AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE EFFORTS TO AID JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS DURING WORLD WAR II

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFSC - American Friends Service Committee

NJASRC - National Japanese American Student Relocation Committee

CPS - Civilian Public Service

WRA - War Relocation Authority

WPA - Work Projects Administration

INTRODUCTION

During World War II countries throughout the world were focused on domination, not only over their neighbors or other enemies further abroad, but over their own people as well. Across the world governments removed civil liberties, imprisoned citizens based on their race or religion, and executions became commonplace for anyone perceived as a threat or simply stood in their way. Throughout all of this the United States seemed like the "white knight" from North America, with a willingness to fight the forces of fascism overseas and the strength and courage to restore peace around the globe. While Americans sacrificed so much at home and abroad to help liberate the world from fascism and tyranny, the United States government with the support of the majority of Americans chose to suspend the rights of many of its own citizens, and went so far as to imprison over a hundred thousand loyal Americans based solely on economic and racial discrimination. These loyal Japanese Americans lost their homes, their belongings, and between two to four years of their lives as they were isolated in inhospitable concentration camps located throughout the Western deserts and Arkansas.

In the face of this miscarriage of justice and in spite of the many Americans who supported the government's removal of the Japanese Americans from the West Coast there were groups of men and women from around the

country who stood up to assist and aid them in whatever way they could. These groups believed that there was no way to move a juggernaut like the U.S. War Department or put an end to the relocation, but they were willing to protest as loudly as they could without causing a backlash from that juggernaut. On top of that they did as much as they could and gave as much as they could spare in order to ease the burden placed on the Japanese Americans. Groups like the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) chose to help the Japanese Americans from the start of 1942 in every way they could. This aid originally focused on getting students out of the camps and into colleges in the East but eventually ballooned into countless other tasks as the war dragged on. The Society of Friends didn't lend their support in the hopes of making converts out of the Japanese or because Quakers were not patriotic Americans. Nor did they limit their aid to other Christians but gave of their time and energy to people of all religions because their own faith admonished them to help any person in need and stressed that equality was a core value central to their salvation. Perhaps just as importantly, they honored the tradition adopted by the U.S. Constitution which promised every man, woman, and child freedom and liberty regardless of race, sex, or religious belief.

My argument in this thesis is that while the AFSC in general, and some of its leaders in particular, wanted to help the Japanese who were subjected to internment during World War II, their results were mixed for many reasons. Furthermore, the AFSC had to walk a fine line in working with both the government and the interned Japanese. That tightrope walk forced them to make

certain concessions to the government and forced the Friends to turn their backs on one of their core tenets, namely the call to fight injustice and always "speak truth to power." My thesis is that the AFSC's level of success was remarkable given certain constraints, but that in the end those internal and external constraints stood in the way of their success. In the end their results were spotty at best; in some ways the undertaking was a huge success while in other regards it could be looked at as an abject failure. Furthermore, the AFSC's experience giving aid to both the Japanese and the federal government during World War II presaged the triangular relationship that formed between NGOs, the people they helped and the United States government for the rest of the century.

The academic study of the Japanese American internment is long and thorough. The bulk of research has focused mainly on the circumstances surrounding the victims of Executive order 9066, but the American Friends have not been absent from scholarly debate. Several studies have been written regarding the role played by the various Caucasian Christian groups who helped give aid to those victims, and one by Allan Austin focused entirely on the National Japanese American Student Relocation Committee. None, however, have specifically delved into the various activities taken on by the AFSC or the important role it played in coordinating efforts to get students, individuals and entire families out of the camps. Austin's book entitled *From Concentration Camps to Campus* does a great job of showing how mainstream Protestant groups helped students leave the camps and enter colleges and universities across the country through the efforts of the NJARC but stops short of revealing the scope

Quaker involvement. In *Storied Lives* Gary Okihiro discusses the effects internment had on Japanese American students on both an individual and personal level including the aid given to them by the AFSC. However, his in depth analysis misses the broader issues that challenged the Quaker's relief efforts. Many books and articles briefly mention the aid given by the Friends but fail to go into the details of how important their participation was to the overall well being of the Japanese Americans. This study seeks to bring that argument to the forefront and show just how much was and wasn't accomplished between January 1942 and September 1945, because in the end it was those successes and failures that impacted the lives and futures of thousands of innocent people.

This work is divided into eight sections, including this opening introduction. The second section is based on secondary sources and is titled "Quaker Philosophy and History." It is an overview of the Friends' origins and the basis of its theology and practice. Their core principle of "speaking truth to power" focused on confronting those causing society's problems but was largely ignored in this undertaking. This could very well have been one of the few times in Quaker history where the Friends chose to hold their tongues and put their theological convictions aside believing that it would have only hindered the process of resettlement and ultimately hurt their Japanese American neighbors. Continuing with secondary sources is the third section which explores the "History of the Internment" through the logistics of the exclusion and the actions that led to the internment of the Japanese during World War II. This section as well as all the subsequent parts of this thesis is also based on archival material

found in the Friends archive headquarters in Philadelphia and at the University of Washington in Seattle. Section four is titled "The Student Relocation Movement" and it introduces the reader to the formation and work of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Committee and shows how Quaker pragmatism and bureaucratic red tape often stood in the way of getting people out of the camps. Individuals in this organization tirelessly worked to place college-age Japanese into educational institutions across America but found that placement was neither quick nor easy because it was dependent on many factors such as community approval, financial limitations and discrimination.

In the fifth section "Friends Hostels" explores the immense need for housing which led the Friends to create hostels and find employment for those seeking to leave the internment camps and move to cities like Chicago and Cincinnati. In section six the reader will begin to see what a tightrope the Friends had to walk while trying to help the Japanese in internment camps. Entitled "Internal and External Difficulties," this portion of the thesis notes how much the Friends wanted to do, and yet found themselves impotent when dealing with larger institutions. Comparing their situation to later instances where humanitarian organizations were co-opted by the government in order to give humanitarian aid while swaying public opinion reveals that the AFSC was not only employed as a tool by the United States government but that their work was used as a model by the government to be used over and over again throughout the rest of the twentieth century. Section seven looks at a case study of one of the West Coast leaders in the Friends' movement and is named after one such leader.

"Floyd Schmoe" was based out of Seattle and his story demonstrates the promises and challenges for what the Friends tried to do during World War II. His individual fervor to help get people out of camps was usually met with caution from the head office in Philadelphia and shows that internal conflicts helped to confound the amount of aid that was given. Section eight is titled "Why Leave?" and it examines how the Friends dealt with Japanese in the camps who were reluctant to leave the security of their barbed-wire compound behind. The "Conclusion" examines the legacy of the Friends work with Japanese in the World War II internment camps.

QUAKER PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY

When George Fox founded the Society of Friends in the seventeenth century he probably couldn't have imagined that his core beliefs would eventually evolve into an organization known throughout the world as an award-winning example of Christian mysticism embodied in action. When looking at most sects that have arisen from the three major Western religions, one sees that the role a person's faith plays in their everyday life is generally personal or internalized, based on their individual relationship with the divine. Of course members of every faith have sought to help others by fighting social and economic injustice or tithing for the poor, but few religious groups have actually incorporated the concept of service as a sacrament. The Society of Friends directs each member to strive to make the world a better place and goes so far as to place this sacrament as a central tenet of the faith and each person's spiritual growth. The history of the Friends is full of examples of selfless giving and the philosophy of social change, and this drive ultimately culminated in the establishment of an organizational branch devoted solely to worldwide service known as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). As the founding Chairman of the AFSC explained, "In the early and middle periods of Quaker history experiments in the service of love were apt to be spontaneously entered into as the individual concern of a tender heart who followed a leading that seemed to be divinely given

to him."[1] The AFSC changed this personal movement into what was to become an organized and committed force of this "service of love", one that has worked tirelessly since World War I to bring all faiths together to help people who have been disadvantaged throughout the world. But what aspect of Quaker philosophy differentiates Friends from other Protestant groups and leads them down this path of service?

George Fox began his mission to find what he called "Friends" throughout England during the 1600's, and while he based his faith on the beliefs of Calvinism, his extreme views caused both he and his followers to face constant persecution in the form of fines, imprisonment, and even execution. First of all he believed that everyone on earth is born truly equal, irrespective of race, gender, or nationality, because internally everyone is considered to possess a part of God. At a time when women were treated as second-class citizens and members of other races were looked upon as either sub-human or as property, Quakers experimented with the idea of treating everyone equally. They took themselves out of the system of class hierarchy that dominated England and refused to address the nobility as their betters or take off their hats in front of members of higher classes. Because of this belief in equality, Fox not only abolished the class system within the religion but also declared that there was no authority, either spiritual or temporal, which Friends must swear allegiance to because God is within every human being and each individual is partly divine. As a result, "Unlike other organizations, those who are in the minority are not outvoted but

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[1]Jones, Mary Hoxie, *Swords into Ploughshares: An account of the AFSC 1917-1937* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1937), viii.

convinced. Men, women, and children are at liberty to speak in any meeting; the delegates who are appointed at quarterly and yearly meetings to ensure adequate representation do not enjoy any unusual position or prerogative. Women are regarded with absolute equality in Quaker policy."[2] It would make sense then that the concept most commonly associated with Quaker philosophy, namely the taking of human life, is outlawed because it would be tantamount to executing the part of God which resides within each human being, whether they be homeless and living on the streets or incredibly wealthy and living in a palace.

On top of these concepts of equality Friends "have no theological language and no formal creed or confession of binding authority," and while the writings of George Fox, William Penn, and others such as Rufus Jones are considered "inspired," no book including the Bible is taken as a final or unchallengeable work. As Balwant Nevaskar states, "Although great importance is placed on the Bible, the Spirit of God that produced the Bible is given preeminence. Among other Protestant groups there is a tendency for the orthodoxy to accept the Bible as the final authority in all religious matters, whereas among the Quakers it is the modern liberals who are drawn to the authority of the Bible."[3]

George Fox based his understanding of God's relationship to humans on one verse found in the book of John, chapter one, verse nine, which states; "that was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." This

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[2] Nevaskar, Balwant, *Capitalists without Capitalism: The Jains of India and the Quakers of the West* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971), 75.
[3] Ibid.,74.

light contained inside every individual is what connects human beings to God directly, and allows for a personal relationship to the divine that can only be realized by quietly meditating and listening to the voice of God speak to one from within. This concept of human unity with God defines the Society of Friends as mystical at its very core because mystics believe that all human beings can connect with God directly either through some form of meditation or physical endeavor. Almost every major religion contains some form of mysticism which usually embodies itself in some form of human asceticism like the yogis in Hinduism, the Zen monks in Buddhism, or the Trappist monks in the Catholic Church. Friends are one of the only groups who have worked hard to keep their mystical faith fundamentally social in nature, and their spirituality tied to performing acts in this world. As a result, unlike most Christians Quakers place little to no weight on the sacraments, and as Charles M. Woodman remarks: "In its place they attempted to live the sacrament in their relations with their fellow men. In other words, all life and, hence, all human conduct were sacraments. No higher ideal for human action had ever been set."[4] So while most Christians focused on attaining heaven through sacramental steps such as baptism, communion, or confirmation, and used the intercession of priests or ministers to help them along the way, there are no intermediaries between Quakers and their God. The only two sacraments they seek to obtain are the mystical union of themselves with God and the elevation of all members of society. In many ways the Society of Friend's belief in social awareness is the temporal mirror to the Mahayana Buddhist belief that all of humanity must work to help one another

[4] Ibid. 78.

attain *Nirvana* simultaneously, so that the whole group might escape *samsara* at once, as on a great raft, knowing full well that to work selfishly towards attaining *Nirvana* alone would be an empty achievement.

The equality the Friends wish to obtain is referred to as a perfect "social order", which is a lofty goal that is generally at odds with the ranking members of society. George Fox often found himself in conflict with society's elite during the 1600's and was imprisoned over and over again for exercising his beliefs and trying to create a new world order which sought to overturn the one in place. For hundreds of years, the Quaker concept of social order sought to promote programs that the United States only implemented during the past century under Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal: "From the beginning of the movement the Quakers have been active in poor relief, education of youth and adults, helping alcoholics, public health, care of the insane, instituting reforms in the prisons, and the abolition of slave trade and slavery."[5] These goals evolved as the group grew in numbers and society changed alongside the industrial revolution. For instance, drinking wasn't originally looked upon as being a grave social concern because everyone drank in large quantities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries whether they were at home, in public, or even at work. As alcoholics filled the jails, accidental deaths grew to be common; serious workplace injuries became part and parcel with industrialization and many Quakers saw these social ills as byproducts of alcohol abuse. Strangely enough, the original arguments put forth by the Quakers against the manufacture of alcohol two centuries ago mirrors many arguments used today in regards to alleviating food shortages and high

[5] Ibid., 98.

grain prices around the world. They argued in the eighteenth century that cereal crops shouldn't be used for making beer and hard liquor because it took food out of hungry mouths. Today a similar argument states that it is immoral to use food stores to make biofuels or to feed cattle because that drives up grain prices and hurts poor people living in third world communities. So by 1839 the Quakers had not only outlawed drinking amongst their own members, they had helped to start the temperance movements in England and the United States that would eventually lead to prohibition.

In regards to race, the Quakers were also in the vanguard. Originally slaveholders themselves, their ideology once again evolved as they saw that injustice and harsh treatment was commonly heaped upon slaves. The report of the committee on race relations in Philadelphia summed up Quaker sentiment best when they stated, "We must secure for every man, regardless of race, creed or color, the right to earn a living for himself and for those he loves. This right is almost as sacred as the right to life itself. Every child must have the right to grow up in an environment in which he has a decent chance to develop as a healthy and normal human being. Only one issue is involved, the fundamental equality of all men in the sight of God."[6] Original Quaker sentiment stated that their duty was merely to teach slaves by example how to become good Christians, but once again that was adapted as Friends saw that something wasn't right with a system that allowed owners to beat or lynch their slaves. This led the Quakers to free their own slaves, and subsequently they met to discuss the problems of slavery in America as a whole and eventually took part in the underground railroad and the

[6] Ibid., 110.

movement for the abolition of slavery altogether. In regards to Native Americans, "The Quakers believed that Christ had died for all men—including the Indians and the Negroes—and that each had an eternal soul in spite of his different skin color."[7] Ironically, in the land of the free and the home of the brave the only treaty in U.S. history between white settlers and Native Americans that was neither ignored, altered, or completely rescinded was the one between the famous Quaker William Penn and the local Native Americans in Pennsylvania. Actually one of the few paintings that was looked upon as modest enough to be seen hanging inside a Quaker house up until the twentieth century was of Penn meeting with the Delaware Indians and signing the peace treaty which they claim has been honored to this day. Penn also believed that it was immoral to give alcohol to Native Americans in order to take advantage of them and that beating a slave or not paying someone for the work that they did was against Christian principles. Many social issues that attracted the attention of the Friends needed no evolution in thought to spur them into action.

From early on the Quakers pushed the British government to take care of the sick who couldn't support themselves, asking that hospitals be built for the poor, specialized institutions be funded to aid ostracized groups like the blind and the deaf, and that special asylums be set aside so that people with mental illnesses could be treated and helped instead of mocked and abused in the streets. Poverty has always been a major focus of the Friends who hold that social equality demands not only the abolishment of a class system, but that everyone is fed, clothed, and given a decent standard of living. The programs instituted by the

[7]Ibid., 109.

Quakers were not simple charity nor did they look like modern welfare, but in true Calvinistic spirit their philosophy could be compared to the motto adopted by Habitat for Humanity over the past thirty years urging people to offer the poor a hand-up, not a hand out. Friends have always felt that aiding the poor by simply giving them charity keeps them from wanting to work.

Since so many Quakers had been sent to government prisons and other institutions, a number of them became intimately involved in prison reform as well. Much like their views on getting out of poverty, "According to Quaker philosophy, reform, not punishment, should be the aim of imprisonment."[8] The term penitentiary actually came from a new style of managing prisons introduced by the Quakers in the state of Pennsylvania. They encouraged separating the criminals according to the harshness of their crimes, believing that having hardened criminals in large holding pens with people being held for minor offenses such as not doffing their hats for the nobility fostered the perfect breeding ground for more hardened criminals. One Quaker prison reformer named John Howard borrowed the Catholic notion of isolating monks in individual cells and applied it to prisoners so that they wouldn't be able to influence one another in a negative way. The goal was also to give prisoners time to reflect on life and their misdeeds in a quiet and peaceful manner, much as someone would do in a Quaker meeting. Whether they were good ideas such as separating hardened from petty criminals or controversial measures such as isolating prisoners for weeks on end in solitary confinement, many of the reforms

[8] Ibid., 107.

first introduced by Quakers in the nineteenth century are still being used in prisons around the world today.

Like all religious movements the Society of Friends went through a series of changes as it evolved and moved towards the twentieth century. The original ideas put forth by Fox and Penn were changed as the movement as a whole adjusted to the industrial revolution in North America. As more people began to leave the countryside and move into cities such as Philadelphia and New York splinter groups formed and broke off from the main sect. Some of these groups held onto the early ideas regarding the light within and quiet meditation while others introduced sacraments such as baptism; sermons became common in other Quaker meeting-houses. But by the end of the nineteenth century a new leader emerged, Rufus Jones, who inadvertently steered the Friends back to their mystical roots and away from many of the Protestant elements that had crept into the religion while simultaneously looking for new ways to focus on the sacrament of service. As one scholar noted, "earlier generations of Quakers had taken aim at specific evils that seemed antithetic to the spread of the Gospel. These modern ideas continued to do so, but within a broader vision of remaking American society along the lines of the teachings of the New Testament."[9] The greatest failure of Christians in the past, Thomas Newlin declared in 1897, was that they had failed to realize that "a new society was quite as emphatic in Christ's teaching as a new man."[10] The idea espoused was that an individual cannot prosper or

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[9] Hamm, Thomas D. *The Transformation of American Quakerism; Orthodox Friends, 1800-1907* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 157.
[10] Ibid.

better themselves if they are in an environment filled with temptation and vice. If the society around you is in shambles to the point where you can't concentrate on your own unity with God, then it is your duty to improve society as a whole. These were the concepts that Rufus Jones and the rest of the Friends carried with them into a century that would become marked by human depravity and war, a century that would end up keeping the Quakers incredibly busy.

The AFSC was founded on the eve of America's participation in World War I, as Friends in the U.S. were watching their brethren in Britain get drafted and then imprisoned if they refused to join in the fighting. The main issue in the United States was that even if the Army didn't need the Quakers to join the infantry, it still wanted them to take some part in the war effort, whether it be cooking for the soldiers or working in the medical field as many Quakers had done during the Civil War. Many Quakers weren't against helping the government altogether, they just didn't want to kill other human beings while serving their country. Initially the AFSC worked in conjunction with the American Red Cross to aid the French Red Cross by sending men and women over to help wounded soldiers and civilians. This movement snowballed as volunteers found more and more groups that they wanted to help throughout Europe and Russia. What started out as a temporary mission to help out people in need while simultaneously keeping their status as conscientious objectors, continued well beyond the end of the war when the fighting had stopped and the soldiers had returned home. "The signing of the armistice did not miraculously restore French villages, nor feed German children, nor give coal to Austria, nor

prevent famine in Russia, nor remove typhus fever from Poland, nor do away with the need for constructive peace, international and interracial programs, nor give work to unemployed miners. The mission remained in France until 1920 but their return to the America was the beginning of another great period of service."[11] The AFSC turned their eyes back towards home, to helping miners and fighting racial injustice between blacks and whites, even towards helping to mend relations between Japan and the U.S. in the face of the Alien Exclusion Act.

In 1924 the AFSC founded a new "interracial section" to deal with what it saw as blatant racism in the United States, a section that would eventually lead it toward constructing a strong relationship with both the Japanese and Japanese Americans. As white Americans became more and more xenophobic against Asians trying to immigrate to the U.S., Clarence Pickett, the future chairman of the AFSC wrote, "One of the factors in Friends' awakening to this situation was the passage of the Japanese exclusion clause of the immigration act of 1924. Pamphlets were issued by the Committee, setting forth Friends' opposition to the Oriental exclusion policy, and pointing out its dangers."[12] The AFSC understood that the passage of the Exclusion Act was a major blunder on the part of the U.S. government and seriously tarnished its relations with Japan. Dr. Inazo Nitobe of the League of Nations Secretariat was quoted as saying: "When I went back to Japan I found the older men almost heartbroken. I have been a Christian for fifty years and after preaching brotherhood for all these years, to have our whole nation

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[11]Jones, *Ploughshares,* 20.
[12] Pickett, Clarence*, For More than Bread: An Autobiographical Account of twenty-two years Work With the AFSC* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1953), 373.

branded as inferior! The earthquake was terrible, but the spiritual devastation caused in Japan by the Immigration Act was far worse."[13] So the Friends sent emissaries to Japan to teach English and make inroads with the Japanese government while inviting several Japanese students to the U.S. to study and live with American families. They even had a Japanese American Friend, Yasushi Hasegawa travel around the U.S. promoting better relations between Americans and the Japanese. Unfortunately the following decade proved to be a downward spiral in the relationship between the two countries that ended with the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Many people in the United States today are under the impression that the internment camps were the one and only event perpetrated against the Japanese in the United States. They believe that this was a military response to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there was a rational belief by the military authorities that the Japanese living in the continental United States posed a threat to national security. In fact it was the last in a long line of offenses committed by white Americans against Asian immigrants starting around the turn of the century. The first step was taken in 1908 with the passing of the Gentleman's Agreement between the United States and Japan which curtailed the addition of any new immigrants coming to the United States while allowing the wives, parents and children of Japanese men already living and working in the U.S. to join the men. This was followed up in 1924 by the Exclusion Act which cut off all Japanese immigration to the U.S. until 1952, effectively leaving the Japanese men and women already in America marooned from their families and friends who may or

[13] Ibid.

may not have wished to join them. On top of that no Japanese man or woman could become a United States citizen until 1952. They could of course pay taxes to the government and own businesses but they couldn't vote in elections nor were they recipients of the rights of citizenship that most Americans take for granted.[14]

Individual states added to these federal measures by passing their own laws aimed at slowing down the "Yellow Peril" as they saw fit. In San Francisco the Japanese were asked to leave the public schools and join the Korean and Chinese students at separate schools set aside for Asian students. Anti-miscegenation laws were also introduced so that Japanese men and women couldn't marry outside of their race. California passed the Alien Land Law in 1913 that prohibited anyone born in Japan from owning property in the state of California. This law in particular placed a heavy burden on the Japanese because it meant that they were forced to rent the buildings that they lived and worked in along with the land where they grew their crops. Their only other option was to ask non-Japanese friends or neighbors to hold their property for them and hope that these friends were honest in the long run. This was in an era when over 45% of the Japanese were involved in agriculture, and an even larger percent were tied to it in one way or another, and when rental rates for whites stood at $10.91 an acre while the Japanese paid an average of $24.75.[15] The government had already had legislation on the books against the Japanese for many years, and

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[14] Nagata, Donna K., *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment* (New York: Plenum Press, 1993), 5.
[15] Ibid., 18.

discrimination was commonplace, but all of this came to a head when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and very little persuasion was needed for Americans to turn against their Japanese neighbors and force them into prison camps.

HISTORY OF THE INTERNMENT

The first and foremost reason given for placing the Japanese in concentration camps was that it was a military necessity and that the Japanese could very well represent a “fifth column” along the West Coast. That meant that the government believed they could rise up to help their native Japanese brethren overrun the United States in the eventuality that the continental U.S. was attacked

and they were allowed to remain along the coast. This of course holds very little water today as it has been revealed that both the FBI and the military felt that there was no threat coming from the Japanese American community after the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the Hawaiian Islands where the Japanese were more closely tied to their homeland and where they constituted over a third of the population, only 1% of them were interned as enemies of the state. On the other hand, on the continental United States where the Japanese were a small percentage of the overall population and had cut most of their ties with Japan, over 90% of the population was sent to camps. Some argued at the time that this was for their own good—that there would have been no way to protect them from vigilante justice so it was best to keep them out of sight. In reality only twenty-five major crimes were reported as having been carried out against the Japanese before they were interned. Even so, vigilante justice is a civil affair that could have been handled by the police simply doing their job without the military getting involved.

Other arguments for incarceration that were discussed before the internment stated that having them in camps would benefit the military in terms of prisoner exchanges because they could be exchanged for POW's or could be used as tools of reprisal. The actual existence of military reasoning for the internment was so minor that the man in charge of West Coast security, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, used a fear tactic that might have been studied by George W. Bush's tacticians when they were putting together their reasoning for invading Iraq. DeWitt's argument stated, "the very fact that no sabotage has taken place to

date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken."[16] The only military purpose that the internment might have served was put forth by a Quaker woman named Elizabeth Johnson who stated in an essay written in December of 1942 that "the directors of these centers, foreseeing a post-war world in which many relocations will occur all over the world, regards the centers as "proving grounds" where sound democratic methods of dealing with disintegrated communities may be developed. Their aim is the steady gradual establishment of normal conditions."[17] Roger Daniels summed it up best when he wrote,

> "The reasons for the establishment of these concentration camps are clear. A deteriorating military situation created the opportunity for American racists to get their views accepted by the national leadership. The constitution was treated as a scrap of paper, not only by Mccloy, Stimson, and Roosevelt, but by the entire congress, which approved and implemented everything done to the Japanese Americans, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, which in December 1944, nearly three years after the fact, in effect sanctioned the incarcerating of the Japanese Americans."[18]

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[16] Nagata, *Legacy of Injustice*, 3

[17] Brochure on Japanese American Student Relocation, Prepared by Elizabeth Johnson, December 12, 1942. American Friends Service Committee Archives, Philadelphia: Social industrial section, Japanese American Relocation, 1942. National Student Relocation Committee Papers (hereafter cited as AFSC Archives).

[18] Daniels, Roger. *Prisoners without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 47.

So there were many ideas circulating as to why the Japanese should be interned, but the most rational reasoning behind why it actually took place was probably a combination of racism mixed with economic greed.

Lieutenant General Dewitt best summed up his feelings in regards to Japanese Americans when he stated that "the Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of the United States citizenship, have become "Americanized", the racial strains are undiluted. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes."[19] In other words, while the Germans and Italians living in America were good people whose distant cousins in Europe were being led astray by fascist regimes, the Japanese race as a whole was evil and unalterably tied to their Emperor, even if they had never stepped foot on Japanese soil and pled complete loyalty to the American government. According to Donna Nagata in her work regarding the psychological impact of the internment, the difference between the Japanese Americans and their German and Italian counterparts who were more numerous and more politically powerful on the U.S. mainland was that the American people viewed the Japanese as "nonentities, expendable, or undeserving: consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just."[20] By and large the general public stood behind the removal, polls at the time showed that 60% of Americans wanted

[19] DeWitt, John L. *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast 1942* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 34.
[20] Nagata, Le*gacy of Injustice,* 6.

Japanese Americans born in the U.S.to be interned, and 93% were in favor of imprisonment for anyone born in Japan. The American Legion was one of the first organizations that called for the removal of all Japanese Americans from the West Coast. The California Joint Immigration Committee, an organization that was formerly known as the Japanese Exclusion League, reasserted its earlier claims that the Japanese could not assimilate into American society. In a press release to California Newspapers, they declared, "those born in this country are American citizens by right of birth, but they are also Japanese citizens, liable… to be called to bear arms for their Emperor, either in front of, or behind, enemy lines."[21]

The justice system even took part in supporting the internment by either blatantly ruling against any Nisei who stood up for their rights, or by ignoring their cases altogether. Judge Lloyd L. Black ruled against one petition for habeas corpus filed by a young woman named Mary Ventura who refused to enter the camps by stating: "how many in this courtroom doubt that in Tokyo they consider all of Japanese ancestry though born in the United States to be citizens or subjects of the Japanese Imperial government? How many believe that if our enemies should manage to send a suicide squadron of parachutes to Puget Sound that the Enemy High command would not hope for assistance from many American born Japanese?" Mitsuye Endo also filed a habeas corpus petition in July of 1942, but the Supreme Court ignored her right to a speedy trial by not ruling on it until 1944 when the high court ruled unanimously that it was

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[21] tenBroek, Jacobus, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson. *Prejudice, War, and the constitution*. 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 78.

unconstitutional to hold United States citizens against their will. By then over 70% of those who had been interned had spent two and a half years in prison and the government was already drafting plans to permit the Japanese to leave the camps and return to their homes on the West Coast so the Court's ruling was a case of too little, too late. This sense of moral exclusion pervaded every aspect of the U.S. government and made it easy to rationalize the locking up innocent Americans, but there was a more practical reason behind the eagerness with which Western politicians encouraged the federal government to go ahead with the internment.

In 1940 the average value for farmland in America was approximately $37.94 an acre, while the average value for an acre of Japanese owned farmland was approximately $279.96. The disparity was quite large, and the Japanese had worked tirelessly throughout the Great Depression to grow and expand the small, labor-intensive fruit and vegetable farms that thrived along the West Coast. As a result, agricultural groups stood to benefit greatly from the disappearance of the Japanese farmers, truckers and laborers. As the managing secretary of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association was recorded as stating: "We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest. We do. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want them back when the war ends either."[22] All in all the relocation would create a large economic vacuum that would have to be filled up by good, hardworking whites once the Japanese went away, and it was the

[22] Ibid., 80.

Western politicians who united to keep the fight alive because in the end the payoff included what has been conservatively estimated at somewhere close to 3 billion dollars in Japanese losses. It is impossible not to suspect that those losses were someone else's gains.[23] So the real question at this point is what did the government do to coerce 120,000 loyal Americans into actually putting up with being imprisoned simply because of their race?

The first thing that the FBI did after Pearl Harbor was to arrest 1,500 Issei (first generation Japanese immigrants) leaders who had traditionally been the backbone of their communities, effectively neutralizing groups by removing their spokesmen. The few Japanese men and women who did stand up and refused to obey the curfews or failed to report to the train stations and enter the camps were arrested and convicted, having to spend months in jail as a result. As Judge Black stated in the Ventura case, "aside from any right involved it seems to me that if petitioner is as loyal and devoted as her petition avers she would be glad to conform to the precautions which Congress, the President and the armed forces deem requisite." How could anyone fight the kind of absurd logic that requested one to give up their freedom and submit to actions completely contrary to the United States Constitution in order to prove their patriotism? As Donna Nagata explains, in the face of such injustice those being abused typically have four types of responses, they can try to restore justice, they can fight back against the offender, they can try to avoid the situation entirely, or they can resign themselves to the injustice. The Japanese Americans quickly, if not altogether eagerly, felt

[23] Nagata, *Legacy of Injustice*, 19.

they had no option but to choose the latter of the four.[24] History had taught the Japanese living in America that injustice was to be expected, and Nagata explains that people accustomed to constant discrimination are much more likely to put up with more and more discrimination whenever it is meted out. There was also a push from within the Japanese community to not fight back against the oppressor because the leaders feared that they would appear disloyal or traitorous to the general public, and of course the Japanese culture values interdependence over independence, loyalty and obedience over rocking the boat or challenging authority.

The government did not help by aiding the divisions being created in the Japanese American community once they were in camps. They chose to bar the Issei from holding any elected offices in the camps and gave all official authority to the second and third generations. This system helped disenfranchise the Japanese elders and created "a structure which directly opposed Japanese cultural values of filial piety and deference to one's elders."[25] On top of that there was a loyalty oath given to everyone which asked two questions, whether men would be willing to serve in the armed forces, and whether everyone would swear allegiance to the U.S. and forswear any allegiance to Japan. This tore apart families because it forced young men to join the military for fear of appearing unpatriotic while it asked the Issei to denounce their Japanese citizenship. The latter point is ironic become the U.S. government wouldn't allow them to become citizens in the first place, so if the Issei renounced their Japanese citizenship in

[24] Ibid., 6.
[25] Ibid., 21.

essence they became a group of people without any nationality. All in all what the U.S. created was a rather blind and slippery slope that the Japanese could not have foreseen, a slope they quickly slid down until they found themselves unable to leave the camps. Much like the Jews in Nazi occupied Germany, the Japanese Americans couldn't really believe that their government would put them in prison just because of their race, and once they were in the camps they found it incredibly hard to get themselves out of them.

It makes sense that the Japanese were unable to uproot themselves and move east in the three months they were given to leave the government sanctioned Western Defense Zone especially since the evacuation took place at the end of the Great Depression. Selling one's land, businesses, and property in the best of times can take months of negotiating, but to do so in 1942 when investment capital was almost non-existent would have been nearly impossible. In addition every white man on the West Coast heard rumors that the government would probably force the Japanese to leave their property behind and head east of the mountains which made them even less likely to pay top dollar for land that the Issei didn't even legally own. Because they couldn't hold titles for the property that they had purchased they were left at the mercy of their neighbors whom many had trusted to hold those titles for them. These neighbors could simply steal the land while they were away or wait for the Japanese to stop making their mortgage payments once they were behind barbed wire and unable to make a living. So the majority of the Japanese Americans suffered in the camps for the next three years and emerged from the war financially unstable, but some were able to gain their

freedom and start over in different regions of the United States. That was mostly due to the fact that there were groups of conscientious Americans willing to help protect their interests and help them start new lives outside of the prisons.

THE STUDENT RELOCATION MOVEMENT

When analyzing the services rendered to the Japanese Americans by the AFSC during the war it is best to remember that the situation was akin to watching the entire life cycle of a humanitarian organization which should have spanned decades play itself out in a three year period. It is also important to keep in mind that everyone hoped the war would end sooner than later, and once the war was over the committee set up to aid the Japanese Americans would disband as the camps were emptied. The organization that was put together to help relocate students was called the National Japanese American Student Relocation Committee (NJAMSRC), and its evolution took place under the umbrella of a government controlled situation that was manufactured out of thin air. As a result their effectiveness was marred by the fact that it was conceived on the fly and it was neither quick, efficient, or even supported by the majority of Americans. The men and women of the AFSC had to go through reams of red tape to get anyone out of the camps during the first two years of the war, and then they were caught up in the effort of trying to get everyone left inside the camps into housing out on the West Coast all at once during 1945. Their roles and activities changed not only as the war progressed but also at the whims of the Federal Government. What started as an effort to simply get a few thousand students out of the camps and into colleges turned into a massive undertaking that could have employed

thousands of paid staff instead of the skeleton crew that was put together of poorly paid workers, conscientious objectors, and volunteers. The driving force behind everything that the AFSC did was the focus on accomplishing whatever was humanly possible in order to help the Japanese overcome a serious injustice no matter how small or overwhelmingly large the tasks might have seemed at the time.

Much of what the Quakers attempted to do could be regarded as an unmitigated failure because they did not have the time or the finances to accomplish many of their more lofty goals. The reality was that they were constantly working to come from behind as new challenges arose, and the government threw new hurdles in their path and changed the rules of the game as the war progressed. Of course the imprisonment of the Japanese Americans was as much of a surprise to the Friends as it was for the Japanese Americans themselves. When the government decided to move 120,000 Americans into the camps the Friends were not sitting idly by waiting for a government-induced catastrophe but were already working at full capacity on several other programs. The rest of the world was already deeply engaged in World War II and there were humanitarian crises occurring throughout Europe and Asia. Reed Cary, the president of the AFSC admitted in response to a letter sent to him from a professor at Princeton; “This Japanese question as a whole has burst upon us at a time when the AFSC commitments in a variety of directions are extremely heavy,

however, it was decided to go forward as rapidly as possible with the project dealing with the transfer of students."[26]

Initially a group of people came together and formed a Committee on Resettlement of Japanese Americans to get things in motion before the Japanese were actually forced to leave the West Coast. This consisted not only of Quakers but also religious leaders from several denominations and many faculty members from colleges and universities across America. For example, the acting President of the Committee, John Nason, was also the president of Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, and one of the West Coast committee members instrumental in getting student's references put together was Lyman Wilbur, the President of Stanford. These weren't retired or out of work Quakers who volunteered to get onboard and help, but prominent citizens and busy men who were willing to give up their valuable time to write letters, go to meetings, speak publicly about the relocation, and give financially whatever they could afford. In March of 1942 the War Relocation Authority was set up with Milton Eisenhower appointed as the acting director; he sent a letter addressed to Clarence Pickett of the AFSC. In it he states:

> The American Friends Service Committee can make a significant contribution to the program of the War Relocation Authority. It is not feasible for the War Relocation Authority to undertake such a university program for American-citizen Japanese, but this in no way detracts from the desirability of such an accomplishment.

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[26] C. Reed Cary to Frank Aydelotte, April 8, 1942. AFSC Archives. Administrative Correspondence.

> Consequently I should like to ask that you establish a committee which would aid you in the selection and certification of students at assembly or relocation centers. I should like to have you not only bring together a committee to formulate a program but also to do the necessary follow-through work which will be necessary if this program is to be realized.[27]

Clarence responded by stating that the Society of Friends would agree to undertake the student placement on certain conditions, first of which being that they wanted the WRA to write a letter explaining to anyone the AFSC might come across that the NJASRC was "a quasi-official agency established at the specific request" of the WRA and that any student who left the camps to start a new life had gone through a thorough background check to make sure they were not a threat to other Americans.[28] Clarence also let Mr. Eisenhower know in a letter that:

> All of us were deeply humiliated that such a relocation problem has seemed to be inescapable and especially that American citizens are being detained. Having expressed our humiliation as American citizens, we wish to offer our services in any way we can to assist in the alleviation of the distress caused to Japanese and to prepare them for useful membership in the American community. It is only by some such policy as this that we shall be able to atone for

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[27]M.S. Eisenhower to Clarence Pickett, May 5, 1942. AFSC Archives. War Relocation Authority.
[28]Milton Eisenhower to College and University Presidents, August 7, 1942. AFSC Archives. War Relocation Authority.

> the violence that has been done to the constitutional rights of American citizens.[29]

Having made it clear that the AFSC was not happy with the situation, they then put their grievance aside and agreed to step in and assist the government regardless, feeling that they couldn't abandon their neighbors in a time of need even if their own government had caused that need.

The next step in the process was to approach companies, charities, and prominent men and women from around the country who they hoped would give not only financial support, but also lend their names and titles to the project. Some of these groups were the George F Baker Charity trust from New York City, the Carnegie Corporation, the Columbia Foundation from San Francisco, the Commonwealth Fund, The Ford Foundation in Dearborn Michigan, the Kresge Foundation, the Rockefeller Brother's Fund and the Charles Hayden Foundation. The committee used quite a wide-ranging approach to get whomever they could find to donate. Time was of the essence as John Nason illustrated when a list of donors was given to him by stating "Henry Taft felt that a letter signed by him and Roland Morris would not be effective, and that the approach should be an individual one. Is there any way of using President Butler in this connection? Individual approaches through interviews are laborious and take time; our need for funds is immediate and urgent."[30] Other men and women were also approached if they had any academic or personal connections to Japan, including:

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[29]Clarence Pickett to M.S. Eisenhower, May 16, 1942. AFSC Archives. War Relocation Authority.

[30] John Nason to Howard Beale, December 22, 1942. AFSC Archives. War Relocation Authority.

Mr. Frankinthall, a professor of Oriental Studies at Columbia, Hugh Borton from the Institute of Japanese Studies at Columbia, Webb Wilson with the American Council of Institute of Pacific Relations, and John W Davis from the law firm Arthur Dean, Sullivan and Cromwell. Anyone was a target for NJASRC support and fundraising. They approached English teachers and instructors who had taught in Japan, a number of Americans who had lived in Japan during the years leading up to the war, and businessmen who had branches in Japan. They even asked for donations from factory and business owners who had lost all of their investments or had been labeled as US spies and thrown into jail before being kicked out of Japan.[31] No one was considered beyond approach.

Surprisingly enough, one of the main setbacks to resettling the students outside of the camps was the United States government, specifically the War Department. Right from the start the AFSC was able to get dozens of universities outside of the Western Defense Zone to agree to accept applications from Japanese students presently held in the camps. Benefactors were ready and willing to send money to pay for their travel expenses back East and their room and board once they arrived; but as the head of the Office of Education admitted, "Mr. Provinse has felt that negotiations with the War Department were so delicate that if a letter went out and many colleges then expressed willingness to participate, it might seem like a form of indirect pressure on the War

[31]"List of Possible Donors." AFSC Archives. Committees And Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

Department."[32] In the same letter the Office of Education encouraged the NJASRC to get their donors ready to give money, get the students physically prepared to head East, get approval from the universities and the communities that they would be moving to, and then once the government had given approval to the colleges, the money, applications, and travel arrangements would be ready for release and the students could leave the camps immediately. But this letter was dated August 6, 1942, and unless things were different during the forties that meant that students would have little to no chance of gaining their freedom from incarceration and travel thousands of miles by rail to attend university terms starting in September. In the end that is exactly what happened. In fact it took the government until September 2nd to approve 100 colleges that the Japanese could "safely" attend, and by November 1942, 284 colleges were deemed open to the Japanese based on the fact that there were no defense installations or war laboratories set up on those campuses or anywhere nearby.[33] The doors were opening at many universities but the Army and the AFSC itself set up countless hoops that the students had to jump through in order to leave the camps and enter schools.

First of all, the AFSC did not want independent applications sent from students in the camps to institutions around the U.S., but wanted to maintain "the

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[32] Memo from Homer Morris to Joe Brown, November 25, 9142. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

[33] Thomas R. Bodine, Letter to National Student Relocation Committee, November 11, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

one official channel for placement and clearance."[34] A committee was formed to handle all aspects of student relocation and it acted as the sole gatekeeper between the students, the government and the colleges. While this may seem a bit over controlling one must remember that this was an age without computers, cell phones, or the World Wide Web. It is also important to note that the clientele was being held behind barbed wire in the desert without easy access to phones so it made sense to keep everything centralized and running through one clear channel. The committee started by getting 2,000 Nisei to fill out questionnaires that provided routine information such as grade point average and what discipline the students wished to study, as well as much more interesting factors such as "professional goals, service to the Japanese community, maturity of character, evidence of successful Caucasian contacts, special interests or talents, etc., etc."[35] Initially the NJASRC would only accept students who could be personally vouched for by Quakers or committee members from the West Coast. This could be considered nepotism but it was in line with a committee goal to send out students that Friends knew personally, students they could depend upon to make the Japanese look like model citizens to whites in the Mid-West who had never been exposed to someone of Asian descent. After those ambassadors of goodwill made a positive impression and proved that they weren't a threat to white

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[34] Bulletin, National Japanese American Student Relocation Council. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

[35] Bulletin, National Japanese American Student Relocation Council. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

America, the NJASRC would be able to open the floodgates and release thousands of students at a time.

Once they found institutions willing to take Japanese students, the NJASRC had to obtain transcripts and letters of recommendation from high schools, colleges, and universities. Professor Botts with the University of Washington Chemistry department wrote one such letter for Mary Iwamoto stating, "This girl is tops. She has the finest scientific mind I have ever met in a woman. She has a charming personality, a great capacity for work, and understanding of situations that is very unusual. He who desires ability, honesty, perseverance, and meticulous accuracy, can find no better than Mary Ishimoto."[36] They also needed West Coast community members for personal referrals and the government asked that important members of the communities which were going to host the Japanese students sign papers agreeing to let them move into their towns before they could arrive. One of the first students to leave the camps was Harvey Tanaka who had applied and was accepted to Haverford College in Pennsylvania. His first stumbling block was the fact that the president of the college had no idea what constituted community approval, so Reed Cary wrote Mr. Morley a letter stating that, "Community approval should take the form of a statement from some qualified law enforcement official, such as the chief of police, sheriff, commissioner, etc., to the effect that public sentiment in your community is not such as to take serious exception to the presence of Tanaka at

[36] Professor Botts, Letter of Recommendation, September 12, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

Haverford college."[37] To show how preposterous and un-American this qualification was, Norris E. Maloney, the sheriff in Madison Wisconsin, wrote a response to one such application stating; "I have no authority under the state law to authorize you to come to this state: and neither do I have authority to prevent you from coming. You are spoken of very highly at the University of Wisconsin and I certainly would have no objection to your coming here."[38] Probably the most important hurdle to cross was whether or not the students had the funding to support themselves in a new community or even pay to get themselves there to begin with. Those with insufficient funds had to apply for help from the NJASRC who dipped into the funds they had been raising from private donors around the United States. Finally these American born citizens had to swear a loyalty oath to the US government and once they had been approved as loyal Americans, they were issued travel papers by the War Department and were able to leave the camps and travel east.

Obviously funding was always a challenge for students and the AFSC not only raised funds but also organized scholarships for the students. One such example is the scholarship that had been set aside for an international exchange that offered one Japanese woman the chance to come and study in Philadelphia each year. The last woman who had come had just finished school after Pearl Harbor and now the family who administered the scholarship wished it to be given to a Nisei (second generation Japanese immigrant) woman from one of the

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[37]Reed Cary to John Morley, October 12, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.
[38]Norris E. Maloney, Letter of Community Approval, August 6, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

camps. "They prefer a Christian, though this is not essential (not a Roman Catholic). It should preferably be someone who has already had one or two years of college and it is probable that if everything goes well they would carry her through until her graduation."[39] In another letter Homer Morris noted that:

> With respect to financial assistance, many organizations and individuals have responded in fine spirit. It is evident that there must be considerable funds available to supplement their own, even in addition to the generous scholarships that are being offered by many of the institutions. Church boards are making substantial amounts available, and other sources of assistance are being explored. One third of the students have sufficient personal resources for the coming year, about one third will need almost complete subsidization, the remaining third having some funds, but not enough for the costs of a year of study. Some of the best and most deserving students are among those without funds.[40]

In the end, many church boards rallied to pay for their members to attend college, but 178 of the students were non-denominational and 129 of them needed direct help from the AFSC. All in all of the 1308 students who left the camps for the east that school year 994 needed some sort of assistance.[41]

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[39]Howard Beale to Homer Morris, November 18, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

[40]Report from Homer Morris, August 30, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

[41] Newsletter, National Student Relocation Council, November 11, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

In some instances the Friends got very creative in getting students educational opportunities. Such was the case in the Granada camp located in Colorado where many recent high school graduates did not want to leave their families behind. There were "A number of students without funds for attending college away from home who wish to stay on in the project for a year. These students do not want either a segregated Junior College in the camp nor do they want to wait another year to get into school. We propose that they continue their leadership in Granada and that at the same time they interpret the Japanese to the nearby community in a way not available to beet field workers."[42] The NSRC worked out a deal to reduce fees for these students to the point where they could obtain both tuition and transportation for the 30 mile round trip to the nearest Junior College for only 50 dollars per student per semester. This allowed the students to stay close to their parents and receive an affordable education without breaking up the families, an important issue that kept many individuals from ever leaving camps to complete higher education. In the end there were only five or six individuals who could afford this meager sum so Bob O'Brien of the NJASRC wrote to the local Baptist Scholarship Board and encouraged them to donate $500.00 needed to send ten additional students to college for the remainder of the year.

By April 15, 1943, 1555 formerly interned individuals were in college, and 358 were currently accepted by colleges to start in the fall. Throughout the Midwest and East there were 521 colleges, universities, seminaries, or trade

[42]Report from Homer Morris, August 30, 1942. AFSC Archives. Committees and Organizations: National Japanese American Student Relocation Council.

schools that indicated a willingness to accept Japanese American students. What was lacking, however, was money; nearly $200,000.00 was needed to meet expenses. In a pamphlet put together in 1942 to explain the situation to average Americans, the AFSC outlined their mission to help resettle the Japanese and their need for money to complete that mission. They tried to convey the concept to everyday Americans that helping the Japanese Americans here in America would have a "conciliatory influence in the Orient," and would help to instill the concepts of freedom and democracy that would eventually help America throughout the world both during the war and after it was over.[43] These fundraising drives continued until all the Japanese had left the camps and the AFSC officially completed all work assisting the Japanese Americans in 1946. Even in 1945 the bulletins and public relations pamphlets were still full of messages such as, "Because the Army has lifted its West Coast exclusion orders, many supporters of the resettlement project have felt that the problem had been solved and have turned their attention to the urgent need for the reconstruction work that the Friends are doing in war-ravaged Europe. We know that such is not the case and that the problem has not been solved and we are also facing difficulty in raising our own budget."[44]

By 1944 the drive to get students out of the camps had mostly run its course because the majority of applicants left in the camps were either high school seniors or the limited few who had not left in the preceding years because

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[43] Bulletin, Japanese Student Relocation, June 15, 1942. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Philadelphia.

[44] "Cincinnati Integrator" Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 3, August 1945. AFSC Archives. Branch office, Cincinnati, 1945.

of familial obligations. This situation could be attributed to the fact that most of the Nisei keen to leave the camps had already headed East, and those who hadn't entered colleges had left the camps to find work or joined the Army and were off distinguishing themselves in Italy. So the new drive from late 1943 to the end of 1945 was to expand a program that administered hostels for those wishing to resettle, and finding those people jobs outside the Western Defense Zone. For example, the tallies at this point found that "Between 19 and 20,000 people (out of a total 120,000) have gone out from the relocation centers on indefinite leave, with between 2-3,000 out on extended seasonal leave. The city of Chicago has the largest number of resettlers, over 3500, next comes Salt Lake City, Denver, Cleveland, and Cincinnati. New York and other eastern cities have received numbers of resettlers during the past few months. 85% are Nisei, the majority ranging in age from 18 to 30. A report early in March showed 2500 relocated students enrolled in 440 different institutions in 44 out of 48 states."[45]

FRIENDS HOSTELS

Once again, to begin filling recently opened hostels, the AFSC decided that it was best to allow in only Japanese Americans that could be vouched for to

[45] Esther Rhoads, Information Bulletin. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices: Pasadena CA 1944.

assure the greatest level of success for the program. The Quakers felt that, "The invitation to the Hostels carries with it the strong obligation to secure a job for the evacuee."[46] This was another situation where the Quakers knew that by taking people in they would be responsible for not only supplying them with room and board but their general welfare as well. They realized that they would be putting themselves on the line to not only find them housing but also some sort of income so that they could support themselves. For the most part they were correct in regards to the responsibilities they were taking on by opening up these hostels. For example, it was Joe Brown's job to find jobs and housing for those wishing to resettle in Chicago. He remarked on the fact that there was a big problem with fluidity and that it was near to impossible to give advanced warning when there would be space available in the hostels because no one knew when housing would come available or when people would leave the hostels. He advised the camps out West that, "It might be better if they would always have ready to leave at least a group of two people who could start for Chicago as soon as they receive a wire."[47] To merely consider these hostels as weigh stations or as places where people stayed a few nights before moving on would be to undervalue the purpose they actually served.

The Friends made it their responsibility to ensure that their charges were well taken care of and lists of friendly doctors; nurses, dentists and even surgeons were compiled. Many health professionals would come and visit the hostels and

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[46] Bulletin: Procedures for Placement of Japanese Evacuees. AFSC Archives. 1942.
[47] Edwin C. Morgenroth to Homer Morris, February 15, 1943. AFSC Archives. Chicago: Correspondence. 1943.

examine patients for a small stipend, often paid for by the AFSC. On top of that, the Chicago office made sure that "…newcomers have been familiarized with community agencies, informed of activities of interest to them, and introduced to persons of good will and working on their integration into the community."[48] Education was of course very important and the AFSC contacted school superintendents, teachers, and local principals so that children could start attending schools as soon as they arrived in their new communities. On a more practical level, full-time cooks were added to many of the hostels due to the fact that, "With the shifting nature of the group in the hostel and the need for evacuees to be out job hunting it is necessary to have a staff member who gives full time to cooking."[49] On top of that, volunteers in Chicago and Philadelphia took time to entertain the children as often as they could taking them to parks, zoos, even museums so that their parents had some free time to search for housing and employment. As always, Quaker aid seemed to be accompanied by a large dose of pragmatism and the concept that they were there to help the Japanese help themselves.

Counseling was also an incredibly important function at the hostels, with 169 people contacting the AFSC office in Philadelphia alone to seek help with personal problems during 1944. While it is unnecessary to explain how traumatic the situation was for the Japanese Americans during the war years, the Quakers realized that counseling was unavoidable and tried to fit it in wherever possible.

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[48] American Friends Service Committee Annual Report, 1945, Regional and National Office Program. AFSC Archives. 1945.
[49] Edwin Morgenroth to Homer Morris, February 24, 1943. AFSC Archives. Chicago Correspondence, 1943.

The hostel directors in Chicago soon became cognizant of the fact that many of the Nisei were reluctant to take their problems to the AFSC offices because they didn't want to bother the men and women who were working to assist them, so the staff in true Quaker fashion found ways for the Japanese Americans to express their feelings.

> We realized that hostelers needed an opportunity to discuss their personal problems. In order to avoid making these interviews formal and stilted, we did not schedule them for any set time, but let the Nisei know when we were available. Consequently, our interviewing was accomplished while drying dishes, or helping in the laundry, or in casual conversations in the living room. Unsystematic as this method sounds, we believe it has merits. We feel that we became better acquainted with the Nisei and that we were able to help them with their concerns, large or small, more effectively in this informal manner.[50]

Counseling was incredibly crucial to the resettlement process and it continued to be so long after the war was over because fear, anxiety and a sense of injustice were much greater threats to the success of the program than finding jobs or housing.

Job-hunting for the Japanese resettling in the East kept many AFSC employees working full time. As the war continued, several Japanese Americans were employed by the AFSC itself, working as typists, office clerks, or in other

[50] American Friends Service Committee Report on the Resettlement Work of the Midwest Office of the AFSC, January 1, 1943-January 1, 1944. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1944.

positions ranging from researching the experiences of the Japanese who had left the camps to giving speeches in front of community groups interested in helping the Japanese. Gordon Hirabayashi, the famous conscientious objector who was jailed for his unwillingness to enter the camps contacted the Chicago office about coming to work for them in the Midwest. They were fully behind him joining them but let him know that his duties would mostly be limited to office work, helping to free up some of Joe Brown's time so "…he would be more useful in opening many new offers for employment."[51] The Chicago and Philadelphia offices made lists of people who had recently arrived, what skills they possessed and what type of work they wished to do. The lists they compiled were circulated to businesses that were friendly to the Japanese and were in need of employees. Out West, AFSC employees working in the camps like Floyd Schmoe and Esther Rhoads often wrote letters to the offices back East asking them if they knew anyone who would hire someone who was an expert in a certain field. George Nakashima was an example of one gentleman who received a job with the owner of an architectural firm on Fifth Avenue in New York City. He was hired to work on the man's Pennsylvania chicken farm and used the opportunity as a springboard to start a sculptor studio that received international fame after Schmoe wrote a lengthy letter explaining not only Nakshima's architectural and design experience but also the merits of Mr. Nakashima's entire family. This included details regarding his in-laws as well as the family's personal beliefs

[51] Edwin Morgenroth to Homer Morris, March 27, 1943. AFSC Archives. Chicago Correspondence. 1943.

regarding pacifism and Nakashima's desire to stay true to his creative abilities as opposed to simply wishing to accumulate wealth.[52]

The Chicago office made a list of jobs that had been filled by Issei and Nisei in the area: "Some of the types of positions which have been filled are hair dressing, secretarial, tool workers, industrial design, chemists, radio technicians, floral designers, civil service, accountants, welders, clerical, dressmaking, food store managers, and photo finishers."[53] The Chicago hostel reported that three quarters of the Japanese who arrived in Chicago had not found jobs before they had arrived and it took them about ten to fifteen days to find a job once in the windy city. "Finding a job is not a real problem. Finding the job to fit you, however, can be."[54] One of the main problems that the Friends were concerned about was whether everyone was getting paid a fair wage equal to people of other races living in the cities to which they relocated. The AFSC employees worked hard to bring employers onboard who wouldn't try to cheat the Japanese, knowing that they could easily be taken advantage of under the circumstances. The hostels also stood as meeting houses where the Japanese could introduce themselves to prospective employers in towns like Cincinnati where there had never really been a Japanese American presence before the war. The Friends soon found that

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[52] Floyd Schmoe to Homer Morris, March 26, 1943. AFSC Archives. Individuals, George Nakashima, 1943.
[53] American Friends Service Committee Report on the Resettlement Work of the Midwest Office of the AFSC, January 1, 1943-January 1, 1944. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1944.
[54] American Friends Service Committee Advisory Committee for Evacuees Bulletin, April 1943. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1943.

having white liaisons standing by to introduce the Japanese Americans to potential employers was incredibly helpful.[55]

As the outcome of the war started to look more optimistic and Americans gained victories both in Europe and the South Pacific, the government started to see the merits of getting the Japanese out of the camps, even if it meant letting them return to the West Coast. During the week of December 19, 1944, Morris wrote a letter to Schmoe discussing the results of the Mitsuye Endo and Fred Korematsu's cases that the Supreme Court ruled on over the course of one day. Morris stated that, "The decision of the army to cancel the restriction orders on the return of evacuees to the west coast is news of first importance. The Supreme Court apparently finally got around to delving into this issue, one decision as you know (Korematsu), upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation order, and the other by unanimous decision held that the evacuees could not be held in relocation centers (Endo). This means that we have now entered into a new phase of the whole program."[56] This of course caused a major change in direction for the AFSC which had up until that point been focused on helping the Japanese resettle in the East. The trend up until that time had been 70% or more of the Japanese leaving the camps and moving east of the Rockies, but once the exclusion order was rescinded on the West Coast 70% or more were heading back to their hometowns in the West. "Manzanar is still running 90% to Los Angeles.

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[55] American Friends Service Committee Annual Report, 1945, Regional and National Office Program. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1945.
[56] Homer Morris to Floyd Schmoe, December 19, 1944. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle Washington, 1944.

Minidoka is running 75% back to Seattle and 25% to the rest of the country."[57] This of course meant a huge drive to find housing and jobs for the returning Japanese, a tough proposition because both were hard to come by in major West Coast cities.

Once again the Quakers went into emergency mode as they tried to accommodate the Japanese and their needs in Los Angeles and Seattle. Esther Rhoads worked from Pasadena, California to ensure that there were beds available in hostels they set up throughout the Los Angeles area. In addition to beds, jobs had to be secured, staff had to be present to assist the Japanese as they arrived, and money needed to be raised to meet the financial needs of the hostels. "We are so swamped with people in the two hostels that we are way behind with reports, and the minutes that I am enclosing do not include all the statistics you would like to have. Is there a chance that Joe Brown could be salvaged from CPS now that demobilization is so near the end? We need someone with experience in hunting openings for people with special skills."[58] In Seattle Schmoe reported that while community acceptance wasn't a great problem in Seattle and Portland, in the rural areas it had been a nightmare:

> In the Yakima Valley and at various places in the White River-Puyallup Valley there is organized resistance of a venomous form. Although substantial and respected residents are active in their opposition, the majority of those opposed would not be considered

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[57]Robertson M. Fort, Trends in Relocation, 10/5/1945. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1945.

[58] Esther Rhoads to Robertson Fort, September 24, 1945. AFSC. Correspondence from/to Esther Rhoads, 1945.

> the "best people" of the community. We know that returning evacuees have been denied entrance to their own homes by the tenants, and that some have been told to their face that they were not welcome in the community and would not find it comfortable to remain.[59]

So with more than a quarter of their property and possessions stolen or destroyed, and with hostels overrun by returning evacuees, it was a real problem finding suitable housing for the Japanese in communities that were less than enthusiastic about their return.[60] But the return was inevitable, and because the government decision to close the camps once again did not take into account the humanitarian crisis that might ensue when 70,000 people were forced out all at once, it was up to the Christian organizations to assist in the resettlement of the West Coast.

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[59]Ibid.

[60] Floyd Schmoe, Statement Regarding Return of Evacuees to Seattle area During one Month, February 14, 1945. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle WA, General, 1945.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIFFICULTIES

What were some of the factors that made the Quaker's effort to assist the Japanese turn into such a cumbersome task? The main problem could probably be tied to the fact that the Friends just didn't know how to say no, and they were willing to help out on so many different levels that they found themselves spread incredibly thin. The AFSC became a clearinghouse not only for people leaving the camps but also for ideas, public relations, news, references, legal aid, and many other matters. At the same time, the AFSC constantly found itself in the middle of negotiations between the government and the Japanese community. It tirelessly met with the WRA and acted as a liaison for the Japanese while at the same time doing a lot of the humanitarian work that rightfully should have been done by the government. A list is needed to accurately document exactly how many pots the Quakers had their hands in, and how many ways in which they worked to help the Japanese out.

At the very start of the evacuation the AFSC dove right into the effort, "…assisting the Japanese in caring for or disposing of their property during evacuation and attempted to befriend them in many ways in the evacuation process."[61] The chief of Community Services at Minidoka and a government employee, George Townsend, sent a letter on Nov. 6, 1942 to Robert O'Brien, the

[61] "Cincinnati Integrator" Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 3, August 1945. AFSC Archives. Branch office, Cincinnati, 1945.

new director of the student program with the NJSRC. "First, that there be sought out those groups likely to be opposed and vociferous in their opposition to such relocation, and then make an attempt to get them to support such a program. I am thinking particularly of the American Legion. I think that such an organization could be shown their obligation and their cooperation secured because it would further their Americanization program. To relocate American citizens, those young people about whom there is no question of loyalty."[62] Christy Snider revealed why Townsend as well as others would have approached NGO's during World War II in order to direct public relations campaigns when she explained, "By 1945 America's decision making elite had realized that several international interest groups were effective in influencing public opinion, and they wanted to use this ability to advance governmental ideas."[63]

Publicity was always an important factor in the war the Friends waged against discrimination, their attempt to create an atmosphere of what they constantly referred to as "fair play" in the US. The Quakers were always out in the communities speaking publicly in regards to relocation and the situation in the camps. In a report from the Friend's center in Cincinnati they stated, "In all denominations, including Catholic, Jew and Negro, the women's organizations have asked for someone to come and explain the problem and to make practical suggestions of what their group might do. Young people's groups and ministerial

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[62] George Townsend to Robert O'Brien, Nov. 6, 1942. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1942. Coms. And Orgs.
[63]Snider, Christy Jo. "The Influence of Transnational Peace Groups on U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Makers during the 1930's: Incorporating NGOs into the UN." *Diplomatic History*. 27(3), June 2003: 404.

association also call for speakers."[64] Meetings were set up throughout Midwest and East Coast towns with the local YMCA's, YWCA's and various other Christian groups so that they could spread the word regarding resettlement, what that effort entailed, and what these groups could do both physically and financially to help out the Japanese. Another aspect of public relations that the Friends took on was a letter writing campaign addressing racist or other anti-Japanese rhetoric found in the popular media.

One such letter was to the 20th Century Fox Film Corporation in response to a movie it had produced titled "Little Tokio in the U.S." Morris wrote to Fox stating, "The arousal of racial prejudice in violent form, which `Little Tokio in the U.S.' tends to create, will react on racial minorities such as the Jews, Negroes and others. It would be disastrous to create several classes of citizenship in this country. I hope you will realize the damage which you are doing in this matter and will withdraw `Little Tokio in the U.S.'"[65] Twentieth Century Fox of course responded by saying thank you for the letter but it did not believe its film was derogatory or inciting in any way. While Fox blew the Quakers off, the publishers behind Superman did respond favorably to one of Morris's letters.

In July of 1943 Ruth Gefvert wrote to Morris asking: "Can't something be done about Superman? The panels have been pretty bad propaganda and one

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[64] Report from Cincinnati, 1944. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1944: Publicity, General.

[65] Bernard G. Waring to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., September 25, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1942: Administration, Correspondence.

definitely gets the idea that there are no loyal Japanese at all."[66] What she was referring to was a cartoon depiction of Superman turning himself through "amazing muscular control," into "a Jap", where he could scale the fences of the relocations centers and "Proceed with my plan!"[67] Morris wrote to the editors of McClure Newspaper Syndicate stating that: "This series gives the distinct impression that all Japanese in the Relocation Centers are traitors, saboteurs, and disloyal to the American Government. I want to protest to you against this type of misrepresentation of a whole people to the millions of children who read Superman."[68] In this case the managing editor of McClure Newspaper Syndicate wrote to Morris himself, apologizing for the impression that Superman was against the Japanese Americans, and included with his letter the following week's episode of Superman saying, "You will be pleased to note that Superman gives full credit to loyal Japanese-Americans." In it Superman states: "It should be remembered that most Japanese-Americans are loyal citizens, many are in combat units of our armed forces, and others are working in war factories. According to government statistics not one act of sabotage was perpetrated in Hawaii or territorial U.S. by a Japanese American."[69] Whether or not it was the influence of the Friends and the letters that Morris wrote to Shuster and Siegel's editors we

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[66] Ruth Gefvert to Homer Morris, 7/9/43. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1943: Publicity, General.
[67]"Superman," The McClure Newspaper Syndicate, July 7, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1943: Publicity, General.
[68]Homer Morris to The McClure Newspaper Syndicate, July 13 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1943: Publicity, General.
[69] "Superman," The McClure Newspaper Syndicate, August 16, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1943: Publicity, General.

can't say, but it is hard to imagine Superman doing such an about face in regards to the Japanese Americans if someone hadn't chastised him beforehand.

A list put together in November of 1942 is a good example of all that the AFSC programs included: camp visitation, continuing student location, individual and industrial placement of evacuees, encouraging adult educational programs, placement of volunteer workers within the camps, sending toys, Christmas presents and layettes to evacuees in camps, and interpretation of the Japanese-American problem to the public.[70] Besides items on that list there were also car loads of goods that needed to be shuttled to the camps from cities like Seattle and Los Angeles because the Japanese had only been allowed to bring a very limited number of supplies along with them. Legal matters were so important that the Minidoka camp had a whole office devoted to settling disputes that arose between people in the camps and whites out on the West Coast because many locals were basically stealing Japanese property or taking over their businesses in their absence. Friends were enlisted to help out on occasions and their lawyers were also employed to help defend the few people who had fought the exclusion order; Quakers like Hirabayashi who refused to enter the camps and turned himself in to the FBI. These cases went on for months if not years and while only one of the cases ended in favor of the Nikkei it was important to file cases in the courts to show that the Japanese were willing to stand up to the illegality of the government's actions. Representatives were also needed to visit

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[70]Memorandum, A Preliminary Report on the Type of Program Which the AFSC should Undertake in Dealing with the Problem of Evacuation of Japanese. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1942: Administration Correspondence, General.

banks and take care of financial arrangements since the Japanese couldn't do it themselves.

The AFSC helped intercede with banks both in the US and Japan because both governments had frozen all Japanese American assets, and of course endless letters had to be written in triplicate on manual typewriters to properly take care of documenting all the transactions taking place.[71] There were also many personal requests and favors that the AFSC responded to as well. To illustrate the fact that no request for help was too small or too big for the Friends to address, late in 1942 Morris received a letter from Mr. Isamu Noguchi, and wrote a two page letter to the WRA for him in reference to the lack of recreational facilities in the camps. Mr. Noguchi, a international renowned New York city artist who attempted to help with the social planning at the Poston Arizona camp by voluntarily entering the camp complained to him that all the movies shown were either produced by the government or by state schools and were either propaganda films or incredibly boring. He asked to have more of a variety, and added, "Pictures of this sort might be rather serious diet but if they could be interspersed with films of a lighter vein it would help materially in the educational life of the camps."[72]

On the other end of the spectrum the Quakers stepped in to help Japanese Americans who weren't even imprisoned in the camps. At one point the WRA had the audacity to ask the Quakers to assist in relocating 15 Japanese Americans

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[71] Gordon Hirabayashi to Floyd Schmoe, June 5, 1943. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle WA.
[72]Isamu Noguchi to Homer Morris, May 11, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1943: Personal Letters.

from Norfolk Virginia because they were too close to Naval installations. One of them, Arthur Wataru Tada wrote to the AFSC looking for advice on moving to Cincinnati Ohio. Tada had lived in Norfolk for 35 years but had been "rounded" up along with the other local Japanese-Americans at the start of the war but had been released by the government in October of 1942, and by June of 1943 he was once again being asked to leave his home and move elsewhere. The AFSC fought the order stating that these citizens posed no threat to the U.S. Navy and it was against their constitutional rights to force them to leave their homes. Several Quakers made trips down to Norfolk to see the small group and also went back and forth between Philadelphia and Washington D.C. to act as intermediaries between the Japanese and the War Department. Of course Tada and the rest were moved to the Midwest regardless of the threat they posed, and the AFSC ended up housing them in their hostel until they could find their own housing, but the Friends had tried to help them as best they could.[73] All in all the job the Quakers undertook to resettle the students and assist the Japanese in getting out of the camps was not a simple one but turned into hundreds of other small endeavors which weren't clearly defined or easy to turn down.

One of the first problems to confront the AFSC when the WRA asked for their help in relocating the Japanese American students was their virulent distaste for the exclusion order in and of itself. Right from the start arguments were made and apologies sent out to American Friends in order to explain that the AFSC was only taking on this task to give aid to the Japanese Americans and was not doing

[73]Arthur Wataru Tada to Mr. G. Raymond Booth, June 8, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, Norfolk VA.

it in order to assist the racist government. Their overarching aim was to make sure that the Japanese were able to get out of the prisons as soon as possible. In an initial message to the Society of Friends written by Clarence Pickett, the Executive Secretary of the AFSC, he made this clear by stating:

> It would be untrue and a matter of regret if the decision of the Service Committee were understood by the Friends and others to mean that we accept the evacuation as a matter of course. It has come to us with deep humiliation and profound concern that events have revealed in the bloodstream of our American life a poison which has caused this disease of hatred. Whether it be greed or race prejudice or war hysteria, it is equally dangerous. It blinds the patient to the long-established values so dearly bought and which we had thought are represented in American citizenship: our boast of fair play and our emphasis on the value of the individual. We want to call every friend to an examination of his own motives and the spirit of his life.[74]

There was a real sense of righteous indignation in terms of how the Quakers felt about the whole situation in general, and while the members of the AFSC wanted to help out as much as they could, the government did not make the task easy.

Throughout the war this feeling of distaste continued to linger because the government had been extremely clever in getting the AFSC to take care of a great deal of their dirty work for them and this bitter feeling came to the surface in

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[74] Clarence Pickett, Message to the Society of Friends, 1942. AFSC Archives. General, 1942.

letters and reports as the government asked more and more of the Quakers. In many ways this situation would surface again and again during the second half of the twentieth century as the US entered conflicts across the globe and NGOs were asked to walk a fine line between becoming government appendages and helping those in need. When the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) got involved in distributing aid and helping rebuild villages during the Vietnam War it battled over many of the same stumbling blocks. One Mennonite volunteer explained, "From the beginning MCC workers assumed that they could engage in their work in a completely nonpolitical way, but they gradually discovered that the moral choices they encountered were more complicated and difficult."[75] One example where a Friend actually put her foot down and refused to give aid to the Japanese on principal alone was in a letter written from Miss Lidie Fite in Pennsylvania to Schmoe in regards to his request for more clothing to be sent to the prisoners at Minidoka. She was quite firm in her conviction that no more clothing should be sent to Idaho. Her point was that the government had the obligation of supplying their prisoners with clothing, "…that this should be handled through adequate wages or in lieu of that, cash grants with which they can buy clothing of their own choice, and that any policy of gift clothing tends to lessen the governments inclination to meet the problem in the better way."[76]

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[75]Bush, Perry. "The political Education of Vietnam Christian Service, 1954-1975." *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research.* Volume 27(2) Dec 2002, 202.

[76]Miss Lidie Fite to Floyd Schmoe, January 12, 1944. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee. Material Aids, 1944.

One of the main problems was that the US government really didn't think this process through before they set the wheels in motion. They didn't have what could be referred to as a legitimate exit strategy for successfully emptying out the camps, and while they did create a civilian agency to handle this miscarriage of justice the fact that the Army made up the rules regarding who was free to leave the camps served to make the situation much worse than it needed to be. In 1942 the US waged war against two of the most technologically superior forces the world had ever seen and entered World War II before being adequately prepared to face either the Germans or the Japanese. As a result, the Army didn't place a high priority on taking care of a group of prisoners who neither they nor the FBI thought should be incarcerated in the first place. For example, when Robbins Barstow went to meet with Colonel Tate in regards to approving colleges that the Japanese could attend, he reported back that "Their department has been so rushed, with McCloy turning so many war details over to him that he has had to wrestle with this student problem evenings at home."[77] One of the reasons why only a few students were able to attend colleges or universities during the 1942-43 school year was because the Army took so long approving acceptable institutions which didn't house defense laboratories or were somehow connected to homeland security. Reed Cary wrote of one stipulation that the AFSC had to overcome which had the program "bogged down at the present moment because an Army officer having the rank of colonel has issued regulations for student movement which would prevent students from being entered in a college located within 25 miles of a railroad junction. Preliminary investigation indicates that there may be

[77]AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, Reports. 1942.

five such institutions in the United States, but the quality of these five leaves it open to grave question as to whether they really are colleges or not." He went on to say, "Responsibilities which should be in the hands of men of top rank remain in the hands of small underlings who are bound hand and foot by regulations and by the fear of displaying an initiative which is by rule limited to superiors."[78] The Mennonites complained about similar policies that impeded their work in Vietnam and forced three of their top MCC volunteers to quit after signing a petition against US action in Vietnam along with 48 other long term volunteers. Paul Rodell explained their reaction to the government: "The signers believed in their volunteer organization, but recognized that American's war policies were negating their efforts and destroying Vietnam. After having worked faithfully within the system for years, they concluded that the only way to help Vietnam was to change American policy. They thus decided to give up their positions in protest and hope their action would have a positive impact. This was a difficult decision to reach, as they had great affection for Vietnam and its people, and resigning meant severing many personal and professional ties."[79]

The AFSC also had to deal with two separate bureaucracies in Washington DC, the Department of War which initially administered the assembly centers and made up the rules regarding who was free to leave and where they were free to relocate, and the newly-developed WRA that was responsible for all of the relocation centers except one, which was under the control of the Indian

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[78]C. Reed Cary to Frank Aydelotte, June 26, 1942. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee, 1942.

[79]Rodell, Paul A. "International Voluntary Services in Vietnam: War and the Birth of Activism, 1958-1967." *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research*. Volume 27(2) April 2002, 225.

Administration. In any case all of the groups involved were in charge of devising the overly confusing rules and as one report explained, "All these agencies and individuals being technically in the defense area are under rulings of General Dewitt. You can see it is all pretty complicated and it has been necessary to designate one of the staff to study these relations and to discover how and where contacts should be made and serve in general as the liaison person."[80] On top of administration woes, the government worked to manipulate many of the projects that they had requested the AFSC get involved with, a problem also noted by the MCC in Vietnam. "MCC staffers in Vietnam encountered problems when working with their own government. As early as 1955 they began to resist efforts by U.S. aid officials to assume operational control of MCC personnel. Within two years, staffers in Vietnam were reporting home that they had faced so many `difficulties' working with U.S. relief officials that they had decided to work instead through the Vietnamese government."[81] Joining forces with the overly-suspicious Diem administration turned out to be a disaster in so many ways that the Mennonites returned to working with the US, a clear case where it is better to be in bed with the devil you know than the one you don't.

In 1945 Schmoe sent a report to the national office detailing all of the problems he had been having finding housing around Seattle, adding, "The W.R.A. is very anxious for us to open a hostel," since the Navy had taken the

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[80] Homer Morris, Memorandum to National Student Relocation Committee, October 6, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1942.
[81] Bush, Perry. "The political Education of Vietnam Christian Service, 1954-1975." *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research.* Volume 27(2) Dec 2002, 202.

Japanese Buddhist Temple and made it into a school for Naval cadets.[82] It had been the WRA who had been asking the AFSC to open more hostels all across America for three years, but on several occasions they had undermined the Friend's work in different locations as well. In one instance the WRA encouraged the AFSC to open up a hostel in Columbus, Ohio, and the Friends in turn spent several weeks doing quite a bit of legwork to find a building, contact people who would run it, and other logistical matters. Then the WRA came back to the Friends saying, "The situation had changed somewhat with regard to available jobs in Columbus, and the WRA here changed its mind rather suddenly in regard to the actual need for the undertaking."[83]

Jobs were another way in which the government stood in the way of progress. Morris wrote to complain about the length of time it took the Defense Command to provide permits for Japanese wishing to leave the camps. He stated, "When an employer wants to hire a man he wants to complete the engagement at once and does not want to wait for four to six weeks before securing an employee." He concluded the letter by saying that the reports concerning increased tension in the camps were very concerning, and that possibly getting people out of the camps by expediting their permits to leave would help alleviate some of those tensions.[84] In addition to that, the government slowed things down with the constant threat of revoking draft deferments for some of the most

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[82]Floyd Schmoe to AFSC Headquarters, May 22, 1945. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1945: Branch offices: Seattle WA. Correspondence.
[83]Ralph E. Smeltzer, Suggestions to Hostel Correspondents and Hostel Committee Members. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1943: Relocation Hostels, General.
[84] Homer Morris to Edwin Morgenroth, April 3, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1942. Administration Correspondence, General.

important members of the AFSC staff. Dozens of letters were written concerning whether or not Joe Brown would indeed be drafted into the Army, whether or not his deferment would come through, or whether he would be able to continue his work as the primary job hunter in Chicago or have to report to a CPS work camp.[85] In the end his draft was deferred by the Selective Service but it made him spend the majority of the war working alongside other Quakers doing manual labor in special work camps, only allowing him to return to Chicago in 1945 to help liquidate the camps of the remaining Japanese. But feelings of righteous indignation towards the government and other forms of outside interference weren't the only things slowing the Quakers down when it came to getting the Japanese resettled.

As mentioned earlier, Quaker philosophy, moving ahead quickly and without taking time to sit quietly and meditate over a problem isn't part of their modus operandi. Rufus Jones, the first chairman of the AFSC stated in an introduction to the history of the first twenty years of the AFSC that: "Nothing in this long period has been settled by a majority vote which overrode the judgment of a strong minority opposed to it. All matters of importance have been luminously presented to the whole group, corporately considered, looked at from many angles, threshed out in clear, open light and decided by unanimous judgment."[86] This sense of consensus must have been incredibly hard to come by in a time where there were no such things as conference calls, the World Wide Web, or red eye flights from coast to coast. At one point Robbins Barstow, the

[85] Homer Morris to Joe Brown, March 24, 1943. AFSC Archives. Chicago Correspondence, 1943.
[86] Mary Hoxie Jones, *Ploughshares*, viii-ix

director of the NJASRC complained, "We have had to call off the Executive Committee meeting for Monday because all our committee members are scattered all over the country. Marsh suggested that it might be well to hold a general conference in early October."[87] This letter was written in August, so it is easy to imagine that from a logistical standpoint it was incredibly difficult to get people together for meetings to organize a completely unprecedented undertaking.

One of the first hindrances to moving the Japanese out of the camps was the fact that the Friends did everything with kid gloves or as if they were walking on egg shells. They took their time accepting the applications of students and individuals wishing to leave the camps and dealing with the Army and the WRA. The only people who upset this tradition and fought the slow and methodic plodding of the National office were the volunteers out in the field, predominantly those in the West like Schmoe and Esther Rhoads who could not accept the injustice of the situation and wanted things resolved immediately. A good example of how visiting the camps and witnessing the problem first hand changed one man's willingness to speed things up was revealed in a letter to the Executive Committee of the NJASRC from Robbins Barstow: "The feeling of urgency comes by reason of the fact that all those people on the West Coast know personally scores if not hundreds of these young people who are involved. They have all been flooded with personal appeals and personal letters and thus have a

[87]Robbins W Barstow, Report to the Executive Committee by the Director, August 25, 1942. AFSC Archives. Japanese-American Relocation, General, 1942.

first-hand interest in the problem."[88] Barstow concluded this letter by saying that after he had gone out to three of the prison camps and met the students and young people who were waiting for word on whether they could get out and attend colleges in the East, he felt he "…could say from personal observation, what I already felt in principle, that we must do everything possible as quickly as may be on their behalf."[89]

Another issue that could be looked at as a double edged sword for the Quakers centered on the fact that the Friends always wanted to get the job done right, feeling that if things were done too quickly they might be completed in a haphazard fashion and have disastrous results in the long run. As a result of this striving for perfection, everything was done in a slow and thoughtful manner, whether it was making sure that the first wave of students to go East were the very best, that the right job was found for every individual looking for employment, that adequate housing was located in decent neighborhoods where people would find little to no resentment, or that the government didn't feel like the Quakers were pressuring them to get things moving simply because they had removed due process and imprisoned American citizens. One excellent example of their assiduousness was a letter from the director of the Chicago office, Edwin Morgenroth, who complained to Schmoe about people fudging in regards to their job qualifications. "Our policy here has been not to recommend domestic

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[88] Robin Barstow, To the Executive Committee, As an Interim Report by the Director, June 29th, 1942. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee, 1942.

[89] Robin Barstow, To the Executive Committee, As an Interim Report by the Director, June 29th, 1942. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee, 1942.

employment for evacuees who were not trained household workers and who intended to use it merely as step stones to other work. We feel that we can find this `other work' for them now and that it is harmful to community relations for them to use domestic employment merely as a means of getting out of camp."[90] In August of 1942, Robbins Barstow once again wrote to the Executive Committee: "The judicious placement of a few hundred carefully selected students at this time, with opportunity to demonstrate to the community at large the safety and soundness of the plan, may, and we hope will, without untoward incident, lead to a development of tolerance and good will."[91] It was as if the AFSC felt that they could only bring the Japanese into communities that would be completely and utterly tolerant towards them and every situation that they encountered had to be ideal and without any reservations which was probably unrealistic if not utterly impossible.

At a meeting with church leaders in Minneapolis one AFSC volunteer stated, "One of the questions often asked is, `Should we start a nation-wide publicity campaign to get assistance in selling the idea?' It is my opinion that it is best to go quietly and work carefully through key people and settle a few at a time. There are a large number of people to be resettled, but I would not advise a large conspicuous group to go into any community."[92] Whereas in the West

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[90] From Edwin Morgenroth to Floyd Schmoe, March 13, 1943. AFSC Archives. Chicago Correspondence, 1943.
[91] Robin Barstow, To the Executive Committee, As an Interim Report by the Director, June 29th, 1942. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee, 1942.
[92] Robbins W Barstow, Report to the Executive Committee by the Director, August 25, 1942. AFSC Archives. Japanese-American Relocation, General, 1942.

people working with the Japanese didn't have this sensation that waiting around for public sentiment to get better was absolutely necessary and relocating a handful of Japanese into each community after the waters had been tested was realistic. That process would have, as Schmoe alluded to in one of his letters, taken years if not decades to complete because there were 120,000 people sitting in the camps waiting for public sentiment to turn in their favor. On top of the worries regarding public sentiment and getting things perfect there was always the simple fact that there was just too much to do.

Edwin Morgenroth sent a report to the national office stating, "We have over 400 cases in our Japanese American placement files right now. Our telephone load last month was 700 outgoing calls in excess of our minimum. Bob Fort and Garry have been sent off today for a week to rest. The doctor has felt that the strain was too great for Garry. They have had much to learn in a short time and I feel that they are growing slowly. I do not feel that we can use him to take any of the work that Joe has been doing."[93] Morgenroth added to this by explaining that the Chicago office had too much on his plate, and even the 20 volunteers they had could not stay on top of all the work that was being asked of them; he went so far as to ask the national office to send him several full-time employees to help his secretary, Ruth Urice, because she "…has been attempting to do the work of organizing the volunteers and caring for her other stenographic and office duties as well. I hesitate to say that it is impossible for her to go on doing this because `impossible' is a strong word and one which we seldom if ever

[93] Joe Brown to Homer Morris, June 4, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, Chicago: Correspondence, 1943.

use. Perhaps I should say that it is unwise for us to continue to burden her this way."[94] Another statement from Reed Cary to Schmoe illustrates how the situation in the national office was during 1942 when the Friends took on the student relocation project. "The fact of the matter is that from an administrative standpoint we have so many irons in the fire that all concerned are spreading themselves so thin as to jeopardize the conduct of projects to which we are irrevocably committed."[95]

To put this all into perspective the next time that a national disaster would test both NGOs and the United States government with to the same extent as the internment would not be until Hurricane Katrina hit the South in 2005. Chris McMurray stated, "Katrina was the first disaster where the size and scope was far beyond the capability of most organizations—including the federal government." He went on to explain, "The government depends on non-profits to provide shelter and care for the survivors and skills to provide for people far beyond the government's ability to provide that care. The decisions regarding allocation of limited resources led to resentment on the part of disaster victims, a feeling of being let down by trusted organizations, and Congressional questioning. Most importantly, the survivors suffered more than they would have if the organization

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[94] Joe Brown to Homer Morris, June 4, 1943. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, Chicago: Correspondence, 1943.
[95] C. Reed Cary to Joseph Conard and Floyd Schmoe, April 9, 1942. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee, 1942.

was fully staffed and funded for very large disasters rather than trying to `stretch' their capability.'"[96]

The situation was the same for the AFSC during World War II because on top of the fact that there was too much work to be done by too few employees and volunteers, many of the committee members had regular jobs to do or to return to like Robbins Barstow, who reported in late August of 1942, "I must advise the Executive Committee that my leave of absence from my duties as President of the Hartford Seminary Foundation terminates as of September 1, and I must devote my time and energies to my regular obligations." So while one of the main issues was the fact that by their very nature Quakers tried to obtain group consensus and perfection in everything they attempted, the fact of the matter was there was just too much work for such a small organization to handle. Floyd Schmoe appreciated this problem and tried to help the Japanese circumvent the slowdowns wherever he could.

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[96]McCurry, Allan R. "Dependence on Non-Profits During Major Disaster Relief: A Risky Dilemma." *Homeland Security Policy Institute*. Issue Brief. January 30, 2009, 2.

FLOYD SCHMOE

The most interesting rationale offered for the government's decision to imprison Japanese American citizens in concentration camps revolved around the argument that the Japanese Americans had lived in exclusive enclaves up and down the West Coast, setting up little Tokyo's as they came to be called. The government argued that these Asians had not become part of mainstream America and by their cohesive nature they weren't able to be trusted and should be put in camps. By spreading 120,000 Japanese into 10 camps where they would be an amalgamation of Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans actually created the mythic "Little Tokyo." The War Department conjured ten towns out of mid-air in the midst of Western deserts, building mini cities that contained only one race. Because this propaganda was often featured in the national press there arose a sharp contrast between how the national office of the AFSC based in Philadelphia and how Schmoe and the other employees working in and around the camps in the West felt the resettlement should be carried out from a practical standpoint. The argument rested on whether the Japanese should leave the camps to resettle in individual family units or whether they should relocate in larger groups, setting up communes in the Inter-Mountain West?

In July of 1943 Schmoe wrote a letter to Morris and attached an essay in which he illustrated his argument that the way in which relocation was taking

place was too slow and too cumbersome, and so he argued for a massive or "group" relocation project. This program would seek to take large groups and settle them in rural areas somewhere between the Cascade/Sierra Nevada mountain ranges and the Rockies. At this point in the resettlement those in AFSC headquarters along with the WRA had several arguments against this idea, but their most consistent rationale was that they wanted to avoid the Japanese setting up mono-racial ghettos or other small, insular communities. Schmoe on the other hand felt that individual resettlement was a fine idea for a limited minority of people who really wanted to get out of the camps and continue with their lives at any cost, but for the great majority he argued that this was completely unrealistic for many reasons.[97]

Schmoe pointed out that by the middle of 1943 about 1,000 people were leaving the camps each month, and if that trend continued it would take at least eight years to empty the camps altogether. He felt closing down the camps in this manner would eventually prove to be entirely impossible, and he believed that resettlement numbers would begin to quickly trickle off to nothing as the Nisei and other more adventurous Japanese left for the east. He predicted that the largest number of people who would be willing to start from scratch would be no more than about twenty-five to thirty thousand men and women who were at the right age and had the right attitude to take on this endeavor. These individuals, often referred to as "the cream of the crop", didn't have familial responsibilities that they couldn't handle in a new city, nor were they in a position where they had

[97] Floyd Schmoe, "Is Group Resettlement a Necessary Second Step?" Internal Memo. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle WA, 1943.

to take care of the young or the elderly. Schmoe argued that the Issei along with the Sansei would never willingly leave the camps.

> Those who remain will face this situation. They will be well past the prime of life or they will be dependent children. They will have almost no financial resources. They will not have older children capable of making a way and a place for them. They will not have the ambition to try again. Many of them will have serious language handicaps. Many of them will represent professions such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, barbers, salesmen, and teachers who will have no opportunity in their own field because a new start would depend upon a Japanese clientele.[98]

Schmoe's solution was to take all the people who fit into these categories and move them in large groups either onto public reclamation land, or in several cases let them start up actual long-term communities in and around the camps where they were already living. Of course they would take down the barbed wire, remove the fences and build permanent homes to live in and move around freely. In a recent interview, Atsushi Kiuchi mentioned that the Minidoka center encompassed thousands and thousands of acres, had the infrastructure to be completely self sufficient, and had the ability to produce all the goods a Japanese American town needed to survive and prosper, except ironically enough, the ability to grow rice.[99]

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[98] Ibid.
[99] Kiuchi, Atsushi (Minidoka Camp Internee), in discussion with the author, April 2008, Camano Island Washington.

According to Schmoe, there was no "ideal" solution for resettlement, but the camps at that point had already become "home" to thousands of people who really didn't want to leave. "They are proud of their `city.' Some of them actually feel they are better off in camp."[100] Group resettlement would give the Japanese what they needed most, the economic strength and buying power that comes with numbers, a sense of confidence that comes with freedom, and a feeling of security because the Japanese would all be living together without having to face white racism and discrimination every time they stepped outside their doors. Schmoe had a strong opinion regarding the fact that it was the Issei that had worked so hard to set a good example and had done such an incredible job raising the Nisei to become successful American citizens. The Issei therefore, should have the opportunity to continue that work for the final years of their life, which wasn't going to be for very long because by the 1940's the medium age of their generation was around 60 years old. He stated that the new camps wouldn't last forever because the children that remained with their parents would want to leave once they reached university age and had a desire to assert their own independence. And the communities wouldn't disappear as the youth left because by that point other groups would move into those successful towns like Mexican Americans, and they in turn would help to make them multi racial towns.

While Schmoe never mentioned the fact that America was already a country that had embraced the concept of separate but equal for African Americans with the Supreme Court ruling on Plessy vs. Ferguson, his feeling was

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[100] Floyd Schmoe, Is Group Resettlement a Necessary Second Step? Internal Memo. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle WA, 1943.

why wouldn't that same concept work for Japanese Americans? Schmoe believed that America had always been a place of segregated colonies, from the Irish ghettos in the East to the Mormons in Salt Lake City and the Mexican-American communities out West, and that these colonies had lasted only as long as it took successive generations to become Americanized and spread their wings as full-fledged members of English speaking America. He stated that the locations for Japanese American communes should be rural but in nicer environs than most of the relocation camps, and that the economic foundation should be based on farming. He understood full well that only about forty percent of the Japanese in the camps had been farmers before the war, but also knew that Japanese culture dictated that the majority of individuals adjust to new roles in order to help advance the group as a whole. He felt that those who wished to leave and set up businesses and farms on their own would be better off to leave the camps and get started as soon as possible, and that if these individuals and families waited for the war to end they would face the huge problem of competition from both soldiers returning from the war and new immigrants coming in to compete for land, jobs, and housing. Strangely enough many of his forecasts came true as only one third of the internees ended up leaving the camps before 1945 and those who waited to resettle at the end of the war faced incredible shortages of both housing and employment.

In the national headquarters of the AFSC Morris disagreed with this plan almost in its entirety. He believed that setting up these communities would take too long, would be too expensive to build and that the government would not

want to get involved in the first place. It is amusing that his arguments against starting up new communities count the major detriments as time, money, and lack of government involvement because those are three things the government had been willing to expend when it had built ten cities out of scratch that were able to house 120,000 people at the start of 1942. It had done these things so well actually that within two years the majority of their prisoners didn't want to leave their new tarpaper barracks nor did they lack for any of the necessities that would make them so uncomfortable they would feel forced to get out. The problem of course was that the government only gave the Japanese resources and transportation for their one-way entrance into the camps, and once the United States was fully engaged in the war the army was too busy to focus on getting them out of the camps. Actually several members of the government did support the idea of group resettlement and were willing to explore it further.

Don Elberson, the Superintendent of Business Enterprise for Tule Lake sent a memo to his headquarters in Washington late in 1943 stating that communal living and group resettlement was a great idea for many reasons. He explained that cooperative farms had already been set up by several groups of Japanese interned at Tule Lake, and one had taken root in Spokane, Washington along with another in Grand Island, Nebraska. Schmoe had also supported Elberson's argument by helping to set up several agricultural cooperatives himself throughout southwest Idaho where dozens of Japanese had settled to work on farms in the Nampa-Caldwell area.[101] But the difference between the Schmoe and

[101] Memo From Gerald Richardson to Don Elberson, October 2, 1943. AFSC Archives. Tule Lake Project, 1943.

Elberson models was the fact that Elberson felt that no more than ten families should leave to work on one communal farm together, and he further believed that they should be interspersed amongst other ethnic groups who would own all the major services to support them in nearby towns. Schmoe on the other hand thought that hundreds if not thousands of Japanese could found their own small communities and with careful consideration could take care of supplying all of their own services with limited help from outsiders.

The key to his argument regarding why farmers should stay somewhere between the Rockies and the Pacific Ocean also had a lot to do with the type of farming that took place on either side of the continental divide. Moving the Japanese into the Midwest was fine as long as they stayed in the cities, but Issei farmers knew nothing about the big grain operations that covered the Midwest nor did they have the investment capital available to buy the tractors and combines needed to manage those large farms. Out west they had predominately been truck farmers utilizing less than ten acres to grow produce or berries and selling them to local markets and at roadside stands. They had no idea about selling grain on the commodity market and while they certainly could learn how to do all this with time, it was a lot easier to wait for the war to end and hopefully go back to doing what they already knew or relocate onto small farms in Idaho or Eastern Washington.

Although Morris never admitted he might have been wrong in denouncing Schmoe's ideas in any of his letters, the following year he managed to prove that Schmoe's theory did hold water and could be implemented. Morris went to visit

the Quaker owned and operated Seabrook Farm in New Jersey where he found that the massive Quaker farm employed hundreds of laborers all working together. They included blacks, whites, even POW's from Italy and Germany, and by August of 1944 it had added 200 Japanese Americans to its payrolls with 65 more en route from the West. The owner of the farm secured draft deferments for all Nisei over the age of 26 and wanted at least 2,000 Japanese Americans working for him on a seasonal and a year-round basis.[102] As far as discrimination at Seabrook, Morris reported that the local community accepted the Japanese once they realized that local business and community leaders had given them a warm welcome. This group experiment in New Jersey appears to have been a successful example of settling large groups of Japanese in a communal environment, one that combined the various ideas proposed by Schmoe and Elberson. Of course as the war continued and there seemed to be light at the end of the tunnel these ideas were pushed to the wayside, but that did not stop Schmoe from coming up with other radical ideas as well.

Schmoe went with any idea he could think of to get the Japanese out of the camps quickly and efficiently, even if it was to the chagrin of his superiors in Philadelphia. His next major plan, one that was also dismissed by Morris was a push to set up a halfway house in Spokane, another hostel of sorts, but he had a much grander vision for the Spokane hostel. He and his colleague Emmett W. Gulley wrote to Morris saying that the best bet for a hostel in Spokane was on an abandoned college campus located just outside of Spokane. The college could be

[102] Memo from Bob Fort to Homer Morris, Subject Seabrook Farms, 8/29/44. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1944.

rented for $75.00 a month or less and could house somewhere between fifty and one hundred people. With a small work crew Schmoe believed it could be fixed up quickly using about a dozen men and could be turned "…out into shape for living in a very short time."[103] There was plenty of irrigated and farmable land surrounding the college and Schmoe spent many hours traveling around the area with community leaders looking to find the perfect spot to set up a communal farm for the Japanese Americans. He then took a number of Issei and Nisei men out to inspect the college and they agreed that it was a great location. He planned to set up a work camp that June made up of volunteers and Japanese Americans who could come and get the place in order, repair broken windows, set up the kitchen and bathrooms, and generally clean up the grounds. A Japanese American couple would be in-charge of the physical maintenance of the hostel while a Caucasian couple would run the general business affairs. He even found a family from Caldwell named the Darrows who agreed to take over the whole operation even though they had just lost their son in a drowning incident at a Quaker work camp the previous year. They had already donated their large farm in Idaho to a Japanese American family to help get them out of Minidoka![104] Schmoe then sent a detailed report to the national office of the AFSC, one that included all the repairs that needed to be done along with the subsequent costs that would be incurred.

Morris didn't like the idea very much. Apparently the Selective Service stopped funding the classes through Quaker universities that allowed

[103] Floyd Schmoe to Homer Morris, August 29, 1944. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle Washington, 1943.
[104] Ibid..

conscientious objectors to join Civilian Public Service work crews. That meant there would be no laborers for working on the hostel, and he advised finding a dormitory or fraternity that didn't need any repairs. Keeping the costs down was of course crucial to the success of their efforts, and he wanted to avoid over-saturating the Spokane area by relocating too many Japanese Americans to the area. Schmoe responded by saying that building up good relations and publicity in Spokane was important for the long run because people were going to relocate in that area as soon as they could, and he was angry that there were long lists of people wanting to leave the camps and head to the East while the Chicago hostel had a two month waiting list. He encouraged the national office to open another hostel in Chicago and also requested that he be allowed to go ahead with his plan in Spokane. As a result of the CPS reclassification by the War Department, the Darrows agreed to take all the repair work on themselves during the summer and there were plenty of volunteers who wanted to help, and that didn't include all the Japanese Americans who wanted to leave the camps and start work on restoring the college buildings immediately. He was even pushing the idea of turning the gym into a building to house a small manufacturing industry, and even included one such business opportunity in a letter to Morris. "For example: The Auburn Pottery owned by Japanese and specializing in clay flower pots might be moved intact to Spokane. They already have a sales office there and imported their clay from a pit only two miles away. Such an industry would provide relocation for this family from Tule Lake, employment for a few evacuees, and income as rent toward the maintenance of the hostel."[105] Morris's response was that they should

[105]Ibid.

abandon their ideas regarding the hostel, work with the YWCA or YMCA to use their facilities and avoid spending any money or investing in a building they didn't own. His argument was that the Japanese had "many points of contact" in Spokane and that they didn't need a hostel to serve as a jumping off point like in New York City or Chicago.

So Schmoe worked to circumvent the AFSC national office by putting together his own committee who agreed to carry out his hostel plan using local Friends and other religious leaders. He then pulled out his trump card and best hope for success, informing Morris that "The committee last night is composed largely of the same group which planned, set up, financed, and for five years administered the Friends Center in Seattle. This has been, including the purchase price, an eighteen to twenty thousand dollar project."[106] So with the help of this committee and all the workers in line to start work, it appeared likely that the Spokane hostel plan would be implemented. Morris's immediately replied: "I view this as a temporary hostel and not a center that might be the basis of an industry for employment of the Japanese. It seems to me that the matter of permanent employment and the development of a business for the Japanese should be kept entirely separate from the hostel. We should not, it seems to me, get in the position of helping finance industries for them. I hope that in your thinking you will keep hostel and industry entirely separate."[107] Schmoe was not happy with this response and the Spokane hostel on the abandoned college campus never did come to fruition, even with all the work he and others had put

[106]Ibid.
[107]Ibid.

into it. Within a few months he was writing to the national office about getting a house rented in Spokane for Gordon Hirabayashi. Hirabayashi wanted a house to use as a base to help people find jobs and housing as they left Minidoka and moved into the area, while simultaneously hosting those Japanese moving to the area until they were able to get on their feet. As the war came to a close and the Japanese were able to return to the West Coast Schmoe's focus changed once again as everyone began returning to Seattle and the rest of the Puget Sound area.

With the lifting of the West Coast ban and the return of loyal Japanese Americans to the West Coast, Schmoe wrote letters to local hotels and boarding houses asking if they had any issues with taking in Japanese Americans. In one such letter to the Hotel Edmond Meany in Seattle he noted, "We anticipate occasional inquiries asking us to arrange or recommend hotel accommodations. Since we do not wish to embarrass either our Japanese American friends or the hotel management, we should like to know in advance whether or not you would accept, subject, naturally to availability of rooms, Japanese American guests?"[108] This request came about because as of February 1945 the AFSC still didn't have a Seattle hostel in operation for the returning Japanese. "In the meantime we are using private homes and various semi public places such as the Friends Center, a former Japanese congregational church, etc."[109] Schmoe reported to the national office that "Many people are calling us and more are writing for information.

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[108]Floyd Schmoe to AFSC Headquarters, May 22, 1945. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1945: Branch offices: Seattle WA. Correspondence.

[109] From Floyd Schmoe to American Friends Service Committee, Statement Regarding Return of Evacuees to Seattle Area During one Month, February 14, 1944. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices, Seattle WA, General, 1945.

Most of the people who have returned find their property in very bad condition and in perhaps half of the cases they have been robbed and vandalized. We have organized a work party of about 15 people, mostly university students, who are spending their Saturdays helping people clean up their places and getting started living again."[110] The biggest concern for the Friends in Seattle was where to place the elderly Issei men who were on their own and too old to work and support themselves.

In March of 1945 Schmoe wrote a letter to Morris stating, "My chief concern this morning is a home for aged Issei men. Harold Fistere (WRA regional office) called me down on Friday and asked if we would set up a home for some 75 old men, mostly bachelors. They can get $50 or more per month for them… if we will provide the home and management they will provide the men and the money. We can charge enough rent per man to cover our initial costs as well as operating expense. It is all cleared with local and state welfare." Morris of course wanted to make sure that the welfare department didn't just drop the men off and never pay their bills so he asked Schmoe to get everything down in writing including whether the government would take care of all medical expenses, and to ensure that the Social Security agency would really pay for the elderly men. He understood that "The willingness of the Issei to leave the camps depends largely upon whether suitable living conditions can be arranged for them."[111] Schmoe also wanted an orchard planted on the property to get the old

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[110] Ibid.
[111] Floyd Schmoe to AFSC Headquarters, May 22, 1945. AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1945: Branch offices: Seattle WA. Correspondence.

men out working a bit and give them some free food to boot.[112] By April of 1945 Seattle's Council of Churches agreed to take over the administration of the home for elderly men allowing Schmoe and the other members of the AFSC to devote more time to other tasks as the floodgates opened and Japanese Americans began returning to the West Coast en masse once the government rescinded the exclusion order

In addition to getting homes repaired and cleaned up after three years of neglect an escort service was also instituted in the Seattle area. "On several occasions we have or have found someone to accompany evacuees back to their home community on their first visit where they felt reluctant to return alone. We have met one call for individuals to live with a returning Japanese until he felt safe to live alone."[113] There was a real feeling of insecurity on the part of the Japanese returning home and the Friends served as part-time social workers to these people so that they would feel more comfortable returning to the communities that they had been thrown out of a few years before. Schmoe also had plans to turn the work weekends he had instituted into a full-blown 15-man summer work camp which he advertised in all of the nation's Quaker bulletins. The focus would still be on building and cleaning up Japanese owned homes for their eventual return, but as they were constantly looking for good public relations and in anticipation of the summer camp Schmoe was "hoping to interest the LIFE and TIME people in next week's work party, which will be on Bainbridge Island

[112]Ibid.
[113] Ibid.

and a 'natural' for pubic interest."[114] So as the war came to an end the AFSC was still incredibly busy but one question needing to be asked though is why had the Japanese been so unwilling to leave the camps and seek their freedom in different parts of the country?

[114] Floyd Schmoe, "Flash: A new Work Camp Opportunity, Bulletin, May 22, 1945." AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1945: Branch offices: Seattle WA. Correspondence.

WHY LEAVE?

It seems rather remarkable that 70,000 people were given the opportunity to leave prison after having been forcibly removed from their homes, placed in prison camps in remote deserts, and unable to earn a living doing whatever they were trained to do, and yet chose to remain behind barbed wire. One would believe that freedom is such an incredibly overpowering emotion that the Nikkei would have jumped at the opportunity; but once you look closely at the situation, it becomes clear that there were more reasons to remain in the camps than there were to leave. As hard as the AFSC worked to get students, individuals, and families to resettle across the United States what they failed to understand for the first two years of the war was that they were fighting an uphill battle on many different fronts. Certainly many American communities didn't welcome Japanese refugees with open arms, and of course the government bureaucracy and the Army made the process slow and cumbersome, but no one could have foreseen the fact that the majority of Japanese themselves would settle into camp life and have no intention of leaving once they had been there for awhile.

The first roadblock to leaving the camps was the fact that discrimination and racism made most of them feel unwelcome in almost every community across the United States. Several examples of outright discrimination and hatred made it obvious that white Americans didn't want to have the Japanese move into their

neighborhoods. The government had labeled them as a fifth column so communities who had never been introduced to Japanese Americans before Pearl Harbor didn't warm to the idea of bringing traitors into their presence, and this news made it back to those still living in the camps. In a letter to Edwin Morgenroth, the director of the AFSC office in Chicago, Morris shows his concerns about moving people to Chicago after the Dies Committee continued to stir up Anti-Japanese sentiment. "Chicago has hit a new low. All reports from there are bad. Community reaction is so bad in Eddie Shimomura's opinion that he has wired his brother not to come on the eve of his departure. Discrimination seems to be growing. Decent jobs are not available to Niseis. George Tokuda is about ready to call it quits and is looking towards Cincinnati and St. Louis for work."[115]

In Spokane Hirabayashi and Schmoe had to get involved in a dispute between a group of angry locals and a Japanese family who wanted to resettle in the area. Upon leaving Minidoka in July of 1943, Mrs. Paul Suzuki found a house in Spokane that she wished to purchase for $6,000.00. Not only did the owner of the home change the terms when he found out it was a Japanese buyer, but Suzuki was also told the house had to be completely paid for up front. This was difficult because the banks in Spokane refused to loan her any money because her husband had been born in Japan. On top of their financial woes a man by the name of S.J Burke threatened legal action and violence against the Suzukis and their property if they moved into his neighborhood. Schmoe enlisted the help of Mary

[115] Gordon Hirabayashi to Floyd Schmoe, June 5, 1943. AFSC Archives. Branch offices: Seattle WA.

Farquharson, a former Washington State Senator who in turn enlisted the support of several leading community and religious leaders, the ACLU, the District Attorney, and even the police department after a rock was thrown through the front window. They eventually met with the group that opposed having the Suzukis move into the neighborhood, and when the men showed up in a drunken state to find the house full of supportive neighbors and six local ministers along with a Catholic priest they quickly backed down. While nothing came of the threats and no more physical violence was demonstrated by the community, this situation certainly reveals some of the animosity that the Japanese Americans had to face in order to simply buy a home and move into a new neighborhood.[116]

Hirabayashi wrote to Schmoe saying, "One Issei voiced the sentiment of many when she said: The Government has crushed our 30 years' sweat stained foundation. We now have nothing, not even our confidence. It is too much for officials to ask us to resettle. Do you expect us to go into an unknown, possibly hostile community and risk all that now? What for? Here in camp the food is terrible and atmosphere not of the best. But our friends are here; we have our social contacts; we can get used to the mediocre meals. The Government took everything away from us. They must give us a decent set-up before we can again go out. I do not intend to go out until then."[117] To sum it up best, Hirabayashi ended his letter to Schmoe by stating bluntly, "I am afraid the end of the war will

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[116] Floyd Schmoe, "Japanese Relocation: from Hunt to Spokane a la Suzukis, 9/8/43." AFSC Archives. Individuals. Suzukis, 1943.
[117] Gordon Hirabayashi to Floyd Schmoe, June 5, 1943. AFSC Archives. Branch offices: Seattle WA.

find that the Government has created a new group of permanent wards. I don't see how some of them will ever be able to get out on their own again."[118]

In Seattle the situation affected not only housing or employment, but also the very ability of the Japanese Americans to compete in the market. When Japanese Americans were allowed to return to the Northwest and take back their farms and businesses, Seattle's labor unions stepped in to create a situation where Japanese farmers could not get their produce to market. This was a real show of patriotism during a time when food shortages threatened the war effort. Schmoe sent a telegram to the head office in Philadelphia stating, "Situation Japanese American grown produce Seattle area critical. Local commission men refuse to buy. AFL Union involved. Ten tons green peas, five thousand crates head lettuce… ready for harvest this week. Requires quick action if food is to be saved and growers given fair deal. Mrs. Mary Farquharson now in Washington, knows situation and will see you this week." Morris replied to the letter by stating what seems to be incredibly obvious: "It seems to me that in the unusual food shortage which the country is facing at the present time it is hard to believe that this situation should prevail. If there is anything that we can do let us know."[119]

Securing adequate housing was a huge stumbling block for people leaving the camps and the risk of being homeless in a new city, during a war, when they might not speak English very well, made for a greater sense of insecurity. How could you honestly ask someone to leave their free shelter in the camps no matter how inadequate the tarpaper shacks may have been? When they received three

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[118] Ibid.
[119] Floyd Schmoe to Homer Morris, March 12, 1945. AFSC Archives. Branch offices: Seattle, WA, General, 1945.

free meals every day? When they were surrounded by all of their Japanese American family and friends whom they had not had the time to visit before the war because they had always been too busy working? Then tell them there might not be any housing or jobs available when they arrived in some massive city back east like Chicago or New York. An AFSC bulletin on minorities in the US stated, "Fear of failure to find adequate living quarters causes heads of families to hesitate to leave the Centers, where the conditions may not be comfortable or convenient but at least family groups may remain together, and the inconveniences are shared by all their neighbors."[120]

Even in 1945 after the government allowed the Japanese Americans to return to the West Coast most continued to stay in the camps because once again there was a real shortage of housing in the West Coast cities and even the hostels set up by various religious groups to aid in resettlement were overflowing with Japanese American refugees. Esther Rhoads wrote a letter to the main office in Philadelphia from Los Angeles where she was running a hostel which illustrated the situation, "Housing is the great bottleneck in LA, and most of those who have left the hostel for permanent housing are returning to their former homes or doubling up with friends."[121] Schmoe added to this report, "There is no difficulty in securing employment, but housing is almost impossible. There are numerous houses listed for sale, although prices have doubled in the last three years, a house for rent is almost never heard of. Apartments can be had in time but it frequently

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[120] Clarence Pickett, "Survey Graphic Article", March 5, 1943. AFSC Archives. Communications and Organizations: Fellowship and Reconciliation.
[121] Esther Rhoads to Robertson Fort, September 24, 1945. AFSC Archives. Branch offices: Pasadena, CA, General, 1945.

takes a month of waiting or searching. We have been able to house temporary visitors in private homes, at the Friend's Center, and at the Japanese Congregational Church."[122]

Barracks were also set up in the Japanese Language School and the Buddhist Temple which had been taken over by the United States Navy during the first year of the war and had housed a school to teach naval personnel. The Japanese nicknamed it the "Hunt Hotel" in honor of the Minidoka camp they had just left. These along with other hostels set up by the Friends and other religious denominations served as the only affordable shelters the Japanese had while trying to resettle in Seattle.[123]

In an attempt to boost morale, the AFSC sent several Japanese Americans out into the communities in the East to test the waters and see how things were going for some of the people who had already left the camps. For instance, Shigeo Tanabe wrote to Morris saying he wanted to work for the AFSC in the Midwest, traveling around and contacting people in order to find jobs and good places for the Japanese to go once they left the camps. Morris replied that the WRA and the AFSC already had plenty of men and women doing that, but that Tanabe could make a real difference by meeting those who were already out, finding out how it was going, if jobs were easy to find in their location, then report back to the camps and let the people know what he had learned. "The bottleneck in relocation is now in the centers and not on the outside. That is, there

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[122] Floyd Schmoe, Statement Regarding the Return of Evacuees to Seattle area During one Month. AFSC Archives. Branch Offices: Seattle WA, General, 1945.
[123] Kiuchi, Atsushi (Minidoka Camp Internee), in discussion with the author, April 2008, Camano Island Washington.

is considerable hesitation on the part of the evacuees to leave the centers. Lack of faith in government promises, reports of bad treatment from those who have gone out, the uncertainty of the draft, and probably most important of all is the influence which camp life has had upon the morale of the whole group. They are being `WPAized' with all that that means in the loss of morale."[124] The latter concept related to the fact that the United States government hadn't taken any notice of how history had played out for Native Americans who had been relocated to reservations throughout the country and had lost their initiative along with their culture and way of life. It was as if they wanted to try one last experiment on placing another racial group in reservations and see if it would fail once again.

Clarence Pickett wrote a public relations article that was sent out to many newspapers around the country that explained some of the major concepts that stood in the way of people leaving the camps.

> Important bottlenecks in the relocation program are the difficulty of the evacuees to leave the centers. After all has been said about unfavorable conditions in the centers, this may seem contradictory. In the first place the evacuees have been on government relief for more than a year. They have experienced a sense of security in being wards of the government. During the depression years the Japanese in this country probably had a better record of managing to take care of themselves than any other national group. But now

[124] Clarence Pickett, "Survey Graphic Article", March 5, 1943. AFSC Archives. Communications and Organizations: Fellowship and Reconciliation.

> this independence has forcibly been broken down. Moreover, many Issei who have lived in West Coast States look forward to returning to the West Coast at the close of the war. They hesitate to move to a new community and discourage their children from doing so because it would separate the family.[125]

In a letter between two Friends, Helen Brill told Bernard Waring, "The people left in the centers are mostly of two groups, the fishermen and the farmers. Both groups usually have large families. The fishermen are not allowed to fish on the west coast; the farmers are unable to get land, and lack tools. Neither can get housing. They are without financial resources. They are afraid. And yet the WRA plans to evict them from the centers."[126] Schmoe on the other hand who was at Minidoka speaking to the people there and had first-hand knowledge of their problems sent a report back to Philadelphia stating something entirely different.

> Those who are now found in the Minidoka Center are Issei and children of school age. The Issei are not opposed to resettlement. There is no resistance seen on the part of the Isseis against resettlement. But a great majority of them appear to have given up their hope to relocate, simply because they are convinced there is nothing they could do outside to make their living. Were they farmers, they would not be so thoroughly convinced of their

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[125] Ibid.
[126] Helen Brill to Bernard Waring, September 23, 1945. AFSC Archives. 1944.

> inability as they are now. The Minidokans are on the whole indifferent to resettlement.[127]

So there were a lot of ideas passed around as to why people did or didn't want to leave the camps, but the reality of the situation lay in the fact that until the government decided to throw everyone out and tear down the facilities, many people just did not want to leave. One report stated the Nikkei opinion quite bluntly, "As you know, many of the evacuees do not believe that the centers will close."[128]

As of August of 1945 there were still thousands of Japanese Americans living in the camps with no intention of moving out. As the war in Europe came to a close and victory looked probable in the Pacific the Japanese who were left in the camps were of two minds, they were either waiting it out so they could return home or they were waiting for the government to move them out by force. In an article from the *Seattle Times* dated September 22, 1944, two Nisei brothers, Fukashi and Takashi Hori stayed at Minidoka and worked at the camp store even though they were in their mid twenties and could have easily resettled in the Midwest. According to the article Takashi "had not left because he was waiting for the moment when it would be possible for him to return home."[129] So it wasn't until the government forcibly started closing down services in the camps, shutting off the water to various housing blocks, tearing down the mess halls, and finally putting people on buses and trains to ship them back to the coast that the

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[127] Memo From Bob Fort to Homer Morris, June 23, 1944. AFSC Archives. Reports, 1944.
[128] AFSC Archives. Reports, 1945.
[129] Two Nisei Return, Yearn to Stay. *Seattle Times*, Friday, September 22, 1944. AFSC Archives. Publicity, Newspaper Clippings, 1944.

camps were finally emptied out. Atsushi Kiuchi summed it up by saying, "The government didn't use dogs to get us to leave, but made our lives so miserable we all wanted to get out."[130] In the end it was one last case of moving a civilian population en masse from one place back to the other.

[130]Kiuchi, Atsushi (Minidoka Camp Internee), in discussion with the author, April 2008, Camano Island Washington.

CONCLUSIONS

After analyzing the efforts made by the AFSC to help Japanese Americans in the concentration camps during World War II there are three questions that need to be answered. Why did the Society of Friends get involved in the resettlement program in the first place? How successful was the aid that they provided and what factors advanced or stood in the way of their success? Lastly, what were the overall lessons taught by this situation and the conclusions we can make about America in the 1940's and today? The important aspect of this examination is not only discovering the who or the what of the situation, but the why behind what went on during the 1940's.

Why would a group of Americans who committed no crime be imprisoned? Why would the majority of them fail to leave their concentration camps until the end of World War II, and why were the Quakers unable to overcome the obstacles that stood in their way? Those seem to be some of the questions that the Quakers were trying to answer themselves when they entered into the rather duplicitous role of helping the government embark on the Japanese American Diaspora.

The Quakers were against the exclusion order from the start, but in the end they were willing to aid the federal government in its efforts to exclude the Japanese from the West Coast. That aid was not given lightly, nor did they wish

for it to be seen as an acquiescence in favor of the government's position regarding the Japanese. Clarence Pickett, the Executive Secretary of the AFSC in 1942 sent out a message directed to all Friends in America stating,

> It would be untrue and a matter of regret if the decision of the Service Committee were understood by Friends and others to mean that we accept the evacuation as a matter of course. It has come to us with deep humiliation and profound concern that events have revealed in the bloodstream of our American life a poison which has caused this disease of hatred. Whether it be greed or race prejudice or war hysteria, it is equally dangerous. Penitent as we are on behalf of those who have been the immediate cause, we want to call every Friend to an examination of his own motives and the spirit of his life.[131]

Pickett believed that to amend the wrongs done by his own government every Quaker should take it upon themselves to do whatever they could to aid the Japanese Americans during their wrongful incarceration. This may have been perceived as acquiescence on the part of the Quakers who had traditionally stood up to fight any form of oppression that denied people their rights but they were not fighting for their own personal freedoms but for those of another group of people. When the military stood in the way of progress by making it nearly impossible for Nisei students to attend universities back east Pickett went on to illustrate exactly why their work was so important, "The point may come where

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[131] Clarence E. Pickett, Message to the Society of Friends. AFSC Archives. General, 1942.

the job the Council has been asked to do is made so difficult as to be impossible and at that point we should state the situation and withdraw formally. However, it is not the Council or the Service Committee that would suffer from such withdrawal, but the students and the Japanese group about whom we all care so much."[132] Perhaps if it had been West Coast Quakers who had been relocated to prison camps instead of the Japanese the rest of the Friends might have stood their ground and chained themselves to the White House fence as they did during the Vietnam War until every last person were free, but it was not their liberty that was on the line and they did not wish to make a bad situation worse. The Friends got involved in this program because their religion dictated that they should help their fellow human beings as a matter of course and because of their belief on righting the wrongs done by an oppressive regime and American society as a whole.

Probably the best way to describe how the AFSC personnel approached the tasks they took on during the war was that they used a shotgun approach as different needs evolved over time. The whole program evolved and changed as the war progressed and their response was very fluid and flexible in order to ameliorate problems as they arose. The umbrella tasks they took on were the placement of students, the locating of both jobs and housing for people leaving the camps, the opening and running of hostels to serve as way stations while jobs and housing were located, and finally aiding in the resettlement of the West when the exclusion order was lifted. But these were merely the tip of the iceberg and in reality no job was too small for the Quakers to take on. It was this doggedness

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[132] Clarence E. Pickett, Memo to the AFSC, July 17th, 1942. AFSC Archives. National Student Relocation Committee, 1942.

and "can do" attitude that made the AFSC a great organization to handle this government manufactured disaster. It had the patience to slowly chip away at any problem no matter how daunting it seemed while simultaneously accepting any form of success as a great triumph. But by the end of the war 70,000 people were still living behind barbed wire in the camps and only 4300 students had been placed by the NJARC in universities across the country but to the Friends the operation was a great accomplishment because it focused not on its shortcomings but on every individual who was able to leave the camps.[133]

The AFSC staff's willingness to take on any task meant that in reality the Quakers efforts were sporadic at best and they couldn't really give the necessary attention that their specific responsibilities demanded. The key to their success was not necessarily getting everything done themselves but like great leaders anywhere they had the ability to delegate tasks, coordinate efforts, and act as intermediaries between dozens of different groups. In the East the Council members were constantly meeting with both the government and civilian groups, trying to get through red tape, making people aware of the situation and raising funds so that the Nikkei could leave the camps. Out West the organization's foot soldiers met with the Japanese and took care of their immediate as well as their long term problems showing with their very presence that Friends were never going to abandon them. Allan Austin summed it up best by saying, "The council succeeded in negotiating this at-times hostile wartime environment, in part, because of internal divisions between pragmatic easterners and crusading

[133]O'Brien, Robert W., *The College Nisei* (Palo Alto, California: Pacific Books, 1949), 90.

westerners."[134] He goes on to argue that these internal divisions were crucial to the success of the program because the AFSC appeared to be on everyone's side. The men and women in the office back in Philadelphia appeased the government by always walking on eggshells and not pushing too hard for change while in the camps people like Schmoe countered Japanese distrust by doing everything in his power to aid them while simultaneously speaking out against what the government was doing.

When looking at other historians' impressions regarding the relationship between the United States government and international NGOs as the twentieth century progressed, it is apparent that there are a lot of similarities in the roles NGOs played when giving aid to civilian populations. The truth is that the AFSC played quite a different role in this situation for several reasons. First of all the way in which the government used the Friends to assist them during World War II didn't include trying to get them to win the hearts and minds of those receiving aid like in South Vietnam or Iraq. The propaganda and public opinion drives were not aimed at the victims of war but at the public in general who were initially led to believe the Nikkei posed a great threat to them and later were asked to host them in their communities. Secondly the tightrope NGOs traditionally have had to walk goes back and forth between three groups consisting of the federal government and its military arm, whomever the Army might be fighting, and the civilians who are in desperate need of aid because of the armed conflict. That leaves the NGO in a precarious position because often times it is impossible

[134] Austin, Allan W., *From Concentration Camp to Campus: Japanese American Students and World War II* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 163.

to tell what side of the battle line the civilians are on; and to the chagrin of the United States government, NGOs generally want to help civilians regardless of their political allegiance. That often forces the government to manipulate the funding they give to NGOs as wars progress, but the Quakers never had to deal with these issues between 1941 and 1945 because there was never any question as to who the enemy was and who they were helping. In addition the Japanese Americans always knew that the AFSC was on their side and wasn't a government pawn like the Mennonite Central Committee appeared to be in Vietnam. Many Nikkei responded to their efforts by saying that in a country where we they had no friends they could always depend on the Quakers. Lastly, the fine line that the AFSC did have to walk was in its approach to the government, whether it voiced its grievances and pushed for more changes or different policies. The fear was that it would upset the bureaucrats to the point that they would dig in their heels and want to hurt the Japanese in some way. The AFSC and the government were not really allies during this situation, but they weren't enemies either.

There were some positive outcomes of the internment and the resettlement process however, the first of which was a new sense of racial awareness. Ross Wilbur, the Quaker in charge of the hostel in Cincinnati once called to answer an ad for a room for rent in Cincinnati and the woman who answered the phone had two sons fighting in the South Pacific. "When I mentioned the Japanese name of the lad I was calling for, I heard her catch her breath and for a long moment there was silence on the line, and then her voice, softer but firmer, came to me and I

saw in my mind's eye, my mother's face as she said, `Well, send the lad along, I'm sure my soldier sons, if they knew, would want their mother to put into living practice, the democracy they may have to give their young lives for.'"[135] Every individual who left the camps and settled in a new city, went to a university that had never had an Asian student, or joined a church in a community was an ambassador introducing the rest of America to a new and vibrant culture. The barriers that the students broke when they entered universities in the East and became scholar athletes, presidents of student bodies, and the heads of their classes helped lead to the adoption of the unfortunate term used by professors across college campuses in the post-war era: "the model minority." Perhaps the most important accomplishment to come out of the resettlement was a program started by the Nisei and Sansei in the 1980's. The organization they created was based on the model set up by the Quakers with the NJASRC; the Nisei Student Relocation Commemorative Fund has supported the efforts of Southeast Asian refugees who have wanted to attend university for the past three decades. "A San Francisco committee awarded eight scholarships of $500 each in 1983. The 2001 ceremony demonstrated the dramatic growth of the fund over its first twenty years. In that year thirty-eight students received scholarships totaling $37,500."[136]

There was quite a bit that was ironic about the Exclusion Order and the ordeal that the US government put the Japanese Americans through during World War II, but did America really learn a lesson after committing such an egregious

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[135] AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, 1944: Publicity, General.
[136] Austin, Allan W., *From Concentration Camp to Campus: Japanese American Students and World War II* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 171.

error? Currently the Supreme Court has taken seven years to decide whether it is unconstitutional to incarcerate over 250 men who have been held without either charges or civilian trials on a US military base in Cuba.[137] Today Americans like to point their fingers at other countries and boast about their civil liberties but the modern news media and politicians use the same fear tactics today that Lieutenant General Dewitt and Shuster and Siegal used during the onset of WWII to silence Americans and bring them into line. Not only that, but America, the wealthiest nation on earth, still does little to protect its citizens from natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina, leaving the bulk of the ensuing humanitarian aid to NGOs and volunteer workers while hundreds of thousands of able bodied men and women are deployed fighting wars in the Middle East. Anti-miscegenation laws from the start of the twentieth century seem laughable in today's society but Americans are still telling men and women who they are allowed to marry. California voters recently passed Proposition 8 which banned homosexuals from legally getting married by stating, "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."[138]

It is hard to say how far America has progressed since the end of World War II, but it is encouraging to know that The AFSC is still fighting for our basic rights today. The homepage for their website at www.afsc.org makes that clear when you open it up to find seven headings regarding concerns they are currently

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[137] Savage, David G., "Judge Orders Release of Five Guantanamo Prisoners." *Los Angeles Times*, November 21, 2008. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/la-na-guantanamo21-2008nov21,0,3536766.story

[138] Cooper, Claire, "Prop. 8 is a tangle for State's High Courts." *Sacramento Bee*, November 24, 2008. http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/story/1418783.html

addressing: "Iraq Campaign; Immigrants' Rights; Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; Africa; Life over Debt; Youth and Militarism; Economic Justice; Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Rights." George Fox founded more than a religion based simply on Christian dogma when he introduced the Society of Friends to the world more than three centuries ago—he inspired a social movement based on equality, liberty, and the belief that every individual has the power to affect change in society and make the world a place worthy of God.

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GLOSSARY

Issei: First generation Japanese immigrant.

Nissei: Second generation Japanese American son or daughter of an Issei.

SANSEI: Third generation Japanese American son or daughter of a Nissei.

NIKKEI: Any American of Japanese ancestry.