On the Possible Forms a Relationship Might Take Between the Moral Character of a Teacher and the Moral Development of a Student

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Background/Context: The claim of a relationship between a teacher’s moral character and a student’s moral development has its roots in a rich philosophical tradition. It is a tradition that maintains that the young acquire virtue by associating with virtuous people in a virtuous community. In this way, it is assumed virtue is acquired by example and imitation. Recently, this relationship has received increased attention from philosophers of education, who emphasize the importance of the moral character of the teacher in bringing about the proper moral development of the student.

Purpose/Objective: This article is an examination of the various forms that a relationship might take between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. It brings important distinctions to bear on the assumed relationship and sheds new light on the complexities of the relationship and its possible permutations. The purpose of this article is to better understand these complexities and suggest alternative conceptions of the relationship in question.

Research Design: The methods employed in this article are primarily philosophical and follow the analytic tradition. Analytic philosophy is primarily concerned with the analysis of meaning, and its primary roots are found in the works of Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Russell, and Moore. The success of this type of philosophical inquiry rests on an ability to better understand the use of language. This article draws on the method of ordinary language and concept analysis, relying on the process of making distinctions and suggesting inconsistencies in the language used to describe the relationship in question.

Conclusions/Recommendations: The analysis shows that each of the forms a relationship
might take is seemingly quite reasonable and sensible. However, it also concludes that none of these forms provides a definitive claim that a relationship does or does not obtain between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. The applications for research suggest that scholars pay closer attention to (a) the agency of students in this relationship, (b) the relative influence of a teacher’s unintentional moral expressions, and (c) the role of modeling in moral education. These applications also point to an important possible shift in the conceptualization of moral education: toward morally good teaching (for its own sake) and away from teaching students to be morally good.

The putative relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student takes on various forms in the scholarship on moral education. Most forms are basic in nature (claiming a relatively direct connection between a teacher’s moral character and a student’s moral development), while others are fairly elaborate (claiming a more indirect connection). This article is an examination of these various forms that a relationship might take—bringing important distinctions to bear on the assumed relationship and shedding new light on the complexities of the relationship and its possible permutations. The purpose of this article, then, is to better understand these complexities and suggest alternative conceptions of the relationship in question.

The claim of a relationship between a teacher’s moral character and a student’s moral development has its roots in a rich philosophical tradition. This tradition is founded, in part, on Meno’s oft-cited inquiry into the nature of virtue acquisition: “Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice, or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?” It is a tradition that maintains that the young acquire virtue by associating with virtuous people in a virtuous community. In this way, virtues are caught, not taught.

Analytic philosophy has primarily offered insight into this relationship by exploring how virtue might be acquired in some “other way.” Of particular relevance to this article is the work of Gilbert Ryle, who follows the Aristotelian notion that the young acquire virtue by associating with virtuous people (those of good moral character). His work shows the evolution of the claim that a relationship obtains between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student: (a) virtue is not acquired by teaching, at least not in the traditional sense; (b) virtue is only partly acquired by practice; (c) virtue is not acquired solely by nature; (d) thus virtue is acquired by a “distinct type of learning” and a “familiar sense of teaching.” In other words, virtue is acquired by example; the greatest influence on the moral development of a child is the
example of moral character set by an adult. Having eliminated the alternatives, Ryle grounds his assertion in an appeal to intuition, assuming that “we all know the answer to it [Can virtue be taught?] perfectly well.” It is this assumption that is ubiquitous in the literature on moral education and moral development.

More recently, this relationship has received increased attention from philosophers of education. For example, Fenstermacher believes that teaching is inherently a moral activity, and as such, teachers influence the moral development of students:

The morality of the teacher may have a considerable impact on the morality of the student. The teacher is a model for the students, such that the particular and concrete meaning of such traits as honesty, fair play, consideration of others, tolerance, and sharing are “picked up,” as it were, by observing, imitating, and discussing what teachers do in classrooms.

He goes on to argue that everything a teacher does in the classroom “carries with it the moral character of the teacher” and has a profound impact on the moral development of students. This notion of teaching as a moral activity is argued from different perspectives, but each perspective emphasizes the importance of the moral character of the teacher in bringing about the proper moral development of the student.

The main argument of this article, then, is that the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student is far more ambiguous and troubled than much of the extant literature assumes. My task is to unveil the complexities of the possible forms a relationship might take, showing that each of the possible forms is seemingly reasonable and sensible but that none of them is necessarily definitive. This article takes on a claim that is intuitively appealing. However, it is also a claim that is fraught with ambiguity, rarely questioned in the literature, and quite easily accepted. The benefits of the analysis reside in the possibility that the relationship will be put in greater relief by asking prior questions and that these questions will have important applications for future research and practice.

The article is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine some possible forms of the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. The purpose of this first section is to better understand the relationship itself and its permutations. In the second section, I explore the applications of this analysis for the study of teaching and learning. The purpose of this second
section is to re-examine some of the extant scholarship in moral education and moral development and discuss possible directions for future empirical research and conceptual inquiry.

THREE FORMS

Etymologically, character derives its meaning from the Greek term for “engraved” and means an enduring mark or lasting impression (concerning what is distinct about a person in a moral sense). Thus, when we use trait language to speak of a person’s moral character, we typically refer to a set of distinct virtues that are “engraved” or possessed by that person. Similarly, when we use trait language to speak of a person’s moral development, we refer to certain virtues that were “acquired” through some process. It is not clear (in the research literature or otherwise) whether moral character is something “engraved” or something subject to constant change, nor is it clear whether moral development entails actual acquisition of certain traits or dispositions; notwithstanding, the possible forms of a relationship that are presented in this section rest on or build off of these commonly held assumptions. The first form posits a direct, relatively basic relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. The second form explores certain intervening variables that might indicate an indirect, more elaborate relationship. And the third form examines the possibility that there is little or no relationship at all—that the relationship is nonexistent.

FORM ONE: A BASIC RELATIONSHIP

The first form of the relationship put forward in this article is that of a close connection between the moral character of the teacher and the moral development of the student. Put another way, what is “engraved” on or possessed by the teacher is directly connected to what is “acquired” by the student, such that the teacher’s character traits “rub off” on—or are “picked up” by—the student. It is a direct effect in that the relationship is almost causal in nature; who the student becomes (morally) stems immediately from who the teacher is (morally). There are certainly other intervening—and likely stronger—forces or elements outside the classroom that contribute to the moral development of the student, but there is still a direct connection between teacher and student as it pertains to what is engraved and what is acquired. Thus, a caring teacher begets caring students, and so on.

Of course, the moral character that is engraved on the teacher must also be conveyed in some manner in order for the students to pick it up.
However, in this first form, this intervening factor does not interrupt the connection between the source (teacher) and the recipient (student). Instead, what is “conveyed” by the teacher is merely an exact extension of what is engraved on the teacher. For example, the teacher who conveys responsibility to her students by always having student papers graded on time or who conveys kindness to her students by doing little things to help them succeed is merely conveying his or her engraved moral character.

What is engraved can be conveyed via either expression or expectation. When we say that a teacher conveys character to her students, we are suggesting that she either expresses or expects some trait of character. The expression of character can be done in a variety of very specific ways: conveying respect by dressing appropriately and professionally; showing kindness by greeting students at the door; exhibiting justice by grading with fairness and equality; displaying care by spending personal time with students, and so on. These expressions are not necessarily offered up as specific examples or models for students to follow, but they convey the character that is engraved on the teacher—making what is engraved on the teacher apparent to the student. In other words, showing kindness by greeting students at the door is offered up as a model for kindness and not necessarily as a model for greeting another person at the door. Thus, there is an important assumption here that the teacher models engraved traits of character and that it is to these engraved traits that students attend (and from which they generalize to their own behavior).

The expectation of moral character is similar to, but nonetheless distinct from, the expression of moral character, and it also occurs in a variety of ways: conveying honesty by requiring students to do their own work; conveying responsibility by requiring students to be punctual; conveying compassion and friendliness by constructing and maintaining a caring classroom community; conveying generosity by asking students to participate in service activities, and so on. In these ways, the students come to understand not only that the teacher values certain rules, for example, but also that the teacher abides by these regulations himself. This follows from the old adage that we cannot expect more from others than we expect from ourselves.

It is in this direct way that we see the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student often conveyed in the moral education and moral development literature. Whether by expression or expectation, it is argued that teachers convey moral character and that it has a direct effect on the moral development of their students—rubbing off on them or being picked up by them. Noddings, for example, believes that “children who are properly cared
for by people who genuinely model social and ethical virtues are likely to develop those virtues themselves.” According to Noddings, these virtues or character traits are acquired by students via caring relations. She explains that “caring relations come first, and it is thought that the virtues develop almost naturally out of these relations.” In this way, a direct relationship between the moral character of the teacher and the moral development of the student is formed: whatever the teacher expresses is subsequently picked up by the student, with no intervening variables, forces, or outside influences. Again, there are other, perhaps more powerful, influences than those of the teacher, but a direct relationship is also believed to obtain in classrooms as described by Noddings. This first form describes the most basic possible relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.

FORM TWO: AN ELABORATE RELATIONSHIP

The second form of the relationship places emphasis on the role of the student and the possible compromising elements that intervene between what is engraved on the teacher and what is acquired by the student. Recall that the first form of the relationship assumes an almost unconscious acquisition by a student whereby the student is seemingly a passive recipient in the process of moral development. However, in the second form, we not only account for an “interpretation” on the part of the student, but we also acknowledge that what is conveyed by the teacher might be different from what is actually engraved. In this second form, the student switches from passive recipient to active participant in the process of moral development.

This second form suggests an elaborate relationship that accounts for discrepancies between what is engraved (on the teacher), what is conveyed (by the teacher), what is interpreted (by the student), and what is acquired (by the student). The interaction between teacher and student weaves a complex web of intention, expression, and interpretation that may or may not result in a relationship obtaining between one’s moral character and the other’s moral development. The relationship in this second form is elaborate—suggesting a complexity not portrayed in the basic form of the relationship and pointing to possible pitfalls in establishing a connection between who a teacher is and who a student becomes in a moral sense.

Thus, in this second form, there is an indirect relationship between what is engraved on the teacher and what is acquired by the student; there are intervening variables that influence what is ultimately acquired by the student. These variables include (a) what is conveyed by the teacher and
(b) what is interpreted by the student; they represent an exchange of communication between teacher and student that is susceptible to multiple levels of misrepresentation and misunderstanding. The field of social psychology, particularly the work of Erving Goffman, is instructive here in illuminating how this relationship may not involve a direct connection, and this section of the analysis closely follows Goffman’s theories of social interaction ritual.

The first intervening variable focuses on what is conveyed by the teacher. These expressions can be conscious or unconscious and provide students with information that will lead them to ascribe certain traits and dispositions to the teacher. Recall that in the first form of the relationship, these expressions or expectations did not deviate from what is engraved on the teacher. This second form, however, acknowledges the possibility that what is conveyed might be different from what is engraved. As Goffman puts it, “Face-to-face situations are, in fact, ideal projective fields that the participant cannot help but structure in a characterizing way so that conclusions can be drawn about him, correct or incorrect, whether he wants it or not.”13 These ascriptions are unavoidable in the daily face-to-face interaction between teacher and student. More important, a teacher can both consciously and unconsciously make this type of information available to students.

What is consciously conveyed by a teacher is a manifestation of the moral role or persona that a teacher adopts in the classroom. However, a teacher’s moral persona is not necessarily what is engraved on the teacher. Goffman suggests that it is not uncommon to consciously express moral traits and dispositions in a way that differs from what is actually engraved: “When the individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially credited values of society, more so, in fact, than does his behavior as a whole.”14 Thus, the moral role or persona that a teacher inhabits has two separate functions: it represents the teacher’s idealized moral view, and it also serves as a mask that conceals what is actually engraved. When a teacher assumes a moral persona, he effectively hides traits and dispositions that run counter to his required performance. It is also possible that a teacher, as a complex human being, displays moral traits and dispositions in ways that differ from one context to another. The point here is that in teaching, as in other professions (or human interactions for that matter), what you see is not necessarily what is there—what is consciously conveyed by the teacher is not necessarily what is engraved on the teacher.

The second intervening variable in this form of the relationship concerns what is interpreted by the student. If what is consciously conveyed by the teacher represents an “ideal” morality, then what is unconsciously
conveyed by the teacher hints at a “real” morality (or what is actually engraved on the teacher). Because the student recognizes that the teacher adopts a moral persona or portrays an idealized view in the classroom, a student separates a teacher’s conscious expression and unconscious expression in an effort to discover what lies underneath the mask. Goffman distinguishes these expressions as what a person “gives” (conscious expression) and what a person “gives off” (unconscious expression). It is through these unconscious expressions that a student can see past the moral persona of the teacher and discriminate what is consciously conveyed from what is engraved.

However, the process of ascertaining what is conscious expression from unconscious expression—and ascribing meaning to these unconscious expressions—involves a complex game of information exchange between teacher and student that may or may not have a conclusion. It is a complex game because the possibility always exists that the teacher’s unconscious expression may only appear to be unconscious. In other words, the teacher can take advantage of this seeming asymmetry and influence what is interpreted by the student (creating symmetry, once again, in the exchange). Goffman contends that this type of exchange is potentially never-ending in its number of iterations and goes on to say in another work that this exchange becomes one of strategy and “counter-uncovering moves” by those involved in the interaction. This back and forth between subject and observer (or teacher and student) reveals the complex nature of the communication process involved in interpreting what is engraved via what is conveyed.

Furthermore, although this type of information game may never end (and the conclusions drawn about others’ morality may not be conclusions at all), it is important to note that the observer (the student) ultimately has the upper hand, having access to one additional “stream” of communication; it is more difficult for the teacher to “cover” than it is for the student to “uncover.” In Goffman’s terms, asymmetry prevails. In this way, the aspect of the communication process that is most vital to this information game is the unconscious, unguided, involuntary aspect of the subject’s (teacher’s) behavior. The student uses this aspect to determine what is “real,” and the teacher uses it to control the student’s interpretation by attempting to make certain expressions appear unconscious. This description of the information game between teacher and student assumes that there is a clear distinction between a teacher’s conscious and unconscious expressions of morality (and that a student has some capacity to make such a distinction), but the game is made even more complex by the possibility that a teacher’s expressions of morality are displayed differently based on situation and context. In the end, determin-
ing unconscious expressions of morality from conscious ones is dependent on a variety of variables that renders the distinction tenuous at best, which results in an increasingly intricate and elaborate exchange between teacher and student.

If the unconscious aspect of the teacher’s behavior is the most important aspect of this information exchange, then the most troubling aspect is that it often relies on relatively minor signs or cues. In search of the teacher’s unconscious expressions of morality, the student depends increasingly on what might appear to be a teacher’s seemingly insignificant expressions. As Goffman describes it, this tendency is potentially hazardous to the communication process, as these seemingly insignificant expressions are susceptible to misinterpretation and can disrupt “the tone of an entire performance.” Thus, what is interpreted or ascertained by the student is constantly in flux as information or “signs” of moral character are constantly being conveyed and exchanged by the teacher, resulting in an indirect and elaborate relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.

FORM THREE: A NONEXISTENT RELATIONSHIP

This third form of the relationship suggests the possibility that there is no relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. In other words, what is acquired by the student has little, if anything, to do with what is engraved on the teacher (nor, perhaps, with what is conveyed by the teacher). In this third form, the moral development of students is not influenced in any important way by the moral character of teachers; a teacher may still have some effect on the moral development of a student via methods of moral instruction and other means, but that effect is simply not connected to a teacher’s moral character in this form of the relationship. For example, a teacher may exhort students to be honest by discussing it as “the moral of the story” when reading a book, and students in turn may acquire the trait of honesty, but the acquisition of the trait is not dependent on the teacher being an honest person himself. In this form, the moral character of the teacher is not a determining factor in the moral development of students.

This form suggests that children will develop certain character traits and dispositions regardless of the moral character of their teachers. Again, their teachers may influence the acquisition of these traits via certain means of fostering moral development, but the acquisition is not contingent on whether their teachers possess these same traits. Understood in this way, the possibility that there is no relationship
between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student does not seem so conspicuous. While this form of the relationship appears to contradict our intuitive sense of how certain kinds of moral development occur, it also appeals to our common sense that the moral character of teachers might have nothing to do with the moral development of students.

The basis for this form of the relationship is the lack of empirical evidence that establishes a relationship. Although the relationship has certain intuitive appeal, it is a largely assumed proposition that is not grounded in any empirically convincing evidence. As Halstead and Taylor suggest in their review of research, “Since values are inherent in teaching, it seems unlikely that students will be able to avoid the influence of teachers’ values completely. . . . However, research provides mixed evidence about the extent to which children follow the example of their teachers, or even respect them. The mixed evidence that they cite is primarily focused on claims that the moral development that occurs in classroom takes place, for the most part, without teacher or student being aware of it. The only evidence of a direct and strong connection is the relationship that may obtain between the moral character of a parent and the moral development of a child. Parent-child studies have hinted at some connection, but the evidence is still not clear. Moreover, there is no evidence that the teacher-student relationship is a proxy for the parent-child relationship in terms of moral development, and there are simply too many factors that influence moral development to assume that the relationship obtains in schools.

While it is clear that this form of the relationship is questionable on empirical grounds, there might also be theoretical grounds for doubting it. The literature on imitation and modeling, specifically the work of Bandura, suggests that certain “subprocesses” (especially attentional and motivational, in this case) influence a learner’s acquisition of modeled behavior. Thus it is certainly possible that factors or conditions related to these subprocesses—such as the level of student identification with the model or the level of student motivation—might not obtain in schools between teacher and student. A theoretical elaboration is needed to confirm this possibility, but the possibility is enough to suggest that the relationship might be nonexistent.

Thus, in this form of the relationship, if we are to judge from the empirical evidence (and perhaps the theoretical evidence), there is little or no relationship between the moral character of the teacher and the moral development of students. Good moral character on the part of the teacher is desirable, but it is not known what effect, if any, it might have on the moral development of students. If teachers do have an impact on
the moral development of students, this form of the relationship holds that such an influence is attributable to other factors (and not the moral character of the teacher). A teacher might be able to “teach” virtue, but a student does not merely “pick up” virtue by being around a teacher. There is simply no evidence that such a relationship obtains in schools.

SUMMARY

In the preceding analysis, I argued that the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student takes on multiple forms. These possible forms highlight some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the relationship. The first form maintains a basic, almost causal, relationship between the moral character of the teacher and the moral development of the student. Who the student becomes (morally) is directly connected to who the teacher is (morally). What is engraved on the teacher is subsequently acquired by the student—what is engraved on the teacher “rubs off” on or is “picked-up” by the student.

The second form establishes a much more elaborate relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Who the student becomes (morally) is only indirectly connected to who the teacher is (morally). There are intervening factors in the relationship that influence what is acquired by the student: what is engraved on a teacher is not necessarily what is conveyed by the teacher, and both may be different than what is interpreted by the student and what is ultimately acquired. The relationship itself is subject to a complex “information game” between teacher and student that contributes to its elaborate nature.

The third form dispels the notion of any relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Who a teacher is (morally) has no necessary effect on who a student becomes (morally). Students will develop certain character traits and dispositions regardless of the moral character of their teachers, and while teachers may influence the acquisition of these traits via certain means of fostering moral development, the acquisition is in no way contingent on whether the teachers possess these traits. What is engraved (morally) on a teacher may or may not be connected to what is taught (morally).

These forms describe the possibility of a basic, elaborate, or nonexistent relationship, suggesting that the relationship itself is indeterminate at best. Thus, while this analysis has shown that each of these forms a relationship might take is seemingly quite reasonable and sensible, it has also shown that none of these forms provides a definitive claim that a
relationship does or does not obtain between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Future research on moral education must take account of these ambiguities and inconsistencies if it is to deal adequately with the complexity of the issues.

APPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF TEACHING AND LEARNING

To apply the analysis in this article to the study of teaching and learning, I re-examine extant scholarship that represents three different types of scholarly inquiry. The first of these comes from the domain of educational research, another from the domain of educational theory, and the last from the domain of educational practice. From a research perspective, I consider Philip Jackson, Robert Boostrom, and David Hansen’s ethnographic study, *The Moral Life of Schools*. From a theoretical perspective, I explore Nel Noddings’s philosophical analysis of moral education based on an ethic of care. And, from a practical perspective, I examine Kevin Ryan and Karen Bohlin’s argument for character education programs and curriculum.

While these scholars certainly do not represent all the work undertaken from their respective perspectives, they are all recognized as exemplary contributors of scholarly work on the moral dimensions of teaching, moral development, and moral education. My selection of scholarship in each of these categories is based on the degree to which I think the particular work illuminates important issues that pertain to the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student, and points to applications that this article might have for the study of moral education and moral development. To discuss these applications, I begin with the scholarly inquiry of Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen, followed by Noddings, and then Ryan and Bohlin. In each section, I describe the assertions of the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student, and then I examine the grounds for these assertions and their strength in relation to the analysis provided in the previous section of this article.

A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE: JACKSON, BOOSTROM, AND HANSEN

The applications of this analysis to research on moral education and moral development focus primarily on the attention (or relative inattention) given to *students*. Claims of a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student often emphasize the moral impact of a teacher (what is engraved and what is
conveyed) without systematically studying students (what is interpreted and what is acquired). In other words, much of the research that assumes a relationship focuses primarily on the moral character of a teacher, without corresponding consideration to the moral development of students. These studies explore the ways that teachers express and model moral character and then assume, perhaps intuitively, that it has an influence on the moral development of students.

For example, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen, in their ethnographic study of moral life in schools, contend that the ever-present morality in classroom practice has an effect on the moral development of students. They set out to “investigate the ways in which moral considerations permeate the everyday life of schools and classrooms.” They looked at all aspects of schools and classrooms and identified eight categories of moral influence—five “intentional” and three “unintentional.” The intentional categories are “deliberate attempts to promote moral instruction and to encourage moral behavior,” while the unintentional categories “consist of activities that embody the moral.” Again, of particular interest to the inquiry in this article are the unintentional ways that teachers foster moral development, specifically the category that Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen label “expressive morality within the classroom.” This category includes “almost everything a teacher says and does,” such as standing at the door of the classroom and welcoming each student—expressing a sense of care and kindness.

Instead of moral curriculum and instruction, these unintentional categories rely primarily on the “personal qualities of teachers that—sometimes unintentionally—embody a moral outlook or stance.” These personal qualities are made visible to students in what Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen describe as “vaporlike emanations of character.” And they argue, citing Emerson, that “we pass for what we are. Character teaches above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice only by their overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment.” As grounds for this assertion, they cite their extended observations and study of classrooms. They also admit that it is difficult to see an expression of character and that any attempt to describe it to others is even more arduous because these expressions are always embedded in the teacher and in the classroom experience. Thus, they argue that “to appreciate fully the basis of that judgment one would have to have been there.”

In terms of moral influence in the classroom, these researchers maintain that these personal qualities of teachers are consequently picked up by students via, for example, “expressive morality in the classroom.” In other words, teachers give off these “vapor like emanations of character,”
which are in turn observed by students and assumedly incorporated. Thus, as they put it, these unintentional categories “help us to see how morals might be ‘caught, not taught’ as the old adage says.”30 The basis for this argument, despite its reliance on an old adage, is not explicitly clear. While it can be assumed that students observed these expressions in much the same way that the researchers did, how exactly students “catch” these expressions and incorporate them is not revealed in their study.

While they do not offer evidence for students picking up the virtues, they do assert that this set of unintentional categories—including expressions of morality—has the greatest moral impact on students. They argue that these categories are of more consequence than deliberate attempts at moral instruction because their influence is always present in the classroom:

We believe that the unintentional outcomes of schooling, the ones teachers and administrators seldom plan in advance, are of greater moral significance—that is, more likely to have enduring effects—than those that are intended and consciously sought. . . One of our chief reasons for doing so, which should be fairly clear by now, is that many of the unintended influences are in operation all or most of the time, whereas the intended ones are more episodic and self-contained.31

Put another way, a teacher’s moral character is more influential in terms of a student’s moral development because a teacher’s moral character is always visible.

To summarize, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen make the following assertions: (a) personal qualities of teachers embody and express a moral position; (b) students pick up or “catch” these qualities by being around teachers for a sustained period of time; and (c) emanations of personal character traits have much greater influence than any attempt at direct moral instruction. As grounds for the first assertion, they cite their observations in classrooms. For the second assertion, they refer to the old adage that “morals are caught, not taught.” And for the third assertion, they reason that a constant (or almost constant) unintended influence has more impact than one that is direct and occasional.

These assertions, particularly the grounds on which they are made, appeal to our intuitive sense of how moral development occurs in the young. However, it is difficult to determine the strength of these claims (in relation to the evidence provided) because of the ambiguities and complexities associated with the relationship in question. The first asser-
tion that they make—that teachers unintentionally express moral messages to their students—is certainly their strongest. In fact, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen convincingly describe a variety of ways that this takes place in a classroom setting, and they base these descriptions on three years’ worth of observations, interviews, and analyses of individual schools. That said, even the researchers admit that a complete understanding of this claim would require a person to observe alongside them in the same classroom. This admission suggests the complexity involved in the moral information game between teacher and student, and it points out that picking up on moral cues in the classroom requires astute observation on the part of the student. In other words, “what is interpreted” by a student (or, in this case, an observer) may be different than “what is conveyed” by a teacher, and it may also differ from student to student in the same classroom.

Furthermore, to also assume that these expressions of morality have an impact on the moral development of students (their second assertion) would likely require more than observation and would certainly entail a systematic study of students. While Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen might correctly assume that students in their study noticed their teachers’ expressions of morality (though probably not to the extent that the researchers did), this article has shown that it cannot be assumed that the students properly interpreted and then consequently “caught” or acquired the expressed traits. Of course, even if the evidence and intuitive grounds for their claims are questionable, it is unreasonable to criticize them because it is certainly not clear what would constitute such evidence (and because their study focused primarily on the morality conveyed by a teacher). Presumably, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen are purposefully vague in their descriptions of students’ moral development because of its complexity and the difficulty of controlling for all the possible variables that might influence it.

For example, in ancillary work from the same study, Hansen is very careful to point out that a teacher’s moral influence on students is, at best, only possible and perhaps indeterminate “in any direct or easily measurable sense.” He also contends that observing a teacher’s moral behavior does “not imply that the students are learning moral dispositions directly from their teachers. [However], students’ awareness of the subtleties of many of their teachers’ habitual actions may in itself make it possible for those actions to have influence on them.” Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen do not hedge their findings in this way, but it can be inferred that they recognized this difficulty in their study.

The third claim—that the unintentional ways of fostering moral development are the most influential—is the most basic of the three assertions
but may also be the most problematic. Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen describe in detail the moral life of the schools that participated in their study, but they do not attempt to measure the effects or consequences that this “moral life” has on students. Their assertion is based on the assumption that influence is correlated to how often the intentional or unintentional ways are in operation or employed in classroom.

However, while the unintended influences may be “in operation all or most of the time,”34 it seems reasonable to suggest that other more intentional ways of fostering moral development (such as interjecting moral commentary into a class discussion) may have just as much influence on the moral development of students as expressing morality in the classroom (an unintentional way). For example, a teacher who repeatedly comments on the importance of achieving social justice may perhaps have as much of a moral impact as a teacher who expresses care for students by greeting them each day as they walk in the door. Determining which teacher in this example has more influence on moral development is not important. The question is, “How would we know?” And in this case, it becomes evident that deciding which activity is more influential does not appear to be a question that can be answered without more focused attention on students and a research design that accounts for the complexity of moral development.

In conclusion, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen rightly assert that these ways of fostering moral development—both intentional and unintentional—have the potential to have an impact on the moral development of students. However, to make claims of particular influence (or that some ways are more influential than others) would likely require a more systematic study of students that mirrored their detailed and insightful analysis of teachers. While their study certainly attended to the students in these classrooms,35 their primary focus appeared to be teachers. This critique is not meant to discount the situational and qualitative nature of their ethnographic approach. It merely suggests, as this article has shown, that specific attention to students would be necessary to establish a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: NODDINGS

The applications of this analysis for theories of moral education and moral development focus primarily on the purportedly unintentional, unselfconscious, and/or indirect ways that teachers foster the moral development of their students. Similar to empirical claims that a teacher’s influence is most powerful when unintended (see the above description...
of Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen), it is commonly asserted in theory that a teacher’s moral character has the most impact when unconscious or indirectly manifested. In other words, it is believed that a strong relationship obtains between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student when a teacher conveys morality unconsciously, unintentionally, or indirectly.

For example, recall that Noddings advocates an approach to moral education based on an ethic of care and on four major components of moral education: modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. She is careful to distinguish her approach from character education programs in that her approach is relational, based on a “caring relation” and involving both a “carer” (or “one-caring”) and a “cared-for.” And these relational terms are integral to her conception of how moral development and moral education occur. Noddings emphasizes that a caring relation involves two people:

A caring relation is, in its most basic form, a connection or encounter between two human beings—a carer and a recipient of care, or cared-for. In order for the relation to be properly called caring, both parties must contribute to it in characteristic ways. A failure on the part of either carer or cared-for blocks completion of caring and, although there may still be a relation—that is, an encounter or connection in which each party feels something toward the other—it is not a caring relation.

Noddings argues that the carer (or one-caring) is characterized by “engrossment” and “motivational displacement.” In other words, the carer is fully “attentive” and receptive to the cared-for and also “feels the desire to help the stranger in his need.”

However, this way of being has no impact on the cared-for unless it is “received.” Thus, Noddings contends that the cared-for is characterized by “reception,” “recognition,” and “response.” In other words, “the cared-for receives the caring and shows that it has been received.” Based on this notion of a caring relation, derived from an ethic of care, Noddings asserts a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.

Thus, the relationship that obtains between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student in Noddings’s work rests firmly on the concept of modeling. Noddings believes that “children who are properly cared for by people who genuinely model social and ethical virtues are likely to develop those virtues themselves.” These virtues are developed in students via caring relations. Noddings explains that
“caring relations come first, and it is thought that the virtues develop almost naturally out of these relations.”

As grounds for this assertion, Noddings draws on an ethic of care. She describes how “a sense that ‘I must’ do something arises when others address us.” Sometimes this “I must” arises out of a natural disposition, such as love for a sibling. When the inclination is not there, we fall back on what Noddings describes as “ethical caring,” in which we “draw upon an ethical ideal—a set of memories of caring and being cared for that we regard as manifestations of our best selves and relations.” In both instances, the role of the carer is of particular importance, and an ethic of care gives preference to natural caring. For example, Noddings also asserts that modeling a caring relation (the first component of moral education) should not be a self-conscious act. She states that “we present the best possible model when we care unselfconsciously, as a way of being in the world.” She warns that self-conscious or intentional caring results in a shift of attention away from the cared-for. In such instances, the carer actually moves away from caring.

To summarize, Noddings makes at least three assertions that pertain to the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student: (a) children develop a caring disposition by being around people who model caring dispositions; (b) the caring relation is the most important component of developing virtue in the young—when the caring relation is in place, virtues develop naturally; and (c) the best, most effective model of caring is one that is not self-conscious or intentional. As grounds for the first two assertions, she relies on an ethic of care, which holds that we have a natural disposition to care when others address us in need. This disposition is developed by being cared for and by observing one caring (in this instance, a teacher). The third assertion is also grounded in an ethic of care and the contention that intentional or self-conscious caring tends to move the carer away from anything we might call caring.

Given her philosophical orientation, it would be unfair to determine the strength of Noddings’s claims on anything other than clarity of concept, and certainly, care theory has proved to be robust and one of the most important contributions to the field of moral education in recent years. That said, her assertions also highlight important applications of the analysis in this article for future research and practice in the field. For example, the task that might present the most difficulty in future research is determining how the unselfconscious model of caring has more influence than the self-conscious model. Again, Noddings contends that intentional and conscious caring removes the carer from the caring relation; caring is only caring if done unselfconsciously.
However, given the analysis in this article, it is not apparent why the unselfconscious or unintentional display of caring or morality is more influential. As Goffman makes clear, there is great nuance involved in the information game that takes place between two persons, and the actor (or teacher) is always capable of “controlling the control.” Put another way, it certainly seems possible for the carer to control the control and “give off” unselfconscious caring to the cared-for. Moreover, Noddings, like Goffman, assumes that asymmetry always prevails in the caring relation—that the cared-for can uncover the intentions of the carer despite any attempt by the carer to “control the control.” This claim has merit in Goffman’s studies of adult interaction rituals, but it is certainly not evident in cases of teacher-student interaction—particularly in the early grades. In other words, a young student’s capacity to employ “uncovering moves” seems less developed than an experienced teacher’s capacity to employ “counter-uncovering moves” in the information game (or caring relation) that takes place between the two in a classroom setting.

In the end, it may be that what sounds good conceptually may be difficult to examine and demonstrate in research and practice. Thus, further investigation and delineation of the unselfconscious, unintentional, indirect ways that a teacher fosters moral development becomes an important application of this article for the philosophical study of the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.

A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE: RYAN AND BOHLIN

The applications of the analysis in this article for the practical study of moral education and moral development focus on claims that rely, perhaps too heavily, on modeling. Recall that Ryan and Bohlin are strong advocates for character education. They emphasize direct instruction and the inculcation of core virtues. They contend that there are commonly agreed-upon virtues such as respect, responsibility, and integrity and that teachers should promote them in their classrooms via a variety of methods. They also place great emphasis on the role that the teacher/adult plays in the process of moral development. They argue that good character is developed by knowing the good, loving the good, and doing the good, requiring support and help from adult/teacher examples. They state that “becoming a . . . person of character is a developmental process. It takes knowledge. It takes practice. It takes support, example (both good and bad), encouragement, and sometimes inspiration.”

Despite an obvious fondness for direct instruction in the virtues, Ryan
and Bohlin hold that a teacher’s example is the most influential means of moral education. They like to say that virtues are caught and taught. For instance, Ryan and Bohlin list six Es that “can help educators remember how to promote moral development within each student.” The first E stands for Example. They argue that students judge their teachers’ character and that “ultimately, it is the person, not the teacher, who makes a lasting impression on his or her students. . . . The examples provided by parents, teachers, and all the adults who are closest to children are the most powerful moral educators.” As grounds for this claim, they cite Robert Coles, who states, “The child is an ever-attentive witness of grown-up morality—or lack thereof; the child looks and looks for cues as to how one ought to behave, and finds them galore as we as teachers and parents go about our lives.” They also list generic examples of teachers who left just such an impression, such as the teacher who consoled a student in a moment of sadness. This lasting impression is a moral one—an indelible mark on the student that contributes to moral development.

Ryan and Bohlin go on to explain that direct instruction does not leave an impression unless the teacher is an example of those virtues in deed as well as in word. In other words, they assert that for teachers to effectively engage in the direct instruction of virtue, their moral character must be expressive of those desired traits and dispositions. Ryan and Bohlin argue that students do not “believe” the moral instruction offered by teachers unless they “see” it in their actions. Playing off an old adage, they ground this assertion by stating that “individual actions speak louder than words; it’s our deeds that really give witness to what’s most worthwhile. These are what compose our most powerful lessons in character.”

A final assertion that Ryan and Bohlin make concerning the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student is that one’s true character is always revealed, despite any attempt one might make at disguising it. They state that “when we spend time with people, their integrity and character are revealed to us, and often these are quite contrary to what they would like us to think.” And they argue, citing St. Exupery’s Little Prince, that “what is essential is often invisible to the eye, but it eventually becomes evident to the heart.” In other words, we can see right through people and false appearances—unearthing their true character.

Thus, Ryan and Bohlin make three claims about modeling that pertain to the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student: (a) “It is the person, not the teacher, who makes a lasting impression on students. . . . Examples . . . are the most powerful moral educators”; (b) direct instruction is only effective if a teacher practices what he or she preaches; and (c) one’s true charac-
ter is always revealed, despite any attempt one might make at disguising it. As grounds for the first assertion, Ryan and Bohlin cite Robert Coles, who argues that children look to adults for moral cues. For the second assertion, they rely on the old adage that says, “seeing is believing.” And for the third assertion, they cite St. Exupery and argue that when we spend time with people, we tend to unearth their integrity and character—what is essential becomes visible.

The analysis in this article details certain complexities that make it difficult to determine the strength of Ryan and Bohlin’s claims. For example, their assertion that students do not believe the moral instruction offered by teachers unless they see it in the teacher’s actions relies on a time-honored adage (“seeing is believing”), but it may or may not be relevant to the impact that the moral character of teachers has on the moral development of students. The analysis in this article suggests that it is not clear how good a teacher needs to be in order to convey good moral character, and it also raises the possibility that a teacher of poor moral character could foster the moral development of children in good, healthy, and positive ways. In other words, is it possible that a teacher could disguise destructive character traits and dispositions, and at the same time express traits in the classroom that students could emulate? Or, as Ryan and Bohlin (along with Robert Coles) contend, would students see right through this charade?

We can already answer these questions at some basic level without engaging in some type of research project or examination of practice. As the analysis in this article attests, it is not difficult to picture a teacher who says one thing in a classroom but does another. It is also easy to imagine that many teachers possess unhealthy character traits that they would rather not bring with them into the classroom. Moreover, it is also easy to conceive of teachers who could conceal these undesirable traits from students. In other words, it seems somewhat implausible to expect students to “see right through” teachers and be able to identify teachers’ less than admirable dispositions. Even accepting that children only, as Ryan and Bohlin put it, “believe what they see,” it seems possible that teachers would be able to disguise a vice and act in a way that makes students believe that they possess the corresponding virtue instead.

Most important, this action or expression on the part of the teacher does not necessarily need to be deceptive; as Goffman suggests, we all portray an idealized moral view of ourselves, especially in professions (such as teaching) that require a certain pose. Instead, it can be an act of good faith on the teacher’s part, with the hope that her students might “pick up” these desirable traits. In the end, the analysis in this article has shown that it is difficult to determine just how good a teacher needs to
be, and Ryan and Bohlin’s claim that students only pick up traits that teachers embody would, again, require supporting evidence that accounts for the complexities of moral development and controls for the possible intervening variables. Thus, the final application of this article for the practice of moral education and moral development is that there might be an overreliance on the concept and practice of modeling.

CONCLUSIONS

This article has suggested three possible forms that a relationship might take between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Given these three quite reasonable and possible forms—basic, elaborate, and nonexistent—the relationship itself is indeterminate at best because none of the forms is necessarily definitive. What implications might a claim of indeterminacy have for the field of moral education and moral development? Is the moral character of a teacher not relevant to an understanding of the development of moral and intellectual virtue in students? In light of the centuries of philosophical work on moral education and moral development, it would be imprudent to answer the preceding question in the affirmative. Surely the expression of moral character is integral to explaining how virtue is or is not acquired in the young—even when empirical evidence is brought to bear. That such an explanation or claim is so pervasive in the historical and philosophical literature on moral education speaks to the intuitive desire of people to acknowledge the moral models who shaped their moral development.

In an effort to further examine claims of a relationship, this article examines the extant literature and suggests three important applications for the study of teaching and learning. First, it recommends that more specific attention to students would be necessary to establish a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Second, it signals a need for increased conceptual analysis of the unselfconscious, unintentional, and indirect ways that a teacher fosters moral development. Finally, it proposes that there might be an overreliance on the concept and practice of modeling moral character in character education programs and curriculum. Together, these applications provide important future directions for empirical research, conceptual inquiry, and practical programs that bear on determining the efficacy or reality of the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.

For example, a systematic study of students might reveal how students make sense of the moral dimensions of teaching, how students interpret
their teachers’ expressions of moral character, and how students acquire their teachers’ traits. In terms of evidence and gathering data, each of these tasks is progressively more difficult. Research on moral education and moral development begs for student reports and commentaries that would aid in understanding the complexities of the relationship in question (as well as the moral dimensions of teaching and learning writ large), and it would be relatively simple to insert more of these voices into the current scholarship. These student reports and commentaries would offer corroboration to researchers’ observations, provide examples of students’ moral awareness, and detail the ways in which students ascribe moral meaning to the role of the teacher.

However, it is less clear what might count as sufficient evidence for determining whether students acquire their teachers’ traits of moral character. The research scientist might be able to offer perspective on providing evidence of a relationship, but the analysis in this article shows that any expectation of establishing a relationship with scientific evidence and measurement tools might not be appropriate or feasible. Thus the analysis in this article merely suggests that further study of students is necessary to place the relationship in greater relief (furthering our understanding of its inherent complexities); it does not imply that such research will be sufficient for establishing a relationship.

That said, the limitations of scientific inquiry only give rise to additional prior philosophical questions that merit reflection and further study. These questions might include (a) why teachers should be of good moral character, (b) how morally good teachers need to be, and (c) what effects teachers of poor moral character might have on students. For example, in light of the analysis in this article, it might be fruitful to examine reasons for wanting teachers of good moral character that extend beyond the moral development (and/or the safety) of students and point instead to pedagogical reasons that might enhance student learning and achievement. In addition, the analysis in this article certainly has implications for determining how morally good a teacher needs to be and suggests that a teacher might be able to adopt a moral persona in the classroom that is not a reflection of “engraved” moral character (leaving open the possibility of just how good a teacher needs to be outside the classroom). And finally, the preceding analysis considers only good moral character. However, it might be that considering the possible effects of poor moral character on students would place the relationship in even greater relief, because common sense likely holds that we would want to avoid teachers of poor moral character regardless of the possible forms that a relationship might take.

Thus, this analysis suggests that there are reasonable theoretical and
empirical grounds for doubting that there is a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student, and it maintains that it might not be possible to determine how or whether a relationship obtains (especially in the context of schooling). It also acknowledges the relationship’s intuitive appeal and holds that it would be unreasonable to dismiss claims of a relationship as unscientific; the notion of a relationship is simply too entrenched in the way we understand the process of moral development. In the end, it might be that virtue is acquired in some other way (besides teaching or practice), but further study is needed to examine the complexities of our vague intuitions.

Notes

1. My analysis rests on the following assumptions: (a) moral character is a developed feature of what a teacher is and does—what she already has, as opposed to what she is coming into, and (b) moral development refers to what happens to a student, what a student is becoming in a moral sense.

2. In this article, the term “moral” is used normatively to refer to that which is morally good or right. As the roots of the relationship in question typically lie within the Aristotelian tradition, the term “moral” will often designate the use of trait language, such that “moral character” or “moral development” will connote the possession or development of certain moral traits or dispositions (e.g., honesty, responsibility, fairness, kindness, compassion, and so on).


8. Ibid., 135.


12. Ibid., 5.
15. Ibid., 7.
16. Ibid., 8.
19. Ibid., 52.
25. Solomon, Watson, and Battistich, “Teaching and Schooling Effects.” In their review of research, the authors describe various studies that suggest possible effects of teacher modeling on student moral development. They suggest that “there is some evidence that students imitate their teachers’ prosocial behavior under certain conditions,” and they cite three studies of the effects of teacher behavior (specifically related to classroom climate) on students’ intergroup interaction (581–82). However, the authors point out that studies examining moral outcome variables are “small in number” and that “much less research has been conducted on the effects of specific patterns of teacher behavior on pro-social-moral outcomes for students” (582).
27. The “intentional ways” are (1) moral instruction as a formal part of the curriculum, (2) moral instruction within the regular curriculum, (3) rituals and ceremonies, (4) visual displays with moral content, and (5) spontaneous interjections or moral commentary into ongoing activity. The “unintentional ways” are (6) classroom rules and regulations, (7) the morality of curricular substructure, and (8) expressive morality within the classroom (ibid., 42).
28. Ibid., 3, 4.
29. Ibid., 11, 34, 34, 35.
30. Ibid., 11.
31. Ibid., 43–44, emphasis in original.
33. Ibid., 418, emphasis added.
35. See Hansen, “The Moral Importance of a Teacher’s Style” and “From Role to Person.”
38. See Noddings, *Caring*.
40. Ibid., 16.
42. Ibid., 16.
43. Ibid., 13.
44. Ibid., 16.
46. Ibid., 141.
47. The “Es” are in order: Example, Explanation, Ethos, Experience, Exhortation, and Expectations (Ibid., 141–148).
48. Ibid., 142.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 240.
51. Ibid., 8.
52. Ibid., 142.

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