rienzo, and Wald 1997) and may be more liberal. Additionally, research on social diversity in a state or region has been demonstrated to be significant at the individual level of politics as well as explaining differences in public policies across states (Hero 1998, 147). Population shifts have profound effects on cities in terms of the political and economic culture being viewed as distressed or prosperous (see Savitch and Kantor 2002 for a description of the ramifications of these shifts). A proxy for prosperity was developed by calculating the change in each of the cities' population between 1990 and 2000.

Individual-Level Variables and Statistical Controls

The dependent and all the independent variables that were categorical variables were coded to binary dummy variables. This was done to minimize the number of parameters to be estimated when adding the variable region to the model to capture its influence on individual level political identity. The author did not recategorize the only individual-level interval data variable, age.[2]

City-Level Independent Variables and Statistical Control

Dummy variables were made for each of the city-level variables including the control country.[3] In the second analysis the same regions were also represented with dummy variables (Southeast, South, Midwest, Rocky Mountains, Northeast and Pacific West), as well as the diversity and the prosperity indices.[4]

Data

The multi-level data for this analysis were drawn in part from the Stowell data sets which provide individual level-data for a large number of citizens in multiple cities across the U.S. and Canada. Leigh Stowell and Company (Seattle, WA), a media market research firm, donated the Stowell data sets to Washington State University (WSU) and the data sets became available publicly in 2006 through the Division of Government Studies and Services at WSU. The digital archive includes over 350 individual major media market surveys conducted over the period 1989-2003 across 72 U.S. cities and nine English speaking Canadian cities. This does bring up issues about national completeness, especially in the Canadian case with omissions such as the city of Quebec. However, the fact that there are several Canadian cities to make comparisons does provide value for this research. Survey responses for the variables in the study for the period of 1996-2000 allowed for 56 cities for the first analysis (48 U.S and 8 Canadian) and 54 cities for the second analysis (46 U.S. and 8 Canadian). For each city approximately 1,000 cases were gathered in telephone surveys of 30 minutes in duration and selected through random digit dialing. The cities drawn from the market studies represent cities in both Canada and the U.S. providing considerable variation in the size of city and geographic location.

The dependent variable, liberalism, was operationalized by using the scale developed in the Stowell data sets for political liberalism. As noted by Moon, Lovrich, and Pierce (2000, 830), the questions in the scale may not directly ask whether someone is liberal or not and the questions cannot be extracted from the pre-developed scales, yet they do have utility as a proxy for the concept. The scale provided in the Stowell data sets for political liberalism includes the following questions:

- I believe that the women's rights issue has received too much attention.
- I believe all young men should serve in the military.

- I think more religious leaders should speak out against the nuclear arms race.
- I always look for products which are environmentally safe.
- A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.
- Too much money is being spent on military defense.

Similarly, the questions in the Stowell data sets and self-esteem (high, mid-range, or low), a control variable, include:[5]

- I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.
- People generally view me as a leader.
- If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.
- My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.
- As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.

The diversity index was gathered from the Places Rated Almanac (2000). The prosperity index was developed by calculating the change in city population between 1990 and 2000 using data from Statistics Canada and the U.S. Census.

RESEARCH METHODS

Most studies ultimately aggregate individual-level responses to regional or national levels, and that brings with it the potential of an ecological fallacy. It also ignores the potential interactions people have with place. Additionally, researchers typically do not conduct comparisons in regions across nations. In this study there are two analyses—the first with 56 cities and the second 54 cities—for which comparable data were available. This study takes into account both the individual and collective effects of city residence in particular regions.

In the first analysis, the study replicates a method used by DeLeon and Naff with the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (2004) conducted on 30 communities in the U.S. wherein the results from individual cities could be compared to a national level cross-section survey. Here, as DeLeon and Naff did, multivariable logit analyses were run using STATA 8 software, and probability weights for each independent sample. This resulted in a total of 56 logit model estimations with one for each city included in the study. The statistic of interest in this portion of the study is the Odds Ratios (ORs) for the three political identity variable predictors of liberalism (3 x 56 = 168). The bi-national aspect of the study allows the examination of whether or not national political culture moderates individual characteristics at the city level by looking for and comparing patterns of similarities or differences in Canadian and United States cities. The method of comparing patterns is formally known as the boolean approach.

The boolean approach allows truly comparative research to be conducted because it examines the patterns of the relationships among the variables as well as across and

within systems (DeLeon 2004, 697; Ragin 1987). In this case, the boolean approach allows us to take the analysis a step further and discover patterns in the factors (Gender, Income, and Education) that are associated with the likelihood of being liberal. The boolean approach allows for the identification of differences that are systematic and exist across multiple levels (such as city and nation) to be identified.

The second hypothesis stems from the belief that political liberalism in Canada and the United States mirror one another in terms of geographic trends across regions. Scholarly research suggests people living in the cities on the East and West coasts of both nations tend to be more liberal than people residing in the midlands of both the United States and Canada (see Ladd, 1998 on bi-coastal liberalism in the U.S., and Moon, Pierce, and Lovrich 2001). This is thought to be the case, in major part, because of the similar historical migration and settlement patterns in the two countries. Subsequently, the second hypothesis of the study asks if the regional similarities in terms of the politically liberal landscape parallel one another on gender, income, and education regardless of differences in political systems. The author anticipates that regional similarities will have more of an influence than U.S. and Canadian national differences.

The second hypothesis was tested using HLM. HLM is the proper tool to use to analyze effects that may be clustered because it incorporates the natural clustering into the model. The HLM method simultaneous considers multiple hypotheses at various levels to: 1) predict political liberalism; 2) explain which factors and at what levels the variables contribute to the prediction of political liberalism; and 3) elicit an understanding of relationships that may not have been considered previously (Keeves 1997, 386-387).

RESULTS

Findings from the First Analysis

The first hypothesis tests whether or not there are distinguishable differences between the factors that contribute to citizens' political identities based on place. Table 1 summarizes the 56 logit analysis results for each of the cities and analyzed them by grouping Canadian and U.S. cities. Examining the findings set forth in Table 1 reveals the range of the effects for each of the predictor variables across the 56 cities on the dependent variable liberalism. In the first column the predictor variables were listed under each dependent variable for both the Canadian and U.S. cities. The subsequent four columns indicate the least and greatest ORs measures, as well as the strength, direction and statistical significance for each predicator in each nation on liberalism. Multivariable logit, like the more commonly used interval level variable regression analysis, adjusts for the effects of the other variables in the model, including the controls. In this case gender as a predictor of liberalism reveals the lowest and highest reported ORs range from .72 to 1.24. An OR of .72 indicates that in at least one city, females in the Canadian sample were approximately 25 percent less likely than males

to say they are liberal. The OR of 1.24 in the highest column for gender indicates that in at least one city, females in Canada are 25 percent times more likely than males to be liberal. The third and fourth columns provide an indication of how frequently these outcomes occurred. In this case, in four Canadian cities women were more likely than men to be liberal, and in four other cities the reverse is true. However, the number in the parenthesis indicates that in both cases there was only one statistically significant observation at the $p \leq .05$ level. There does not appear to be a distinguishable pattern in terms of gender predicting liberalism in Canadian cities when looking at this factor alone.

TABLE 1: Comparison of Estimated Odds Ratios (ORs) for Gender, Income, and Education Logit Model Predictors with Descriptive Statistics Summarizing the ORs for 8 Canadian and 48 U.S. Cities from the Stowell Data Sets on the Dependent Variable: Liberalism.

	lowest OR	highest OR	OR < 1 (n with P< .05)	OR > 1 (n with P< .05)	PATTERN FIT[a]
LIBERALISM—CANADIAN					FIC 2(4)
Gender (femdum)	.72	1.24	4 (1)	4 (1)	
Income (highincdum)	.73	1.47	3 (0)	5 (3)	
College (collegedum)	1.24	3.18	0 (0)	8 (7)	
LIBERALISM—UNITED STATES					FIC 11(19)
Gender (femdum)	.64	1.69	18 (5)	30 (8)	
Income (highincdum)	.74	1.34	18 (2)	30 (1)	
College (collegedum)	.79	2.48	3 (0)	45 (34)	

NOTE: All estimates are weighted and statistically control for the effects of the other three model predictors and two statistical controls (marital status and self-esteem).

[a] Entries summarize country pattern results: uppercase = positive correlations, bold type = $p \leq .05$, followed by number of city samples matching that exact pattern and (in parentheses) number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

The findings for individuals in cities in Canada with respect to gender and liberalism indicate a more consistent pattern where females with higher incomes and some college were more likely to be liberal. This pattern was the most frequent as well as had the greatest number of statistically significant observations as indicated by the number in parenthesis in the third and fourth columns of Table 1. As previously noted, gender did not produce a consistent pattern in terms of liberalism when comparing the number of results or those that were statistically significant, but as part of an overall pattern it did. In the United States, having at least some college, higher income, and being female were also identity factors that were more likely to predict an individual as liberal. Although there was one more statistically significant finding for lower income than higher income in the U.S. cases, the fact that 30 out of 46 cases were higher

income was a notable pattern compared to 18 occurrences for lower incomes. Finally, having some college was the most prevalent finding in this analysis. The statistical significance in the study was not given as much consideration because probability weighting used for the smaller samples (samples ranged from 500 to 3000) might call into question the statistical significance of findings for these samples.

Finally, the "Fit Pattern" column in Table 1 summarizes the most prevalent pattern in the country. The first number indicates the frequency of exact matches for the statistically significant factors at the $p \leq .05$ level. The second number indicates the pattern based on the OR alone, with consideration for which factors are statistically significant in any individual model. For example, F**IC**, meaning (F) women are more liberal than men, (**I**) people with higher incomes are more liberal than those with lower incomes, and (**C**) people with some college are more liberal than those with no college experience. Two symbols are in bold indicating that they are statistically significant at the $p \leq .05$ level. The conclusions from Table 1 that can be made are:

- Of the three factors, having some college was the most frequent predictor across nations of liberalism.
- Of the three factors, gender varied the most in terms of frequency of predictions. Gender was not as clear of a predictor of political liberalism in Canada, but in the U.S. 30 of the 48 communities females are more likely than males to be liberal.
- The pattern fit column demonstrates having at least some college consistently predicts liberalism in both nations. The effects of income and gender did not differ much across nations resulting in a pattern where in four of eight cities in Canada females with higher incomes and some college were more likely to be liberal. The same pattern was present in the United States where 21 of 46 times this was the case. Finally, the fit pattern suggests that there is variation within the two nations, but similar variation across the countries.

The current examination finds that cities in the same regions across U.S. and Canada at times do reflect similar political identity characteristics and at other times, cross national differences supersede regional influences on individual political identity characteristics that predict political liberalism.

The second hypothesis is that regional similarities will carry across nations, negating the effects of national differences. Previous research established that differences exist across U.S. regions (see Moon, Pierce, and Lovrich 2001). The cities in the study here were classified by region using the same designation of cities in each region for the U.S. as was performed in the Moon, Pierce and Lovrich study. The region for the Canadian cities was determined by geographical correspondence to the previously established U.S. regions. Based on the averages for each country found in Appendix A, when comparing the regions, the Pacific West was the most liberal in

both countries and across countries. The Northeast was the second most liberal, both within and across countries. The regions in the Pacific West or the Northeast were more liberal than regions in the Midwest, Rocky Mountains, Southeast and South. That said, however, there were noteworthy differences between the countries. The averages were informative but have not been tested for statistical significance, in part because of the small number of Canadian cities in the study. Furthermore, even if differences of means tests, were conducted that would only indicated that the cities in the two countries were statistically different at the aggregated level. The way in which the cities are similar or different would remain unknown. This is where one of the greatest values of the boolean approach to analysis comes into play. The Boolean method made it possible to identify the ways the cities were similar and different and to identify the systematic patterns across levels of analysis in terms of gender, income, and education.

Tables 2 through 7 revealed the coded differences between and within the nations with regard to liberalism as well as illuminated patterns of the variety of similarities and differences that exist. Table 2 reveals that the Northeast region "fit pattern" paral-

TABLE 2: Northeast Region Patterns for the Dependent Variables Liberalism

NORTHEAST	LIBERALISM
Maritimes (Halifax)	f I C
Toronto	F I C
Baltimore	F I C
Boston	f I C
Hartford	F i C
Philadelphia	F I C
Portland (Maine)	f I C
Roanoke-Lynchburg	F i C
Rochester	F I C
Washington (D.C.)	f I C
NORTHEAST FIT PATTERN N = 10	f I C 3(4)
Canadian Cities Fit Pattern n = 2	n / a
United States Cities Fit Pattern n = 8	f I C
NATIONAL FIT PATTERNS	
Canada	F I C 2(4)
United States	F I C 11(19)

NOTE: Entries summarize country and region pattern results:

lowercase = negative correlations,

UPPERCASE = positive correlations,

bold type = $p \leq .05$,

followed by:

number of city samples matching that exact pattern

and (in parentheses):

number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

lels the U.S. cities in that region, but not the national pattern on liberalism. In the Northeast males with higher incomes and at least some college were more likely to be liberal in four of the eight cities. In the national United States pattern the same things held true for females. There was no distinguishable pattern for the two Northeastern Canadian cities on liberalism. Toronto's pattern matched the Canadian national pattern, while the Maritimes (Halifax) matched the regional trend. Considering all of this information together this indicates regional similarities in the Canadian and U.S. Northeast were stronger than national differences.

Table 3 reveals there was no difference between U.S. and Canadian cities in the Pacific West in regional patterns when predicting liberalism. The result was that in the Canadian Pacific West males with lower incomes and at least some college are more likely to be liberal. Additionally this pattern did not match the Canadian or U.S. national pattern where females with higher incomes and at least some college are more likely to be liberal. In this case, also, there were regional differences apart from the national trends.

TABLE 3: Pacific West Region Patterns for the Dependent Variables Liberalism

PACIFIC WEST	LIBERALISM
Vancouver	f i C
Vancouver Island	f i C
Los Angeles	F I C
Palm Springs	f I C
Sacramento	F I C
Salinas	f i C
San Diego	f I C
San Francisco	f I C
Santa Barbara	f i C
Seattle	F i C
Spokane	f i C
PACIFIC WEST FIT PATTERN N = 11	f i C 3(5)
Canadian Cities Fit Pattern n = 2	f i C 2(2)
United States Cities Fit Pattern n = 9	f I C 1(3)
NATIONAL FIT PATTERNS	
Canada	F I C 2(4)
United States	F I C 11(19)

NOTE: Entries summarize country and region pattern results:

lowercase = negative correlations,

UPPERCASE = positive correlations,

bold type = $p \leq .05$,

followed by:

number of city samples matching that exact pattern

and (in parentheses):

number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

Table 4 reveals that the pattern in the Southeast of the United States matched the national pattern when predicting liberalism. Females with higher incomes and at least some college were more likely to be liberal. In this case, the United States' national pattern appeared to dominate the regional pattern for liberalism.

TABLE 4: South East Region Patterns for the Dependent Variables Liberalism

SOUTH EAST	LIBERALISM
Atlanta	f i C
Charleston	F i c
Charlotte	F I C
Fort Myers	F I C
Jacksonville	F I C
Norfolk	f I C
Raleigh	F I C
Salisbury	F i C
Tampa Bay	F I C
West Palm Beach	F I C
SOUTH EAST FIT PATTERN N = 10	F I C 4(6)
Canadian Cities Fit Pattern n = 0	n / a
United States Cities Fit Pattern n = 8	F I C 4(6)
NATIONAL FIT PATTERNS	
Canada	F I C 2(4)
United States	F I C 11(19)

NOTE: Entries summarize country and region pattern results:

lowercase = negative correlations,

UPPERCASE = positive correlations,

bold type = $p \leq .05$,

followed by:

number of city samples matching that exact pattern

and (in parentheses):

number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

Table 5 reveals the pattern in the Midwest for both Canadian and U.S. cities. The Midwest pattern matched the U.S. national pattern in ORs, but not the statistically significant findings for gender. In the Midwest being female was a statistically significant predictive factor, but in the U.S. as a whole it was not statistically significant. The Canadian cities took on two different patterns, with London Windsor matching the Canadian national pattern exactly for liberalism. A national influence was more apparent in both the Canadian and United States Midwest region cities.

Table 6 reveals that cities in the South region exactly match the U.S. national patterns in terms of ORs, but not for the statistically significant factors. This suggests a national influence rather than a regional distinction dominates the outcomes for the cities in the South. There was an exact match with the national pattern in terms of ORs for the Canadian cities; this again suggests a greater national influence.

TABLE 5: Midwest Region Patterns for the Dependent Variables Liberalism

MIDWEST	LIBERALISM
London Windsor	F I C
Winnipeg	f i C
Chicago	f i C
Cincinnati	F I C
Cleaveland	F I C
Columbus	f I C
Dayton	f i C
Kansas City	F I C
Minneapolis-St. Paul	f I C
St. Louis	F I C
Tulsa	F I C
MIDWEST FIT PATTERN N = 11	F I C 3(6)
Canadian Cities Fit Pattern n = 2	n / a
United States Cities Fit Pattern n = 9	F I C 3(6)
NATIONAL FIT PATTERNS	
Canada	F I C 2(4)
United States	F I C 11(19)

NOTE: Entries summarize country and region pattern results:

lowercase = negative correlations,

UPPERCASE = positive correlations,

bold type = $p \leq .05$,

followed by:

number of city samples matching that exact pattern

and (in parentheses):

number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

TABLE 6: South Region Patterns for the Dependent Variables Liberalism

SOUTH	LIBERALISM
Calgary	F I C
Edmonton	F I C
Dallas	F i C
Houston	F I C
Little Rock	F I C
Louisville	f I C
Nashville	F I C
Shreveport	F i C
SOUTH FIT PATTERN N = 6	F I C 2(6)
Canadian Cities Fit Pattern n = 0	F I C 1 (1)
United States Cities Fit Pattern n = 6	F I C 2(6)
NATIONAL FIT PATTERNS	
Canada	F I C 2(4)
United States	F I C 11(19)

NOTE: Entries summarize country and region pattern results:

lowercase = negative correlations,

UPPERCASE = positive correlations,

bold type = $p \leq .05$,

followed by:

number of city samples matching that exact pattern

and (in parentheses):

number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

Table 7 reveals a great deal of variation in the Rocky Mountain region for the U.S. There was a slight pattern of being female, having a lower income and at least some college predicting liberalism in the U.S. cities. The large amount of variation reflects little national influence.

TABLE 7: Rocky Mountain Region Patterns for the Dependent Variables Liberalism

ROCKY MOUNTAIN	LIBERALISM
Albuquerque	f i C
Colorado Springs	F i c
Denver	f I C
Las Vegas	F I c
Reno	F i C
Salt Lake City	F I C
ROCKY MOUNTAIN FIT PATTERN N = 8	F I C 0(6)
Canadian Cities Fit Pattern n = 0	n / a
United States Cities Fit Pattern n = 6	F I C 1(2)
NATIONAL FIT PATTERNS	
Canada	F I C 2(4)
United States	F I C 11(19)

NOTE: Entries summarize country and region pattern results:
lowercase = negative correlations,
UPPERCASE = positive correlations,
bold type = $p \leq .05$,
followed by:
number of city samples matching that exact pattern
and (in parentheses):
number matching that pattern based on odds ratios alone.

Findings from the Second Analysis

The analysis presented here is based on 56,076 survey responses. Fifty-one percent of the respondents were female, 54 percent of respondents had an income in the range of 40,000 or higher, and 64 percent of respondents had at least some college education. Survey respondents ranged in age from 18 to 98 years old. The average number of cities in each identified region was nine, where the actual number of cities ranged from six to eleven. The diversity index ranged from 0 to 99 with a mean of 57.07 and standard deviation of 28.37. The prosperity proxy, derived from changes in the city population, ranged from -11.53 to +110.84 percent, with a mean of 19.71 and a standard deviation of 18.46 percent.

Bivariate Correlations

One major aim of the study was to disentangle the effect of individual-level influences from city-level factors such as region. The bivariate correlations among variables included in the analysis address concerns of collinearity. Table 8 presents a correlation matrix for the several independent variables as well as the dependent variable liberalism. The results show that no relationship (measured as a Pearson correlation coefficient) exceeded the value of .5, indicating that collinearity was not a problem in

TABLE 8: Bivariate Correlations (n=56076)

	Political Liberalism	Female	High Income	College	Age	Married	Self-Esteem	Diversity	Prosperity	Canada	Rocky Mountains	Northeast	Pacific West	South	Southeast	Midwest
Political Liberalism	1															
Female	-.00	1														
High Income	.01*	-.13**	1													
College	.10**	-.05**	.25**	1												
Age	-.11**	.06**	-.11**	-.05**	1											
Married	-.12*	-.01**	.24**	.05**	.14**	1										
Self-Esteem	-.05**	.02**	-.22**	.21**	-.11**	.06**	1									
Diversity	.01	-.01	.03**	.07**	-.02**	-.02**	.01**	1								
Prosperity	-.01	-.00	.02**	.03**	-.00	.00	-.01*	.13**	1							
Canada	.02**	-.01	-.01*	-.08**	-.02**	-.02**	-.03**	-.37**	.03**	1						
Rocky Mountains	-.00	-.01	.00	.03*	-.00	.01*	-.02**	.1**	.39**	-.13**	1					
Northeast	.01	.01	.00	.03**	.01	.00	.05	-.11**	-.18**	.21**	-.17**	1				
Pacific West	.05**	-.01*	-.02**	.04**	-.02**	-.03**	-.01**	.14**	-.11**	-.01**	-.16**	-.27**	1			
South	-.03**	.00	-.01*	-.04**	-.02**	.01**	.00	-.22**	.11**	.12**	-.13**	-.22**	-.21**	1		
Southeast	-.02**	.00	.01**	.09**	.02**	.02**	.00	.29**	.27**	-.17**	-.13**	-.21**	-.20**	-.16**	1	
Midwest	-.01**	.01	-.02**	-.01**	.01**	.00	.02**	-.14**	-.30**	-.10**	-.14**	-.27**	-.25**	-.20**	-.20	1

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .0$

the use of these variables in the multivariate analyses to follow.

The bivariate associations in Table 8 also provided a first glimpse into the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. The strongest relationship of all was between the city-level variables of prosperity and the Rocky Mountain region (r = .39). As expected, high income, some college, self-esteem, and the city being in Canada were all statistically significant and positively associated with liberalism. Age and being married are also statistically significant and negatively associated with liberalism, again as expected. Living in some regions such as the Southeast, South, and Midwest were statistically significant and negatively associated with being liberal, while living in the Pacific West was also significant but positively associated with being liberal. Interestingly being female, the diversity and prosperity of the city, as well as living in the Northeast or Rocky Mountains were not associated with liberalism in this preliminary analysis.

Hypothesis Testing

Preliminary data analyses (see Appendix) suggest that there were differences in liberalism by region. Given the nested structure and ordinal character of the data used in this research, HLM was used for the analysis. The models presented in Table 2 are estimated using HLM 6.06 which allows for individual-level factors and city-level variables to be estimated simultaneously. Although the primary focus was on the impact of region, *a city-level factor*, four models are presented to examine the ultimate effect of region. In order to gauge the variation among the cities the fully unconditional model was run and the exponential of the coefficient was used to generate an estimate of the variation attributable to cities. The outcome is 29 percent of the variation in liberalism was attributable to cross-city differences.

The results displayed in Table 9 for the first three models were generated using the estimation methods of Laplace approximation.[6] The population average log-odds for predicting liberalism and the robust standard errors (se) are reported in the table.[7] The population average and the robust se estimates are similar, implying that a misspecification of the distribution of random effects is unlikely in these data (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 301-307). The final model was too large to compute using the estimation method of Laplace approximation and therefore lacks robust se for comparison. The first three models were also run using Restricted Maximum Likelihood (RML), as was the final model. The estimates and standard errors were very similar to the Laplace approximation model and robust se in the first three models, providing additional support for the reliability in estimates.

The second model was estimated using the individual-level predictors. In this model the individual-level factors are allowed to vary across cities with no city-level factors contributing to the model. This analysis supports the individual-level factors of gender, education, age, marital status, and self-esteem as being associated with liberalism as expected, except for the case of income. This model provided estimates

TABLE 9: Odds Ratios with Standard Errors in Parentheses for Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models of Individual only, Individual and City, and Individual and City with Region Variables on Predicting Liberalism.

	FULLY UNCONDITIONAL			INDIVIDUAL ONLY			INDIVIDUAL AND CITY			INDIVIDUAL & CITY WITH REGIONS
Individual Level (n=56,076)	Population Average (RML)	Population Average (Laplace)	Robust se (Laplace)	Population Average (RML)	Population Average (Laplace)	Robust se (Laplace)	Population Average (RML)	Population Average (Laplace)	Robust se (Laplace)	Population Average (RML)
Female				.104* (.02)	1.04* (.02)	1.04* (.02)	-.85* (.05)	-.85* (.05)	-.85* (.06)	-.91* (.07)
High Income				-.98 (.02)	-.98 (.02)	-.98 (.02)	1.06 (.06)	1.06 (.06)	1.06 (.08)	1.07 (.07)
College				1.57** (.03)	1.57** (.02)	1.57** (.02)	1.66** (.06)	1.67** (.06)	1.67** (.10)	1.63** (.07)
Age				-.99** (.00)	-.99** (.00)	-.98** (.03)	-.99** (.00)	-.99** (.00)	-.99** (.00)	-.99* (.00)
Married				-.62** (.02)	-.62** (.02)	-.62** (.02)	-.65** (.06)	-.65** (.06)	-.65** (.07)	-.59** (.07)
Self-Esteem				1.15* (.04)	1.15** (.02)	1.15* (.04)	-.99 (.06)	-.99 (.06)	-.99 (.07)	-.96 (.07)
City Level (n=54) Intercept	-.40** (.04)	-.40** (.04)	-.40** (.04)	-.61** (.05)	-.61** (.05)	-.61** (.07)	-.64* (.14)	-.64* (.13)	-.64* (.16)	-.55* (.16)
Canada							1.14 (.15)	1.14 (.14)	1.14 (.16)	1.12 (.14)
Diversity							-.80* (.11)	-.80** (.11)	-.80 (.12)	-.80 (.11)
Prosperity							-.96 (.10)	-.96 (.10)	-.96 (.14)	-.85 (.12)
Region: Northeasta										1.10 (.15)
Pacific West										1.48* (.15)
South										1.35 (.17)
Southeast										1.04 (.18)
Rocky Mountain										1.90* (.21)
Random Effects Variance (City)	.078**	.076**		.072**	.070**		.072**	.065**		.051**

[a] The reference category for region is "Midwest" * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$

that females are four percent more likely to be liberal than males and that people with at least some college are 57 percent more likely to be liberal than their less well educated counterparts. For each year of aging people were nearly one percent less likely to be liberal, and being married decreased the likelihood of being liberal by 38 percent. Finally, people with higher self-esteem are 15 percent more likely to be liberal than people with moderate or low self-esteem.

The third case in Table 9 shows tests for the combined individual and city level factors excluding the variable region. This model revealed that residing in a city in Canada as opposed to the U.S. had no effect on the likelihood of someone being liberal. The measure for prosperous city was not associated with being liberal either. However, there was a statistical relationship with diversity where being from a more diverse city *decreased* the likelihood of being liberal by 20 percent. The same individual-level factors remain significant but some noteworthy changes of impact and directionality of effects were documented. In particular, the effect of education increased the likelihood of being liberal by an additional 10 percent, while being female represents a 15 percent decrease in the likelihood of being liberal when city-level factors, excluding region were also taken into account. Tests were conducted to assess the improvement of *Individual and City model* over the *Individual factors only* model. Those tests revealed the third model is an improvement over the second model, underscoring the relevance of the nested structure of factors that predict liberalism. Finally, the variance of city decreased with each successive model, providing additional support for the notion that the inclusion of region was valuable to understanding the multiple factors that contribute to predicting the political ideology of citizens in Canada and the U.S.

The fourth and final model of interest in the second analysis in this study revealed that when individual-level factors were taken into account with the complete list of city-level factors, only education level, age, and marital status had a predictive effect on liberalism. Of the regions, only living in the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific West were associated with being liberal, increasing the likelihood by 90 and 48 percent, respectively. The intercept, living in the Midwest, decreased in terms of the likelihood of being liberal by 45 percent. Although none of the other regions demonstrated an effect, taking into consideration city-level factors such as whether the city was in Canada or the U.S., the cities prosperity or diversity and including the region altered the individual effects slightly. When considering city-level factors and individual factors, people with at least some college were 63 percent more likely to be liberal than those who do not have at least this much education. Additionally, for each year of aging there was a one percent likelihood of being liberal and being married decreased the likelihood of being liberal by 41 percent. Being female, having a higher income, and having high self-esteem were not predictive when considered in conjunction with region.

CONCLUSIONS

This study used factors from previous research to understand more about the way regional similarities across nation-state borders mediated individual factors that predict political liberalism. How did these findings advance our original thinking about place, and in particular region, as an independent influence on political identity? The findings support the supposition that place still matters even in an era when globalization threatens to standardize much of what makes up our communities. The boolean methods and HLM models developed here demonstrated that when city and regional level factors were not taken into proper consideration it is possible to over-estimate the impact or importance of individual-level factors on predicting liberalism.

In the first analysis there are similarities in the way the predictors operated in Canadian and U.S. cities. When considering the second alternative hypothesis, that the particular region where the city is located also had an effect, the findings were not as universal in the end. Only living in the Pacific West and Northeast demonstrated a regional impact on predicting liberalism. The primary difference in the comparison of the two regions was that lower income was a predictor of liberalism in the Pacific West and higher income was a predictor in the Northeast. There was also considerable variation among the cities in the regions. The mid-lands show less variation overall, with the exception of the cities in the Rocky Mountains that have only one two-city pattern out of six U.S. cities and none matching the national U.S. pattern. In the Rocky Mountains being female and having some college and lower incomes were the most frequent predictors of liberalism. It should be noted there are no cities from Canada in the Rocky Mountain or Southeast region. As such the results could change if comparable data for Canadian cities becomes available. In the end, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that for some regions, such as the Pacific West and Northeast regional level similarities on factors that contribute to citizens' political identity attributes trump national level differences. Yet it is not always clear cut and in other instances such as the Midwest region, the alternative hypothesis that national level differences between Canada and the United States in terms of factors that contributed to predicting political liberalism outweighed any potential regional similarities.

Across all the outcomes, in the second analyses conducted, it was the case that education, age and marital status consistently predicted political liberalism in the U.S. and Canada. However, the addition of city location as a contributing influence (even before considering place-specific factors related to cities) altered the influence of income as a predictive individual-level factor. When several specific city-level factors such as diversity, prosperity, and the country in which the city was located were added to the multivariate model, the effect of gender changed markedly but the effect of income remained inconsequential. This set of findings demonstrates that place or city of residence has an important effect on U.S. and Canadian citizens alike. The null hypothesis that where someone lives does not affect political identity factors can

be rejected with confidence. Political liberalism is clearly influenced by contextual factors such as place of a citizen's residence.

Despite the limitations of this study, the findings reported here do contribute to advancing previous research on the importance of place in influencing political identity factors. City of residence mediated the effect of political identity factors when taken into consideration simultaneously with individual-level factors. Region had an effect when Canada/U.S. national location did not. The documentation of this "place matters" effect in these data sets of 56 and 54 cities (reflecting the views of over 50,000 citizens) offers a fair warning against attributing too much significance to individual-level factors and provides encouragement to bolster the use of "contextual" variables in studies where it is possible to do so. One case in point from this study is that in the individual only level model there was a finding that people with higher self-esteem are 15 percent more likely to be liberal than people with moderate or low self-esteem. However, in subsequent models that included city and regional factors, self-esteem had no impact on predicting liberalism.

The effect of region was not universal in the end. Only living in the Midwest, the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Northwest demonstrated a regional impact on predicting liberalism. This suggests that place still matters, however, the exact impact of region is less clear. The limit of the impact of region in other parts of the two countries suggests that although regional differences may certainly exist and cross international borders, it is the case that not all identifiable, geographically contiguous and logically derived regions have an effect upon political outlook. The findings reported here certainly suggest the continued importance of region in North America, but they also raise questions for future research. The fact that the South was not negatively related to liberalism in the presence of the other independent variables (when it had been by a considerable margin with the lowest mean proportion of liberalism as a region as seen in the Appendix), for example, motivates the need to understand more fully the multi-level dynamics that likely affect the urban-area residents taking part in the survey. The presumption of an enduring Southern political culture, one reflecting a "traditionalistic" political culture described in considerable detail by Daniel Elazar and others may be more of a convenient belief than empirical reality in more contemporary times. This evidence supports Clarke et al.'s findings of a decline in regional differences importance for predicting political attitudes. Similar questions could perhaps be raised about the value of other formulations of local political culture such as those that Gastil, and Garreau noted previously.

The Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) technique used—in combination with datasets such as the Stowell archives, the Social Capital Benchmark Survey and their follow-up studies in 40 communities, and similar attitude/belief studies and the many multi-jurisdiction studies conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA)—can provide an important contribution to our understanding of circumstances under which place matters in our politics and policies. In the area of economic development policy Reese and Rosenfeld (2004) also found regional

similarities across national boundaries and in particular in the west of both Canada and the United States. They specifically found that western cities' regional similarities superseded national differences that are more pervasive in cities in other regions near the border of the two countries. While this study and Reese and Rosenfeld's study add to the evidence that in some areas regional identity crosses national borders there is more work to be done. The data archives are growing and the statistical tools for multi-level analysis are improving, and in turn permitting our understanding of such questions as "when does place matter" to grow proportionately. This article seeks to contribute to that growth and stimulate more research of this type.

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NOTES

[1] Worth noting is the fact that a study by Moon, Pierce, and Lovrich in 2001 did not find a statistically significant difference on self-esteem of individuals in cities grouped by region in the United States. However, as a cross-national control it is still important to include.

[2] Specifically, the dependent variable liberalism - coded 1 if liberal; 0 if mixed or conservative; Gender - coded 1 if female; 0 if male; Income - coded 1 if equal to or greater than $40,000; 0 if equal to or less than $39,999; Education - coded 1 if some type of college to post graduate; 0 if high school or less. The individual-level statistical controls for marital status and self-esteem were coded as dummy variables, while age, the only individual level interval variable in the data set was used in its raw format. The individual level statistical controls for marital status and self-esteem were coded as dummy variables. Marital Status (married) was coded 1 if married; 0 if not. Self-Esteem was also operationalized using the Stowell data sets pre-developed scale for the concept. Self Esteem (Esteemdum) was coded 1 if high self-esteem; 0 if mid-range or low.

[3] The second analysis does not include the cities of Palm Springs, CA and Salisbury, MD due to missing data for some variables.

[4] Country which was coded 1 if Canada and 0 if U.S. Diversity was coded 1 if equal to or greater than 50; 0 if equal to or less than 49. The population change is a proxy for the city prosperity and the variable prosperity was coded 1 if equal to or greater than the mean population change of 19.72; 0 if equal to or less than 19.72. The data were

recoded for computational efficiencies. Even after having created dummy variables for diversity and prosperity one of the final models was too large to compute.

[5] The scales grouped the respondents into three equal sized categories based on the highest third, the middle third, and the lowest third of scale scores for all of the survey respondents from all of the cities (i.e., more than 70,000 respondents from more than 50 cities). The same cut points were used for each city, enabling and assessment of each type person (e.g., liberal, mixed and conservative) in terms of the degree of over- or underrepresented in the city. This distribution of the city samples and their subgroups within the sample for the three categories was then made available in the data set (Moon, Lovrich, and Pierce (2000, 830-831). Note: Moon, Lovrich, and Pierce published from the data prior to making it publicly available.

[6] Laplace approximation was deployed as a tool within the HLM modeling because logit or non-liner HLM is significantly more complicated than linear modeling. Laplace approximation is both more computational efficient and accurate than simpler approximation methods.

[7] Population average differences as opposed to unit specific averages are used because of the nature of the research question being investigated. The intent here is to disentangle the effect of region, a city level factor, from individual factors. Consequently, if two individuals with the same gender etc…differ only in terms of the region the city is located, the point of interest becomes overall population mean (Raudenbush et al. 2004, 111).

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APPENDIX A - Regions Compared by Proportion Liberal

NORTHEAST	LIBERALISM
Maritimes (Halifax)	.30
Toronto	.30
Baltimore	.25
Boston	.27
Hartford	.23
Philadelphia	.29
Portland (Maine)	.29
Roanoke-Lynchburg	.30
Rochester	.32
Washington (D.C.)	.44
Northeast Mean	.30
Canadian Mean	.30
U.S. Mean	.30

MIDWEST	LIBERALISM
London Windsor	.23
Winnipeg	.34
Chicago	.27
Cincinnati	.26
Cleveland	.33
Columbus	.32
Dayton	.22
Kansas City	.29
Minneapolis-St. Paul	.38
St. Louis	.28
Tulsa	.16
Midwest Mean	.28
Canadian Mean	.29
U.S. Mean	.28

ROCKY MOUNTAIN	LIBERALISM
Alburquerque	.27
Colorado Springs	.23
Denver	.33
Las Vegas	.28
Reno	.30
Salt Lake City	.29
Rocky Mountain Mean	.28

SOUTHEAST	LIBERALISM
Atlanta	.31
Charleston	.24
Charlotte	.33
Fort Myers	.25
Jacksonville	.23
Norfolk	.13
Raleigh	.28
Tampa Bay	.28
West Palm Beach	.32
Southeast Mean	.26

SOUTH	LIBERALISM
Calgary	.28
Edmonton	.29
Dallas	.24
Houston	.28
Little Rock	.25
Louisville	.28
Nashville	.26
Shreveport	.19
South Mean	.25
Canadian Mean	.29
U.S. Mean	.25

PACIFIC WEST	LIBERALISM
Vancouver	.39
Vancouver Island	.40
Los Angeles	.31
Sacramento	.27
Salinas	.41
San Diego	.30
San Francisco	.32
Santa Barbara	.36
Seattle	.33
Spokane	.27
Pacific West Mean	.34
Canadian Mean	.40
U.S. Mean	.32

SOURCE: Stowell data sets